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Foreword

TheWar

International

Law

Studies "Blue

Book"

series

was

initiated

by the Naval

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute

volume of

to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eightieth

the series, contains edited proceedings of a colloquium entitled Current Issues in
International Law

and Military Operations hosted here

June 25-27, 2003.

at

the Naval

War College on

'

The colloquium's mission was to examine the latest developments in international law, drawing on issues from then ongoing military operations. In doing so, the colloquium participants focused on the applicability and operation
of the law of occupation, the perspective of military judge advocates
tegic, operational,

and tactical levels

armed

in

at the stra-

Operation Iraqi Freedom, maritime op-

and military operations other than war,
including navigational freedoms in international waters and airspace, the increasingly complex considerations of combatant status and coalition operaerations issues in

tions,

flict

and information operations, and
the interpretation and application of the law of armed con-

developments

challenges faced in
in current

Renowned

conflict

in the laws of targeting

and future

conflicts.

international scholars and practitioners, both military and civil-

ian, representing

government and academic

institutions

from throughout the

world participated in the colloquium, which was co-sponsored by the Strategic
Studies Institute of the United States

Armv War

College

at Carlisle

Barracks;

Yearbook on Human Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel; the United States Coast
Guard Academy; the Francis Lieber Society of the American Society of International Law; the Judge Advocate General of the Navy; the Naval War College
Foundation; the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of

the Israeli

and the International Law
Naval Warfare Studies, United States Naval War

Salve Regina University, Newport,

Department of the Center
College.

for

Rhode

Island;

On

behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

Commandant

of the Marine Corps,

ing authors our thanks
ject

and

and gratitude

I

extend to

all

the co-sponsors

and contribut-

for their invaluable contributions to this pro-

to the future understanding of the laws of war.

J.

L.

SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War

College

Introduction

Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the United States and her coalition partners conducted military operations for the express purpose of removing

Saddam Hussein from power
in

both theorv and

more than

practice.

in Iraq, implicated a host of international

Many

of those issues are

still

law issues,

being debated today,

3 years later.

Was Operation Iraqi Freedom undertaken consistent with

norms on

the use of force? Are tarsetins: norms, as traditionally un-

international

der stood, adequate in the age of precision strategic strike capability and/or against

an enemy

who

intentionally

fails

to distinguish himself

from

civilians?

Or who

Or who purHow do States reconcile com-

purposefully uses protected places from which to launch attacks?
posely attacks protected persons, places and objects?
peting views of what the law of war

is,

or requires, or forbids, in dealing with

captured foes? Discussing and debating these questions, and others raised by characteristics

of the conflict with "rogue" nations and international terrorists, was the

purpose of the colloquium that
Studies ("Blue

Book"

I

series,

In June, 2003, the Naval

this

book. Volume 80 of the International

Law

memorializes.

War College conducted a symposium entitled

Current

Law and Military Operations. The colloquium, organized by
the International Law Departments Commander Don Rose, US Coast Guard, was
made possible with the support of the Strategic Studies Institute of the United
States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks; the Israel Yearbook on Human

Issues in International

Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel; the

United

States

Coast Guard Academy; the Francis Lieber

Society of the .American Society of International Law; the Judge Advocate General

of the Navy; the Naval
tional Relations

land.

War

College Foundation; and the Pell Center for Interna-

and Public Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode

Without the support and

Is-

assistance of these organizations, the colloquium

would not have been the success that it was. Their support is greatly appreciated.
Two members oi the International Law Department served as primary editors
of this volume. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Friend, JA, L*S Army,
editorial

work on

this

volume

until the exigencies of

initially

performed

war intruded and he was

transferred, prior to his

normal rotation

date, to Kuwait.

Major Richard Jaques, US

Marine Corps, eventually assumed these duties and carried them through
ition.

to fru-

Their dedication and perseverance are responsible for the production and

completion of this excellent addition to the "Blue Book"

series.

A special thank you is necessary to Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, former President of the Naval War College for his leadership and support in the planning and
conduct of the colloquium.

The "Blue Book"

series

and libraries.

Operations (2003) to

vided

at the

a fitting

published by the Naval

US and

War

College and distributed

commands, academic instituThis volume, entitled Issues in International Law and Military

throughout the world to
tions,

is

more

foreign military

accurately reflect the fact that the perspectives pro-

colloquium depicted events

and necessary addition

veloping consensus on

as

known and perceived at the time,

is

to the series as nations continue to wrestle with de-

how to best deal with groups and tyrants whose willful bel-

ligerence pose unacceptable threats to international peace

and

security.

MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
DENNIS

L.

International

xn

Law Department

Preface

should be no surprise that, coming as did in June 2003, a colloquium that
Itfocused
on "current" issues in international law and military operations
it

would by necessity devote most of its time

to the issues

and challenges raised by

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the then nascent occupation of Iraq, and the developing efforts to apply long established maritime rules and principles based on, and

designed to respect, State sovereignty, against a Stateless belligerent.

be surprising (or perhaps sadly ironic)

and arguments

yses, positions,

for

is

What may

how current the issues, challenges, anal-

and against various interpretations and/or ap-

plications of international law to military operations voiced in 2003

today. This suggests that despite the passage of three years,
nature, scope

and degree of the threat

faced,

little

remain

consensus on the

and the appropriate responses

thereto, has yet developed.

Readers unfamiliar with the International Law Studies ("Blue Book")

wonder why
2003

is

a

work that

largely captures the proceedings of a

only now, in 2006, rinding

its

way to

print.

series

may

colloquium held in

Long-time supporters and con-

who have patiently anticipated publication for some time (especially
those who participated in the colloquium) may well wonder why this volume does
tributors

not serve, as previous volumes have, to

ments and audience discussion or

fully capture all speaker

reflect the

and panelist com-

order in which those

comments and

To both groups of readers an explanation is warranted, if for
no other reason than to ensure that those deserving of credit in making this book a
discussions occurred.

reality receive their due.

For reasons of detail that are unnecessary here, most of the record of this collo-

quium was not

available to the editors of this publication.

problem was the

fact that the first

Compounding

this

two assigned editors found their tenure in the In-

Law Department cut short or interrupted by the exigencies of war. In
significant portions, this work largely reflects an effort starting some 18 months af-

ternational

ter the event to recreate the

colloquium and capture key portions of it.

Books" that serve as

Typically, "Blue

a record of colloquium

proceedings will

reflect the

order in which the panel discussions occurred. In this case, however,

because

was impossible

it

to recreate the "give

other and with the audience, and because not

most

the book, the

logical

and take" of panelists with each

all

the panels could be included in

arrangement was to group

within the major

articles

and legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the tactical and operational challenges in air and land warfare, the wide
variety of issues affecting operations in the maritime domain, and the question
of how the law of armed conflict needs to develop to adequately address current
subject areas addressed (the legality

and anticipated challenges) as reflected in the Table of Contents. Articles in
which the author refers specifically to another article are grouped within the
same major category.
I

also decided to

eschew the past practice of attempting,

marize the key points of each

sum-

around a central theme or themes. The choice

article

of articles and organization of the book

itself essentially reflect

my perspective on

and themes. Moreover, readers will find it of much more value to de-

the key points

cide for themselves

only suggestion

I

what arguments and positions

set forth

herein have merit.

making those assessments

offer the reader in

whatever the law of armed conflict was in the
it is

in this Preface, to

past,

is

is

to

The

remember that

today, or will be in the future,

not merely a subject for a panel discussion or an academic debate or an intellec-

tual position.

As with

For those affected by

all

works such

it, it is

as this, a

a matter of life or death.

number of individuals were involved

in the

publication process. Thanks must go to Lieutenant Colonel Jim Friend, JA,

US

Army, the first editor, who initiated this effort. A special note of thanks is due to
Mr. Matthew Cotnoir in the Naval War College's Desktop Publishing office. He
served as the "point
tirelessly

edits

man"

in converting draft after draft into publishable form,

and patiently enduring numerous

without complaint. Thanks must also go to the contributors to

long after the

fact, for their great

Heinegg and Colonel Charles H.

B.

is

owed

to Professor

on

for their

life itself),

Finally,

last

three

Wolff Heintschel von

Garraway, CBE, British

whom served as the Naval War College's Charles H.
national Law during my tenure, and both of whom
ume,

this

patience and understanding over the

years. In particular, a debt of thanks

and revolume

rewrites, reconfigurations,

Army

(Ret.),

both of

Stockton Professor of Interare contributors to this vol-

knowledge, expertise, perspective on law (and, more importantly,

and comradeship.

two individuals,

for

both of whom the "Blue Books" are

deserve the lion share of the credit for ensuring that this

a labor

work has come to

of love,

fruition.

Simply put, without the leadership arid vision of Professor Emeritus Jack

Grunawalt and the painstaking detailed editing and review of Captain Ralph

xiv

Thomas, JAGC, US Navy
project, Volume 80 would

(Ret.),
still

both of whom devoted countless hours to

this

be barely a work in progress. Even more, they have

served as mentors, teachers, advisors, confidants, leaders, and friends to the under-

signed in more ways than can be expressed.

By all rights, theirs should be the names
printed on the binding of this volume. For everything that is good about this book,
the credit is theirs. For everything that is not, the blame is mine.

RICHARD B. JAQUES
Major,

xv

US Marine Corps

PARTI
JUS

AD BELLUM: IRAQ

I

Iraq's

Transformation and International Law

Ruth Wedgwood

There

is

a great delight in returning to the

Newport

as a

1

US Naval War College. My time in

Stockton Professor of International

Law was wonderful

in-

deed. But few of us at the War College in the academic term of 1998-99 could fore-

momentous events of the next five years. No one foretold al Qaeda's attacks
of September 11, 2001. And we could not know that the United States and the
United Kingdom, alongside their allies, would commit their fortune and fate to insee the

tervene again in Iraq, this time to defeat Saddam's Baathist regime. But trouble was

brewing, even in 1998. At the time,
tions

weapons

inspectors,

Operation Desert Fox.
lic

square

Iraq's

and the

Saddam limited and then excluded United Naallies

conducted a limited military campaign in

A broad debate on the use of force began to reenter the pub-

—-when and on what authority military force could be used to compel

compliance with post-Gulf War disarmament obligations.

In the immediate

moment, we

are in the midst of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Faced with Saddam Hussein's continued intransigence in accounting for his weapons programs, in March 2003 the United States and

its

coalition forces

mounted

a

fast-moving ground campaign against the Baathist regime, and quickly reached

Baghdad. Public conversation has again focused on important issues of international law, including standards for the use of force, the role of the Security Council,

the methods of enforcing disarmament obligations, and the claims of humanitarian intervention. 2 But

I

will concentrate here

governing occupation and reconstruction.

on the practical problems and the law

and International Law

Iraq's Transformation

Our

panel today

is

graced by

its

commentators. Professor Thomas Franck

profound scholar on whose foundational work

all

of us have

Rostow has a twenty- five-year career of dedicated public
the legal adviser to the National Security Council

Mission to the United Nations.

and not the
Let

and the Middle

gone.

is

Nicholas

service, including

work as

as general counsel to the

US

should be providing comments on their views,

I

me start with a speculation on the more general

Hussein

a

reverse.

conflict for Iraq

East. It

restored to power.

critics

Saddam

of the war have suggested that

No one argues that the Baathist dictatorship

reflected the free will of the Iraqi people.

and the

implications of the current

a cause for celebration to see that

is

Not even the most vocal

Saddam should be
leader,

and

built. Dr.

is

Saddam Hussein was

a callow

and

cruel

toppled an authoritarian regime of unremitting

allied intervention

Saddam used chemical weapons to attack Iraq's Kurdish villages. He attempted to destroy the Marsh Shia. He was ruthless in suppressing political oppoharshness.

nents.

Among

the supporters of Iraqi sovereignty,

no one can confuse Saddam's

regime with the claims of democracy.

The end of Iraq's Baathist regime may advance the Middle East peace process.
The roadmap process for Palestinian-Israeli peace still has only a limited chance of
success.

But Iraq's threatening stance towards

and the end of an aggressive regime
rity space.

The

in Iraq

Israel

had obvious consequences,

may change how Israel regards its secu-

Baathists supported terrorist attacks against Israel, through financ-

ing and perhaps through training. In the

Scud missile attacks against

first

Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched

civilian centers in Israel,

hoping to create

The elimination of an unpredictable and looming threat to the
facilitate crucial Israeli concessions on the West Bank.
After September

1 1, it is

a

wider war.

eastern border

may

unacceptable for any country to provide financing or

physical sanctuary to international terrorist groups. This includes any insurgent

group seeking to attack

civilians as targets.

The Security Council has endorsed new

standards for State responsibility, forbidding any and
3

terror groups in Resolution 1373. Iraq's financial

ism contributed to the spoliation of Middle East

all

assistance to international

and material support

politics,

for terror-

and removal of that threat

may produce salutary results for the region as a whole.
One hopes that the intervention in Iraq will affect other countries

also

in the region

through the example of an emerging democracy. Saudi Arabia and Egypt need to
create

some space

demonstrate,

neous State

if

for popular voice

and competition

in their politics. Iraq

things go well, that there can be a secular, prosperous, heteroge-

in the region

under

a

democratic government. Support for a new and

moderate democratic State should enjoy support from both

American

may

politics.

The long-term

sides of the aisle in

goals of democracy are a realist's agenda, as well

Ruth Wedgwood

who have
been excluded from governance is one of the elements of real power. And the claim
as

an

idealist's

hope. Harnessing the energies and ambitions of people

way to preserve stability deserves to be disproved. Iraq is a resource-rich country, and maybe in a better potential position to
demonstrate that a modern democracy can work, than impoverished States such as
Afghanistan or East Timor or other economically desperate places where the
that totalitarian repression

is

the only

United Nations has intervened.

With respect to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we should recall the immediate purpose of the Iraqi intervention. At the time of the first Gulf War, Saddam had
embarked on ambitious programs

to develop nuclear weapons,

produce chemical

weapons, and manufacture biological weapons. After he invaded Kuwait, he

at-

tempted to speed up the production of a nuclear bomb. When coalition troops drove

Guard on the run, Saddam agreed to
stringent and unique conditions as part of the cease-fire. Under Security Council
Resolution 687, 4 as a condition of the ceasefire, Iraq was required to shut down its

him out of Kuwait, and had

the Republican

programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and medium-range or long-range
missiles,

and

to

do so

in a transparent way. Resolution 687 placed the

burden of

proof on Iraq to demonstrate the dismantling of these weapons programs,
the destruction of

components and precursors, and

this

burden of proof did not

change during the next decade. But to the great surprise of the
fused to account for the programs of
verifiable destruction of weapons

as well as

allies,

Baghdad

re-

WMD development, defying the demand for

components under the

UN resolution.

—

The predicate for allied intervention in 2003 was "smoking documents" not
"smoking weapons." Iraq was in the midst of active nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs at the close of the first Gulf War, and was required to show
how and when they would be abandoned. Even in the last Iraqi declaration to the
United Nations filed in December 2002, Baghdad failed to give a plausible account
of its weapons inventories and their disposition. It refused to allow weapons scientists to be interviewed outside the country. Ambassador Hans Blix opposed any
military intervention, at least at that time, but as executive director of the

Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UN

(UNMOVIC), he acknowl-

edged the unsatisfactory character of Iraq's continued game of hounds and hares.
In the world after September 11, accounting for

quired destruction

Even

is

not an optional matter.

after the retreat

Baghdad and elsewhere
the United States

and

Baathists can return to

and the

Iraqi people.

WMD inventories and their re-

of Saddam's forces, the continuing war in the streets of

in the

Sunni triangle has presented

difficult

problems for

Saddam has gambled that the
inflict damage on the allied forces

coalition forces in Iraq.

power by continuing

to

He has counted on a version of the "Somalia syndrome"

—an

Iraq's Transformation

and International Law

He looks forward to an
example of Vietnam, when we will simply with-

exhaustion of the United States' political will to continue.

imagined moment, based on the

draw, whether or not the military and security forces of a democratic Iraq are ready
to take over the fight.

opened

for

He

predicts that

we

that the field will be re-

the ongoing insurgency will be a great challenge.

It is

difficult to

new Iraqi law enforcement capability. We have had this same struggle in far

create a

more benign environments, whether

in Haiti, in Bosnia, or in

curred every time an existing authority

we

and

Sunni and Baathist hegemony.

Overcoming

that

will wither,

face the issue again.

pendent, robust, and
easy task.

It is

is

displaced, so

it

Panama.

It

has oc-

should not be surprising

To vet and stand up a police force that is suitably inde-

reliable, especially in a

country with ethnic divisions,

is

not an

crucial to have a local face as the intermediary with a large popula-

tion. Defeating

an insurgency requires information and cooperation from local

izens. Baathist retaliation against Iraqi citizens

new transition has been
defeated, information

ferocious. Yet

from

Iraqis

it is

cit-

who are seen as cooperative with the

clear that if the

about insurgent

Sunni resistance

activities will

be

is

to be

critical.

A second practical problem is the wasting and destruction of critical infrastrucThe arrival of allied forces in Baghdad was followed by a rampage. The disorder and debellation would not surprise UN veterans who saw the razing of East
Timor by paramilitaries and militias, after the UN-organized vote for independence. Part of the violence may be the reaction of a people whose political psyche
was battered by three decades of suspicion and fear. The lesson for military force
structure and capabilities seems clear. In peacekeeping, over the last 15 years, we
have discovered that even if a mandate calls for a limited peacekeeping operation,
ture.

must have

forces

on the ground.
Iraq, we see the opposite problem. In the follow-on to a robust combat op-

change too

Now,

in

a robust capacity for peace enforcement. Security environments

fast,

and can render under-equipped

forces helpless

eration one needs a strong police capacity, with troops trained in security operations, arrest,

and the responsible processing of prisoners.

It

to confine the functions of military police to the reserve

armed

forces.

This capability

such situations

We

also

whether

in

may

be needed in the active-duty force to sustain

in the future.

need to be frank about

how

long peacekeeping operations will

last,

Bosnia or in Iraq. The time horizon for an international presence in

Bosnia was ignored by

at least

one White House. An attempt

time horizon can improve our training for the tasks
lied forces are called

upon

at

we should seek to train

allied

at realism

about a

hand. For example,

when al-

would be

useful to

dumb

show. In

to support local police operations,

have some language capability, to avoid operating
Iraq,

may no longer be viable
components of the US

in a

it

deaf and

personnel in rudimentary Arabic. In the work of

Ruth Wedgwood

a gendarmerie,

it is

know who started a quarrel, or to solicit tips without
through an unknown interpreter. Independent language

useful to

having a security breach

capability will usefully allow each allied unit to check whether a local interpreter

is

providing faithful translations.

Another

—and another lesson learned from post-conflict

practical difficulty

peacekeeping missions

—

is

the importance of quick and visible economic progress.

The slow decision and funding

cycle of the

terrible obstacle to this, since the

World Bank and other aid agencies

is

a

period for formulation, approval, and funding of

may be two to three years. "Quick impact" projects are critical to showing
Iraqi citizens that their material lives can change for the better. The Army Corps of
Engineers and other US government components have an important role here, to
projects

facilitate

the rebuilding of the national infrastructure

economy. Though freedom
starting the

is

a

most precious commodity,

economic recovery of Iraq

greater hesitation to

and the jumpstart of the
a prolonged delay in

will result in the loss

embrace the transformation of Iraqi

of goodwill, and a

political society.

The ultimate puzzle is how to substitute civic nationalism for a cult of personality and ethnic division. A new set of institutions is needed as the touchstone for
Iraqi allegiance and commitment. We faced similar challenges in post-war Germany and during the Cold War, though the differences to be overcome in those
cases were more singularly ideological. The act of voting and organizing a government can be inspiring. But there were other important efforts in fighting fascism
and communism; in particular, using effective cultural tools. Those days seem to
be gone. Fifty years ago, international funding for a host of cultural and educational projects

was key

in restoring

German

political culture.

We

have forgotten

how to use cultural power to stabilize a fractious political situation.
And then there is the legal challenge of finding a framework that allows us to accomplish these worthy purposes. Are the United States and coalition forces in Iraq
to be considered

under the law as an "occupying" force? In Bosnia,

NATO was not

characterized as an occupier.

The Dayton Peace Accords acknowledged NATO's

5

Characterizing the presence of allied forces as an in-

role as a peacekeeping force.

would have slighted the importance of Bosnia's reestablished civilian government. NATO military commanders were concerned that
the legal category of occupation presumed a degree of control that might not be realistic, and in particular, were aware that they might not be immediately able to initiate searches for top-level Serb, Croat and Bosnian war criminals, a duty that
applies to occupiers under the Geneva Conventions. Rather, it was argued that
ternational "occupation" also

NATO served in Bosnia in the tradition of a classical peacekeeping force, that
intermediaries tasked to keep the opposing sides apart.

is,

as

Iraq's Transformation

In Iraq, with

Saddam

and International Law

we are once again in an uncertain area
handle new situations. The Hague and Geneva

Hussein's removal,

where international law

is

asked to

Conventions may be read to suppose that an occupying power should leave
as

intact,

much as possible, the existing institutions of a society. But Saddam's political in-

stitutions

were savage and

totalitarian,

long a gross violation of human rights.

and
It is

to maintain their operation

would pro-

hard to conclude that the Hague rules of

monopoly of politand Kurdish communi-

land warfare could be intended to protect the Baathists' violent
ical
ties.

power or

to bolster Baghdad's disregard for the Shiite

Treaty law must be read as part of a legal landscape in which

makes

own demands.

its

The United Nations
Iraq,

human rights law

also has kept eyes

and

through a special representative of the

ian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello,

High Commissioner

for

Human

who

ears,

and

a voice,

on the ground

UN Secretary-General. This

is

in

Brazil-

has served also as the United Nations

Rights in Geneva and has

worked

in a

number of

senior United Nations positions, including as Transitional Administrator in East

He

Timor.

can be a

vital link in

mobilizing the UN's specialized humanitarian

agencies, as well as contributing to cooperation

In an

among competing

environment of confrontation, the United Nations could serve

symbol of multilateral commitment. Though the military
a "coalition

broader
ute.

Iraqi factions. 6

was conducted by

of the willing," the reconstruction of Iraq has been mounted under a

aegis, in

which even countries opposing the war will be invited

A visible United Nations presence

tries to participate in

To be

effort

as a useful

sure,

in Iraq

may make

it

to contrib-

easier for those

coun-

the key tasks of reconstruction.

we have

learned that the United Nations does not enjoy automatic

legitimacy in every situation. Multilateral endorsement

is

not a respected or com-

some corners of the globe. This point has been made
a wonderful memoir of his dangerous adventures during

prehensible cultural artifact in

by

Sir

Brian Urquhart, in

the early days of

Bunche and

UN

mission in the
Sir

UN

peacekeeping. 7 Sir Brian served as a key aide to Dr. Ralph

Secretary-General

Congo

Dag Hammerskjold

in the

UN

peacekeeping

in 1960.

Brian was dispatched to the Congo's Atlantic port at Matadi, passing

through an area where the Congolese Army had staged
to transport a

its

mutiny.

He found a train

hardy contingent of Moroccan peacekeepers and had a

draped across the front of the

train.

UN

flag

But the UN's emblem did not have the desired

The Congolese, as Sir Brian reports, "had never heard of the United Nations.
'L'ONU? C'est quelle tribu?' (The UN? What tribe is that?) a local Congolese offi-

effect.

cial

inquired."

So, too,
Tikrit will

we should not assume that Sunni clan members living in the Iraqi city of
show any great deference to the United Nations. The United Nations will
8
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be perceived as the institution that helped to enforce weapons inspections and eco-

nomic sanctions in the

1990's. In other quarters of Iraq, the

United Nations maybe

seen as the institution that failed to protect the Kurdish and Shiite communities after the first

Gulf War. This will not enhance its local legitimacy. Nonetheless, in the

eyes of foreign countries, the United Nations' presence

may make it easier to

con-

tribute to the Iraqi reconstruction effort.
It is

last

often said that the law of armed conflict seeks to solve the problems of the

—catching up with worthy innovations demanded by circumstances on

war

by new technologies. But there are occasions when even
post-war rules fail to reflect important problems of the most recent conflict. We
should direct a few more words to the problems of adapting the law of occupation
the ground or allowed

to the project of democratic transformation.

In the aftermath of World War

form the

militaristic societies

tions Respecting the

II,

the goal of the allied occupations was to trans-

of Germany and Japan. Yet the 1907 Hague Regula-

Laws and Customs of War on Land 8 were and are still in force,

and posed some problems even

for lawyers in 1945.

The 1949 Geneva Convention

9

on the protection of civilians, did not remedy these problems. Article 43 of the
Hague rules states that the occupier should "take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV notes that "The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in
force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying
Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the apIV,

plication of the present Convention."
shall

And "the tribunals of the occupied territory

continue to function in respect of all offences covered by said laws."

In Iraq the goal

is

to transform a Baathist culture of oppression. Certainly that

is

going to require an intrusion into and transformation of local law, mitigated in
practice

by the democratic participation of

Iraqis

and the United Nations, but

nonetheless, a change of local law that might appear inconsistent with the thrust of

some Hague

rules

Of course, even

and

Article 64 of Geneva

forces operating

Convention IV.

under the mantle of "occupiers" have powers

that could aid a democratic transformation of the country.

Under

Articles 55

and

64 of the Geneva Convention IV, the occupier has to provide for the basic needs of
the population

and maintain orderly government. 10 Security Council Resolution

1483 of May 22, 2003, enacted under Chapter VII of the
rectly to the Coalition Provisional

Authority as a temporary governing body, pend-

ing the organization of a democratic Iraqi government.
authorities, responsibilities,

UN Charter, refers indi-

It

recognizes "the specific

and obligations under applicable international law of

these states [the United States

and United Kingdom]

as

occupying powers under

—
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unified

command," 11

their efforts to

as well as calling

and International Law

on

all

States "to assist the people of Iraq in

reform their institutions and rebuild their country." 12 Maintaining

orderly government and assisting the reform of institutions surely could not in-

clude restoring the chaotic brutality of Baathist hegemony.

And then

there

the interplay between the law of occupation

is

Geneva Convention IV was completed

law.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

two instruments

in

harmony. The

in the

same

and human

rights

moment

as the

historical

One thus has a strong reason to read the

13

diktat of the Baathist party in Iraq has

been a

Human

Rights.

daily repudiation of the principles of the Universal Declaration of

To be sure, in an earlier age, there was a much greater acceptance of positive power,
even when exercised by undemocratic regimes. There was less willingness to
openly test the legitimacy of State power before respecting

it.

of 1948-49 saw the anointment of both instruments, and

it is

read

them

But the two-year span
not unreasonable to

together.

Perhaps the simplest justification for the democratic changes that will
lies

in the sovereignty of the Iraqi people.

The United

States

and

affect Iraq

its allies

can have

reference to the concurrence of the Iraqi people, expressed through the Interim

Governing Authority and subsequent representative
son of other peacekeeping operations

cement

in place

who

nationalism. In Iraq,

and the

But one hard

les-

that mechanical political choices can also

an angry nationalism. In Bosnia, elections should have been de-

By holding early elections there, we succeeded in electing na-

layed until after 1996.
tionalist parties

is

institutions.

Iraqi people

could claim democratic provenance alongside their virulent

we should not cement in place the

—would ultimately

sectarian angers that

we

rather not have.

What does one do in peacekeeping when confronted with a tendentious law, with
no other available? The problem of a legal vacuum during occupation is not new. A

UN legal adviser has written

elsewhere that

it

could be handy to have a temporary

criminal code for post-conflict situations, so that peacekeeping forces
legal basis for action.

14

In East Timor, the

would have a

UN civilian police would arrest and release

those suspected of violent crimes in ongoing cycles, because there was

no criminal

code under which to hold and charge them. Nonetheless, in addressing these problems,

we should not forget the major justification for the adaptation and amendment

of prior Iraqi law, including interim measures by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The occupation of Iraq

the benefits of democracy

is

meant

to be transformational, to allow the Iraqi people

and modern human

rights law, just as the occupations of

Germany and Japan were transformational. The law of armed
way have to catch up to that.
There

We

is

a

long-term problem for American strategy

have been using ground surrogates

in

10

many

conflict will in

in these

some

kinds of conflicts.

of our wars. In Bosnia

we

relied
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upon

the Croatian ground campaign. In Afghanistan

we had

the Northern Alli-

The US Secretary of Defense has the vision, which indeed I share, that our
combat forces need to be agile and mobile, able to get places where there are not
good airfields and good seaports. As a consequence, it maybe necessary to form alliances of convenience in the hotspots where we need to send our forces, choosing
ance.

on the ground.

the better of the parties

But reliance on light and mobile forces poses a potential problem in occupation

and post-conflict

policing.

When we have succeeded in vanquishing an adversary,

we still need a force structure to carry out the policing obligations of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions require the occupier to maintain
orderly government and ensure that the normal functions of government are met.

This

may be hard to

The challenge
on the

do, until

and unless

American

for

local forces are trained

forces in the Iraq intervention

and stood up.

was

to

move quickly

keep Saddam Hussein from using any chemical weapons and

battlefield, to

to prevent

him from

Gulf War.

We must salute the coalition forces that punched their way to Baghdad

repeating the environmental attacks that he used in the

so robustly. But a large

ground presence will

also

be needed in post-conflict peace-

keeping, to assure the police authority needed to sustain order.
sistance

from other

countries,

We may look for as-

through the United Nations or our

coordination. Yet in a difficult environment, a core American presence
sential.

Thus, in such operations, we need substantial

US

follow after the light and mobile forces that vanquish the
Let

me mention

first

own

may be es-

contingents available to

enemy on the battlefield.

Security Council Resolution 1483, and

its

on the Iraqi
and efforts can

effect

15

Economic sanctions have been lifted. Oil can be sold
begin to repair refineries and distribution equipment to facilitate petroleum production. The resolution renders Iraqi petroleum products immune from legal proeconomy.

ceedings against them. Thus, Iraq can

sell its oil

without concern about a replevin

action in a French port. Resolution 1483 also establishes an Iraqi development

fund. Frozen Iraqi assets of the Baathist regime can be transferred to the fund, protected

by required independent

auditing.

Ultimately, Iraq will face the difficult question of how to
tion

form

a

new

constitu-

and establish the political legitimacy of a new government. The process used in

South Africa

at the

end of apartheid may provide a useful

lesson. In that situation,

consensus on foundational principles was sought, before addressing specific
cles

of a constitution.

opment of

arti-

An unanswered question is who will participate in the devel-

the constitution.

The process of

drafting a constitution requires

democratic voice as a foundation stone.

There are other crucial choices
the constitution center

upon

in the process of constitution-building.

civic

Should

nationalism or religious nationalism?

11
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American constitutional advisor has supposed

that an Islamic Republic

is

sensible alternative for Iraq. But differences in the interpretation of Islam
this as a provocative

the only

may cast

course of action, rather than ameliorative. The alternative

is

As

secular republic or a secular republic that helps to assist established religions.

Americans, with our history of separation of church and
with direct State support of religion. But this

is

State,

we would be uneasy

not North America, and

it

an attractive alternative to the radical Islamism seen in some other Arab

There

made about

a crucial choice to be

is

federalism

—

erning powers are spun out to the regions. Certainly one

could be
States.

the degree to which gov-

way of maintaining peace

within Iraq could involve decentralization of political power, at least once order
stored. Significant authority can

Kurds and

a

is

re-

be vested in local government, in the north for the

in the south for the Shia. This territorial federalism

of local autonomy. The Kurds obviously would
plore a form of so-called "consociationalism"

like

—

a

nothing better. Or one could ex-

community-based method of or-

ganizing political society, as seen in Belgium and

There is an economic caveat, however.

may approach a form

some other multiethnic

states.

Many of the petroleum reserves of Iraq are lo-

and development revenues cannot be claimed

cated in Kurdish areas. Iraqi

oil

by the Kurds. They must be

a national asset. In addition, local

solely

autonomy cannot be

used as a mask for ethnic cleansing and forced relocations.
Structuring the executive

is

a

most

delicate issue, after the abusive exercise of

power by Saddam Hussein. The separate

election of

an

Iraqi president

may

afford

greater stability, since presidential leadership will not be immediately dependent

the waxing

and waning of

tionally, against a history

coalitions of minority parties in the parliament. Addi-

of personality-driven politics in Iraq, a widely- recognized

and democratically-elected president may provide
totalitarianism of Iraq's past to the

Another

difficult issue will

more prominent

a

democracy of the

symbol of transition from the
future.

concern the status and role of women.

had

a

that

prominence should continue.

Finally, the role

on

role in Iraq than in

of the armed forces

is

some other Arab

Women have

countries. Certainly,

a critical issue for the future of Iraq.

The

Turkish and Indonesian model in which the armed forces have a role in the parlia-

ment

is

highly problematic for Iraq, particularly measured against the past and

Saddam's declaration of war against
a centrifugal society,

apart,

one needs

own

and since some actors

population. Nonetheless, since Iraq

is

be tempted to tear

it

in the region will

to preserve a role for a democratic military in

forces are honored, trusted

command and

his

and valued by the

State

which the armed

—and very firmly under the

control of a democratic republic.

The Administrator of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul
Bremer, has reemployed some portions of the Iraqi Army as an interim security
12

Ruth Wedgwood

force.

There needs to be Sunni participation in the new republic, rather than exclu-

sion from

all

governmental

institutions. If former

government employees cannot

participate, they will provide a continuing source of angry insurgents.

Constitution building will take time.

One wishes

for a flourishing civil society,

with newspapers and civic associations and broad conversation, alongside the process of transferring

power

to organized political groups. In East Timor, Sergio

Viera de Mello contemplated a slow and gradual transfer of political power, because there was

no trained administrative

class.

(Under Indonesian

rule,

most of

by West Timorese or Jakarta-based
administrators.) But very quickly, Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, who
had shared the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, reminded the United Nations that IndoneEast Timor's managerial positions were filled

sian rule should not be replaced

new

by

practices that could be

as a

of multilateral colonialism. There was great impatience for the visible

style

participation of the East Timorese in governance.
felt

misapprehended

in Iraq.

not allow

The key is to

this to

find a

I

think the same impulse will be

way in which there is a prominent Iraqi role and yet

develop into crony capitalism or nationalist hegemony.

In conclusion, one can modestly admit that bundles of legal rules will not be the

determining factor in the immediate days ahead and in the development of a viable
democratic governing structure in Iraq.
for the principles

A successful transition depends on respect

and values of Hague and Geneva law, while

at the

same time,

establishing a civic culture after thirty years of tyranny.

Although there are

hurdles to overcome, both by the United States and

coalition partners

the Iraqis themselves,
cratic

and prosperous

I

its

re-

many

and by

am optimistic that at the end of the day we will see a demo-

Iraq.
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II

Iraq and the

Law of Armed Conflict

Thomas M. Franck

The

law of armed conflict

is

generally understood to pertain to the rules gov-

erning the conduct of war, the jus in

however,

is

1

hello.

Superior,

the jus ad bellum, the law pertaining to the initiation of war.

when fought in accordance with the letter of the jus in
mate
first.

if

and antecedent

bello, will in

the

war

course to force?

If,

in Iraq
as

I

A war, even
first

things

undertaken in compliance with the law governing

believe, the

answer to that question

is

way, but also by why, a war

is

is

re-

"probably not," then

the war could not have been fought in accordance with the law of

because the lawfulness of the conduct of hostilities

it,

no way be legiti-

the conflict was initiated in violation of the jus ad bellum. So,

Was

to

armed

conflict

determined not only by the

fought.

The United Nations Charter, a treaty consented to by the US Senate and ratified
by the president and to which more than 190 States are parties, purports as its central undertaking to limit the grounds upon which States may lawfully have recourse to force. Article 2(4)
international relations

stipulates

that

parties

shall

"refrain

from the threat or use of force against the

in

their

territorial integ-

2

With this provision, the world, as it
emerged in 1945 from history's bloodiest war of aggression, sought forever to repudiate the principle attributed by Thucydides to the Athenians in their conduct
rity

or political independence of any state."

towards the island-State of Melos during the Peloponnesian

do what they can and the weak

suffer

what they must." 3

War that:

"the strong

Iraq

The
tively

conflict

and

the

Law of Armed Conflict

Thucydides describes

that initiated

is

democratic Athenian State against the

by

a highly cultivated, rela-

much smaller Melian State, which had

sought to remain neutral in Athens' larger conflict with Sparta. Athens, the historian

tells us,

eventually destroyed

lignant eventuality

protect against every

itself in a futile effort to

by attacking and securing the submission of every place from

which danger might emanate. Whether or not one perceives
these events,
treaty

is

it is

ma-

amply

clear that the

a

modern

parallel in

purpose of the world's most widely

ratified

Melian principle, replacing it with a strong rule

to repeal the vestiges of the

against the initiation of war.

The sole exception envisioned by the Charter is set out in Article 5 1 "Nothing in
:

the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective

defence

if

an armed attack occurs.

self-

." 4
.

.

Thus any examination of the lawfulness of US conduct in deploying force
against Iraq in the spring of 2003 must begin by asking whether that action was
congruent with the post-Melian requirements of the UN Charter.
Iraq was nothing but an act of self-defense
coalition, or only

by the United

States

If the

invasion of

and the supporting

an exercise of the collective police-power that had previously

been approved by the

UN Security Council, then the recourse to force would have

been lawful. The Charter's Article 2(4) no-first-use pledge
the Article 51 -based right of self-defense

and

clearly subordinate to

is

also to the authority of the Security

Council, set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, to initiate action against a threat to
the peace. If the 2003 invasion of Iraq
rity

Council,

It is

its

legality

would be beyond question.

possible to position the invasion of Iraq in either, or both, of these exculpa-

tory contexts, but just barely.
Iraq,

The argument

have not violated the Charter

efforts

had previously been authorized by the Secu-

is

that

IV, the

forces, in

occupying

not easily or readily sustained, despite the best

of US and British government lawyers. Indeed, the deputy legal adviser of

the British Foreign Office resigned rather than sign
sition.

our armed

As enunciated by US

State

Department Legal Adviser William Howard Taft

argument has two prongs. The

first is

ways use force under international law

problem with

that rationale

is

on to London's official legal po-

that,

even

that the President

in self-defense."
if it

were agreed

3

may "of course,

al-

The readily-apparent

(as

it

well might be) that

the Article 5 1 right of self-defense has been interpreted in practice to include a right

of action against an imminent armed attack,

it is

difficult to

fit

the facts of the situa-

March 2003 within any plausible theory of imminence. This was a
time, after all, when UN and International Atomic Energy inspectors were already
actively conducting seemingly unimpeded searches for weapons of mass destruction with the full weight of Security Council resolutions to back them up. Nothing

tion existing in
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in the inspectors' reports lends

any credibility to the claim that Iraq, in the spring of

2003, posed any imminent threat of aggression to anyone.

The second prong of justification is more sophisticated, averring that the attack
on Iraq by the United States and Britain had already been pre-authorized by the Security Council. To sustain this assertion, the United States produced a creative, but
ultimately unsustainable reading of three previous Security Council Resolutions:
678, 687

and 1441. 6 According

to Taft, 7 Resolution 678, with

had authorized the use of force

to oust Iraq

from Kuwait

which the Council

in January of 1991,

kept in force by Resolution 687 of April 1991, which ended the

imposed stringent disarmament conditions on

Iraq. Taft

first

was

Gulf War and

maintained

that, as Iraq

had "materially breached" these obligations, the right to use force had revived "and
force

may again be used under UNSCR 678 to compel Iraqi compliance

over, Taft said, the Security Council, in

its

Resolution 1441 of November

which had ordered the inspectors back into
Iraq has been

and remains

Iraq,

in material breach of

Legal Adviser, Resolution 1441 gave

"

More-

8,

2002,

"had unanimously decided that
its

obligation." According to the

Baghdad a final opportunity to comply, which

would constitute a further material breach. He concluded that "Iraq
committed such violations and, accordingly, the authority to use force

if disregarded,

has clearly

to address Iraq's material breaches

is

clear." 8 Taft 's British

that Resolution 678 of November 29, 1991
States to use all necessary

and

area"
ties in

ries

still

effective to authorize

to restore international peace

and

"Member

security in the

while that authorization had been suspended at the end of hostili-

1991 by Resolution 687,

Is this

force

that,

means

was

counterpart also argued

it

was "revived by SCR 1441(2002)." 9

a fair reading of the resolution that, in 1991, first authorized the use of

by a coalition of the willing? Resolution 678 was itself the culmination of a se-

of earlier resolutions by which the Council had responded to Iraq's invasion of

Kuwait.

It

called for the

immediate withdrawal of the aggressor, imposed manda-

tory sanctions and declared the annexation of Kuwait null and void. In each instance, the Council's purpose, evidently,

was to

roll

back the aggression committed

by one member against another. Only after these measures

failed to suffice did the

Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter "authorize

Member

States co-

Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement [its earlier resolutions] and to restore international peace and secuoperating with the

rity in the region.

Obviously,

it

." 10
.

.

was the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty that had motivated the

Council in 1990-91. That Resolution 678 incidentally makes reference to the restoration of "international peace

and

security in the region" does not connote

expansive additional mandate beyond that of Kuwaiti liberation.

It

some

does not con-

tingently license the pursuit of quite different objectives such as "regime change" at

17
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members of the coalition. President George Bush
St. acknowledged as much in explaining why the American military had not pursued Saddam Hussein's forces all the way back to Baghdad. "The U.N. resolutions
never called for the elimination of Saddam Hussein" he said. "It never called for
taking the battle into downtown Baghdad." 11
What Resolution 687 did do was to establish intrusive post-conflict controls over
Iraq and to make these mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter, subject to colthe sole discretion of individual

lective

enforcement in the event of non-compliance. Compliance monitoring, how-

was to be the domain of the Security Council and

ever,

inspectors.

its

Baghdad was

compelled to agree to the verified elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and
of the industrial capacity to produce them, as well as of its

medium- and long-range

To make sure this happened, the Council and the UN SecretaryGeneral were made responsible for creating and supervising the inspectors and for
delivery systems.

12

deploying them, 13 and
"that

it

will

its

was

to the Council that

Baghdad was required

to certify

not commit or support any act of terrorism or allow any organization

directed toward
clinch

it

commission of such

continuing supervisory

acts to operate within

role,

its

territory.

." 14
.

.

To

Resolution 687 stipulated that the Council

was to "remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps

as

may

be

re-

quired for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and
security in the region." 15 It

is

not individual States acting on their

own information

without authorization of the Council.

This does not sound as

if the

Council then, or thereafter, intended to cede to the

United States and Britain the right to determine when to use military force
absence of an (imminent) armed attack.
ual

members of

It

in the

does not appear to delegate to individ-

the Council authority to determine the existence of a material

breach or to decide the appropriate response.

To

interpret Resolutions 687

and

1441 otherwise would be to imply, without further evidence, an intent of the

Council to overturn the basic architecture of the Charter by authorizing individual

members to
sites

effect

an unprecedented and uncontrolled derogation from the requi-

of Article 2(4). Without supporting evidence,

it

would be foolhardy

make

to

such an assumption.
This difficulty for those arguing the legality of US recourse to force

is

not

allevi-

ated by reference to Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which effected the return

of the inspectors to Iraq. While that resolution passed unanimously,
that goal

cide

if

by resolutely refusing to delegate to individual

and when

members,

its

mandate was being violated,

in voting for

Resolution 1441,

let

it

achieved

States the authority to de-

alone what to do about

it.

Most

may have hoped there would be no occa-

sion to cross the bridge of enforcement. However, there

18

is

no evidence whatsoever

Thomas M. Franck
for the confident assertion that they intended to authorize individual States to de-

cide whether the Council strictures

What,

if

anything,

is

had been violated and, if so, what to do about it.

to be learned

from the consequences of this US decision

to

use force without the requisite Security Council authorization? This was certainly

not the
terest

first

time a State had chosen to pursue what

by reverting to such

unilateral action. France

and Bangladesh, Tanzania

it

perceived to be

and Britain

national in-

its

in Suez, India in

Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, and even

in

Goa

NATO

in

Kosovo, are but a few of a plenitude of examples. Sometimes, the unlawful action

was defended by lying about the
vice

facts,

which,

sometimes pays to virtue. In most instances, however,

—

out reason
force

that,

compliment

at least, exemplifies the
it

was argued

by violating the technical letter of the law, the initiator of the use of

was preventing the occurrence of some

far greater

wrong.

Any legal system will

take such an argument into account. But these are not the justifications
is

producing

—not with-

now that

Washington

weapons of mass destruction have not been discovered

the

and the link of Saddam Hussein

to Al

Qaida remains unproven. In the wake of these

disappointments for those who sought to justify this war in traditional terms of self-

we

defense,

are

now being

invited to

draw more far-reaching conclusions about a

need to reshape the ostensibly broken international system because of its obstinate
refusal to endorse

our recourse to

force.

Some call for the dismantling of the United

Nations as a spent force vainly resisting the
France,

it is

said,

needs to be punished and

reality

of American predominance.

Germany ignored.

But these are the wrong conclusions to draw from the Iraq experience. Drawing

may have to await further clarifying events, but a few may be ventured tentatively. One is that the collective decision-making process of the Security
the right ones

Council should not be regarded as just a hobble on the sole superpower's discretion,

but also as an important

reality check, a

way to

get important perspective that

may even sometimes save Washington from acting too hastily in over-reliance on
its own imperfect and sometimes distorted vision. Another is that the United States
needs the world, and

that,

without

its

support for projects important to our na-

tional interest, the successful pursuit of that interest

may

prove

far

more

elusive

and expensive.

A final lesson is that the rule of law is not a smorgasbord, where the sole superpower

is

entitled to pick

and choose among

its

offerings.

For example, the United

Nations has put in place an extensive system for preventing and monitoring the
flow of

money

to terrorists.

some of their sovereign
they?

To implement

it,

however, States must subordinate

prerogatives to an interstatal legal regime.

Very few countries feel as

directly threatened

by terrorism

as

Why

should

do we: not most

African and Asian States and not even the nations of Europe. If they support us in
the

war on terrorism,

it is

not necessarily in their national interest that they act in

19
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mechanisms,

for to help the

example, the Government of Pakistan appears to be doing,

is

United States

to invite the terrorists

to extend their retributive reach. That the legal regime underpinning the

terrorism nevertheless enjoys such broad support of governments

adherence of States of diverse

as, for

races, religions, political persuasions

war on

testifies to

and

the

social out-

looks to the rule of law that the Charter supremely exemplifies.
It

would be

a mistake to underestimate the cost to the culture of

were the United States to continue over-demonstrating
exceptionalism.

The war

in Iraq

was undertaken

in

what

is

its

compliance

entitlement to

almost universally per-

ceived as a serious violation of international law and, thus, a weakening of all legal
regimes' capacity to secure acquiescent compliance. This deterioration of the legal

ethos cannot be to the longer-term advantage of the United States, whatever the
short term temptations. If it

the
ror,

damage done.

is

need to be taken to mitigate, not to magnify,

not, steps

In the age of globalization,

and globalized anti-governmental

Athens needs the Melians to be willingly on

its

ter-

side.
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Law and the 2003 Campaign
against Iraq

Nicholas Rostow

1

Introduction

When, on September

12, 2002, President

Security Council to enforce
that the United States

called

on the

UN

binding resolutions on Iraq and indicated

was willing to enforce them alone

tions he put before the
it

its

George W. Bush
if need

be, 2

one of the ques-

world had periodically come up in the preceding decade: was

lawful for a State or group of States to enforce the Security Council resolutions

Iraq without specific Security Council authorization in each case? Or, to put

it

on

an-

"who decides?" The previous occasions when this question was raised involved the enforcement in the 1990s of the No-fly Zones by the United States,
Britain, and, for part of the time, France or larger scale attacks on Iraqi military targets as in December 1998. 4 However one frames this constitutive question, in each
case the answer is that those members of the Security Council decided.
3

other way,

Of course,

actions are taken in context,

be assessed without examining
after the terrorist attacks

its

context.

of September

and the lawfulness of an action cannot

The circumstances of the speech,

11, 2001, lent special

a year

urgency to the Presi-

The effort by Iraq to mount terrorist attacks against the international
coalition formed in response to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi support for Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel, Saddam Hussein's applause for the September 1 1 attacks themselves, and Iraq's repeated efforts to obtain and then maintain
dent's

call.
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and biological weapons programs and

nuclear, chemical,

obligations

the 2003

capabilities while defying

stemming from the 1991 Gulf War formed the

ronment of the 2003

On September

political

and

legal envi-

military action.

2002, President Bush summarized the principal

12,

UN Security
He

Council resolutions binding on Iraq and Iraq's failure to comply with them.
said "

tions

[

t]

he conduct of the Iraqi regime

and

a threat to

is

United Na-

a threat to the authority of the

Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and

peace

enforced or cast aside without consequence?" 5

He added that the United States had

the right and indeed the obligation to enforce the law against Iraq and called

on UN

Member States to join in doing so.
The US view of international law applicable to the Iraq case did not and does not
now enjoy unanimous support. For example, Professor Thomas Franck argues
6

that, in 2003, the

United

States, Britain, Australia,

force against Iraq not sanctioned

under the

and others engaged

in a use of

UN Charter. He disputes the idea that
7

the campaign was a lawful exercise of the international use of force under existing

UN

Security Council resolutions

fact,

the arguments Professor Franck disagrees with have merit and deserve elabo-

and general

principles of international law. In

ration before the invisible college of international lawyers renders

its

judgment. 8

The Legal Basis for the 2003 Campaign against Saddam Hussein

The argument

for the lawfulness of the

2003 campaign against Saddam Hussein's

government of Iraq is rooted in the Persian Gulf situation
argument concludes

that, first,

UN

after

August

Security Council resolutions

2,

1990.

The

and statements

from 1990 through 2002 provided legal authority for the 2003 campaign and demonstrated that, as a legal matter, the 1991 Gulf War had not ended, and, second,
that, in
rity

any event,

Iraq's material breaches of the 1991 cease-fire,

Council repeatedly recognized as such, kept

alive, if it

which the Secu-

were necessary to do

so,

the Security Council's 1990 authorization to use force to uphold and implement

subsequent resolutions and restore regional peace and security. The terrorist
tacks of September

1

1,

and ended more than
to the

UN

2001, transformed the context and analysis of Iraqi behavior
a decade's tolerance of Iraq's refusal to

fulfill its

obligations,

Security Council. 9

UN Security Council
the

at-

UN-based

legal

Resolutions and Council Presidential Statements created

framework

for the

2003 campaign. 10 Resolution 1441, which

the Security Council adopted unanimously
threat Iraq's

on November

8,

2002, recognized "the

non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weap-

ons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and
security."

1

'

The operative

section of Resolution 1441

22

commences with

the finding

—
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that Iraq "has

been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant

resolutions, including resolution 687

of the 1990 Gulf Crisis,

knowledge that the

1991)." 12 These words refer to the beginning

(

when Iraq invaded and purported to annex Kuwait, and ac-

conflict thus

begun had remained unresolved. They therefore

UN Security Council authorization to use force against

put under the lens both the

Iraq because of the invasion of Kuwait

and the resolution setting forth the terms for

ending that conflict and authorization.
Material Breach of

UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)

The Security Council was the forum through which the collective defense of Kuwait was managed in 1990. 13 On August 2, 1990, the Council condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait of the same day. 14 The Security Council then affirmed the right of
collective self-defense in response to the invasion, 15

bargo,

16

imposed an economic em-

authorized the ongoing maritime enforcement of the embargo, 17 carved

out humanitarian exceptions to the embargo, 18 warned Iraq about the conse-

quences of
during the

illegal
first

hostage-taking, 19

and addressed other

four months following the invasion.

On November 29,

specific issues that arose

20

1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 authoriz-

ing the use of force and giving

Saddam Hussein until January

15, 1991, to fulfill his

government's obligations to implement pre-existing Security Council resolutions
beginning with Resolution 660, which had condemned the invasion and de-

manded an immediate, unconditional

Iraqi withdrawal

from Kuwait. 21 In

sence of Iraqi compliance with this ultimaturn, the Resolution authorized
States co-operating

with the Government of Kuwait ... to use

uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and

and to

restore international peace

the 1991 Gulf War to eject Iraq

and security in

all

all

the ab-

"Member

necessary

means

to

subsequent relevant resolutions

the area." 22 Operation Desert

—began on January

from Kuwait

16, 1991,

Storm

by decision

of the US-led Coalition, not of the Security Council, and ended with a cease-fire, also

by decision of the US-led Coalition, which the Security Council subsequently endorsed
as a "suspension of offensive
3,

combat operations" on March

2,

1991. 23 Then,

1991, the Council adopted Resolution 687, codifying that cease-fire

additional obligations

on

Iraq, "bearing in

mind"

on April

and imposing

the goal of securing international

peace and security in the area. 24 In order to obtain a cease-fire, Iraq formally accepted
the terms of Resolution 687

by letter dated April

Resolution 687 set forth the conditions for

but did not rescind or provide for

on April

3,

its

6,

1991.25

fulfilling the

terms of Resolution 678

termination. Since adopting Resolution 687

1991, the Security Council never found that Iraq has

thereunder or that Resolution 678, including

hold and implement Resolution

660

23

its

met

its

obligations

authorization to use force "to up-

(1990)

and

all

subsequent relevant

International

resolutions,"
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even that the war

commenced by Iraq's

UN

vasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had ended. Indeed,

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's introduction to the

in-

Secretary-General

UN publication of documents on the

Iraq-Kuwait conflict, 1990-96, states that, notwithstanding the adoption of Resolution 687, "enforcement measures remained in effect, including the sanctions re-

gime and the Council's authorization
uphold

to

tried to

Iraqi compliance."

26

to

Member States to use 'all necessary means'

As shown by the series of resolutions in 1990, which

manage the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, the Security Council

is

capable of taking de-

cisions about mandates.

From

1991 onwards, the Security Council repeatedly concluded that Iraq's ac-

tions failed to correspond to Iraq's obligations. Iraq's refusal to

tion 687, apparent within

implement Resolu-

one month of the Resolution's adoption, caused the

—

that

The term "material breach" was

de-

Security Council to find that Iraq was in "material breach" of the Resolution

of the conditions for the 1991 cease-fire.

is,

rived
is

27

from the 1961 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

a repudiation of the

28

a material breach

agreement or a violation of a provision or term

essential to

the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the agreement. Material breach of

an international agreement by one of the parties

entitles the other to

invoke the

breach as a ground for terminating or suspending the agreement in whole or in
part. 29 In the

circumstances of Iraq's failure to

fulfill

essential

terms of the cease-fire

agreement by submitting inaccurate and incomplete declarations of its holdings of
prohibited weapons, weapons systems, and support structures, concealment of prohibited

weapons and weapons programs, and obstruction of the inspection regime

designed to monitor and verify Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687, 30 the United
States

and the United Kingdom and

others, including Secretary-General Boutros-

Ghali understood the finding of material breach to
again permitted to compel Iraq to

comply with

wrote in 1996, "to uphold Iraqi compliance."

31

its

mean

force authorized

by the United

States

under Resolution 678.

and

Iraq's failure to

its

was

obligations or, as Boutros-Ghali

paragraphs of Resolution 687 violated the cease-fire and
law, the resumption

that the use of force

comply with core

justified, as a

matter of

coalition partners of the use of

32

Resolution 1441's use of the words "material breach" to characterize Iraq's repeated failures over

ment was

more than

a

decade to implement the 1991 cease-fire agree-

the ninth such Security Council finding since the end of the Gulf War. 33

In addition, the Security Council also repeatedly

ing with

its

obligations

more

generally.

concluded three times that Iraq was

From

found that Iraq was not comply-

1991 to the end of 2002, the Council

in "flagrant violation"

of

its

obligations, 34 12

times that Iraq was not complying, 35 once that Iraq was in "clear-cut defiance" of
its

obligations, 36 three times that Iraq

had committed

24

37
twice
a "clear violation,"
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that

its

violations were "clear

lation" of Resolution 687.

39

and

flagrant," 38

and once that Iraq was

in "gross vio-

In addition, from the cease-fire of 1991 through the

adoption of Resolution 1441 in November 2002, the Security Council threatened
Iraq with "serious consequences" 12 times as a result of its persistent non-compliance

with essential terms of Resolution 68 7. 40 The different formulations used in the
1990s reflected the widening fissures
rity

among the Permanent Members

of the Secu-

Council with regard to Iraq.

While some, including Professor Franck, have argued that only the Security
Council ought to determine when,

after the cease-fire

of 1991,

it is

voke the authorization of Resolution 678 (1990), 41 the United

permitted to in-

States

and others 42

have never shared that opinion. The United States consistently has argued that
Resolution 678 remained in effect until the Security Council specifically rescinded
it,

that

its

reference to "all subsequent relevant resolutions" includes Security

Council resolutions adopted subsequent to Resolution 678, and that no subse-

quent Security Council authorization was needed before the United States and
others lawfully could use force against Iraq to

compel compliance with Security

Council resolutions, including Resolution 687, which codified the
Security Council

had neither included an expiration date

cease-fire. 43

The

for the authorization to

use force in Resolution 678 nor provided for the termination of such authorization

on Iraqi acceptance of Resolution 687 or for some other reason. 44 While Resolution
678 contained no time limit, succeeding resolutions, including 1441, contained no
termination of the authorization to use force that was granted in previous Security

Council resolutions. Whether they liked
stood that the United

States, the

would treat Resolution 678
justified the

as

it

or not, Security Council

members under-

United Kingdom, France for a time, and others

providing continuing authority. Indeed, although they

maintenance of No-fly Zones with reference to Security Council Resolu-

tion 688, the United States, the United

Kingdom, and, during the period

it

partici-

pated in enforcing the No-fly Zones, France used their patrolling aircraft to keep
pressure
acting

The

on Iraq

to

comply with Resolution 68 7. 45 In so doing, they arguably were

on the continued authority of Resolution
British view, authoritatively

Goldsmith, on March
material breach
rity

17,

678.

expounded by the Attorney General, Lord

2003, stressed the significance of the finding of ongoing

by Iraq in Resolution 1441. Lord Goldsmith concluded

that Secu-

Council Resolution 687:

[S]uspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678.

A

material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under resolution
678. In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been

25

and

International

remains

in material
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breach of resolution 687, because

it

has not fully complied with

its

46
obligations to disarm under that resolution.

Russia's

one of the

then-UN Permanent Representative Ambassador Sergei Lavrov made
most comprehensive statements against the US and British view in De-

cember 1998, during Operation Desert Fox undertaken by the United States and
United Kingdom. 47 Lavrov argued that the Security Council, which was "actively
seized" of the matter:

alone has the right to determine what steps should be taken in order to maintain or

and security. We reject outright the attempts made in the
48
letters from the United States and the United Kingdom
to justify the use offeree on
the basis of a mandate that was previously issued by the Security Council. The
resolutions of the Security Council provide no grounds whatsoever for such actions. 49
restore international peace

He came back to these arguments in 2002, using the word "automaticity" as representing the view he opposed. 50

Iraq's "Final

The second

Opportunity"

part of Resolution 1441 allowed Iraq a "final opportunity" to

into compliance with

its

obligations under Resolution 687, thus eliminating

material breach. In the words of the French

dor Jean-David
confrontation."

was

To ensure compliance,

called in the negotiations

toring, Inspection

tional

opportunity" "to avoid

the Security Council established what

"an enhanced inspection regime" of the

and Verification Commission

(UNMOVIC) and

UN Moni-

the Interna-

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "Enhanced inspection regime" meant

the Security Council had given

its

Permanent Representative, Ambassa-

Levitte, Resolution 1441 created a "last
51

come

UNMOVIC

and the IAEA

clearer, broader,

that

and

stronger instructions and powers than ever before. 52

Resolution 1441 required that Iraq

make

a

new declaration of all

its

weapons of

mass destruction and associated agents and materials and support, research, development, and manufacturing
and/or omissions in

facilities

this declaration

and

structures. Iraqi material misstatements

and "failure to cooperate

fully in the

tion shall constitute a further material breach

and

assessment in accordance with paragraphs

and 12 below." 53

its

declaration under this Resolution

IAEA

official

defended

it

as

Iraq's

programs

be reported to the Council for

When

Iraq submitted

no Security Council Member or

UNMOVIC or

1 1

complete within the meaning of the Resolution. 54 Indeed,

they found material omissions. 55

dence of

will

implementa-

The preliminary results of the post-war survey of evi-

to develop

weapons of mass destruction and

26

their delivery

—
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systems further illuminate the inadequacies of the

December 2002

declaration; the

fi-

56
nal report confirmed this conclusion.

Omissions and

false

statements in the declaration were not enough in the lan-

guage of Resolution 1441 to constitute the "further material breach" defined in
Resolution 1441. The second of the two requirements was "failure to cooperate
fully in the

implementation" of the Resolution. Iraq's derelictions in both respects

were evident to the Council and reported by

—the

UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

"
5

would determine what came next
reflected a compromise between those governments that did not want to require a
second Security Council decision with respect to the use of force and those that
did. 58 The result was agreement to meet "to consider the situation and the need for
The

full

rest

of Resolution 1441

compliance with

all

part that

of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure inter-

national peace and security." 59 Finally, Resolution 1441 ended
that the Security Council

obligations

ure to

would have
essential

fulfill

by reminding Iraq

had repeatedly warned that continued

violations of

"serious consequences." In the circumstances of Iraq's

its

fail-

terms of the cease-fire agreement, the finding of material

would follow non-compliance
with Resolution 1441, everyone understood that the United States, Britain, and
others were contemplating the use offeree to compel Iraq to comply with its obligations if Iraq failed to fulfill them in response to Resolution 1441 although the Security Council was not unanimous on the legal interpretation of existing
breach, and the threat that serious consequences

resolutions. 60

Nothing

in Resolution 1441 required the Council to

adopt another

November 8,
and the United Kingdom
Security Council met some

resolution as a prerequisite for military operations. And, between

when the United States
launched their campaign against Saddam Hussein, the
2002, and

March

19, 2003,

47 times in public and in informal consultations considering the situation. The
terms of Resolution 1441 therefore were met and the 2003 campaign against Iraq

was lawful in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and actions on Iraq
after

Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 61

The Context: The Terrorist Attacks of September
Iraq's attack

on Kuwait

2003 campaign.

in 1990 thus

11,

2001

launched the train of events leading to the

Iraq's unwillingness to accept the

outcome of Operation Desert

Storm and comply with Security Council Resolution 687 meant that Iraq remained
a threat to international peace

and

the 1990s, the Iraq question stayed

security after the 1991 Gulf War.

Throughout

on the UN Security Council agenda, and UN

curity Council sanctions against Iraq,

imposed

in the

Se-

wake of the 1990 invasion of

Kuwait, remained in place. The Security Council monitored application of the

27
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sanctions,
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the 2003

UN bureaucracy supervised Iraqi sales of oil and importation of

and the

goods, including foodstuffs and medicines. 62 Iraq was contained militarily and

prevented from attacking the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south by the

American,

British, and, for part

of the time, French enforcement of the Northern

and Southern No-fly Zones, beginning
programs had depended

in substantial part

not on Iraqi cooperation and inspectors'
in 2003, the

Council
veto

United

States, the

UN inspections of Iraq's weapons

in 1991.

on

skills,

intelligence

however

reports,

great, for success. 63 Early

United Kingdom, Spain, and others on the Security

— perhaps more than the nine needed

—concluded

and defector

to

adopt a resolution absent a

that every effort to obtain the compliance of

government with Security Council resolutions
ing the 1990 Gulf conflict had failed.

Why,

Saddam

Hussein's

stipulating the conditions for end-

if

Saddam's Iraq was contained and

watched and the economy supervised, did the United

States

and Great

Britain de-

removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003?
The answer, as President Bush said on March 6, 2003, lay in the impact of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The repeated failure by Saddam Hussein's
Iraq throughout the 1990's to comply with Resolution 687, and the repeated failure
cide to launch the

campaign

that

within the Security Council to agree about what to do in response, was no longer
tolerable for the

ber

1

United

States, the

United Kingdom, Spain, and others. "Septem-

1th changed the strategic thinking, at least as far as

I

was concerned,

protect our country," President Bush said. "It used to be that

we could

for

how to

think that

you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us
from his type of terror." 64 Saddam Hussein's statements about the September 1
attacks could give no assurance about his attitude, 65 and his record of continued
material breach of Security Council Resolution 687, despite economic sanctions,
diplomacy, low intensity military pressure, and repeated Security Council de-

mands, combined

to support the

view that there would never be voluntary Iraqi

compliance with Resolution 1441 and that changing the regime by force was proportional and lawful and, after September 11, 2001, necessary.
All Security

Council

member governments believed that Saddam Hussein's Iraq

had not complied with Resolution 687 and

at least

had programs

to develop or ob-

weapons of mass destruction, even if some of
them questioned whether Iraq actually possessed such weapons at that moment. 66
tain nuclear, biological, or chemical

In this connection,

UN

one should weigh the assessment of Rolf Ekeus, the

inspection effort in Iraq, and, in the view of a former British

United Nations, "the most-clear sighted and by

far the

most

first

head of the

Ambassador

to the

successful" of them: 67

produce warfare agents, but rather to concentrate on
design and engineering] with the purpose of activating production and shipping of
[Iraq's policy since 1991

was not

to
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agents

and munitions

Many hundreds

directly to the battlefield in the event of war.

of

chemical engineers and production and process engineers worked to develop nerve
agents, especially VX, with the

primary task being to

stabilize the

warfare agents in order

and activities, e.g., for agricultural purposes, where batches of nerve
agents could be produced during short interruptions of the production of ordinary
chemicals. This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch
production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat its
chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and
to optimize facilities

—

pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the

WMD

administrations to unjustified criticism.

and exposed the American and British
The real chemical warfare threat from Iraq has

had two components. One has been the

capability to bring potent chemical agents to the

important question of

battlefield to

in

Iraq

be used against a poorly equipped and poorly trained enemy. The other

is

weapons specialists would sign up with terrorist networks
Qaeda with which they are likely to have far more affinity than do the
unemployed Russian scientists the United States worries about.
While biological
weapons are not easily adapted for battlefield use, they are potentially the more
devastating as a means for massive terrorist onslaught on civilian targets. As with
chemical weapons, Iraq's policy on biological weapons was to develop and improve the
quality of the warfare agents. It is possible that Iraq, in spite of its denials, retained some
anthrax in storage. But it could be more problematic and dangerous if Iraq secretly
maintained a research and development capability, as well as a production capability,
run by the biologists involved in its earlier programs. Again, such a complete program
would in itself constitute a more important biological weapon than some stored agents of
doubtful quality. It is understandable that the U.N. inspectors and even more, the
military search teams, have had difficulty penetrating the sophisticated, well-rehearsed
and protected
program in Iraq.
The Iraqi nuclear projects lacked access to
fissile material but were advanced with regard to weapon design.
This is enough to
justify the international military intervention undertaken by the United States and
Britain. To accept the alternative
letting Hussein remain in power
would have been
to tolerate a continuing destabilizing arms race in the Gulf, including future
the chance that Iraqi chemical

such as

al

—

.

WMD

.

.

.

.

.

.

—

.

.

—

nuclearization of the region, threats to the world's energy supplies, leakage of

WMD

technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic sabotage of efforts to create

and sustain a process of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the continued
terrorizing of the Iraqi people. 68

The Iraq Survey Group responsible for searching for prohibited Iraqi weapons and
weapons programs in the wake of the 2003 Iraq campaign confirmed the existence
of such programs. 69
Security Council unity about Iraq's ambitions did not extend to wanting to join
a use of force to obtain compliance

and bring an end to the programs

—

that

is,

to

overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Therefore, the Council's unanimity in
adopting Resolution 1441 expressed more solidarity than existed,
the French and Russian statements explaining their votes

29

as, for

made

clear

example,

and the
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French-Russian-Chinese Joint Statement of November
rity

Council members, Secretariat

US

military forces in

degree he did with

officials,

8,

against Iraq

2002, reinforced. 70 Secu-

and others agreed

that the build-up of

Kuwait had persuaded Saddam Hussein to cooperate to the

UNMOVIC

and the IAEA, but they did not agree

run-out for non-military solutions to the threat posed by Iraq.

Permanent Representative pulled back from the
Implementation of the resolution [1441]

dire

will require

71

that time

had

For example, Russia's

message of Resolution 1441:
goodwill on the part of

all

those

They must have the
on moving forward towards the declared common goals, not
yielding to the temptation of unilateral interpretation of the resolution's provisions and
preserving the consensus and unity of all members of the Security Council. 72
involved in the process of seeking a settlement of the Iraq question.

willingness to concentrate

France's

Ambassador

control of the process."

73

Levitte said that "the Security Council

would maintain

He did not acknowledge that any one besides the heads of

UNMOVIC or the IAEA might report to the Security Council on Iraqi compliance
with Resolution 1441. The fact that Resolution 1441 contemplated reports from
sources other than the

IAEA

or

UNMOVIC ought not to have needed saying but

did because Ambassador Levitte only referred to reports from those sources as

causing the Security Council to meet.

Some commentators have

seen economic

motives behind Russian and French Iraq policies throughout the 1990s: "By 2000,
Iraq's trade

was worth roughly $17 billion, and other countries were determined

get a piece of

it.

Iraq carefully awarded contracts to those

who echoed

its

to

propa-

74

way in the Security Council." Perhaps more importantly,
Abassador Lavrov's and Ambassador Levitte's statements revealed again the divergence of perspectives about international threats in the wake of the terrorist attacks
ganda and voted

of September

11,

its

2001. 75

The importance of those attacks for the United States cannot be exaggerated.
They have exerted hydraulic pressure on US officials, sending them to bed each
night worried that they have again failed to understand bits and pieces of intelligence about terrorist plots, and causing them to look out on the world through a
prism formed by the September 1 1 attacks. Thus, acceptance of Iraq's unwillingness to abide by the result of the 1991 Gulf War

no longer appeared

to be a sensible

policy option.

Conclusion

The
for

legal

foundation for the 2003 campaign against Iraq

is

not the

less

important

being well known. The aspiration that international society operate according
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from the aspiration for international peace.

to law is inseparable

2003, Security Council

members joined

in

emphasizing

On September 24,

76
this point.

While there

have been periods of peace, enforced by a balance of power, these periods historically

have ended in great wars. Whether an international system of independent

States,

even one that includes international institutions to which States delegate

important powers, can

live

according to law and even whether that law can be en-

forced so as to strengthen peace within the international society,

whose answer we

One

are

still

is

a question

fashioning.

of the most important and therefore one of the most controversial

ele-

ments of the 2003 campaign against Iraq involved enforcement of international
law by a group of States motivated by the attacks of September

11, 2001,

without

being able to prove a connection between Iraq and those attacks. Unlike the Afghanistan campaign, which was directed against the apparent source of those

campaign involved

tacks, the Iraq
threat,

a response to a previously defined

which acquired new seriousness

at-

but ongoing

as a result the terrorist attacks. Security

Council actions on Iraq, including the authorization to use force and the repeated
findings of Iraq's failure to carry out
all States,

especially after

sponsibility for the

September

its

cease-fire obligations, raised the stakes for

11,

2001, because of the Council's primary re-

maintenance of international peace and

security.

Those same

actions created a compelling legal foundation for the 2003 campaign. Critics

choose to ignore

it.

They cannot rebut

may

it.
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AIR AND LAND WARFARE

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

—

IV
Jus in Bello Issues Arising
in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003

Yoram Dinstein

T

he

hostilities in Iraq in

1

2003 brought to the fore a number ofjus

in bello issues

deserving special consideration. This paper will deal with ten such issues.

The Status of Unlawful Combatants
The subject of unlawful combatancy has already been addressed by the present writer
in the conference

stated at

on Afghanistan in 2002. 2 It is not proposed to repeat here what was

some length in the

earlier essay. Suffice

ternational law, a combatant who does not
(or privileged)

combatancy

nizable at a distance" 3

fulfill

inter alia, that

it

to state that,

the cumulative conditions of lawful

of having "a fixed distinctive sign recog-

—becomes an unlawful combatant,

leges of a prisoner of war status

under customary in-

and exposed

system for any act of violence perpetrated by

i.e.,

he

is

denied the privi-

to the full rigor of the domestic penal

him

in civilian clothes.

The use of uniforms by members of the regular armed forces is a matter of custom, esprit de corps and convenience. Lawful combatancy is not determined by the
wearing of a uniform per
ing of a fixed distinctive

emblem may be

less

se.

As indicated,

emblem

it is

determined

{inter alia)

by the wear-

recognizable at a distance. This fixed distinctive

than a full-fledged uniform

(e.g.,

a special headgear or an

armband). But if the fixed distinctive emblem of regular armed forces

is

a uniform,
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then the removal of that uniform in (or in proximity to) combat does divest the

person acting that way of lawful combatancy.

emblem) by members of the regular armed forces must be examined within the confines of space and
time. A member of the armed forces who is performing his duties far from the contact zone with the enemy and removes his uniform without any possible intention

The

issue of the

removal of a uniform

(as a fixed distinctive

(or even reasonable ability) to deceive the

enemy

as to his true

combatant

status

does not thereby lose his entitlement to prisoner of war privileges. Thus, the question whether military personnel stationed in the Pentagon

wear uniform or civilian

work is irrelevant to their status as lawful combatants while hostilities are raging in Iraq. However, any member of the armed forces who removes his
uniform during combat or even en route to combat or in the course of disengagement from it becomes an unlawful combatant.
The legal position is the same whether the combatants under discussion are
Americans or Iraqis. The jus in bello applies equally to both sides in an international
armed conflict, regardless of who is in the right and who is in the wrong in
clothes while at

—

—

—

terms of the jus ad bellum.

4

One

—

of the hallmarks of the

was that much of the fighting on the

hostilities in Iraq, in

2003,

was conducted by "fedayeen" who

Iraqi side

fought Coalition forces out of uniform. These "fedayeen" were unlawful combatants.

But so were any members of the

tary units)

who

Removal by
fects his

US

Special Forces (or other Coalition mili-

fought out of uniform.
a

combatant of a fixed

distinctive

entitlement to prisoner of war status.

the domestic courts of the Detaining

crime under the local

condoned

if

legal

carried out

system

Power

—such

as

for

act

amounting
etc.

to an ordinary

—which would be

in the course of hostilities; or to

immense panoply of protection spread over

oners of war pursuant to Geneva Convention
distinctive

any

murder, arson,

by lawful combatants

detention without benefit of the

It

emblem (such as a uniform) afexposes him either to (i) trial by

(III).

(ii)

pris-

However, removal of the fixed

emblem does not amount to a breach of the jus in

bello itself,

and cannot

be deemed a war crime.
Admittedly, Article 37 of Additional Protocol

1.

It

is

prohibited to

kill,

I

of 1977 provides:

injure or capture an adversary

inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead

him

by

resort to perfidy. Acts

to believe that

he

is

entitled to, or

obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in
conflict,

acts are

is

armed

with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following

examples of perfidy:

(c) the feigning

of civilian, non-combatant status.'

44

Yoram Dinstein
Neither the United States nor Iraq

is

a Contracting Party to the Protocol

therefore, inapplicable in the hostilities

sion of Article 37( 1 ) (c)

On the face of

it,

fixed distinctive

37(1 )(c),

if the

is

between them. But, in any event, the provi-

brought about in customary international law

of combatants

emblem and wear

who

feign civilian status

by removing

is

their

plain clothing. In conformity with Article

who

act leads to the killing, injury or capture of an adversary,

vited to believe that he

is,

must be viewed as curious and in some respects misleading.

a radical change

as regards the status

which

facing a civilian, the act

constitutes a direct breach of the jus in bello

is

is

in-

considered perfidious, and

it

itself.

The wording of Article 37(l)(c), to say the least, is surprising, inasmuch as the
Protocol in general far from imposing more stringent constraints on combatants
actually relaxes in a controversial way
taking off their fixed distinctive emblem

—

—

the standards of customary international law in this context.

How can one account

new stricture? The answer is that Article 37 1 (c) does
not amount to much more than lip-service. Any lingering doubt is dispelled by a
rider in Article 44(3) (where much of the controversial relaxation of unlawful
for the singular thrust of the

(

)

combatancy occurs): "Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph
shall

not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph

1(c)." 6

Even the ICRC Commentary concedes that "[t]here

tion in terms" between the provisions of Article 37(l)(c)

Since

emblem

—under customary

a certain contradic-

and Article

—the removal of

international law

44(3). 7

a fixed distinctive

(such as uniform) by a combatant during military operations

of loss of privileged status, and not a breach of the jus in
crime),

is

it

follows that each belligerent party

is

bello (let

is

a matter

alone a war

at liberty to factor in a cost/benefit

calculus as to whether or not circumstances militate in favor of retaining the fixed

emblem or removing it. If members of Special Forces units are fighting
behind enemy lines, and if the enemy has a demonstrably poor track record in observing the jus in hello's norms concerning the protection of hors de combat enemy
distinctive

military personnel, the conclusion

worth assuming the

risks

may be

of (potential) loss

on the whole it is well
of prisoner of war status upon capture
arrived at that

while benefiting from the (actual) advantages of disguise. However, as a rule and in

terms of the armed forces in general

(as distinct

units), the prospect of loss of prisoner of

that should,

war

from high-hazard commando

status

is

a significant consequence

and does, weigh heavily on commanders before they

give their assent

to an adventurous course of action.

The preservation of traditional modes of combat by uniformed (or otherwise
properly identified) soldiers is a matter of great import. The only way to ensure respect for the basic principle of distinction between civilian and combatants, protecting the latter from attack and injury, is to enable each belligerent party to know
45

Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003

whom

it is

facing.

A

combatant disguising himself as

tion of loss of prisoner of war status for he endangers

a civilian deserves the sancall civilians.

Dealing with Suicide Bombers
There

suicide

phenomenon of
civilian clothes is concerned. Clearly, suicide bomb-

currently a lacuna in the jus in

is

bombers disguised

in

them? By

available against

is

insofar as the growing
8

ers disguised in civilian clothes are

tion

bello,

unlawful combatants. But what effective sancits

very nature, the sanction of detention or

prosecution (under the domestic legal system)
batant out of uniform)

but

is

Once

thwarted in the attempt, can
the act

tion as to

is

irrelevant.

prepares himself to
still

executed, the perpetrator

A civilian

become

a

comhuman bomb,
(or a

be subject to detention or prosecution.
is

beyond the reach of the

law.

The ques-

which measures can be taken by way of deterrence against potential

bombers

cide

who merely

is

is

by no means resolved

at the

sui-

present time, especially in light of the

nobody can be punished for an offense he has not
personally committed. Accomplices and accessories to the terrorist act can evidently be prosecuted or detained, but members of the perpetrator's family
or
others associated with him
cannot be held responsible for his conduct solely begenerally upheld principle that
9

—

—

cause of that connection.

A

specific question relating to suicide

bombers

arises in the context

of naval

The issue is how to protect hospital ships from immense potential peril of
being sunk by suicide bombers operating from speedboats (a la the well-known attack against the USS Cole), with a view to causing vast numbers of casualties. The
problem is derived from the fact that Article 35 of Geneva Convention (II) of 1949,
warfare.

in listing conditions

not depriving hospital ships of protection, indicates that arms

held on board must be confined to those kept by the crew for the maintenance of

own defense or that of the sick and wounded. 10 This appears to exmachine guns (and of course heavier armament) which may repel suicide

order, for their

clude

bombers."
suicide

How

bombers

best solution

can hospital ships be safeguarded against the external threat of
in the

would be

absence of adequate armament on board? Probably, the

to allow light

hospital ships. But the matter
(II)

is

armed naval

craft to patrol the waters

around

not currently addressed by Geneva Convention

or by any other instrument.

Feigned Surrender

The above-mentioned
killing, injuring

Article 37 of Additional Protocol

I,

in prohibiting the act

or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy, refers also

46
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to: "(a)
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the feigning of

.

.

.

a surrender." 12

many instances

national law. In Iraq, there were
perfidiously.
versary,

No doubt, this is a reflection of customary inter-

must be appreciated

It

and the perfidious

in

which surrender was feigned

that the killing, injuring or capture of an ad-

resort to feigning of an intent to surrender,

need not be

committed by the same person or persons. Should combatants hoisting the white
flag

of surrender be in collusion with their companions (who are lying in wait),

perfidy

is

consummated once

the latter

open

fire

forward to take the former as prisoners of war.
manifestation of perfidy. In

many combat

persists in shooting

the white

flag.

To be on

does not

some

is

the key to such

individuals (or even

Absent collusion, the fact that John

mean that Richard Roe

is

when

feigning

raising

risks,

and they may demand

that Richard

Roe

step for-

13

"Human
Possibly the

collusion

soldiers stepping

the safe side, the adverse party's troops need not expose

themselves to unnecessary

ward unarmed.

Still,

situations,

units) surrender while others continue to fight.

Doe

upon enemy

most

Shields"

characteristic feature of the hostilities in Iraq in

Saddam Hussein regime

constantly

—and

—resorted

flagrantly

is

that the

to the tactics of in-

"human

termingling civilians and combatants, using civilians as

2003

shields" with a

view to protecting combatants and military objectives. The deliberate intermingling of civilians

and combatants, designed to create a situation in which any attack

against combatants would necessarily entail an excessive
ties, is

number of civilian casual-

a flagrant breach of the jus in hello. Article 51(7) of Protocol

I

proclaims:

"The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians
not be used to render certain points or areas

shall

immune from military operations,

particular in attempts to shield military objectives

from

attacks or to shield, favor

or impede military operations." 14

at the root

appears already in Article

(IV):

The concept lying
28 of Geneva Convention

in

of the prohibition

"The presence of a pro-

may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from milioperations." 15 Irrefutably, this norm mirrors customary international law. 16

tected person
tary

Utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to render certain

immune from military operations is recognized as a
8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International

points, areas or military forces

war crime by Article

Criminal Court. 17 The reference to other protected persons extends beyond
ians to prisoners of war, military medical personnel, etc.

civil-

18

There are three ways in which the shielding of military objectives by civilians can
be attempted:
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One scenario relates to civilians who voluntarily choose to serve as human
shields, with a view to deterring an enemy attack against combatants or
(

i

)

military objectives.

the hostilities

Such conduct would amount

on the

to

an active participation in

part of the civilian volunteers,

who would consequently

become (unlawful) combatants.
The second scenario comes into play when combatants compel civilians
(either enemy civilians or their own) to move out and join them in military
operations. The civilians in question may be obliged to serve as a screen to
marching combatants, sit on locomotives of military trains in transit, etc.
Acting as they do under duress, these civilians do not become combatants.
Those who coerce the civilians to act in such a manner assume full criminal
(ii)

responsibility for their conduct.

(iii)

The

third scenario

that, instead

is

a variation of the second.

The only

difference

is

of the civilians being constrained to join the combatants, the

combatants (or military objectives) join the
combatants emplacing tanks or

That

civilians.

artillery pieces

in

done,

is

e.g.,

by

the courtyard of a

functioning school or in the middle of a dense civilian residential area.
Likewise, military units

may

infiltrate

happened during the Korean War),

columns of

in order to

mask

civilian refugees

(as
19

a military operation.

Once more, the civilians do not become combatants as a result of the military
action taken.

All three types

man

of attempts to protect combatants or military objectives with hu-

shields are equally unlawful.

The

crucial question

is

whether the brazen

act of shielding a military objective

enemy by bar-

with civilians (albeit a war crime) can effectively tie the hands of the
ring an attack. Article 51(8) of Protocol

I

states that a violation

of the prohibition of

shielding military objectives with civilians does not release a belligerent
gal obligations vis-a-vis the civilians.

20

its le-

What this means is that the principle of pro-

portionality (discussed below) remains relevant.

the actual test of excessive injury to civilians
praisal

from

However, even

must be

relaxed.

if

That

that

is

is

the case,

to say, the ap-

whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military advantage

anticipated

must make allowances

for the fact that, if an attempt

is

made

to shield

military objectives with civilians, civilian casualties will be higher than usual.

quote Louise Doswald-Beck, "[t]he

Israeli

To

bombardment of Beirut in June and July

of 1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given
the fact that the military targets were placed

48

amongst the

civilian population."

21
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Customary international law
this point. It has traditionally

from an illegal attempt to

is

certainly

more

been perceived

shield

that,

stringent than the Protocol

should

civilian casualties

not vested by the jus

is

in hello

A bel-

with the power to block an otherwise

legitimate attack against combatants (or military objectives)

ing civilians in harm's way.

ensue

combatants or military objectives, the ultimate re-

22
sponsibility lies with the belligerent State placing innocent civilians at risk.

ligerent State

on

by

deliberately plac-

23

Abuse of Hospitals, Mosques and Schools
Throughout the hostilities of 2003, the

and schools

as

weapon

Iraqis consistently

arsenals, staging areas for military operations

pads for attacks against Coalition forces.

mosques and schools

are civilian objects

It

However, the jus

protection.
tection

is

in hello is clear

and launch

goes without saying that hospitals,

which are

—indeed,
nature— from

entitled to protection

special protection because of their medical, religious
attack.

used hospitals, mosques

and

cultural

about the requirement to not abuse that

When hospitals, mosques and schools are put to military use, their pro-

terminated and they become military objectives. 24 Article 52 of Protocol

clarifies in

I

Paragraph 2 that any object can turn into a military objective through

use (making an effective contribution to military action); the sole qualification

proclaimed in Paragraph

3:

"In case of doubt whether an object which

is

is

normally

dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling
or a school,

is

being used to

make an
25

effective contribution to military action,

it

must be borne in mind that the presumption is patently rebuttable, and it arises only in case of doubt. There is no room for
doubt once combatants are exposed to direct fire from a supposedly civilian ob26
If a steeple of a church or a minaret of a mosque is used as a sniper's nest,
ject.
doubt is eliminated and the enemy is entitled to treat it as a military objective.
Even Article 53 of the Protocol, which lends special protection to certain cultural objects and places of worship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage of
shall

be presumed not to be so used."

It

peoples, prohibits their use in support of the military effort. 27 Article 13 adds that

the protection of civilian medical units shall cease
side their

humanitarian function,

acts

if

they are used to commit, out-

harmful to the enemy. 28

The pivotal issue here is proportionality. That is to say, in the words of Judge Higgins, in her Dissenting Opinion in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat
or Use

c

oj

Nuclear Weapons: "even a legitimate target may not be attacked

eral civilian casualties

the attack."

29

Protocol

would be disproportionate
I

in Article 51(5)(b), the

if the collat-

to the specific military gain

from

does not employ the phrase "disproportionate," preferring,

term "excessive." 30 Thus,

49

it

would be

excessive to destroy a
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many dozens of civilian casualties, in order to eliminate a single enemy
sniper. 31 In contrast, if, instead of a single enemy sniper, a whole artillery battery
would operate from within the hospital, such destruction may be warranted. 32
hospital, with

Individual Targeting of Central Figures in the Regime

Pursuant to the jus

in bello, all

members of

armed

all

the

combatants can be lawfully targeted. 33 This includes

forces (other than medical or religious personnel),

whether or not they are actually engaged
or merely dons a uniform as a

poses himself to
dividual
forces,

member

as a target,

specific individuals

who

Thus, leaders of the Iraqi regime

—

combat. 34 When a person takes up arms

of the armed forces, he automatically ex-

enemy attack. The jus in

enemy combatant

on

in

bello
i.e.,

does not preclude singling out an in-

by regular armed military

"attacks,

are themselves legitimate military targets." 35

like

Saddam Hussein

—who wore

forms and prided themselves on holding high-ranking positions
tary hierarchy could be targeted

by Coalition

forces,

military uni-

in the Iraqi mili-

provided that the

not entrust the mission to unlawful combatants, as discussed

latter

did

earlier.

Looting by Enemy Civilians
Pursuant to customary international law, as reflected in the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws

and Customs of War on Land, annexed

of 1899 and IV of 1907, pillage of towns and other places
sault (Article 28) 36 or in

ends.
a

Looting

problem

The

is

a

is

territories (Article 47).

enemy, public or

(or plundering) of
38

occupied

private, property

to

Hague Convention

II

forbidden, either in as-

37

Pillage

means looting

by individuals

for private

common phenomenon in warfare, but it is usually perceived as

affecting the belligerent forces (especially in assault or in occupation).

Iraqi situation

was somewhat singular

in that the collapse of the

Saddam

Hussein regime brought about prolonged large-scale looting of Iraqi public and
private edifices (including, notoriously, the national

museums) by the

local

popu-

on the rampage. Undeniably, the jus in bello prohibition of pillage covers all types of looting by whoever is undertaking it. The obligation of belligerent
parties is evident, and it is reflected (inter alia) in Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague
lation going

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
flict:

"The High Contracting

necessary, put a stop to

in the

Event of Armed Con-

Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and,

any form of theft,

pillage or misappropriation of, or

acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property."

39

Surely, this covers

of looting, including that carried out by local inhabitants against their

ernment, institutions and co-nationals.

50

all

if

any

types

own Gov-
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The Status of Journalists
Article 79 of Protocol

I

enunciates that journalists engaged in dangerous professional

missions in areas of armed conflict are to be considered and protected as
Journalists

do not

lose their status as civilians

being "embedded" in them).
bers of the media

is:

It

the expression "journalists" covers photographers,

it

40

forces 41 (or

by accompanying armed

does not matter what their specific mission as

men, sound technicians, and so on.
All the same,

civilians.

mem-

TV camera-

42

must be understood

that

when journalists choose to go

into the

combat zone, with a view to covering hostilities from the front, they are engaged in
a dangerous professional mission. Being civilians, journalists must not be attacked
deliberately. But one should not be surprised when journalists are accidentally
caught in the cross-fire between the belligerent parties (as happened on several occasions in Iraq).

It is

unrealistic to expect journalists to undertake a

dangerous pro-

fessional mission without casualties.

In any event, journalists

der heavily

must behave as civilians.

armed guard, and attempt to

If they

go on their mission un-

pull heroic feats (using,

if necessary,

their

escorts), they are liable to lose their protection.

Treatment of Prisoners of War
Judging by media reports, a
forces

may have been

number of Coalition

soldiers captured

by Iraqi armed

executed. If so, this was in direct contravention to the

fundamental rule of Geneva Convention
oners of War, encapsulated in Article 13

(III)

(first

most

Relative to the Treatment of Pris-

Paragraph). 43 Willful killing of pris-

oners of war constitutes a "grave breach" of the Convention, as per Article 130, 44

namely, a war crime.

The

Iraqis also interrogated

ner that

American prisoners of war on

man-

many people in the United States found objectionable. Such interrogation

may have amounted to a violation of Article
tion,

television in a

13 (second Paragraph) of the

which mandates the protection of prisoners of war against

curiosity.

45

However, even assuming that that was the

case,

insults

it is

Conven-

and public

noteworthy that

such an act (unless amounting to torture or inhuman treatment) does not constitute a grave breach of the

Convention under Article

130.

Moreover, interrogation

on television at least attested that the prisoners of war in question were alive in captivity.

The appearance on

television therefore substantially

the subsequent execution of the prisoners of war.

It is

a matter of record that

American prisoners of war seen on television were in fact,

51

reduced the chances of

eventually,

all

found alive.
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The Applicability of the Law of Belligerent Occupation

The Coalition was very eager
But notwithstanding the

to present

fact that the

brought liberation to the Iraqi people,
ternational law

— the

legal status

its

overthrow of the

it

army of liberation.
Saddam Hussein regime

forces in Iraq as an

must be appreciated that

of the Coalition forces in Iraq

is

—pursuant

not that of libera-

tors but that of belligerent occupants. Belligerent occupation
Articles

42-56 of the Hague Regulations of 1 899/ 1 907,

tion (IV) of 1949.
tal

collapse

47

It is

as well as

governed by

is

Geneva Conven-

true that, following the unconditional surrender

—of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan

May and August

46

at the close

to in-

—and

of World War

to-

II

(in

1945, respectively), the Allied countries did not regard themselves

Hague Regulations in running the two counHowever, that was before the adoption of Geneva Convention (IV) in 1949.
tries.
Article 2 (second Paragraph) of Geneva Convention (IV) makes it clear that the
as subject to the application of the
48

Convention applies to

"all cases

of partial or total occupation of the territory of a

High Contracting Party." 49 It is also noteworthy that the Security Council explicitly
refers to the Coalition forces in Iraq as

resolutions adopted

unanimously

"Occupying Powers"

(initiated, in fact,

tion 1483 (2003). Resolution 1472 refers to the duty of the

mentions the

the United States

in particular the

fully

significantly, Resolu-

Iraq. 50 Resolution

as

occupying powers; and

calls

The

number of issues, such

Hague

duty, under Article 43 of the

and

Regulations, to "restore,
52

reaching repercussions.

must ensure,
paralyzed by

It

armed bands and

saboteurs.

characterized at least parts of Iraq for a

(b)

Article 43 has far-

should be emphasized that the Occupying Power

as far as possible, that life in the

hostilities,

and

while respecting, unless

safety,

absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
53

(IV) to Iraq

as:

ensure, as far as possible, public order

major

all

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. 51

liable to raise a

(a)

upon

with their obligations under international law, including

The application of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention
is

1483

and obligations under applicable international law of

and the United Kingdom

concerned to comply

and the

States

Occupying Power to en-

and medical supplies of the population of
responsibilities

two Chapter VII

by the United

United Kingdom): Resolution 1472 (2003) and, even more
sure the food

in

A

occupied territory
state

is

not

of anarchy, which

number of weeks following the end of

could not be allowed to continue.

While regime change

in

Iraq—ri.e., the overthrow of the

— was

regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party

52

dictatorial

merely a natural

Yoram Dinstein
consequence of the Coalition's victory in the Gulf War, American notions of
changing the structure of Iraq, for instance, transform

may run

to a federal State,

consent

expressed

circumstances.

It is

of

it

from a unitary State

into difficulties (unless gaining the freely

the

noteworthy

during

that,

accused of a breach of Article 43

Much depends on
World War I, Germany was

population).

local

when

it

change the regional

tried to

organization of occupied Belgium into two administrative parts (Flemish

and Walloon)/
into

On the other hand, when the British divided occupied Libya

two administrative

War II,
(c)

4

there was

districts

no complaint.

(Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) during World
55

Pursuant to the Hague Regulations, there are

many issues

handling of public and private property in occupied

relating to the

territories.

The

Regulations are not necessarily draconic for the Occupying Power. Thus, the
Coalition forces could have kept the billions of dollars of cash and gold
bullions found in caches

regime. Article 53

(first

army of occupation

left

behind by the leaders of the Saddam Hussein

Paragraph) of the Regulations expressly allows an

to take possession of cash, funds etc.
6

property of the State/ The rule

is

war.

battlefield: these constitute

booty of

In the event, notwithstanding the preceding provisions, the Coalition,

owing to

its

self-perception as a liberator of Iraq, chose to take the altruistic

step of preserving the troves

(d)

are the

similar to that governing the capture of the

enemy's State cash and funds on the
5/

which

found

for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

However, in other instances the Hague Regulations may tie the hands of

the Coalition. There are questions

Occupying Power, under

spawned by the

Article 55, can only be regarded as "administrator

and usufructuary" of public immovable property.'
affects the drilling

of

oil,

Having said

Gulf of Suez

all that, it

8

One such problem

especially in light of a rather controversial legal

opinion of the Department of State
fields in the

principle that the

—

—but now

offered

liable to

when

Israel

developed

haunt the Coalition in

new oil
9

Iraq.'

should be noted that under Article 6 of Geneva Conven-

tion (IV), the application of most

—

albeit

by no means

all

—of the provisions of

the Convention ceases one year after the general close of military operations. 60

The general close of major combat operations has already been announced, albeit
perhaps somewhat prematurely. In any event, it is generally hoped (and expected) that the full application of the Geneva Convention would prove a relatively

temporary matter.
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1

Introduction

The argument

of the United States administration that those individuals cap-

tled to prisoner of

was

tured during the "global war on terror" 2 are unlawful combatants not enti-

States
is,

is

status

may be summed up

engaged in an international armed conflict

—the "war on

United

terrorism." This

armed conflict against a non- State
social and criminal phenomenon (ter-

second, one single worldwide international

actor (al Qaeda) or perhaps also against a

—

armed conflict started without the United States so characterizing
time at some point in the 1990s and will continue until victory. Third,

rorism). That
it

as follows. 3 First, the

at that

—

while the United States claims in this conflict

all

the prerogatives that international

humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to international armed conflicts confers upon a
party to such a conflict, in particular the right to detain

any judicial decision in Guantanamo;

most of that law by claiming
rules applying to

it

enemy combatants without

denies these detainees the protections of

that their detention

is

governed neither by the IHL

combatants nor by those applicable to

civilians. Fifth, all

those

considered to be enemies in the "war on terrorism," even those denied the benefit
of IHL's

full

protections, are not dealt with under domestic criminal legislation or

under any other new or existing legislation, nor do they benefit from international
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The US administration claims that their treatment
ruled by some mysterious rules of customary IHL. 4

rights law.

and exclusively
In this paper

will

I

address the approach of the

US

entirely

is

administration towards the

persons held in the "war on terrorism" from the point of view of IHL. As always

when IHL is applied,

this implies, first, that the situation in

involved must be examined to determine whether

whether
sons

it is

who

which those persons are

an armed conflict and,

it is

if so,

international or non-international in character. Second, for those per-

are covered

by IHL,

their status

under IHL has to be determined.

The Status of the "War on Terrorism" under International Humanitarian Law

IHL

today largely codified in

is

treaties, in particular the

four 1949 Geneva

6

5

Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols. The United States
to the former, but not to the latter.

It

I

as reflecting

a party

recognizes, however, Additional Protocol

desirable or even as restating existing law,
ditional Protocol

is

and most, but not

all,

II

as

provisions of Ad-

customary international law.

The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply to international
armed conflicts. Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions states that they
"shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." Only States can be
parties to the Geneva Conventions. Al Qaeda and terrorism are not States, therefore, the

law of international armed conflict does not apply to a conflict between

no indication that State practice and
opinio juris go further and apply the law of international armed conflict to conflicts
between States and some non-State actors. On the contrary, and in conformity
the United States, a State, and them. There

is

with the basic construct of the Westphalian system, States have always distin-

guished between conflicts against one another, to which the whole of IHL applied,

and other armed
rules,

conflicts, to

which they were never prepared

but only more limited humanitarian

rules.

Even

to apply the

same

a conflict spreading over

borders remained a non-international armed conflict. "[IJnternal conflicts are distinguished from international

by the

territorial

If the

armed

conflicts

by the

parties involved rather than

scope of the conflict." 7

aforementioned principles are applied to the "war on terrorism," the law of

international

armed

conflicts

covered the conflict in Afghanistan, because

rected against the Taliban, representing de facto

Qaeda, where

it is

government of that

State.

it

was

As

di-

for al

acting de facto under the global or effective direction or control of

Qaeda may

be qualified as international. 8

the Taliban, the conflict against

al

Such direction and control

however, only in Afghanistan and not elsewhere.

exists,
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Each component of the "war on terrorism"
sons were arrested

now,

it

—has

was regretted

to he

that

examined and

—and even"

its

status

situation in

which per-

determined separately. Until

once there was an international element to a conflict on a

given territory, the whole conflict could not, under consistent State practice, be clas-

wholly international but had to he

sified as

split off into its

components. 9 Even

less

could a worldwide conflict be determined to be international simply because some of
its

components were

IHL of

international

Xo

international.

armed

one claimed during the Cold

conflicts applied to internal conflicts

War

such

that the

as those in

Greece, Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, or even to political tensions and arrests
in

Germany,

Italy or Latin

the "war against

America, simply because those were part of the Cold War,

communism,"

or because there were international

between proxies of the two superpowers

in the

Near

armed

East, Korea, or

conflicts

Vietnam.

Components of the "war on terrorism" that do not qualify as international
armed conflicts may be non-international armed conflicts covered by Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions and by Additional Protocol II. To fall
under those provisions they must, however, be armed conflicts. Criteria permitting
such classification are the intensity; number of active participants; number of victims; duration

and protracted character of the violence; organization and

open and coordinated

pline of the parties; capability to respect IHL; collective,

character of the hostilities; direct involvement of governmental

opposed

to law

enforcement agencies); and de

disci-

facto authority

armed

forces (as

by the non-State

ac-

tor over potential victims.

Other situations are not armed

conflicts at

"situations of internal disturbances

radic acts of violence

and other

flicts."--

Terrorist actions

creating

armed

Protocol

I

conflicts.-

"that the

tion oi a kind

is

Additional Protocol

and tensions, such

II

as riots, isolated

acts of a similar nature, as

excludes

and spo-

not being armed con-

by private groups have not customarily been viewed
1

The L nited Kingdom

term 'armed

which

all.

conflict'

stated

of itself and in

when
its

it

ratified

as

Additional

context denotes a situa-

not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes in-

cluding acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation." 13 The British and

Spanish campaigns against the IRA

'.Irish

Republican Army) and

Askatasuna have not been treated as armed conflicts under IHL.

ETA

(Euskadi

ta

14

I

If IHL applies,

each conflict has

active hostilities in

its

own beginning and its own end. At the end of

an international armed

of or sentenced for a crime)

must be

fighters captured in Afghanistan,

ippines or in Iraq the "war

conflict, prisoners

repatriated.

of war (not accused

The detention, such

as of Taliban

cannot be prolonged simply because in the Phil-

on terrorism" goes on.
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The Status of Persons Held in the "War on Terrorism"
under International Humanitarian Law

Under the Law of International Armed Conflict
In international armed conflicts, there are two categories of "protected persons"
combatants, who become pristhat are subject to two very different legal regimes

—

oners of war protected by Geneva Convention

enemy, and

civilians protected

III if

they

fall

into the

by Geneva Convention IV when

in

power of the

enemy hands.

"Unlawful combatants?"

The US administration claims
are neither

combatants nor

that the persons

civilians

it

holds in the "war on terrorism"

but "unlawful combatants." President Bush

himself made this argument concerning the status of Taliban fighters. 15 Other administration officials extend
rorists."

16

According to the

IV, however,

tected

by

no one can

neither.

it

to

text,

fall

members of al Qaeda and others qualified as "tercontext and goals of Geneva Conventions

between the two conventions and therefore be pro-

sons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given

manner whatsoever,

conflict or

III

"shall

article,

any

persons protected by

clearly indicates that

the requirement for protected person status

International

in

not be considered as protected persons within the

meaning of the present Convention." This
falls

moment and

Occupying Power of which they are not nation-

According to the fourth paragraph of that

Geneva Convention

follows: "Per-

find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the

hands of a Party to the

Convention

and

17

The first paragraph of Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV states as

als."

III

18

that

is

anyone

fulfilling

not protected by the Third

under the Fourth Convention. The Commentary published by the

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides:

Every person in

enemy hands must have some

either a prisoner of

war and,

as such, covered

covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a

status

under international law: he

by the Third Convention,

is

a civilian

member of the medical personnel of the

armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that that is a satisfactory
solution - not only satisfying to the mind, but also, and above all, satisfactory from the
humanitarian point of view. 19

The preparatory work
first

suggested referring to "persons

XVI Ith

The ICRC had
hostilities." The

for Article 4 confirms this interpretation.

who

take

no

active part in

Red Cross Conference criticized this phrasing because it did
not "cover those who commit hostile acts whilst not being regular combatants,
International
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such as saboteurs and franc- tireurs." 20 This problem was reported to the Diplomatic

Conference that was negotiating the four conventions, which then adopted the
present wording. Moreover, Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV allows for

some

derogation from the protective regime of that Convention for persons engaged in
hostile activities. If such persons

vision

would not have been

From

were not covered by the Convention, such a pro-

necessary.

a humanitarian perspective,

it is

dangerous to revive such an easy escape

category for detaining powers as "unlawful combatants."
the law

and

in particular not outside the carefully built

No one should fall outside

up

protective system offered

by the Geneva Conventions. They are the minimum safety net in the profoundly inhumane situation that is war, in which most of the other legal safeguards tend to dis-

The US administration has declared that it treats all captured "terrorists"
humanely. First, such a vague commitment is not sufficient. The law covers even
those who commit the most horrible crimes; only this allows us to judge over them.
appear.

may take advantage of such a new loophole by,
for example, denying the protection of the conventions to US personnel.
In conclusion, all persons who are covered by the IHL of international armed
Second, other,

conflicts

and

less

scrupulous States

fulfill

the nationality requirements

must perforce be

either

combat-

ants or civilians.

Combatants

members of the armed forces of a party to the international armed conflict. The United States argues that the Taliban held in
Guantanamo, who are members of the armed forces of the de facto government of
Combatants are defined

as

Afghanistan, are not prisoners of war, because they "have not effectively distin-

guished themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they

have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war." 21 This allegation

may astonish

Enduring Freedom, the United

those

States stressed that

and control centers and did not complain
Taliban from

civilians.

22

who remember

If the allegation

that

it

it

attacked Taliban

was impossible

militias [or]

.

.

.

command

to distinguish the

were true, the legal consequence would be

that the Taliban are indeed denied prisoner of war status

"members of other

that during Operation

if

they are considered as

volunteer corps, including

.

.

.

resistance

move-

"members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict." 23
It is at least arguable that the Taliban belong to the latter category. For regular armed
forces, however, it would be dangerous to require respect for the laws of war as a
ments," but not

if they

are

precondition for prisoner of war status. In

all

of not complying with IHL, and such accusations are
violations

by regular armed

forces

enemy is accused
too often accurate. If IHL

armed conflicts,
all

the

were permitted to deprive
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independently of their individual behavior, of prisoner of war status, that status
could frequently not provide

its

protective effect. Historically, the United States

never invoked such an argument concerning the

German Wehrmacht, which

can-

not be considered to have regularly complied with the laws of war.

Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan, there may be justification to deny them prisoner of war status on two bases. First, al Qaeda was a separate entity that was distinct from the military forces of the enemy State in the
international armed conflict, Afghanistan. Second, even if considered as an
As

for the al

Afghan

ments

militia,

it is

to distinguish itself

from the

compliance with the law.

in

In case of doubt as to

civilian

al

24

whether persons

combatants, Geneva Convention
ers

Qaeda complied with the requirepopulace and conduct its operations

highly doubtful whether

III

who have committed a belligerent act are

prescribes that they

must be treated as prison-

of war "until such time as their status has been determined by a competent

tri-

25

The United States established such tribunals in the Vietnam war and the
1991 Gulf War, 26 but it argues that in the case of those detained in Guantanamo,
there is no doubt that they are not entitled to prisoner of war status. 27 If the applicability of the clause merely depended on whether the detaining power has doubts,
the latter could always escape from its obligation, which would make the clause
bunal."

practically useless. 28
If a

person

he or she

is

fallen into the

power of the enemy is determined

a prisoner of war. Prisoners of war

may be

to be a combatant,

interned, not as a punish-

ment, but to prevent them from rejoining the fighting. Therefore no individual decision needs to be taken in order to detain them.

enemy combatant

is

they are an

fact that

sufficient justification for their detention until the

tive hostilities in that conflict.
specialis for

The mere

combatants, over

29

end of ac-

Classification as a prisoner of war prevails, as lex

human

rights

law and domestic law requiring an in-

dividual judicial detention determination. While in detention, prisoners of
benefit

however from the protections of Geneva Convention

that ensures they are treated not only

since they are not serving a sentence

III,

humanely, but also not

war

a detailed regime

as prison inmates, 30

and have committed no unlawful

act.

Civilians

During an international armed
requirements
this case

31

are protected

if they fall

into the

who

fulfill

own

territory,

ally

certain nationality

hands of a belligerent and enemy,

Afghan, nationals are always protected. In an occupied

of a third country other than an
party's

conflict, civilians

territory, nationals

of the occupier are equally protected.

only neutral nationals are protected, and then only

not benefit from normal diplomatic protection.
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Protected civilians

if

On

a

they do

may

not be
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two circumstances.

First,

detention

maybe authorized under

domestic legislation (or security legislation introduced by an occupying power) for
the prosecution

and punishment of criminal offenses (including direct participation

in hostilities). Second, civilians

may

be interned for imperative security reasons,

upon individual decision made in a regular procedure (which must include a right of
appeal) prescribed by the belligerent concerned. 33 Such civilians are

whose treatment
tion

IV and

civil

internees

governed by extremely detailed provisions of Geneva Conven-

is

their cases

must be reviewed every six months. 34

Under any circumstances, civilians who fell into US hands in Afghanistan may
not be held in Guantanamo, but only in Afghanistan. While combatants may be
held as prisoners of war in every corner of the earth, civilians protected by Geneva
Convention IV may indeed never be deported out of an occupied territory. 35 Afghanistan was an occupied territory because it came under the control of the
United States and its allies during an international armed conflict.
Surprisingly, and much to my relief, the Legal Adviser of the US State Department has admitted that "unlawful combatants" are protected by Geneva Convention IV. 36 Nevertheless the US administration has not yet comprehended the
practical consequences of this

Guantanamo and

denies

acknowledgement,

them

as

it still

detains those persons in

individual judicial or administrative determina-

tions of the basis for their detention.
It

may appear

armed

ironic to classify heavily

"terrorists" captured in

an

inter-

armed conflict who are not entitled to benefit from combatant and prisoner of war status as "civilians." Borderline cases never correspond to the
category's paradigm of the individual who has taken no part in the hostilities. Nevnational

ertheless these persons

fall

within the parameters of the law.

that "civilian status" does not

combatants

pation in
it

hostilities;

results.

As

is

important

is

"civilians," unprivileged

attacked while they unlawfully participate in hostilities. After

Geneva Convention IV does not bar

arrest,

tion,

may be

produce absurd

What

it

their

punishment

for unlawful partici-

even prescribes such punishment for war crimes. In addi-

permits administrative detention for imperative security reasons and for

derogations from protected substantive rights of civilians within the territory of a
State

and from communication

rights within

occupied

territory. 37

Geneva Con-

vention IV was not drafted by professional do-gooders or academics, but by experienced diplomats and military leaders

who

fully appreciated the necessity

of

concluding an agreement that addressed the security needs of a State confronted
with dangerous people.

Some may

find

it

shocking that unprivileged combatants

classified as civilians

have an advantage over captured lawful combatants in that the former are entitled
to individual judicial or administrative status determinations, while the latter are
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combatants are normally easily identified and given prisoner of war status

based on objective
erally will

tional

Is

members of a State's military forces genthe armed forces. In contrast, the organiza-

criteria. Additionally,

acknowledge that they are

membership and

in

combatant and the future

past behavior of an unprivileged

threat he or she represents can only be determined individually.

Under the Law of Non-international Armed Conflicts
The international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts

does not provide for combatant or prisoner of war

rules

on the

status, contains

status of persons detained in connection with the conflict,

may be

the circumstances under which civilians

whether "unlawful combatants" are combatants or
in non-international

armed

conflicts. In

such

detained.
civilians

conflicts,

no other

nor

details

The question

as to

simply does not arise

IHL cannot

seen as providing a sufficient legal basis for detaining anyone.

It

possibly be

simply provides

for guarantees of humane treatment and, in prosecutions for criminal offenses, for

and

certain judicial guarantees of independence
rest,

impartiality. Possible bases for ar-

detention or internment are entirely governed by domestic legislation and the

human

rights

law requirement that no one be deprived of his or her liberty except

on such grounds and
State practice too,

in

accordance with procedures as are established by law. 38 In

governments confronted by non-international armed

conflicts

base arrests, detentions, and internment of rebels, including rebel fighters, either

on domestic criminal law or on
conflict.

special security legislation introduced during the

They never invoke the "law of war."

Outside Armed Conflicts

IHL applies only to armed conflicts.
old of a non-international
falling

taining in

offers

no protection to those held in connec-

components of the "war on terrorism"

tion with those

conduct

It

armed

conflict.

below this threshold,

it

that

do not meet the thresh-

Because IHL has no application to

certainly cannot provide a legal basis for de-

Guantanamo or elsewhere those

that engage in such conduct.

Conclusion

Meant

as the

branch of international law providing protection to

by or involved
tification for

in

armed conflicts, IHL has become

for the

those affected

US administration a jus-

denying such individuals and others detained under the rubric of the

"war on terrorism" any of the protections provided by
domestic

all

legislation.

However, while the United

ready to provide those detained the

full
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benefit of this law. In effect, the
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administration argues that they are covered by no law except for those never defined

and mysterious

rules of customary IHL.

To properly apply IHL, every component of the "war on terrorism," the circumstances of each individual's arrest or capture,

be examined and
ism" do not

classified separately.

and the basis of each detention must

Many of those

held in the "war on terror-

within the parameters of persons covered by IHL. Others benefit

fall

from the fundamental guarantees of IHL applicable to non-international armed
conflicts. Again, however, that law provides no legal basis for their detention, an issue dealt with by domestic law. Those persons

who were

captured in Afghanistan

by the IHL of international armed conflicts. Under that law, only
those who are prisoners of war may be held in Guantanamo. Those who are not
prisoners of war are civilians. As such, they may only be detained in Afghanistan
are protected

and only

after individual judicial or administrative determinations.

vinced that the "war on terrorism" can be
if

won

—and

victory

I

am

con-

may even be easier

the carefully drafted standards of IHL are respected.
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of Non-Standard Uniforms
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1

February 2002, newspapers
the United
and United Kingdom pubInlished
complaints by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about US
in

and other Coalition
clothing." 2

The

States

Special Operations Forces operating in Afghanistan in "civilian

reports sparked debate within the

NGO

community and

military

judge advocate ranks about the legality of such actions. At the US Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) Annual Legal Conference May
vocate debate became intense. While

and the
wear

in the

Freedom

The

attendees raised questions of "illegality"

right or obligation of special operations forces to refuse

"civilian clothing," others

many

some

13-17, 2002, the judge ad-

room were not

Special Forces,

3

its

an

"illegal

order" to

urged caution. The discussion was unclassified, and

privy to information regarding Operation Enduring

special mission units, or the missions assigned them.

topic provides lessons

and questions

judge advocates. The questions

for consideration of future issues

are:

What are the facts?
(b) What is the nature of the armed
(c) What is the relevant law of war?
(d) What is State practice?
(a)

conflict,

and

its

armed

participants?

by

—
Special Forces'
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What Are The Facts?
Thirty years ago

it

was

my privilege to serve as the first Marine Corps

Representa-

The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, in Charlottesville, Virginia.
As the lone Marine on the faculty, I was expected to attend all major public ceretive at

monies, including the graduation of each Judge Advocate Officers Basic Course
the accession course for

new

ranted a speech by one of the

lawyers entering the Army. Course graduation war-

Army JAG Corps'

flag officers. Regardless

of who the

graduation speaker was, the speech was the same. Written by The Assistant Judge

Advocate General of the Army, the

was

called "the facts speech." Its

charging off to

There
hand.

is

tilt

much

at

Major General Lawrence H. Williams,

it

message was simple and straightforward: Before

windmills, be sure you have the

to be said for this

Condemning

late

admonition and

certain actions or declaring

them

facts.
its

application in the case at

a law of war violation based

upon news accounts is not a sound basis for analysis. No lawyer would prepare his
case based solely upon news accounts. Indeed, media reports generally are inadmissible as evidence. Regrettably, there was a rush to judgment by some based on a
less-than-reliable source.

The facts surrounding the issue were two-fold. The first had to do with what was being worn,

and by whom. The second concerned the motive

In response to the September 11, 2001

al

World Trade Center and Pentagon, US and
tions in Afghanistan in late

Qaeda

for the

NGO complaint.

4

terrorist attacks against the

coalition Special Forces

September 2001. At the request

—

began opera-

initially insistence

of the leaders of the indigenous forces they supported, they dressed in indigenous
attire.

For identification purposes within the Northern Alliance,

Massoud pakol
scarf,

each

(a

named

this

included the

round brownish-tan or gray wool cap) and Massoud checkered
for

former Northern Alliance leader

Ahmad Shah Massoud,

as-

Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. This attire was not worn to appear as civilians, or to blend in with the civilian
sassinated days before the

al

population, but rather to lower visibility of US forces vis-a-vis the forces they supported. Al

Qaeda and the Taliban had announced

uniformed US military personnel. Placing

(BDU)

or Desert

US
Camouflaged Uniform (DCU)

ance formation would greatly
Forces.

may

5

As

will

facilitate al

a

a $25,000 per

head bounty on

soldier in Battle Dress
in the

midst of a Northern

Qaeda/Taliban targeting of

be seen in review of the law, dressing in

Uniform

this

US

Special

manner more accurately

be described as wearing a "non-standard uniform" than "dressing as

ians." Special Forces personnel

who had

served in Afghanistan with

whom

I

civil-

spoke

Qaeda and the Taliban had no difficulty in distinguishing Northern
or Southern Alliance forces from the civilian population. 6

stated that al

Alliance

Alli-
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The

fall

of Kandahar in early December 2001 was followed by the collapse of

the Taliban regime and the swearing-in of Hamid Karzai as Prime Minister.

other aspect of US Special Operations Forces

November

In

ter Afghanistan.

2001,

—Army

US Army

Civil Affairs

—began

An-

to en-

Command

Forces Central

(USARCENT) had established the Coalition and Joint Civil Military Operations
Task Force (CJCMOTF) using soldiers from the 377 th Theater Support Command (TSC), the 122 nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352 nd Civil Affairs Command. By January

2002, the

3,

CJCMOTF was

established in Kabul.

It

served as

Government and supervised the humanfrom US Army Civil Affairs (CA) teams from the 96 th Civil Af-

liaison with local officials of the Interim
itarian assistance
fairs

Battalion,

who were beginning

operate throughout Afghanistan.

to

CJCMOTF also was the liaison with the US Embassy,

and coordinated

coalition

humanitarian assistance contributions.

The

USARCENT Commanding

civilian clothing

soldiers to
fairs

over

DCU.

General

made

His rationale was based on two factors:

perform humanitarian assistance operations; and

personnel, that

is,

force protection.

Command (USCENTCOM)

7

working with uniformed

(a) ability

(b) safety

of

of Civil Af-

A strong desire existed at the US Central

headquarters (Tampa) to present a non-confronta-

tional face, as well as a sentiment expressed that

nel,

the uniform decision, favoring

NGO would be reluctant to be seen

soldiers. Additionally,

96 th Civil Affairs Battalion person-

who initially operated in Islamabad, Pakistan, were ordered by the US Ambas-

sador to Pakistan to wear civilian clothing rather than their uniforms, reflecting the
sensitive
ing.

and unique

political

environment

in

which US Army forces were operat-

This order was not clarified or countermanded on entry into Afghanistan.

Civil Affairs personnel

continued to wear Western

adopted Afghan native

attire.

civilian attire. Eventually

8

some areas, local
uniformed Civil Affairs personnel. In December 2001,

Other reasons existed for continued wear of civilian
governors would not talk to

some

attire.

In

the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began arriving
in

Kabul in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. United Nations representatives

refused to meet with

US Army Civil Affairs leaders

if

they were in uniform.

US Army Civil Affairs units have a long, distinguished history. They played an indispensable role in the European Theater of Operations during and after World War
II, and in the postwar occupation of Japan. US Army and Marine Corps Civic Action
units played an equally indispensable humanitarian assistance role during the Viet-

nam War. NGO involvement during those conflicts was
(World War II) or extremely limited (Vietnam).
Under

the terms of the 1949

Civilian Persons in

Geneva Convention

Time of War (GC),

NGOs

71

virtually non-existent

Relative to the Protection of

operate subject to the consent of
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relevant States parties to a conflict. 9

which

in

NGOs

The

GC also contemplated a linear battlefield

could operate in secure areas, a combat environment different

from Afghanistan. Legally and operationally, military operations and requirements take

priority over

NGO activities. However, NGOs provide valuable services

NGOs not present.
Military commanders must give due consideration to this, as the absence of NGOs

that the military

might be expected or required to perform were

could add other responsibilities (such as refugee care) to a military commander's

NGOs cannot expect a risk-free work environment. Mil-

burden. At the same time,
itary
if

commanders

are entitled to

those decisions might place
Service

make

lawful mission-supporting decisions, even

NGOs or other civilians at greater risk.

NGOs have become a more significant player in areas of armed conflict over

the past decade.

NGO emphasis

is

on mission performance following the principles of

humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality.

NGOs feel obliged to maintain

independence from the agendas of both the donors that fund them and governments

and
see

them

local authorities that allow

to operate in their territory. In contrast,

NGOs

CA engaged in assistance activities as driven by political and security objectives.
The US

military leadership

was not

entirely successful in seeking a dialogue,

much less a working relationship, with NGOs in Afghanistan. The relationship was
particularly bad as US Army Civil Affairs arrived in Afghanistan. Civil Affairs personnel were denied access to

CJCMOTF-hosted

NGO meetings, while some NGOs refused to come to

meetings.

A

cluded that the key issue was

worked

senior on-scene

NGO

Cells

Civil Affairs officer con-

image and market

in Afghanistan since the 1980s feared

Humanitarian and Liaison

Army

share.

NGOs who

had

being upstaged by the Army's Civil

NGOs also objected to humanitar-

(CHLC). The

ian projects being used in support of a military campaign.

The

CJCMOTF

served as liaison with the Interim

the humanitarian assistance for

Government and supervised

US Army Civil Affairs teams beginning to

operate

throughout Afghanistan. Civil Affairs personnel deployed across Afghanistan to
provide assessments and identify projects for some $2 million in

initial

aid

money.

The money went directly to local contractors. NGOs wanted to be subcontracted.
Based on limited money, a need to have an immediate impact, and concern about

US Army Civil Affairs leadership
subcontract to NGOs. Moreover, due to se-

whether such use of these funds was permissible,

NGOs that would not
curity concerns, NGOs were in the main
informed the

Affairs

it

cities

but not in the villages where Civil

teams conducted business. Going directly to

fear of some

local contractors increased the

NGOs that they would be cut out of their "market share."

Friction also existed with respect to fiscal accountability.

are expected to account for

money provided

NGO — as

100% of funds

much

as

60%

allocated to

—
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it.

US Army Civil Affairs

A substantial amount of

directed to "overhead," preventing
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its

allocation

toward the designated project, and

full

accountability.

scrutiny of their financial accountability shortcomings

was another

Civil

and amounts attributed

to

US Army Civil Affairs and the NGOs.

overhead. This increased tension between
Social reform

NGOs resent

Affairs/NGO point of tension. Contrary to

many NGOs in Afghanistan moved into adand human rights. This caused friction with US Army

claims of neutrality and impartiality,

vocacy of women's rights

whose role is to provide humanitarian relief without interference in
customs, however objectionable they may be. Civil Affairs work stifled NGO

Civil Affairs,
local

agendas on non-humanitarian

issues.

A better than average, although uneven, relationship evolved between CA and
NGOs at the working, "grassroots" level. This contrasts with a poor relationship
at

higher levels due to the conflicts identified above.

NGO

resentment of

US

Army Civil Affairs and market share concerns apparently prompted the NGO com-

—

plaint

led

clothing.

The

10

by Medecins sans

Frontieres

—regarding

Philosophical differences between

uniform/civilian clothes issue

Civil Affairs

wear of

civilian

NGOs and the military are inevitable.

was symptomatic of a

larger issue. It should

be

noted that not all NGOs agreed with the complaint made by Medecins sans Frontieres.
In early

March

mise, directed

all

2002, the

CJCMOTF commander,

Civil Affairs personnel in

desiring to broker a

compro-

Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to return to

Some Civil Affairs personnel in remote locations (where NGOs would
not work due to the risk) were permitted to stay in civilian attire. On March 19, following its review, USCENTCOM supported CJCMOTF's decision. Guidance and
full

uniform.

authority was provided to ground force

commanders

to establish

uniform

policies

based upon local threat conditions and force protection requirements.

As

a result of the

NGO complaint, the issue of military wear of civilian clothing

was reviewed within the Department of Defense (DOD). Following DOD-Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) coordination, guidance was forwarded to

May 2002
result of

that

was consistent with

CENTCOM/CJCMOTF

USCENTCOM

in

CJCMOTF guidance issued April 7, 2002. As a

guidance, the

number of Civil

Affairs

and other

SOF personnel in civilian clothing had diminished substantially prior to DOD- JCS
action or the aforementioned

USSOCOM Legal Conference.

11

What Are The Legal Issues?
Considering an issue in the public sector, including the military,
vate practice or a law school examination.

is

similar to pri-

The legal issues have to be identified and

addressed. In weighing the situation at hand, the following legal issues were
identified:
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•

Is

lawful for combatants to wear civilian clothing or non-standard

it

uniforms
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in

combat?
there legal restrictions in use of either?

•

If so, are

•

Are there unique law of war considerations, such as

risks, a

commander

should balance in making his decision?

Other questions had to be answered prior to answering these questions.

What
the

the nature of the

is

armed

armed

conflict in Afghanistan

conflict,

was an

and

its

issue that

armed

participants?

The nature of

prompted considerable discussion

within and outside the government, in large measure due to the nature of the enemy.

Qaeda and the Taliban as separate entities constituted an incomplete and inaccurate picture. The enemy consisted of a loose amalgamation of
at least three groups: the Taliban regime (until its December 2001 collapse, followReferences to

ing which

it

al

reverted to

its

tribal origins), the al

Qaeda

terrorist group,

used as the

Guard for the Taliban leadership (both for internal security prior to and
following commencement of US/Coalition operations), and foreign Taliban. The
picture was further complicated by the tendency of some to refer to the Taliban as
the de facto Government of Afghanistan because it exercised rough control over
eighty per cent of the country. This was open to debate until collapse of the
Taliban, at which time it ceased to be an issue. Up to the time of the Taliban regime
collapse in December 2001, a strong case could be made that this was an internal
conflict between non-State actors in a failed State. 12 By the time of US Army Civil
Praetorian

Affairs entry into Afghanistan, the case

Another factor was that the United
gaged

was absolute.
States

and

in military operations in a foreign nation.

the Taliban, an argument could be

its

coalition partners

Hence

were en-

regardless of the status of

made that for certain purposes this was an inter-

armed conflict. However, by the time the uniform issue was raised by
non-government organizations and considered in Washington, the conflict
against the Taliban and al Qaeda looked more like a counterinsurgency campaign
or counter-terrorist operation than an international armed conflict. While the US
Administration chose to apply the law of war applicable in international armed
national

conflicts as a template for

US

conduct, 13

it

would be

incorrect to conclude that

all

of the law of war for international armed conflicts was applicable. For example,

Qaeda personnel were regarded as entitled to prisoner of
war status. 14 Nonetheless, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War 15 (GPW), proved a useful template for their treatment.
This issue was not entirely new. US and other military forces engaged in the various peacekeeping and other peace operations during the 1990s frequently sought
neither the Taliban nor

to ascertain

al

where they were along the

conflict spectrum.
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US military conduct, the issue made little difference. Department of Defense policy
is that US military personnel will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts,

however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of

the law of war during

to

other operations. 16

The primary issue

in

US and coalition

Qaeda and the Taliban was entitlement of captured al Qaeda
prisoner of war status under the GPW. That, as indicated, had been

operations against

and Taliban

all

al

decided.

What Is The Relevant Law?
In a speech

at

the United States Institute of Peace

on March

Roberts declared "Lawyers stick to the safe anchor of treaties."

more erudite way of expressing the adage,
every problem

is

viewed

So

as a nail."

it

"If the only tool

was

1,
17

2001, Sir

This perhaps

you have

in the debate over

Adam

is

a

is

a

hammer,

SOF wear

of non-

standard uniforms. The argument against non-standard uniforms primarily was

terms of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

cast in

War (GPW). 18 The author frequently heard critics argue that "in accordance
with" the GPW, (a) SOF were required to wear uniforms; (b) failure to wear uniforms was a war crime; and (c) SOF had to wear uniforms and treat captured al
enemy prisoners of war in the hope of reciprocity should
enemy hands. A closer examination of the law reveals (a) and

Qaeda and Taliban
any SOF
(b) to
al

fall

into

as

be legally incorrect, while

(c)

was highly speculative

at best

Qaeda and Taliban conduct.
The GPW and its predecessors contain no language requiring

nel to wear a uniform, nor fight in something other than

full,

with respect to

military person-

standard uniform.

Nor does it make it a war crime not to wear a uniform. Article 4, GPW, lists persons
entitled to prisoner of

GPW.

It states

war

status

and subject

to the protections set forth in the

in part:

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to

one of the following

(1)

categories,

Members of the armed

militias
(2)

who

have

fallen into the

power of the enemy:

forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as

and volunteer corps forming part of such armed

Members of

other militias and

members of

forces.

members of other volunteer

corps, including

those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and

operating in or outside their
that

such

militias

movements,

fulfill

or

own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided

volunteer

corps,

the following conditions:
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(a) that

of being
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commanded by a

person responsible for his subordinates;

(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that

of carrying arms openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in

accordance with the laws and customs

of war. 19

Differing views as to whether regular force combatants are expected or required
to

meet the four

presentation. While history, the negotiating history of article 4
treaties,

other provisions in the

GPW, and

and predecessor

recognized experts strongly suggest

combatants are entitled to prisoner of war status once they are

that regular force

members of the

identified as

regular forces (however attired

when

captured), 20

other experts argue that the 4A(2) criteria are prerequisites for prisoner of war
tus for regular force personnel as well as militia

number, tend

ited in

Additional Protocol

been identified

my

contained in Article 4A(2) are beyond the scope of

criteria

I

members.

21

to support the latter point of view.
23

Court

22

cases, while lim-

Article 46 of the 1977

denies prisoner of war protection to spies, even

as regular

members of the

sta-

have

if they

military.

Historical State practice, provided infra, suggests that denial of prisoner of war
status

even

is

not automatic, while the experience of

when

in

US

military personnel captured

uniform has been one of refusal of the captor to provide prisoner of

war status and/or suffer serious abuse. 24 Past abuses of captured US military and civilian

personnel do not constitute either justification or an argument for military

personnel to abandon standard uniforms. In international armed conflict, stan-

dard uniforms should be the norm; non-standard uniform, the rare exception;
vilian attire,

even

rarer.

But

risk

ci-

of denial of prisoner of war status, while a serious

commander's question: Is wearing something
less than the standard uniform illegal? The answer in treaty law and State practice is
clear: Wearing a partial uniform, or even civilian clothing, is illegal only if it involves
consideration, does not answer the

perfidy, discussed infra. Military personnel wearing non-standard

ian clothing are entitled to prisoner of war status
civilian clothing

There

is

may be

no doubt

and should, weigh
That being

at risk

a decision to authorize the

armed

civil-

Those captured wearing

of denial of prisoner of war status and

that in an international

said, military

if captured.

uniforms or

conflict

trial as spies.

any commander

wearing of civilian clothing

will,

carefully.

personnel are in a high-risk profession, and commanders

must make life-and-death

Under most circumstances, a commander ordering a frontal infantry assault on a heavily fortified position understands that in doing so, he has accepted that some soldiers are likely to lose their
often

lives in

decisions.

carrying out his order. Similarly, individuals

be under no illusion as to the attendant
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risks.
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As

the military should
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____
M.

Executive historian
gerous,

and people who

The decision

to

"The truth

R. D. Foot acknowledged,
fight

them

are liable to be killed."

is

that wars are dan-

25

wear something other than a standard uniform

military necessity. At issue then

what constitutes

is

first

requires

a "non-standard uniform?" If a

commander provides military necessity for a Special Forces team to conduct operations in an international

armed

conflict in

something other than the standard

uniform, what steps are necessary to comply with the law of war? What guidance,

any does the law of war provide

as to

form?" Second, what is "treacherous"
the 1907

if

what might constitute a "non-standard unikilling,

prohibited by Article 23(b), Annex to

Hague IV?
the law of war principle of distinction.

The law of war
divides the population of nations at war into the belligerent forces and civilians not
taking an active or direct part in hostilities. 26 With a single, limited exception, 27
At the heart of the

only military forces

issue

is

may engage directly or actively in hostilities, that is, in combat-

ant-like activities. Hostile acts
able, in

by

private citizens are not lawful,

order to protect innocent civilians from harm.

28

and

are punish-

and the

Civilians,

civilian

population, are protected from intentional attack so long as they do not take an active or direct part in hostilities. In turn, military forces are obligated to take reason-

able measures to separate themselves
objects, to distinguish

forces

at

undue

civilian

population and civilian

innocent civilians from civilians engaged in hostile

to distinguish themselves

population

from the

from the civilian population so as not to place the civilian

risk.

and other military

and

acts,

This includes not only physical separation of military

objectives

from

civilian objects

and the

civilian

tion as such, but also other actions, such as wearing uniforms.

An

popula-

early 20 th -

century law of war scholar observed: "The separation of armies and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct classes

Law.

Its effect

is

perhaps the greatest triumph of International

in mitigating the evils of war has

been incalculable." 29

Another law of war scholar summarizes the principle of distinction

in the fol-

lowing way:

It

may

be said that the principle ... of distinction between belligerents and

civilian

population, had found acceptance as a self-evident rule of customary law in the second
half of the 19 th century. Indeed,

demonstrated in

many

it

seems no more than a

reflection

of practice as

of the wars fought in Europe in that period. Soldiers were not

merely distinguishable; they were conspicuous in their proud uniforms; and armies
fought each other, and preferred the civilian population not to mingle in their business. 30

State practice

and

treaty

development make

it

clear that the principle

ther absolute nor rigid.

Wearing civilian clothing for

knowledged

law as a lawful military

in treaty

77

is

intelligence collection

activity.

SOF wearing

nei-

is

ac-

civilian
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clothing while serving with partisans was

and codified

The

in

subsequent

ancillary law of

common State practice in World War II

treaties or their negotiating records, as will

war prohibition on

"killing treacherously"

31

be shown.

does not pre-

clude lawful ruses or Special Forces' wearing non-standard uniforms, or openly
fighting in civilian attire with

no intent

to conceal their

combatant

status. 32

Wearing of Uniforms
Military wear of uniforms during conventional

armed

conflict reflects the general

exceptions discussed
least to the

combat operations

in international

customary practice of nations, subject to limited

infra. State practice

of uniform wear

is

extensive, dating at

Peloponnesian Wars (431 to 404 B.C.). 33

The customary

principle of distinction

is

applicable to the regular military

Conventional military forces should be distinguishable from the

forces.

civilian

population in international armed conflict between uniformed military forces
of the belligerent States.

It is

an expectation, with codified exceptions, and an-

other exception acknowledged in the negotiating record of the 1977 Additional

regular
tice

34

The criteria set forth for militia and partisan forces not a part of the
military had as their intention recognition of the generally accepted prac-

Protocol

I.

of nations with respect to the characteristics of conventional forces. 35

No

the only

way by

which regular armed forces may make themselves distinguishable from the

civilian

rule exists stating that a complete, standard

population.

36

Historically

it

uniform

has been the predominant

is

way by which

military per-

sonnel, including special operations forces, have distinguished themselves

the civilian population. But

it

from

has not been the exclusive way.

A difficulty lies in the lack of definition. There is no international standard as to
what

constitutes a "uniform." 37 Neither the 1907

GPW offers a definition or precise standard.
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on

Hague Convention IV nor the
In the International Committee of the

Article 4,

GPW,

its

author

states:

Hague Conventions, considered
it unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed forces should have for
purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so that members of its
armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily

The drafters of the 1949 Convention,

distinguishable

from

.

Similarly, reporting

.

.

civilians.

like

those of the

38

on discussions of the same

issue at the

Conference that promulgated Additional Protocol

I,

the

1974-1977 Diplomatic

ICRC Commentary states:

and how can emblems of nationality be distinguished
from each other? The Conference in no way intended to define what constitutes a

What

constitutes a uniform,

78

—

.
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uniform.

wearing

.

it

standard

"[A]ny customary uniform which clearly distinguished the member
from a non-member should suffice." Thus a cap or an armlet etc. worn in a
.

.

way is

actually equivalent to a uniform.

The uniform and other emblems of nationality are visible signs. Although certain kinds
of battle dress of different countries are very similar nowadays,

it

is

nevertheless

armed forces from enemy armed forces by means of
characteristics of outfitting and other signs of nationality. Furthermore, this makes it
39
possible to distinguish members of the armed forces from the civilian population
possible to distinguish allied

The ICRC Commentary
tional military forces

indicates that a State should ensure that

be distinguishable from the

its

conven-

civilian population. It

does not

manner in which this may be accomplished, nor state that the complete
standard uniform is the only way in which this requirement may be met.
specify the

In spite of the clear treaty language in Article 4A(2)(b),
sign"), the device

GPW

("fixed distinctive

need not be permanent or fixed. What "fixed distinctive sign" means

remains unresolved. In commenting on

this,

Howard

Professor

S.

Levie notes:

The ICRC has made several statements attempting to offer acceptable interpretations
of the meaning of the term "fixed distinctive sign" [contained in Article 4A(2), GPW].
In 1960 it stated that the sign "must be worn constantly"; but in 1971 it backtracked
somewhat when it said that the sign must be "fixed, in the sense that the resistant
[partisan or guerrilla] should wear it throughout all the operation in which he takes
part." Moreover, at that same time the ICRC stated that the sign "might be an
armband, a headdress, part of a uniform, etc." During World War II the listed items
were, on various occasions, used by resistance groups; but they were frequently
removed and disposed of at critical moments in order to enable the individual to
escape being identified as a

member of the resistance.

40
.

.

Given the generally accepted understanding of the term "distinctive devices"
a hat, a scarf, or an

armband

—

vision at reasonable distance

a device recognizable in daylight with

unenhanced

would meet the law of war obligation

to be distin-

guishable from the civilian population.

There are
(b) a

at least five categories

uniform worn with some

with a distinctive

emblem

upon

body armor)

civilian clothing;

that,

uniform

42

and

as such,

(c) civilian

from the

and

combined with

actions

such as

BDU;

clothing only, but

civilian population;

as load-bear-

and circumstances,

(e) civilian clothing,

with weapon concealed

member

of the military. 43 Based

visual indication that the individual

historical practice

(a) a

arms and other accoutrements (such

clearly manifest military status;

and no

of clothing:

to distinguish the wearer

(d) civilian clothing only, with

ing equipment,

41

is

a

treaty negotiation records, the first three constitute a

79
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"uniform." The fourth should protect the individual from charges of spying
tured provided he

is

distinguishable

from the

and other

ration, clearly military duties,

civilian

of the law of war occurs only when there
is

is

As

Conference

did not regard

The United

States

is

tensive military, legal

it

as serious

46

to the

The 1974-1977 Diplomatic

I

Following ex-

I.

States decided against sub-

United States Senate for

However, the United

bound by Additional Protocol
law.

I

States

its

advice and

acknowledged that

it

is

provisions that constitute a codification of cus-

47

Most paragraphs of Article 44, Additional Protocol I, amended
law of war with respect to entitlement to prisoner of war status for
(so-called "liberation

lawful for

be indicated, violation

not a State party to Additional Protocol

mission of Additional Protocol

tomary international

last is

enough to be classified as a Grave Breach.

and policy review, the United

consent to ratification.

will

The

treacherous use of civilian clothing that

the proximate cause of death or injury of others.
45

population by physical sepa-

characteristics. 44

intelligence gathering or other clandestine activities.

if cap-

movements"). For

the customary
private groups

humanitarian and military rea-

policy,

sons these provisions are regarded as unacceptable by the United States, and were a

major reason for the

US

decision against ratification.

With respect to conventional forces, Article 44, paragraph 7, states: "This Article
is

not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to

wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to regular, uniformed armed units
of a Party to the conflict." [Emphasis added.]

An

authoritative

commentary on Additional Protocol

viduals directly involved in

drafting

its

and negotiation

—

I

—prepared by

offers

indi-

an explanation of

this provision:

Within the Working Group the

initial

enthusiasm for a single standard applicable both

and independent armed forces was dampened when concern was expressed
that the
[new rules] might encourage uniformed regular forces to dress in civilian
clothing
Accordingly, para. 7 was developed to overcome this concern
The report
of the Working Group, however, states that "regulars who are assigned to tasks where
to regular
.

.

.

they must wear civilian clothes, as

may be

resistance units, are not required to

construed in the

light

the case

.

.

.

with advisers assigned to certain

wear the uniform." The implication of para.

of the Working Group report

is

7,

that uniforms continue to be the

means by which members of regular uniformed units distinguish themselves
population
but that members of regular armed forces assigned or
attached to duty with the forces of resistance or liberation movements may conform to
48
the manner in which irregulars conform to the requirements of para. 3.
principal

from the

civilian

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

That being

said,

another Diplomatic Conference participant offered the follow-

comment

as to

uniform requirement

ing

80

in light

of Article 44, paragraph

7: "[I]t
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•

should be noted that it is apparently not intended to exclude
the application of the previous paragraphs of the article.
ever,

that regular forces

is

hostilities),

whenever possible (notably

all

regular forces

from

What it does imply, how-

in "conventional" types of

should continue to wear uniforms." 49

Thus, commentaries by participants in the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference

confirm the Additional Protocol I acknowledgement that, where warranted by military necessity,

it

may be

permissible in international

military forces to wear civilian clothing.

mate ruse or

At

issue

is

armed

conflict 50 for regular

whether the action

is

a legiti-

perfidy.

Ruses and Perfidy
Ruses of war are lawful deceptive measures employed in military operations in international

armed

conflict for the

purpose of misleading the enemy. 51 The law of

war prohibits "killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile

Article

52

commonly known as perfidy. 53
23 of the Annex to the 1899 Hague II Convention

nation or army,"

23. Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions,

(a)

especially prohibited -

To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to

of army.

This

it is

states:

article,

the hostile nation

54

along with Articles 29 and 31, were re-codified with non-substantive

changes in the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention. They are important for
several reasons.

They

constitute recognition of the general obligation for military

forces to fight in uniform.

wear or
sult

However,

fight in civilian clothing unless

of killing treacherously.

as "perfidy" in Article

It is

it is

prohibited to

kill,

What

not a war crime for military personnel to

it is

done

for the purpose,

and with the

constituted "killing treacherously" was defined

37 of Additional Protocol

I:

injure or capture an adversary

by resort

to perfidy. Acts inviting

him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged
armed conflict,
confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are

the confidence of an adversary to lead

to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in

with intent to betray that

examples of perfidy:

(a) the feigning

of an intent to negotiate under a

(b) the feigning

of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;

(c)

re-

flag

the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status;

(d) the feigning of protected status

of truce or of a surrender;

and

by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the

United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict."
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In order to be perfidy, the act

or capture of the enemy.
limited criminal

perfidious use

.

.

36

killing, injury

But while the Diplomatic Conference codified perfidy,

it

made a Grave Breach only if it involves "the
of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion

liability.
.

must be the proximate cause of the

and sun." 37 Wearing

Perfidy was

civilian attire or feigning civilian status

was not designated

a

Grave Breach.
Each

differs

from US and

forms

as part of heavily

and

Qaeda

al

in the

war

forms, whether partial

coalition Special Forces operating in non-standard uni-

armed

units clearly

known and

identifiable

by the Taliban

wear of non-standard uni-

in Afghanistan. Special Forces

BDU or indigenous apparel of their Northern Alliance part-

ners, including their distinctive pakol hats

and/or

tribal scarves,

did not constitute

perfidy.

US Army Civil Affairs wear of Western-style civilian clothing or indigenous

attire in

Afghanistan would not have constituted perfidy unless

the purpose,

no such

and with the

allegation,

result of, killing treacherously.

and no evidence has been surfaced

That being said, the devil always has been in the
for military personnel to operate in

At the heart of the balance

which more
There

is

will

be

is

it

had been done

The NGO complaint made

to suggest such conduct.

details in

balancing the allowance

enemy denied areas in civilian attire, and perfidy.

the law of war principle of distinction. State practice, of

said, suggests that the lines

between the two are

far

from

clear.

logic to this history. State tolerance of Special Forces fighting in civilian

clothing in limited, special circumstances, such as support for partisans,
tent with humanitarian tolerance for captured guerrillas.

oner of war protection to

all

and not

to prosecute except in the

is

consis-

follows efforts

It

many, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,

drafters of Article

most egregious

44 had a better sense of State practice than did

coalition Special Forces

critics

on terrorism.

not entitled to law of war protection, and the law of war
counter-terrorist operations.

The
of US and

59

is

Terrorists are

not applicable as such in

Counter-terrorist units have been authorized to use

hollow-point or other expanding ammunition, 60 for example, and have worn
ian clothing or non-standard uniforms

some

civil-

on missions. 61 President Bush's radio

and the world on September 29, 2001,

th terror attacks

cir-

38

wear of non-standard uniforms.

Into the midst of this discussion steps the global war

dress to the nation

by

to provide pris-

cumstances, such as terrorism and treacherous use of civilian clothing.

1 1

for

in response to the

ad-

September

on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, may have prompted

in the military to err initially

wear were not applicable

and assume that law of war rules

relating to

uniform

in the military operations that followed in Afghanistan.

This leads to the proper point for review of State practice.

82
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What Is State Practice?
State practice

is

important to answering legal questions because

determining customary international law.
tary history

—

reveals

62

State practice

how governments interpret,

—

it

forms a basis for

synonym

a

for mili-

apply and/or enforce law of war

treaty provisions.
State practice in international

armed

conflict

tains a significant record of Special Forces

enemy uniforms

forms, and/or

and other military operations con-

wear of civilian

non-standard uni-

attire,

as a ruse or for other reasons.

Beginning with

Colonel T. E. Lawrence, the celebrated Lawrence of Arabia, State practice
overt tolerance bordering

on admiration

when working with indigenous persons
gence gathering or combat operations.

wearing

civilian clothing

been honored

The

enemy denied

in
63

areas,

whether for

intelli-

Special forces personnel captured while
as spies rather

than charged with a war

fought in civilian clothing and returned safely have

as heroes.

actions of Colonel Lawrence in

digenous
list

who

an

for special forces wearing civilian clothing

have been treated

crime, while Special Forces

reflects

attire

all

likelihood were not the

was worn, but one of the more

influential.

An

first

in

which

in-

appreciation of the

that follows necessitates a brief historical overview.

Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938 sparked

interest within the British

military in the potential necessity for irregular operations. Recalling the Spanish
guerrillas in Wellington's

(1807-1809), Boer

campaign against the French

in the Peninsular

commando success against the British in the

War

1899-1902 Anglo-

Boer War, Colonel Lawrence's success, the British experience in facing Sinn Fein in
Ireland 19 19- 192 1, 64 Chinese guerrilla operations against Japan in the Sino- Japa-

nese War, and other guerrilla activities in other conflicts, in 1938 the Research

Branch of the

British General Staff (GS(R))

began research that led to preparation

of Field Service Regulations entitled The Art of Guerrilla Warfare, The Partisan
Leader's Handbook,

GS(R) Report No. 8

and

How

to

Use High Explosives,

all

subsequently noted in

'Investigation of the Possibilities of Guerrilla Activities. 65

Commencement of the Second World War with the German invasion of Poland
on September

1,

1939, revealed Germany's

first

use of Special Forces in civilian

enemy uniforms, or non-standard attire as a ruse to seize critical objecBritish focus on partisan warfare and Special Forces was renewed with Ger-

clothing,
tives.

many's invasion of Western Europe, the
evacuation from Dunkirk in

fall

of France, and British

Army

May 1940. Standing alone, the British leadership iden-

means for action. In addition to traditional means such as naval
blockade and aerial bombing, it directed commando raids and "the undermining
of enemy morale and production possibilities through close co-operation with
tified several

83
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governments and through them

—or without them —with Resistance Move-

enemy occupied territory." The Charter for the British Special Operations
Executive (SOE) received War Cabinet approval on July 22, 1940. At this time
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill offered his oft-quoted edict: "And now set
Europe ablaze." Working closely with exile governments, the British Government
began making contact with potential resistance movements throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, ultimately providing them personnel and material support, subsequently coordinating their actions to link them directly to the British and Allied
ments

war

in

effort.

It is

important to understand what

independent secret

service. It

SOE

was, and what

was not a military

service.

it

was

But

not.

SOE

SOE was an

relied heavily

upon assignment of military officers to it, coordination of operations with the military chiefs of staff, and was dependent on the military services for personnel, support, supply and transportation. Although intelligence was sometimes a byproduct of its
tended for
clothing.
chill's

rules

its

activities,

SOE was

not an intelligence collection agency.

It

was

in-

operatives to engage in clandestine, subversive operations in civilian

The dagger

lay concealed beneath the cloak. In

Prime Minister Chur-

words, this was "'ungentlemanly warfare' in which the 'Geneva Convention'

do not apply and the

Thus the

British

price of failure

Government and SOE

form of operations

fully

was often a slow and

terrible death." 66

operatives consciously entered into this

cognizant of its law of war implications.

The "Geneva Conventions" baby had not been tossed out with
As was the case with US Special Forces
placed on wearing civilian

attire.

the bath water.

in Afghanistan in 2002, restrictions

were

Military personnel providing transport to

SOE

personnel to and from an operation were required to be in uniform, for example,

some to wear uniforms. For post-D-Day operaSOE personnel were provided armbands for partisans and British military

while late-war operations enabled
tions,

personnel not in uniform. Prior to and after D-Day, a clear showing of military necessity as

it

related to the mission

clothing. For example,

on May 30,

mander-in-Chief, India, that the

armed

forces

.

.

.

for authorization to

wear

civilian

War Office informed the ComChief of Staff had decided: "No member of the
1943, the British

should be sent on military operations, however hazardous, in

vilian clothes, except in the case

are essential."

was necessary

of subversive

activities for

which

civilian clothes

67

Germany invaded

Russia on June 22, 1941. In response, Russian Premier Josef

Stalin declared that day:

The

struggle against

merely a

ci-

fight

Germany must not be looked upon

between two armies

... in

as

an ordinary war

order to engage the

84
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of partisans and saboteurs working underground everywhere
In territories occupied
68
by the enemy, conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out.
.

Soviet partisan warfare differed

United States,

if perhaps

from

that of Great Britain

.

.

and (subsequently) the

only slightly. Whereas Great Britain and the United States ex-

ported support for underground movements in Axis-occupied nations, the Soviet Union supported partisan warfare within
operating along interior
rected

The

lines.

its

partisan

by Soviet Army personnel, was

own

charges

occupied by Germany,

movement, organized, trained and

di-

month of July 1943, partisan
of track to impede German re-supply

substantial. In the

forces carried out 10,000 separate demolitions
efforts.

territory

During the night of July 4, 1944 alone, partisans laid 4,1 10 separate demolition

on

railroads

rail lines;

on June

19, partisans

planted over 5,000 mines

behind the Second and Fourth German Armies. While

it

on the roads and

was estimated that

250,000 people were directly engaged in partisan operations by 1944, Soviet authorities

boasted that every Soviet civilian in Nazi-occupied territory was at

volved in partisan

activities,

and on September

6,

least indirectly in-

1942, the partisan

movement

—something

achieved the nominal status of a separate branch of the Soviet military

thought about in the United Kingdom by some, but never achieved in either the

United Kingdom or the United
United Kingdom and United

States.

Like underground operations supported by the

States, Soviet partisan operations

—were

military personnel fighting in civilian attire

United

State

—with

approved and

civilians

and

directed.

movement into partisan operations closely followed Russian and
Early in World War II, the Roosevelt Administration established the

States'

British actions.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, the

OSS was

a hybrid organization led

guished, decorated former

by Major General William A. Donovan,

Army officer. OSS was under

a distin-

the administrative cogni-

zance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but under operational control of the theater

commander. 69

It

was an organization focused on espionage, sabotage and partisan

US Army personnel provided a major part of the OSS strength, which
reached its maximum of 13,000 in December 1944. US Army Special Forces traces its
support.

lineage to OSS.

70

By the spring of 1944, SOE and OSS were operating together in
sions.

71

Some OSS

a variety of mis-

units operated in uniform, while others did not

cumstances. In one of its major

efforts, France,

OSS

under

operational units

all cir-

worked

in

Nazi-occupied territory in direct support of the French Resistance. As a leading
history notes:

The

first

group consisted of seventy-seven Americans who wore

civilian clothes as

organizers of secret networks, as radio operators, or as instructors in the use of

85
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explosives. Thirty-three

before 6 June 1944, D-Day.

The

1

OSS group

.

.

members of

that

group were active

France consisted of 356 Americans

in

in France

.[Emphasis added.]

who were members

of

OGs were French-speaking volunteers
and engineer (for demolition experts).

Operational Groups (OG). All recruits for the

from US

Army

Working

in

a

units, primarily infantry

.

uniform, these teams parachuted behind the lines after

variety of missions.

In addition to

.

its

.

and

OSS worked

Operational Groups,

a continental

Europe member, each

initially
6,

1944.

French

who were

with

SOE

in

Jedburgh

composed of an Englishman, an Ameri-

the third was the communications specialist.
officers fluent in

.

72

teams. These teams were intended to be
can,

.

D-Day to perform

military,
73

The

to parachute in

two of whom were

initial

core contained

officers;
fifty

US

uniform to resistance groups,

throughout France during the weeks following the Allied landings on June

They would provide

liaison with the

quis, boost "patriotic morale,"

underground, arm and train the Ma-

and coordinate

resistance activity with Allied mili-

tary strategy. Ninety-three Jedburgh teams parachuted into France to join the

Maquis

after

D-Day, numbering three hundred French,

British

and US

officers.

Eventually they served in other Nazi-occupied territory.

While the Jedburghs normally operated
ble.

in uniform, this

In an operation in Nazi-occupied France,

was not always possi-

Major Horace

Fuller,

USMC,

avoided capture as a result of accepting the advice of his French contact to wear
vilian clothing, including

during combat operations.

Similar operations occurred in other theaters.
cer
its

ci-

74

On May 4,

1942, a

US Navy offi-

formed Naval Group China. Composed of Navy and Marine Corps personnel,

mission was to establish radio intelligence posts, weather-gathering and lookout

stations, form,

supply and train indigenous sabotage units, and conduct attacks on

Japanese units and equipment. Also
ganization,

it

executed

its

known

as the

Sino-America Cooperative Or-

operations successfully for the duration of the war,

of them in non-standard uniform or indigenous civilian

mission and situation.
This

is

attire,

many

depending on the

75

not the time to recount Allied support for partisan operations in World

War II, nor what then were termed "commando" operations. However, several observations are relevant to the issue at hand. First, partisan operations were universal,

occurring in every Axis-occupied nation, actively supported by each of the

major

Allies

in exile.

— United Kingdom, United

States

and Russia

—and each government

Second, they were significant in their breadth and longevity. For example,

the French Resistance

Movement began

shortly following

German conquest

1940 and continued through the war. By 1944, approximately three million

86

in

men

W. Hays Parks
and

women were

associated with the various French Resistance organizations. In

Yugoslavia, 400,000 were involved in partisan operations.

Resistance activity was dependent

upon volunteers

—whether

the civilian population of Axis -controlled nations, civilian
serving with the

SOE

or OSS, or

possible consequences

if

members of Special

partisans

from

and military personnel

Forces. All were aware of the

they were caught, whether in uniform or other

attire.

At

same time, execution as a spy if captured in something other than standard uniform was not a certainty.
Partisan sabotage operations were regarded as a valuable alternative to

the

highly inaccurate strategic

bombing

in

Nazi-occupied

territory, as the Allies

sought to reduce collateral civilian casualties to friendly populations. 76 Partisan
sabotage was the "smart bomb" of World War

employment of very precise means, it was the epitome of the second facet of the fundamental law of war
principle of distinction. 77 In some cases, the evidence was clear that partisan/
Special Forces sabotage often was more effective than air operations against the
same targets, 78 while in other instances OSS-lead partisans were able to destroy
heavily defended targets that had resisted air attack. 79 While the rationale for
partisan or Special Forces attacks

more

for political than

ments chose not

to

Additional Protocol
tions tied

I.

In

may have been

law of war reasons,

condemn

II.

80

it

offers evidence of why govern-

Special Forces/partisan unconventional warfare opera-

down Axis units that could have been used more
81

and

tions,

Special Forces

and

their partisan allies

effectively

engaging

significantly impaired

efforts to reinforce their defenses at Allied points

tions.

selected over aerial attack

attacks in civilian clothing as a Grave Breach in

Allied forces but for the partisan threat,

82

its

German

of offensive ground opera-

performed other

life-saving ac-

such as the rescue of downed Allied aircrew and assistance in running

escape routes. 83 Special Forces served as on-the scene ambassadors where Allied

combat operations

killed

innocent

civilians. 84

Partisan operations, including sabotage

were executed primarily in
rope on June

6,

and

direct attacks

on Axis personnel,

civilian attire, occasionally (after the Allied return to

Eu-

1944) wearing a distinctive device, sometimes in a partial uniform,

modern "gang"
colors than a traditional military uniform. The same was true for SOE and OSS military personnel serving with resistance movements and, in some cases, Special Forces.

but seldom in

full

uniform. "Uniform" varied, often being more

Finally, partisan operations

like

were successful. Danish historian Jorgen Haestrup

concludes "The Resistance Movements, seen in their entirety, deeply influenced
the course of the war, psychologically, militarily
thereof,
fight

he quotes Russian historian

E. Boltin:

and

politically." 85 In

support

"History has never known a popular

of such huge dimensions as was apparent during the 1939-1945 war.
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Furthermore the masses had never before taken so directly
combat, as was the case

in the last

The preceding comments

war

in

Europe."

are offered to

by partisans or military personnel

show

it is

clear that the

that the wearing of civilian attire

in Special Forces units or in the

neither unique, occasional, nor limited in time

low,

a part in the military

86

wearing of civilian

and

attire

SOE or OSS was

space. In the examples that fol-

or non-standard uniform (and, in

some cases, enemy uniform) was a deliberate act based upon a decision made at the
highest levels of government.

The list set forth

in the

Annex (infra)

is

illustrative rather

than exhaustive, and

is

condemnaWith the exception of US action in Ex parte Quirin 87 and

offered for historical purposes rather than necessarily with approval or
tion of the missions listed.

the unsuccessful prosecution of Otto Skorzeny, 88 the
in international

armed

conflict has

tended not to

enemy uniforms by

standard uniforms, and/or

list

treat

reveals that State practice

wear of civilian

war

enemy uniforms

sometimes (but not always) with severe consequences.

as spies,

However, those who returned
festing

non-

regular military forces as a

crime. Personnel caught in flagrante delicto in civilian attire or

have been treated

attire,

safely

were decorated rather than punished, mani-

an endorsement of their actions by their government.

The wearing of enemy uniforms is not directly within the scope of the issue under
consideration. However, State practice is germane regarding the prohibition on
"killing treacherously" contained in Article 23(b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV. 89 State practice shows that governments have been willing to deploy

enemy uniforms where a major advantage is antici-

Special Forces in civilian attire or

pated,

and where the gain

tions have not

is

greater than the risk to the deployed personnel.

been regarded

as a

Such

ac-

war crime either by the government ordering them

or the government against which the forces were employed. 90
State practice provides several points for fine tuning a general principle:
(a)

Colonel Lawrence wore indigenous

against the

Ottoman Empire

attire

in the Hejaz. Coalition Special Forces aligned with

Northern Alliance and Southern Alliance forces
in the

while leading the Arab uprising

in Afghanistan, suggesting a

nuance

law of war principle of distinction: an armed military group recognizable

distance

and

readily identifiable to the

even when wearing indigenous
lawfully. In essence, there

is

attire

enemy by

its

size

and other

characteristics,

with or without distinctive devices,

no "treacherous

killing" or perfidy

at a

is

acting

because there has

been no treacherous use of civilian clothing.
(b)

Non-standard uniforms or indigenous

attire

may

be adopted for practical

The British/Commonwealth
Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), operating behind enemy lines in North Africa

reasons rather than with intent to

commit

from 1940-1943, adopted the kaffiyeh and

88

perfidy.

agal as a standard part of their

uniform

W. Hays Parks
The

for utilitarian purposes, for example.

coats to

ward off the nighttime desert cold,

LRDG

wore native sheep or goatskin
and US Special Forces op-

as did British

erating behind Iraqi lines in the 1991 coalition effort to liberate Kuwait.

Wear

of

by the LRDG served partially as a ruse against casual observation, such as
by enemy aircraft. However, their identity clearly was recognizable at a distance by
the latter

enemy ground forces. 91
(c) Law of war compliance with something as simple as wearing a distinctive device
may not be practical where the enemy is known to punish rather than reward compliance. For example, immediately prior to D-Day (June 6, 1944), British air-delivered
supplies included

armbands

for partisan

and supporting

Allied conventional forces returned to the continent.

Special Forces' use once

However,

distinctive

emblem

wear was viewed with skepticism in light of Hitler's Commando Order denying quarter
to

any partisans or Special Operations Forces. 92

mens rea,

(d) Perfidy requires

intent to deceive.

that

is,

the donning of civilian attire with the clear

A group of alert, fit young men, heavily and openly armed, sur-

rounding an individual in military uniform, and themselves surrounded by host
nation military personnel in uniform, clearly are a personal protection

mask

are not attempting to

pecting

detail,

and

nor gain an advantage over some unsus-

their status

enemy soldier.

The law of war regards

way

a uniform as the principal

military forces distinguish themselves

in

which conventional

from the civilian population in international

armed conflict. State practice (including US practice), treaty negotiation history,
and the views of recognized law of war experts reveals (i) that the law of war obligation

is

one of distinction that otherwise has eluded precise statement in

stances;

(ii)

there

"requirement"

is

is less

no agreed

definition

of uniform;

stringent with respect to Special Forces

deceive,

and the

the enemy.
against

its

act

where an
is

is

perfidious, that

is,

circum-

uniform

working with indige(iv)

a law of war vi-

done with an intent

to

wounding or capture of
found no enforcement by a government

the proximate cause of the killing,

My review of State

own

act

the

(iii)

nous forces or executing a mission of strategic importance; and
olation occurs only

all

personnel.

practice

Enemy combatants

captured

in flagrante delicto

were

prosecuted as spies rather than for law of war violations, with the exception of Ex
parte Quirin

and the unsuccessful post-World War

II

US

prosecution of SS-

Obersturmbannfuhrer Otto Skorzeny.

Summary
In international

armed conflict,

the wearing of standard uniforms

military forces, including Special Operations Forces,

89

is

by conventional

the normal

and expected

—
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standard. Wearing civilian attire or a non-standard uniform

is

an exception that

should be exercised only in extreme cases determined by competent authority.
In international

uniforms or
stricted. It

in

armed

conflict, military necessity for

civilian clothing has

been regarded by governments

extremely

as

re-

has been limited to intelligence collection or Special Forces operations

denied areas.

No valid

military necessity exists for conventional military forces,

whether combat (combat arms, such
standard uniforms or civilian

as infantry,

combat

port (such as Civil Affairs), or

The

wearing non-standard

armor or

service support personnel, to

attire in international

armed

codified law of war for international

wearing of a non-standard uniform.

combat sup-

artillery),

armed

wear non-

conflict.

conflict does not prohibit the

does not prohibit the wearing of civilian

It

clothing so long as military personnel distinguish themselves from the civilian

population, and provided there

is

legitimate military necessity for wearing

thing other than the standard uniform.
tinction

when wearing something

distinctive device,

such as a hat,

The

generally recognized

not a non-standard uniform

proximate cause of the
not exist

when

tifiable as a

killing,

through a

is

or armband, recognizable at a distance.

Violation of the law of war (perfidy) occurs
clothing

manner of dis-

other than the standard uniform

scarf,

some-

—with

when

a soldier wears civilian

intent to deceive,

and the

act

is

the

wounding or capture of the enemy. Perfidy does

a soldier in civilian attire or

combatant, and there

is

no

non-standard uniform remains iden-

intent to deceive.

Discussion of the issue raises an appearance of a double standard in considering
Taliban militia/al Qaeda (in Afghanistan) or
vilian clothing while justifying
attire.

SOF wear

Saddam Fedayeen

of Western civilian

(in Iraq)

attire

wear of ci-

or indigenous

A "double standard" exists within the law of war for regular forces of a recog-

nized government vis-a-vis unauthorized combatant acts by private individuals or

non-State actors. The issue was complicated by the unique nature of operations in
Afghanistan, that
failed State,

is,

counter-terrorist operations against non-State actors in a

and the increased role of NGOs in a non-linear combat environment.

The law of war
military field

principle of distinction cannot be taken lightly.

uniform should be worn absent compelling military necessity

wear of a non-standard uniform or

civilian clothing. Military

wearing a uniform

vilian clothing.

is

dard uniform or

may

be

at greater

not in and of itself sufficient basis to justify wearing

"Force protection"

is

civilian attire. Risk

for

convenience should

not be mistaken for military necessity. That military personnel
risk in

The standard

ci-

not a legitimate basis for wearing a non-stanis

an inherent part of military missions, and

does not constitute military necessity for the wear of civilian

war requirement to wear a complete, "standard" uniform
have recently suggested.

90

is

attire.

But the law of

not as absolute as some

W. Hays Parks
To summarize:
(a) The law of war

requires military units

and personnel

to distinguish

them-

from the civilian population in international armed conflict. Article 4 (A) 2 of
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW) 93 sets forth standards all combatants are expected to satisfy. However, miliselves

may

tary personnel

distinguish themselves

from the

civilian

population in other

ways, such as physical separation.
(b)

Standard

US military uniforms satisfy the requirements of GPW Article 4A.

"Standard military uniform" refers to battle dress uniform (BDU), desert camou-

uniform (DCU),

flage

official flight suit,

or other obvious military apparel. 94 The

presumption should be that all US armed forces operate in standard uniforms during military operations in international
(c)

armed

conflict.

When authorized, the requirements of GPW Article 4(A) 2 maybe satisfied

by other than the complete standard military uniform. For example,
of the standard military uniform, or a fixed, distinctive sign will

ments provided that the forces are recognizable

as

a visible part

satisfy the require-

combatants with unenhanced

vision at a distance.
(d) Neither the

War on

Global

Terrorism nor the

fact that

one

is

Special Operations Forces offers carte blanche for military personnel to

thing other than the

full,

of

wear some-

standard uniform. The wearing of a partial uniform or

non-standard uniform with
tional circumstances

member

a

when

fixed, distinctive sign

should be reserved for excep-

required by military necessity. Force protection does

not constitute military necessity. Authority should be regarded as extremely limited,

mission and unit specific, and decided by a senior

commander or higher, such

Combatant Commander responsible for the mission.
(e) While a hat, scarf or armband would meet the fixed distinctive sign requirement, a permanently affixed distinctive sign such as an American flag sewn onto
as (in the

US military)

body armor or
(f)

the

clothing

is

more prudent.

Forces operating in other than the complete standard uniform should re-

ceive training in the law of war to ensure that they understand the requirements of

distinction

and

are fully aware of the risks they

may face

if

captured

if

they

fail

to

comply with the law of war.
(g)

Captured

wearing

ons

US

military personnel (other than escaping prisoners of war)

civilian apparel

without a fixed distinctive sign and without

visible

weap-

may be considered spies by their captor. The captor may try them for domestic

law violations

war violation

(e.g.,
(e.g.,

violative of the

spying). Unless they otherwise

commit an independent law of

perfidy), history indicates that the acts will not be regarded as

law of war.
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ANNEX
TABLE OF HISTORICAL STATE PRACTICE 95
Who

When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

Japanese officers in

Japan

Chinese

1904

civilian attire

Russian soldiers in
Chinese civilian attire

Manchuria

Captured and

(Russo-Japanese

executed.

War)

on sabotage mission.
Russia

any)

1904

Manchuria

Japanese diplo-

(Russo-Japanese

matic protest.

War)

attacked Japa-

nese units.

Col. T. E.

Wore Arab

Lawrence
(Lawrence

while leading Arab

of Arabia)

Ottoman (WWI)

British

Army

1916-

Lawrence

1918

Hejaz Province
Arabia (Syria)

1939

Germany

None.

1941

Libya

Killed in attack.

Special Operations

1940-

Europe, Asia

Executive (SOE) per-

1945

attire

decorated.

uprising against the

Empire, fighting
Turkish Army.

Germany

SF dressed

as Polish

civilians fake raid

customs house
pretext for

on

as

German

invasion of Poland.

France

commander wore indigeFree French

nous attire in attack
on Italian fort at
Murzuk, Jan 11, 1941.
United Kingdom

SOE

agents cap-

tured in flagrante

were incar-

sonnel in civilian

delicto

clothing supported

cerated, not always

partisan operations in

executed.

96

Axis-controlled

Nations.

92
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Who

When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

Germany

Danish-speaking SF

any)

1940

Denmark

None

1940

Netherlands

None

1940

Belgium

None

1940-

Libya

None. Kaffiyeh/
agal adopted by

dressed as Danish
soldiers seize

key

bridge to initiate
invasion.

Germany

SF dressed

as

Dutch

military policemen
seize
start

key bridge at
of German

invasion.

Germany

SF wearing Belgian

Army overcoats

over

their uniforms seize
key bridge at start of

German
United Kingdom

invasion.

Long Range Desert
Group wore Arab
kaffiyeh and agal,
sometimes wore in-

1943

LRDG as official
uniform.

digenous coats over
uniforms.

Germany

SF wearing Russian

Army overcoats,

1941

Russia

None

1941

Libya

None

car-

rying Russian weapons, driving Russian

Germany

vehicles,

spearhead

German

invasion.

SF dressed in British
Army uniforms and
indigenous attire,
driving British vehicles,

attempt recon-

naissance to Suez.
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When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

United Kingdom

SF in German uniforms infiltrated

any)

1942

Libya

None

1942

Czechoslovakia

Partisan agents

Tobruk

as part of
Operation Agreement. Mission executed with
infiltration

by an-

other officer in indig-

enous
United Kingdom

attire.

SOE-trained,

equipped and trans-

commit

ported partisans

rather than

kill

Obergruppenfuhrer
Reinhard Heydrich,

suicide

surrender.

Reichsprotektor for

Nazi Governor of
Czechoslovakia.

Soviet

Union

Russian partisans and

1941—

German occu-

Partisans captured

military operative

1945

pied territory in

were executed.

Soviet Union.

Survivors deco-

groups deployed to
support them fought

rated

Soviet

Union

Naval Spetsnaz conduct operations in ci-

by Russia

postwar.

in civilian clothing.

1942-

German-occupied

1945

territory in Soviet

Same

as above.

Union.

vilian clothing,

enemy uniforms.
Used English-speak-

Japan

ing

1942

Malaya

None.

1942

US

Tried by Military

Germans (French

Foreign Legion) captured in Thailand in
Feb. 1941 dressed in

uniforms resembling
British Khaki to penetrate British lines.

Germany

97

Eight

Germans on

sabotage mission

Commission

captured

violation of the

in civilian

law of war.

clothing.

94
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Who
UK/Australia

When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

Operation Jaywick,

1943

Singapore

combined SOF team

any)

Participants

commended.

navigated to Singa-

pore in Japanese

fish-

Kofuku

ing boat

Maru, flying Japanese
flag and dressed in
native sarongs. At-

tacked and sank seven
ships (38,000 tons).

Poland

SOE-trained partisans, one dressed in
SS uniform, raided
Pinsk prison near

1943

Poland

None.

1943

Norway

None.

1943

Burma

Post-war

Brest-Litovsk, freed
prisoners, killed

commandant.
United Kingdom

SOE-trained,

equipped and transported partisans sabotaged

German heavy

water plant

at

Vermok.
98

Japan

Formed Indian National

Army from

trials

of

under India
Army Act or Indian
soldiers

captured Indian

Army personnel, who

Penal

fought in Indian

than charged with

Army uniforms

war crimes.

against British

Code

rather

and

Commonwealth
forces in

United Kingdom

LT.

B.J.

Burma.

Barton, No. 2

1944

Commando, penetrated German deindigenous

Awarded
Cross.

fenses wearing

killed

Brae (Ageaen)

attire,

German

commandant.
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When

What

Disposition

Where

(if

United Kingdom

British officers

1944

Crete

None.

1944

Aegean

None. One Victoria Cross, numerous other awards.

1944

Singapore

Captured died
from illegal medi-

German

dressed as
soldiers,

any)

with parti-

san assistance, abduct

Major General Karl
Kreipe,

Commander,

22nd Panzer Division
on Crete.
United Kingdom

SAS wore mixed
of British,

and
and
United Kingdom,
Australia

dress

German

Italian

uniforms,

civilian clothing.

Operation Rimau,
combined SF team in
uniform to attack

cal

experimenta-

tion, or

Japanese ships.

were

executed.

United Kingdom

Special Boat Squad-

1944

Nisiros (Aegean)

None.

1944

Norway

None.

1944

France, Yugosla-

None.

ron(SBS) officer
dressed as priest led
successful attack

German
United Kingdom

on

units.

SOE-trained/

equipped partisans
sabotage and sink
ferry carrying Ger-

man
United States

heavy water.

Office of Strategic
Service (OSS) teams

via,

enter Nazi-occupied

garia,

Albania, Bul-

Rumania

Europe, conduct operations in civilian
clothing.

United States

US

Naval Group
China wearing civil-

1944

ian clothing collected
intelligence

and exe-

cuted direct action
missions against
Japanese.

96

China

None.
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Who

When

What

Disposition

Where

(if

United States

Army Rangers
as

German

dress

1944

Germany

19441945

France,

any)

None.

soldiers to

penetrate and fight in

Aachen (OSS
operation).

United States
United Kingdom/
Host nation

Jedburgh teams operate

post-D-Day in

Italy,

Yu-

None.

goslavia, Albania,

Netherlands

support of partisans,

not always in uniform.

Germany

German Kommando
unit dressed in

1944

Belgium

US

in

uniforms

executed. Mission

Ardennes.

commander, Otto
Skorzeny, and ten

vehicles, penetrate
lines in

US

US

uniforms, driving

US

Members captured

others acquitted in

war crimes
United Kingdom

Operation Tombola
SAS operation with

1945

Italy

None.

Partisan operations

1944-

Germany

None.

by German SF

in ci-

1945

German

1945

trial.

Italian partisans. Ci-

with
mixed uniform.

vilian attire

Germany

vilian clothing.

United States

OSS team

in

Germany

Mission aborted

by end of war.

uniforms to conduct
Operation Iron Cross
to execute subversion

missions and capture
or

kill

senior Nazi

officials.

United States

OSS Operations
Groups operate

1945
in

US

uniforms, indigenous

Chinese Pup.Army
pet
uniforms.
attire,

97

China

None.
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When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

Indonesia (I)"

any)

vilian attire while at-

Captured and
tried under do-

tacking civilian

mestic law.

Soldiers dressed in ci-

1965

Singapore

objects.
100

Indonesia

(II)

Soldiers in civilian attire

1965

Singapore

captured while

on mission

Captured and
tried under domestic law.

to attack

civilian objects.

MACV (SOG) teams
wore non-standard

United States

1965-

Southeast Asia

None.

South Vietnam

Awarded Medal of

1971

uniforms operating
in denied areas.
United States

101

SF soldier fought in

1968

Honor.

civilian clothing in

response to Tet Offensive assaults.

United States

102

Navy SEAL

officer

1972

South Vietnam

form

Awarded Medal of
Honor.

switched from unito indigenous

attire to fight

way in

and out of encircled
aircrew to rescue him.

Israel

Operation Aviv
Neurim, IDF SF team

1973

Lebanon

Ehud Barac evenbecomes
IDF Chief of Staff,

dressed in civilian
clothing raids

Team commander
tually

PLO

Beirut targets.

Israel

Prime

Minister.

Israel

Entebbe rescue force
includes

1976

Uganda

commandos

dressed as

in rescuing hijacked

Uganda

aircrew and passengers held hostage.

soldiers.

United States

Team for rescue
US hostages in

Mission successful

of

1980

Iran

Mission aborted

due

AMEMB Tehran

to helicopter

failures.

wore non-standard
uniforms approved
by Joint Chiefs of
Staff, President.
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Who

When

What

Where

Disposition
(if

any)

NATO nations

Never executed.

1979

Afghanistan

None.

Special Forces infil-

1950-

Republic of

Treated as spies

South Korea
wearing Civilian

1988

Korea

when

Sidi-bou-Said,

None.

Soviet Union, East

Spetsnaz dressed in

Cold

Germany (GDR)

civilian clothing or

War

NATO uniforms
trained/planned to
penetrate/operate in

NATO rear, attack
high-value targets.

Soviet

Union

Spetsnaz dressed in

neu-

civilian clothing

tralized senior

Afghan

officers,

then

secured Kabul airport

wearing Afghan

Army uniforms.
North Korea

trate

clothing or

captured.

ROK

uniforms.

Israel

Sarayet Maktal wear-

1988

ing non-standard uni-

Tunisia

forms carry out
successful direct action

mission to
had,

kill

commander,

Panama

1

7

Abu Ji-

PLO military

Infantry

in Tunis.

Company

1989

(Macho de Monte),
Panamanian Defense

Panama (Opera-

Captured members

tion Just Cause)

treated as prisoners

ofwarbyUS.

Forces (PDF), fought
in civilian attire of
shorts, t-shirts,

and

straw hats.

United States

CINC's SF personal
wore

security detail

1990-

Saudi Arabia

None.

Iraq

None.

1991

civilian attire.

United Kingdom/
United States

SF wore kufiyah/agal
and indigenous coats

1991

over uniforms during
operations in Iraq.
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Notes

1.

Professor Parks holds the

Law of War

Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of

He is a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War
A version of this paper was published in 4 Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (Fall
The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author, and may not

Defense.
College.

2003).

necessarily reflect an official position of the

Department of Defense or any other agency of the

United States Government.
for example, Michelle Kelly

2. See,

endangering aid workers,
3.

&

Morten Rostrup,

THE GUARDIAN (London),

Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan are

Feb.

This article offers a subtle distinction. Special Forces

1,

2002, at 19.
limited to

is

US Army

Special Forces

assigned to Special Forces Groups or detachments, Naval Special Warfare (SEALs and Special

Boat units), and Air Force Special Tactics Units, and their coalition counterparts, while Special
Operations Forces includes Special Forces, Psychological Operations units, and
Affairs units.

There are members of Army Civil Affairs Units who are Special Forces

distinction offered in this article

is

Army

Civil

soldiers.

The

one of unit assignment and mission(s).

The section that follows was prepared from personal interviews with Special Forces personnel
and materials provided by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US
Army War College, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and the Department of State. Pertinent
documents are in the author's personal files. In particular, see US Army Peacekeeping Institute,

4.

Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (2003).

wear of Northern Alliance attire was undertaken at the insistence of Northern
Abdul Rashid Dostum, commander of its 8,000-man Junbish-e-Millie, the largest
Northern Alliance army. President William J. Clinton ordered the prompt withdrawal of US forces
from Somalia following the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in which eighteen members of
Task Force Ranger died. See MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR
(1999). General Dostum feared US withdrawal from Afghanistan if confronted with US casualties.
Multiple Northern Alliance bodyguards were assigned to each US Special Forces soldier. In the early
days of fighting, General Dostum told some of his subordinates in Mazar-e-Sharif that he would kill
them if they allowed their US charges to be hurt or killed. Once US and coalition forces showed that
they were not casualty averse, the bodyguard standards were relaxed. SF wear of the Northern
5.

Special Forces'

Alliance General

Alliance pakol, tribal scarves,

and beards prevented them from being singled out

Qaeda/Taliban personnel. Wearing indigenous
Alliance forces

wore beards

The

risk

it

supported. Special mission unit Special Forces, whose identities are

classified, also

to reduce risk of media/public identification.
is

not new. In 1915, serving in the Arabian Peninsula as a military adviser to Wahabi

chief Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, British
attire.

attire also

by al
aided SF rapport with the Northern
for targeting

During a

battle

Army Captain William H.

I.

Shakespear eschewed indigenous

between the forces of Ibn Saud and pro-Turkish tribal leader Ibn Rashid,
Army uniform singled him out and

Shakespear was killed by an enemy sniper when his British

him as a high-value target. See JEREMY WILSON, LAWRENCE OF ARABIA 1043 (1990).
Knowledge of the circumstances of Captain Shakespear's death prompted T.E. Lawrence to wear
Arab clothing as he lead the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule that began June 5, 1916, and to
identified

incorporate the lesson into his "Twenty-Seven Articles" (Articles 18-20) published in August

1917 as lessons learned.

Id. at

1043, n.4.

Indigenous personnel over-protection of
Strategic Services

China

in

1945.

OPERATIONS

IN

US

Special Forces personnel

is

not new. Office of

(OSS) Operational Team Muskrat/Bear experienced the same phenomenon in
FRANCIS B. MILLS, ROBERT MILLS, & JOHN W. BRUNNER, OSS SPECIAL

CHINA

300, 321 (2002).
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In Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces wear of the pakol was possible because of the

Pashtun (Taliban) versus Tajik/Uzbek (Northern Alliance) differences in attire. Special Forces
supporting Southern Alliance forces were confronted with a more difficult situation. Southern
Alliance soldiers looked and dressed exactly like the Taliban. Afghan Taliban dressed in Pashtun
attire since

they were from the Pashtun

wore Pakistani

tribes.

Other Taliban, from Pakistan predominantly,

attire.

In the south, Special Forces wear of indigenous attire and

distinguishing devices was

its

encouraged by Hamid Karzai, again to lower US visibility. Accordingly, these Special Forces
wore native tops over their DCU. After three days, the Special Forces abandoned the indigenous
tops for the balance of their tenure, their leader having convinced Karzai that as everyone

they were American, there was no reason to pretend otherwise.
access to their
6.

It

knew

also gave the soldiers better

DCU pockets and load-bearing equipment.

Because neither Taliban/al Qaeda nor Northern or Southern Alliance forces wore a uniform,

was a challenge. Third Battalion, Fifth Special
SF Group
in Afghanistan, 15 SPECIAL
WARFARE 34, 36 (June 2002). However, this differs from dressing as civilians for the purpose of
using the civilian population or civilian status as a means of avoiding detection of combatant
status. From the standpoint of possible violation of the law of war, the issue is one of intent. As
indicated in the main text, use of non-standard uniform (Massoud pakol and/or scarf) by some
Special Forces personnel was to appear as members of the Northern Alliance rather than be
visual friend or foe identification at a distance

Forces Group, The Liberation ofMazar-e Sharif: 5

conspicuous as
7.

US

UW

th

soldiers and, as indicated in the preceding footnote, high-value targets.

In Are Soldiers in Civilian Clothes Protected Under Geneva-Hague? (unpublished paper, 2003) at

31, Lieutenant Colonel

The need

H. Allen

Irish

provided the following

to reduce the potential for violence that

personnel

may be

[to

may be

the decision:

directed at

CJCMOTF

Afghanistan was the

critical factor

operate in civilian clothing]. In uniform,

[CJCMOTF]

personnel engaged in humanitarian

mandating the decision

official rationale for

relief efforts in

targeted since they could be confused as being engaged in offensive

combat operations instead of providing humanitarian assistance.
The traditional
wear of civilian clothes by unconventional forces for the purpose of humanitarian
.

assistance

is

.

.

time-proven.

This rationale

is

historically inaccurate

unconventional forces.

Civil

Affairs

operations short of international

armed

Civil Affairs personnel in international

Army and Marine Corps

and

legally flawed. Civil Affairs

personnel
conflict

armed

personnel are not

performing humanitarian

have been authorized to wear

conflict

assistance

in

civilian clothing.

have worn standard uniforms only.

US

Civic Action (Civil Affairs) personnel operating in the Republic of

Vietnam (1964-1971) wore standard field uniforms in threat circumstances similar to those
faced by Civil Affairs personnel in Afghanistan. US Army Civil Affairs operating in support of
Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989-1990) and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm/
Provide Comfort (1991) wore standard BDU. These operations were significantly different from
Special Forces missions in denied territory.

From

a law of war standpoint, neither "force protection" nor a desire to distinguish soldiers

performing "offensive duties" from those engaged in humanitarian assistance constitutes

wear civilian attire in international armed conflict.
With respect to the force protection argument, US Army Civil Affairs doctrine in preparation

military necessity for soldiers to

at the

time of the "force protection" decision (and subsequently approved)

Army Field Manual 3-05.401,

Civil Affairs Tactics,

to include Kevlar load bearing vest
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to the contrary.

US

at 4-

Uniform, complete with
and individual weapon, risk reduced

40, indicates that Civil Affairs personnel in less than full Battle Dress

combat equipment,

is

Techniques and Procedures, Table 4-2,
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force protection, while noting that wearing civilian clothing "Greatly increases the possibility of
fratricide."
8.

Unlike their Special Forces counterparts, Civil Affairs personnel in indigenous

necessarily
attire,
9.

wear the Massoud pakol or

some concealed

their

Whether wearing western

scarf.

art.

75 U.N.T.S. 287; reprinted in

10,

& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed.

Roberts

did not

attire

or indigenous

weapons.

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons

1949,

attire

in

Time of War, Geneva, Aug. 12,
301 (Adam

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

2000). Article 10 provides: "The provisions of the present

convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian

activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to

the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons

and

for their relief."

10.

The

Speaking

October

[Emphasis added.]

NGO civilian clothing complaint was directed at Civil Affairs units and personnel only.
at a

Harvard University Carr Center Symposium, Army-Navy Club, Washington,

18, 2002,

Nicolas de Torrente, representative of the

NGO

Medecins sans Frontieres

(Doctors Without Borders [MSF] ), made it clear that the NGO complaint was directed only at US
Army Civil Affairs personnel operating in proximity to NGO. He emphasized that MSF offered no
objection as to the attire of US or Coalition Special Forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations
against Taliban/al Qaeda. [Personal knowledge of the author, who was present.]

During the question and answer period, this author offered the counterargument that NGO
personnel working in proximity to uniformed CA personnel might be at greater risk of being
targeted because of an appearance of overt support for US operations, or as collateral casualties
incidental to al Qaeda attacks on uniformed Civil Affairs personnel performing humanitarian
relief operations. Mr. Torrente acknowledged the counterargument before stating that MSF
objected to the presence of any military personnel in proximity to
11.

Six

months

later the

Commanding

US Army

General,

Special

and grooming

issued an order re-enforcing standard uniform

MSF activities.
Forces Command

practices that received

coverage. See, for example, Kitty Kay, Close shave for special forces,

(USASFC),
wide media

TlMESONLINE, (Sept. 13, 2002),
Mike Mount, Close shave

available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0„3463-413550,00.html;

CNN.COM/WORLD,

for special ops forces in Afghanistan,

(Sept.

13, 2002), available at http://

www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/12/afghanistan.clean/; and Headquarters
Afghanistan

Memorandum

Rescinding of Relaxed
Special Forces

(Sept. 6, 2002), Subject:

Grooming

Command,

the

Standards. According to the Staff Judge Advocate for

commander's

CJSOTF

Uniform and Appearance Standards
was

intent

for field

commanders

Policy-

US Army

to review the

appropriateness of continued wear of non-standard uniforms and beards, particularly by support

personnel not engaged in combat missions. This
special mission units judge advocates,

uniforms

non-standard

who

subsequently

USCENTCOM). The USASFC

is

borne out by reports the author received from

advised that bearded special mission unit personnel in

Combatant Commander

the

briefed

where there was no military necessity

for

wearing either beards or non-standard uniforms.

Qaeda grew beards
rapport with and to appear

Special Mission unit personnel operating against
(1) a dearth

of water for daily shaving; (2) for

personnel with

(Commander,

order was a general tightening of discipline and uniform standards

whom they were serving; and

them, and their families, from

(3) to

terrorist attacks.

al

for several reasons:
like the

indigenous

prevent their identification and thus protect

The

latter rationale

is

not new. In 1918, then

Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence was publicly identified as a leader in the Arab Revolt. His

biographer explains:

As soon

London

as these reports

began to appear, the Censorship and Press Committee

issued a warning to editors

which

read:
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"The Press are earnestly requested not
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any photograph of Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, C.B., D.S.O. This
not known by sight to the Turks, who have put a price upon his head, and any

to publish
officer

is

photograph or personal description of him

WILSON, supra note

5, at

safety.

552.

In Lawrence's case and the

With

may endanger his

World War

II

cases, identification risks

were limited to the

and the global threat of terrorism, the identity of special mission
them and their families. This practice has existed for some time;
see, for example, photographs contained in PETER RATCLIFFE, NOEL BOTHAM & BRIAN
HlTCHEN, EYE OF THE STORM (2000), where the faces of current members of 22 British Special

battlefield.

personnel

is

ease of travel

classified to protect

Air Service (SAS) are obscured.
12.

The

section that follows (including the text of this footnote)

was prepared from materials

provided by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations,
College,

US Army

Peacekeeping Institute, the Department of

TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL

AND FUNDAMENTALISM

State,

and

US Army War

AHMED

RASHID,

(2001).

Arguments with respect to the Taliban militia (as they called themselves) depend only so
slightly on who and when. The Taliban was a loose amalgamation of occasional and disparate tribal
and other factions. It was a faction engaged in a civil war in a failed State that owed much of its
strength and origin to the Pakistani Intelligence Service. It exercised none of the usual activities of a
government, other than the negative one of closing down all schools. The Taliban militia never
claimed to be the Afghanistan government or armed forces. The Taliban had no uniformed armed
forces. The Taliban was structured around tribes rather than as a military unit, recruiting the
allegiance of other tribes or personnel from other tribes and private citizens through temporary
alliances, defections, bribery, and conscription, while also relying on foreign volunteers.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia, the international test
has been whether an entity is permitted to sit behind the nameplate in the United Nations (and
in other international fora) rather than the previous test of whether it controls population,
territory, etc. The Taliban was never permitted to represent Afghanistan at the United Nations or
in other international fora.

The UN Security Council never recognized the Taliban as the representative of Afghanistan.
In a number of UN Security Council resolutions issued against the Taliban, there was discussion
as to

whether a binding resolution could be issued against a non-State

entity.

These Security

Council resolutions included 1189 (1999), 1267 (1999) and 1363 (2001). Security Council
resolution

1 1

89 referred to "the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by

the Taliban;" hence the Security Council distinguished between the Taliban
Prior to September

1,

2001, the Taliban was recognized only

and Afghanistan.

by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and

the United Arab Emirates. All three withdrew their recognition following the terrorist attack.

98.5% of governments, including the United States, did not recognize the
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attack. Nor
was it recognized by the League of Islamic Nations, nor by Switzerland (depositary of the Geneva
Conventions). The Taliban was not invited to the 1999 Conference of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies as the Afghanistan representative. Had it been invited, it is likely the US and
other governments would have prevented it from occupying the Afghanistan delegation seat, as
was the case with respect to the FRY in Yugoslavia. By the time coalition operations began in
Afghanistan, no government recognized the Taliban as the Government of Afghanistan.
Once US and allied operations began in Afghanistan in October 2001, al Qaeda assumed
command of most Taliban militia units. As the battle continued, most Taliban withdrew to their
normal areas of Afghanistan, leaving the fighting to al Qaeda and foreign members of the Taliban.
Stated another way,
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Any perception of the Taliban as any sort of a national government dissolved following Taliban
abandonment of Kabul (November 12, 2001 and US capture of Kandahar (December 10, 2001).
)

A leading authority, in discussing guerrillas, summed up the Taliban militia and al Qaeda status:
denies belligerent qualifications
The law of nations, apart from the Hague Regulations
to guerrilla bands. Such forces wage a warfare which is irregular in point of origin and
authority, of discipline, of purpose and procedure. They may be constituted at the beck of
.

.

.

a single individual; they lack uniforms; they are given to pillage

few prisoners and are hence disposed to show

and destruction; they take

slight quarter.

Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States 1797 (2d ed. 1951).
13.

See, e.g., the President's Military

Order of Nov.

Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism, §

14.

Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Feb.

1 1

2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of

66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001 ),

(a),

1

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1/1 1/2001

13,

2002, available at http://www, whitehouse.gov/

7,

news/releases/2002/02/20020207-6.html; Katherine Q. Seelye, In
Fit Taliban Captives,

also available at

13-27.html ("Military Order").

Shift,

Bush Says Geneva Rules

NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. The issues are summarized in John

Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
207 (2003).
15. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75

C.

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 244.
DOD Law of War Program, para. 5.3.1; CJCSI
1999), Subject: Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, para. 5a. For

U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in
16.

DOD

Directive 5100.77 (Dec. 9, 1998), Subj:

58 10.01 A (Aug. 27,

this reason, the decision

in international

armed

was announced that the United
conflict to non-State actors in

States

would apply the law of war applicable

Operation Enduring Freedom. See excerpts

from interview with Charles Men, Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, US
Department of Defense, Dec. 16, 2002, Crimes of War Project, available at. http://www.crimesofwar
.org/onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html. This announcement was greeted with astonishment by

some

Marco Sassoli, Query: Is There a Status of "Unlawful

international law experts. See, for example,

Combatant"?, which

is

Chapter V in

this

volume,

at 57.

Comments similar to Professor Sassoli's were

by his foreign military counterparts. As will be indicated, the intention
was to use the law of war applicable in international armed conflicts as a template for US conduct in
Operation Enduring Freedom.
offered privately to the author

Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law: Challenges for the UN Security Council
and the USA, US Institute of Peace, Mar. 1, 2001. [Personal knowledge of the author, who was
17.

present.]
18.

Supra note

19.

Id. at

20.

Historically, regular military force entitlement to prisoner of

15.

245-46.

war

status

was absolute and

unqualified. Article 49 of US General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) (the Lieber Code), states: "All soldiers, of
whatever species of arms ... all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured
.

are prisoners of war,

and

as

.

such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT]. Similarly, COMMENTARY ON
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
privileges of a prisoner of war." Reprinted in

l

1

949 46-47 (Jean

bound by

S.

Pictet ed.,

1

960)

states:

"Once one is accorded the status of belligerent, one is
and entitled to the rights which they confer. The

the obligations of the laws of war,
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most important of these is the right, following capture,

to be recognized as a prisoner of war,

and

to be treated accordingly."

members of the armed forces existed without preAnnex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and

Entitlement to prisoner of war status for

condition in treaty law. Article

1

to the

Customs of War on Land, The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631, also
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 73, and Article 4(A) 1, GPW,
supra note 15. WILLIAM E. S. FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR 27-28 (1942) states: "Persons serving in
the regular army, navy and air force of a belligerent state have rights as prisoners of war when
they

fall

into the hands of the enemy. This rule

is

part of customary international law as well as

treaty law."

The Present Law as to Combatancy, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND
Conflicts: The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the Late Professor
COLONEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 197 (Michael A. Meyer & Hillairie McCoubrey eds., 1998),
Similarly, G.I.A.D. Draper,

Armed

comments:
Article

1

of the Hague Regulations, and

its

four express and two implicit stringent

conditions for volunteer and militia corps, represented a triumph for the "military"
at the Hague Peace Conference. Those four express conditions: (i) a
commander responsible for his subordinates; (ii) distinctive sign; (hi) open carrying of

faction

arms and

(iv)

compliance with the Laws of War in their operations, enable an extension

of the class of the privileged belligerent by way of identification to the normal features

not absolute. Members of the armed forces
status upon capture. The
do not lose their

of military armed forces. This identification

is

violate the Law of War
of Articles 4, 5 and 85 of the Geneva
[emphasis provided].

(POW)

who persistently
effect

POW

Convention, 1949, makes

this clear

Denial to regular forces (including special operations forces) of prisoner of war status and the
protections of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27,
1929, reprinted in

GPW,

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at 421, predecessor to the current
War II tribunals, including in cases where

were held to be war crimes by post-World

and American military personnel were summarily executed.

British

On

October

response to British special forces missions, Adolf Hitler issued his Fuhrerbefehl
Order"), which declared that Allied special forces, even

were to be "slaughtered to the

forces,

Annex

last

man"

(that

is,

if

18, 1942, in

("Commando

uniformed members of the armed

denied quarter, in violation of Article

Hague Convention IV) or, if captured, denied prisoner of war status
and summarily executed. The "Commando Order" was declared a war crime at Nuremberg.
23(d),

to the 1907

International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy
(1947).
Dostler,

and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment 58

implementation resulted in war crimes convictions by US military tribunals (In re
Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals, 22-34 (HMSO, 1945), and by British military

Its
1

War Crimes Reports (HMSO, 1946), and Trial of Karl Buck and
Ten Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 39-44 (HMSO, 1946).
In the Dostler case, two officers and thirteen enlisted men from Unit A, l Contingent (OSS
courts (In re Falkenhorst, VI

bt

were captured March 22, 1944, and executed under the orders from
Major General Dostler, even though they had been captured in uniform. Dostler was tried,
Operational Group,

Italy)

World War II; In re Dostler, and photographic
OSS Operational Groups sewed Seventh USA Army
patches on their left shoulder to conceal their OSS identity. Ian Sutherland, The OSS Operational
Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces, 3 SPECIAL WARFARE 2, 3 (June 2002).
21. Yoo & Ho, supra note 14, argue that the four criteria contained in Article 4A(2), GPW, are
convicted and executed by firing squad following

evidence in author's possession. Other

prerequisites to prisoner of war status for regular force combatants. That view
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5,

Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms

GPW or the negotiating history of the four criteria; see, for example,

85 and 93,

Toman, The Status ofAl Qaeda/Taliban Detainees Under the
Geneva bnventions, 32 Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights 271 283, 285 (2002).
22. An element of inconsistency with customary and treaty law evolved within the United States
during World War II as a result of dicta in the opinion by the United States Supreme Court in Ex
Draper, supra note 20,

at 29;

and

Jifi

t

parte Quirin, 317

US

1

(1947), involving the

trial

of eight Nazi saboteurs captured in civilian

clothing in the United States. Changes in treaty law and
part have returned

US

US

most
muddied by the

practice since Quirin for the

interpretation to the pre-Quirin position, albeit

experience and two subsequent Singapore cases that followed Quirin.

Quirin

is

lacking with respect to

citation of paragraphs of

some of

War Department,

its

law of war scholarship. Review of the Court's

Field

Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (War

Department, 1914 and 1940) suggests that the Court apparently confused provisions relating to

who would be unprivileged belligerents, and those
by military personnel, who remain entitled to prisoner of war status. The Court
correctly stated, citing paragraphs 83 and 84 of US Army General Orders No. 100 (1863), that
soldiers "disguised in the dress of the country
if found lurking about the lines of the captor,
are treated as spies, and suffer death." This provision is consistent with Article 29 of the Annex to
Hague Convention IV. However, the Court failed to note paragraph 203 of Field Manual 27-10,
Rules of Land Warfare (1940), which states that spies are not punished as "violators of the law of
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities,

related to actions

.

.

.

war." Rather, the Court erred in stating "the absence of uniform

.

.

.

renders the offender liable to

(sic.) of war." The statement has no basis in the law of war. It is
Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV (a treaty to which the
United States was a party during World War II), which states that "A spy who, after rejoining the
army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war,
and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage." Were absence of uniform a

trial for

violation of the laws

contrary to Article 31 of the

violation of the law of war, criminal liability
his

own

commander who

lines. Similarly, a

civilian clothing

would incur no criminal

Power and War Rights

would remain even

after a soldier returned safely to

orders military personnel to carry out a mission in

liability for his order.

JAMES MALONEY SPAIGHT, AIR

287 (1924).

summary of the German operation, trial of the saboteurs, and critical analysis of Quirin,
LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL (2003).
Two cases from Singapore follow the reasoning of Quirin. The facts of each are similar. In
peacetime, Indonesian Marines in civilian clothing entered Singapore on sabotage missions. The
courts determined that while entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4A(1), GPW, a
dubious finding in and of itself, that entitlement was forfeited when the soldiers executed their
missions in civilian clothing. In both cases the defendants were charged with domestic law
violations rather than violation of the law of war. Stanislaus Krofan & Another v. Public
Prosecutor, Federal Court of Criminal Appeal, 1966, 1 Malayan Law Journal (1967), and Osman
For a

see

23.

Mohamed

and Another v. Public Prosecutor, Privy Council, 1968, 1 A.C. 430.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

bin Haji

Ali

Protection of Victims of International

Armed Conflict

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

supra note

24.

See, for

(HMSO,

(Protocol

I),

1

125 U.N.T.S.

3,

9, at 422..

example, Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others,

1948) (denial of prisoner of

war

reprinted in

status to

V LRTWC

1

and execution of eight US Army Air Corps

personnel); and In re Dostler, supra note 20.

US

Vietnam war were illegally denied
captors and routinely tortured. GUENTHER LEWY, AMERICA IN

military personnel captured in uniform during the

prisoner of war status by their

VIETNAM 332-34

(1978);

Howard

S.

Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, in
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Vietnam War and International Law (Vol. 2) 361, 382, (Richard A. Falk ed., 1969); Stuart
Rochester & Frederick Kiley, Honor Bound: The History of American Prisoners of
War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, at 188-194, 199-207 (1998); and Vernon E. Davis, The
Long Road Home: US Prisoner of War Policy and Planning in Southeast Asia 5, 64-84
and other violations of the
GPW are ROBINSON RlSNER, THE PASSING OF THE NIGHT (1973); JEREMIAH A. DENTON, WHEN
Hell Was in Session (1976); and George E. Day, Return with Honor (1989).
US and coalition prisoners of war captured by Iraq during the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait
were not provided prisoner of war treatment, and were routinely tortured. US Department of
Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 619-620 (1992); Secretary
of the Army, Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), (1993); United Nations
(2000). Three representative personal accounts detailing the torture

Security Council S/25441 (Mar. 12, 1993).

FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE 20 (1966).
US War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (1940), at
4, states: "The enemy population is divided in war into two general classes, known as the armed
forces and the peaceful population. Both classes have distinct rights, duties, and disabilities, and
no person can belong to both classes at one and the same time."
See also The War Office [United Kingdom], Manual of Military Law, 7 (War Office, 1929):
25.

M.

26.

For example,

R. D.

The

division of the

enemy population

war

to ensure that

other,

and

shall

Similarly, see

an individual must definitely

War Office, The Law of War on Land, being Part III
More

the classical term.

is

classes, the

It is

not be permitted to enjoy the privileges of both.

Law, 30, paragraph 86 (War Office, 1958), which
"Belligerent"

armed forces and the
one of the purposes of the law of
choose to belong to one class or the

two

into

peaceful population, has already been mentioned.

is

.

.

of the Manual of Military

the current British law of war manual.

recently "belligerents" have been referred to as

"combatants," as medical personnel and chaplains are part of the belligerent forces but are non-

combatants.
27.

The

levee en

supra note 20,

is

masse which, as defined in Article

2,

Annex

to

Hague Convention IV (1907),
on the approach of the

"the inhabitants of a territory not under occupation who,

enemy, spontaneously take up arms to

resist the

invading troops without having had time to

organize themselves." Treaty recognition of the levee en masse constituted a

first

step in

relaxation of the principle of distinction.
28.
29.
30.
31.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., Vol. II) 206 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
James Maloney Spaight, War Rights on Land 37 ( 19 1 1).
Frits Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare 3 1 ( 1973).
Article 23, paragraph (b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note
L.

states that

it is

prohibited "to

kill

or

wound

20,

treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile

nation or army.
Article 24, 1907 Hague Convention IV, id., states: "Ruses of war and the employment of
measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered
permissible." See also Paragraph 51, US Army Field Manual 27-10, at 101-102 (1956), The Law
32.

of War on Land.
33.

Where

their

soldiers in international

own, they were expected to wear a

civilian population.

34.

armed

distinctive

OPPENHEIM, supra note

The negotiating record exception

GPW,

conflict lacked

is

proper uniforms through no

emblem

to distinguish themselves

fault

of

from the

28, at 429-430.

discussed infra.

supra note 15, states in part:

107

Two

treaty exceptions exist. Article 93,

.

Special Forces'

Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms

[Ojffenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating escape
and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public
property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false
papers, the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only

[Emphasis added].
Richard R. Baxter, The Juridical Basis of the Distinction between Lawful Combatant and
Unprivileged Belligerent 47-51 (1959) (unpublished thesis, The Judge Advocate General's
35.

School,

US Army).

GPW, Article 4A(2) constituted acknowledgement of the legitimacy of World War II partisan
its amendment of previous treaty
members of other volunteer corps, including

warfare in

This was a further

[Emphasis added.]

COMMENTARY
36.

,

and

militias

."
.

.

of the principle of distinction.

relaxation

See

supra note 20, at 52-61.

states: "

uniform or even

"Members of other

those of organized resistance movements.

US Department of War Manual, Rules of Land Warfare

paragraph 22,

The distinctive sign.

(1914, Corrected to April 15, 1917),

—This requirement

will

be satisfied by the wearing of a

ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed

than a complete uniform." See also

less

Prisoners of War: A Study in
Conflict 349 (1976).
37.

categories to

ROSAS, supra note 36,

at 349.

("[T]he concept of uniforms has never been explicitly defined

in international law.")
38.

COMMENTARY,

'distinctive device'

supra note 20, at 52. SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 57, emphasizes "The

does not

mean

a uniform."

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of

June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 468 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). The ICRC Commentary
does not reflect the complexity of the discussions within the Working Group. As three Diplomatic
Conference participants indicate in their separate commentary, the Working Group experienced
considerable difficulty with the practical details of this issue. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH
& Waldemar Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts 205-206 (1982).
40. Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict 49 (1977)
39.

(Vol. 59,

US Naval War

College International

argued that the distinctive device
concealed at

will."

This

is

Law

"must be fixed

8

Studies).

—

SPAIGHT, supra note 29,

externally, so as not to

at 57,

be assumed or

not consistent with prior or subsequent practice. The original view

regarding a distinctive device was expressed by Francis Lieber in his "Guerrilla Parties

Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War." In
difficult to

adopt something of a badge,

HARTIGAN, LlEBER'S CODE
41

easily put

on and off, and to

& THE LAW OF WAR 40

SPAIGHT, supra note 29, commented

it

he noted "Nor would

call

it

a uniform".

(1983). [Emphasis added.]

at 57:

At what distance should the sign be recognizable? The German authorities demanded
in

1870 that French irregulars should be distinguishable

eminent English jurist,

is

at rifle range. This, says

an

"to ask not only for a complete uniform but for a conspicuous

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (5th ed. 1904)].
are sighted to 2,000 yards and over, the German requirement is clearly

one," [citing

When

rifles

unreasonable.

If

the sign

distinguish the form

is

recognizable at a distance at which the naked eye can

and color of a person's

dress,

all

reasonable requirements appear

to be met.

At the

commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Government addressed

a note to

Tokio

(sic),

had approved the formation of certain free
the seat of war, and that these corps would wear

stating that Russia

corps composed of Russian subjects in
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no uniform but only a distinctive sign on the cap or sleeve. Japan replied: "The Japanese
Government cannot consider as belligerents the free corps mentioned in the Russian
Note, unless they can be distinguishable by the naked eye from ordinary people or fulfill
the conditions required for militia or volunteers by the Hague Reglement." [Emphasis
in SPAIGHT] Similarly, US War Department Manual, Rules of Land Warfare, supra
note 36, followed the Japanese Government's test:
.

—

The distinctive sign. This requirement will be satisfied by the wearing of a uniform, or
even less than a complete uniform. The distance that the sign must be visible is left
vague and undetermined and the practice is not uniform. This requirement will be
satisfied certainly if the sign is "easily distinguishable by the naked eye of ordinary people"
at a distance at which the form of the individual can be determined. [Emphasis added.]

HYDE, supra note 12, at 1793, cites this provision as authority.
The term "unenhanced vision" is utilized in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol on Blinding
Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 12, 1995, Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (1995), 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATTERS 1218. It means normal vision without enhancements, such as binoculars, or vision
corrected to 20/20. For its negotiating history, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office
of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IO Memorandum of Law (Dec. 20, 1996), Subject: Travaux
Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol. The memorandum, at 8,
notes the intent of its drafters:

Unenhanced

vision

means "the naked eye or

such as glasses or contact

lens. It

does not

.

.

.

the eye with corrective eyesight devices,"

mean binoculars,

a telescopic sight, night-vision

goggles or similar devices used to increase visual capability above that required

by an

ordinary person to perform routine tasks, such as reading or driving an automobile.

accompanying note 99, infra, British Special Forces in North Africa in
World War II, and British and US Special Forces operating behind enemy lines in Iraq during the
1990-1991 war to liberate Kuwait, frequently wore indigenous overcoats over their BDUs to
counter one of the coldest winters on record, but also as a ruse to reduce immediate, positive
identification at a distance by Iraqi military units.
43. Treaty negotiation records suggest participants did not rely upon "carrying arms openly"
for regular forces. This is one of the four prerequisites for militias or partisans seeking combatant
and prisoner of war status. The phrase "carrying arms only" has itself been plagued with lack of
agreement as to its meaning. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32
AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 84 (1990) (the debate with regard to Article 44(3), Additional
Protocol I). It also was of limited to no value in Afghanistan, as most Afghan civilians carry
military weapons. Similarly, following cessation of formal combat operations in Iraq (May 1,
2003), private Iraqi citizens were permitted to retain Kalashnikov AK-47 or AK-74 select fire
weapons in their homes for personal protection. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number
3 (May 23, 2003). [Copy in author's personal files.]
44. As summarized in this memorandum, there is substantial State practice of Special Forces
wear of civilian clothing or non-standard uniforms. As an example of the fourth category, the
personal security detail for Commander in Chief, US Central Command [Combatant
Commander] during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ( 1 990-9 1 ) wore civilian attire
on the basis that VIP protection from terrorist attack is not a traditional military mission.
(Attack by conventional Iraqi forces was not regarded as a viable threat.) The personal security
detail worked in close proximity to the Combatant Commander, who wore standard BDU. The
42.

As noted

at the text

,

,
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Special Forces'

personal security detail in turn was surrounded by an outer perimeter of uniformed Saudi
soldiers.

The

civilian attire

of the personal security detail was dictated in large measure by host

nation concerns. Their immediate proximity to the

and

their physical separation

distinction.

No

from the

civilian

reasonable case could be

made

commander and uniformed Saudi

that their actions

[Personal knowledge of author and photograph in author's

on the

military,

population was consistent with the principle of

were tantamount to perfidy.

files.]

Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Convened by the Swiss Government in 1974,
the Conference formally adopted Additional Protocols I and II on June 8, 1977.
46. On January 28, 1987, President Ronald Reagan informed the United States Senate that
Additional Protocol I would not be submitted for Senate advice and consent to ratification.
Message of the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, 100 Congress, 1
Session (1987); 26 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 561 (1987).
47. US Department of State, 3 Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law,
1981-1988, at 3434-3435. See also DOD Law of War Working Group, Memorandum for Assistant
Counsel (International), OSD (May 9, 1986), Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions; Customary International Law Application. See also Michael J. Matheson, The United
45.

Conference

Diplomatic

Reaffirmation

and

lh

st

on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions" 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

States Position

POLICY 419 (1987), based upon a speech Mr. Matheson made at an American University workshop.
Mr. Matheson's statements with regard to the provisions of Additional Protocol I regarded by the
United States as customary law are based upon the DOD Law of War Working Group

memorandum,

cited above. Thereafter

he expresses

his personal

opinion that other provisions

"should be observed and in due course [may be] recognized as customary law, even
already achieved that status
48.

BOTHE, PARTSCH

and

3,

In order to
hostilities,

they have not

& SOLF, supra note 39, at 256-257. The new rules set forth in Article 44,

were among those found unacceptable to the United States
against ratification. Paragraph 3 provides:
paragraph

if

their relationship to the provisions of Protocol I." Id. at 422.

promote the protection of the

civilian

in taking

population from the

combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the

its

decision

effects

of

civilian civilian

population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to

an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,

owing

to the nature of the hostilities

an armed combatant cannot so distinguish

himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his

arms openly:

(a)

during each military engagement, and

(b)

during such time as he

is

visible to the adversary while

deployment preceding the launching of an attack

in

he

is

which he

engaged
is

in a military

to participate.

Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as
perfidious.
49.

.

.

ROSAS, supra note 36,

at 333.

[T]his provision does not

uniforms

hand

it

Continuing, the author notes:

seem

in all situations in

to

imply that

all

members of regular forces have

order to benefit from prisoner-of-war status.

serves as a reminder that the uniform continues to be the normal

On

to

wear

the other

way for regular

combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. [Emphasis added.]
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The footnote

in support thereof states:

In the 1976 report of
"regulars
case, for

Committee

III

[of the Diplomatic Conference]

See also,

stated that

who are assigned to tasks where they must wear civilian clothes, as may be the

example, with advisers assigned to certain resistance units, are not required to

wear the uniform when on such assignments." CDDH/236/Rev.
(Vol. 2) 475

it is

1,

at 29.

PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
(Howard S. Levie ed., 1980).

The uniform requirement has not been codified for military operations short of
international armed conflict.
51. Article 24, Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention, supra note 20; SPAIGHT, supra note
29, at 152-156; OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 428; War Office Manual, Part III, supra note 26,
50.

at 101.
52.

Article 23(b),

53.

The

Annex to

the 1907 Hague IV Convention, supra note 20.
between a ruse and perfidy is offered as "whenever a belligerent has
engaged, and is therefore bound by a moral obligation, to speak the truth to

distinction

expressly or tacitly

an enemy,

it is

perfidy to betray his confidence, because

it

constitutes a breach of

good

faith."

OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 420; see also FM 27-10 (1956), supra note 32, ff 49-55.
54. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
reprinted in

THE LAWS OF ARMED

55.

Supra note 23.

56.

BOTHE, PARTSCH

States

is

57.
58.

Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899,
CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 60-82.

& SOLF, supra note 39, at 203-04. As neither Afghanistan nor the United

a State party to Additional Protocol

the extent that

it

War on

codifies

I,

the United States

is

bound by this

article

only to

customary law.

I, supra note 23, art. 85, f 3(f).
This approach, taken by the United States in Vietnam, was praised by the International

Additional Protocol

Committee of the Red Cross;

see

GEORGE

S.

PRUGH, Law AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973,

at

66-67(1975).
This legal approach

Anglo-Boer

War

civilian clothing

is

not new. During the American Civil

War

(1861-1865) and the

(1899-1902), rebel soldiers captured wearing either

were treated

as prisoners

enemy uniforms or

of war and not prosecuted unless their actions

involved treachery. See, for example, SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 105-109. Boer

commandos'

wearing of portions of British uniforms produced one of the more sensational historic
examples. In 1902 three Australian officers serving with the Bushveldt Carbineers were tried by

murder of captured Boers and murder of a civilian. Their plea with
regard to the murder of the captured Boers was one of superior orders on the basis that Lord
Kitchener had ordered the execution of Boers wearing "British khaki." The prosecution
argued that Boer punishment was authorized only if the captured Boers had worn British
khaki with intent to deceive. Convicted, two of the three
Captain Harry "Breaker" Morant
and Lieutenant Peter Handcock were executed by British firing squad, resulting in a
controversy between Great Britain and Australia that remains to this day; see, for example,
Nick Bleszynski, Shoot Straight, You Bastards! (2002). (This title is based upon
Morant's last words.) The incident was the basis for the 1979 Australian movie Breaker Morant
starring Edward Woodward and Bryan Brown. Its screenplay was based upon KIT DENTON,
THE BREAKER (1973). Subsequently, Denton authored the non-fiction CLOSED FILE: THE
True Story behind the Execution of Breaker Morant and Peter Handcock (1983),
less sympathetic to Morant than THE BREAKER. Comprehensive, authoritative accounts are
contained in BREAKER MORANT AND THE BUSHVELDT CARBINEERS (Arthur Davey ed., 1987)
British court-martial for

—

—
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and William woolmore, The Bushveldt Carbineers and the Pietersburg Light

Horse (2000).
59. Toman, supra
60.

note 21,

at 287.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IA

Memorandum

1985/7026 (23 Sept. 1985), Subject: Use of Expanding Ammunition by

US

Hollow point or expanding small arms
ammunition is prohibited in international armed conflict by Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning
Expanding Bullets, The Hague, July 29, 1899, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 9, at 64. The United States is not a State party to this treaty, but has taken the position
that it will adhere to its terms in its military operations in international armed conflict to the
extent that its application is consistent with the object and purpose of article 23(e) of the Annex
to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 20, which prohibits employment of "arms,
Forces

Military

or

Counterterrorist

in

Incidents.

unnecessary

cause

for

example,

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General,

DAJA-IO

projectiles,

material

Memorandum (May

calculated

to

5.56mm, 77-grain

19, 2000), Subject:

suffering."

Sierra

See,

MatchKing™

Bullet; Legal

Review.
61

For example,

German counterterrorist Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9) and British Special Air

wore

Service soldiers

civilian clothing in the

October

1977 hostage rescue of Lufthansa Flight

18,

BARRY DAVIES, FIRE MAGIC (1994), photographs between 82-83;
Rolf Tophoven, GSG9: The German Response to Terrorism 66-73 (1985). The SAS wore
181 in Mogadishu, Somalia;

non-standard, fireproof uniforms during
Princes Gate in

London on May

its

hostage rescue operation in the Iranian Embassy at

MICHAEL PAUL KENNEDY, SOLDIER

T

SAS (1989),
PETER DE LA BlLLIERE, LOOKING

6, 1980;

which contains photographs between pages 1 16-117; and SIR
FOR TROUBLE 319-337 (1994) and photographs between 296-97. Other examples are provided
in the State practice section

of this paper,

infra.

Supreme Court stated in The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900):
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice.
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling
judicial decision, resort must be had
."
to the customs and usages of civilized nations.
62.

As the United

.

States

.

.

.

63.

In an experience similar to that of

Lawrence donned indigenous
the only soldiers

US

.

Special Forces in Afghanistan eighty-five years later,

attire at the request

many Arabs had

.

.

of the Arab forces he joined, in part because

seen wearing khaki were Turkish, the enemy. Mindful of the

death of Captain William Shakespear the previous year because he wore his British uniform,

Lawrence obliged his hosts. WILSON, supra note 5, at 334-335.
As noted by James Maloney Spaight, Colonel Lawrence was not alone in wearing civilian
clothing on combat missions during World War I. SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 273-74.
64. M. R. D. Foot, The IRA and the Origins ofSOE, in WAR AND SOCIETY, HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN
HONOUR AND Memory OF J. R. WESTERN, 1928-1971, at 57-69 (1973); M. R. D. FOOT,
RESISTANCE: EUROPEAN RESISTANCE

TO NAZISM

1940-45,

at 7 (1977).

These two publications were distributed free in the hundreds of thousands throughout
Europe and Southeast Asia during World War II, either in English or in translated form in
Burmese, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Malay, Norwegian,
Polish, Serbo-Croat, Slovak, Slovene, and Thai. M. R. D. FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Executive 14(1984).
The association of British thinking with Lawrence's success, the Anglo-Boer War, the Irish
War, and the Sino-Japanese War is acknowledged in J0RGEN FLESTRUP, EUROPE ABLAZE 38-39
65.

(1978); FOOT,

SOE

Executive, supra

IN

25, at 2-4; FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance,

FRANCE, supra note

this note, at

1

1-15;
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PETER WILKINSON & JOAN BRIGHT ASHLEY, GUBBINS & SOE 34, 36
(1993); W. J. M. MACKENZIE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE, 1940-1945, at 10, 38-39 (2000). The Mackenzie volume, the official "in-house"
history of the British Special Operations Executive, was compiled in the late 1940s. It remained
classified until 1998, and reached open publication in redacted form in 2000.
66. ELESTRUP, supra note 65, at 36, 76, 198. The "Geneva Conventions" were referred to as a
general reference to the law of war. Churchill's reference to the "Geneva Convention" otherwise
would have been to the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July
27, 1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLCITS, supra note 20, at 421. Article 1 thereof
incorporated by reference Article 1 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV, supra note 20, to establish
criteria for prisoner of war status.
67. India Office Records L/WS/ 1/1296, as cited in CHARLES CRUICKSHANK, SOE OPERATIONS
IN THE FAR EAST 249 (1983).
68. STAFFORD, supra note 65, at 68.
69. Presidential Military Order (June 13, 1942), Subject: Office of Strategic Services; and JCS 67
(June 21, 1942), Subject: Office of Strategic Services. The latter stated in part that "Under direction of
execute subversive activities." See
the Joint US Chiefs of Staff
[OSS will] prepare plans for and
America's
Smith,
The
History
of
First Central Intelligence
also R. Harris
OSS:
Secret
Agency (1972); Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (1972); Richard Dunlop,
Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma (1979); William Casey, The Secret War
Against Hitler (1988); Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla (1990); Tom Moon, This Grim
and Savage Game (1991); Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and
Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (1993); Mills, Mills & Brunner, supra note 5; and
Dan Pinck, Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China (2003).
70. Colonel Aaron Bank, in a paper done at The Presidio in 1986 entitled From OSS to Green
Beret [on file with author] traces the OSS to US Army Special Forces lineage, as does ALFRED H.
Paddock, Jr., US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Rev. ed., 2002); and Ian Sutherland,
1940-1945, at

19, 21 (1980);

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces, 25 SPECIAL WARFARE 2,3 (Summer
2002). As indicated in the main text, the OSS also was a forerunner of the Central Intelligence
Agency. See THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THE CIA (1981) and RICHARD DUNLOP,
Donovan: America's Master Spy (1982).
71. SOE/Special Operations (SO) became Special Forces Headquarters on May 1, 1944. British
SOE and US OSS components in the United Kingdom were amalgamated into the Special Projects
Operation Center (SPOC) on May 23, 1944. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 32.
72.

PADDOCK, supra note

70, at 28.

more the exception more than the rule. Of the 101 Jedburgh
teams deployed to France, only ten were so composed. Sutherland, supra note 20, at 13, n.ll;
73.

This nationality mix became

Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden Ally: The French Resistance,
the landings in southern france, 1944, at 141, 145 (1992).
74.

Special Operations,

robert mattingly, herringbone cloak-gi dagger: marines in the oss 140

Another Marine, Captain Peter
clothes,

J.

Ortiz, followed the

SOE

and

(1989).

practice of parachuting in civilian

but carried his Marine Corps uniform. In a touch of bravado, he frequently wore

it

in

populated areas, thereby alerting the Germans and forcing his team to remain on the move. FOOT,

SOE

IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 357.

On one occasion Captain

Ortiz entered a cafe dressed in a

Hearing a German soldier denigrate Americans, Ortiz drew his weapons

—

two
Marine uniform before opening fire on the
Germans. MATTINGLY, supra at 116. For his OSS service, Captain Ortiz was awarded two Navy
Crosses, a Legion of Merit, made a member of the Order of the British Empire, and received the

long

(civilian) cape.

.45 pistols

—then threw back

his cape to reveal his
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French Croix de Guerre. Captain Peter

).

Ortiz, 18

FORTITUDINE 14 (Marine Corps History and

Museums Division Historical Bulletin), XVIII, 2 (Fall 1988); Benis Frank, "Colonel Peter Julien
Ortiz, US Marine," unpublished manuscript. [On file with author.]
75. Mills, Mills & Brunner, supra note 5, at 9; Milton E. Miles, A Different Kind of War
274,371 (1967);PlNCK,swpranote69,at 134; Dale Andrade, Every Man a Tiger, NAVAL HISTORY
(VII, 6,

Nov./Dec. 1994),

at

16-21.

The French, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments-in-exile expressed concern
over collateral civilian damage and injuries resulting from Allied air attacks. HENRI MICHEL,
76.

The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939-1945,

at 212,

216-217 (1972). As

it's

author notes, "The Allies undoubtedly committed a major error in disregarding such
appeals and in persisting to
2

1

Sabotage vis-a-vis

7.

bomb Europe

air attacks

— including

their friends in the Resistance." Id., at

An example is the successful

did reduce civilian casualties.

on the SCNF (French national railways) locomotive works at Fives, described as
and most important in France, on June 27, 1943. The factory was in a
heavily populated area, and bombing would have caused many collateral civilian casualties.
Dressed as gendarmerie with the raid leader disguised as Gestapo, the factory was attacked
successfully with no loss of life. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 266. Another
example the Peugeot factory at Sochaux near Montbeliard, which manufactured tank
turrets
was taken out of action by an SOE-delivered satchel charge after an earlier Royal
Air Force attack missed the target and resulted in heavy civilian casualties nearby. FOOT,
SOE: The Special Operations Executive, supra note 65, at 219-220. For a list of key SOE
industrial sabotage, see FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 505-5 1 7. Benjamin F. Jones,
The Moon is Down: The Jedburghs and Support for the French Resistance, 40 (1999)

SOE

attack

one of the

largest

—
—

(unpublished

MA

thesis, University

of Nebraska), describes the Resistance process for

and attacking these targets. [Copy in author's files.] FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL
OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note 65, at 505, notes that the industrial sabotage listed was
accomplished with a total of approximately 3,000 pounds of explosive. In contrast, a single
Royal Air Force Lancaster bomber could carry 14,000 pounds of bombs, with some modified
to carry the 22,000 pound Grand Slam bomb. SIR CFIARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND,
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, Vol. 1,452-53 (1961). For
heavy bomber accuracy, see W. Hays Parks, "Precision" and "Area" Bombing: Who Did
Which, and When?., 18 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 147 (March 1995). In contrast to
infiltrating

SOE accuracy through industrial sabotage, it took 9,070 bombs dropped by 3,024 US heavy
bomber aircraft to achieve a 90% probability of a single hit on a target 60 by 100 feet in size.
RICHARD HALLION, STORM OVER IRAQ 283, Table 2 (1992).
Distinction

77.

only

in military

is

the customary international law obligation of parties to a conflict to engage

operations the effects of which distinguish between the civilian population (or

individuals not taking a direct part in hostilities),

and combatant

forces or military objectives,

directing the application of force solely against the latter.

The

principle of distinction

was acknowledged

in Articles

20-23 of the 1863

US Army

General Orders No. 100 (the Lieber Code), supra note 20.
78.

MACKENZIE, supra note

engineer

who

65, at 599, provides the following report

from

a

French railway

reached England in December 1943:

Aircraft attacks on Locomotives. Since the beginning of 1943 650 locomotives have been
hit

(an average of 70 a

month) out of 10,200

average period of repair

is

a fortnight.

in service.

The damage

is

very slight and the

There are therefore on an average 35 locomotives

under repair, about 0.34% of the total. In order to achieve
railwaymen have been killed and 378 wounded.
.
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Sabotage of Locomotives. 40 locomotives on an average were sabotaged each month, but
much more serious. The average time required has not yet

the repairs required were

been established. But if we take it as
repair, 2.40% of the total, eight times

six
as

means 240 locomotives under
those damaged by aircraft.

months,

many as

this

SOE attack on the Vermork heavy
Norway.
79. MILLS, MILLS & BRUNNER, supra note 5, at 45, 47, 186-203 describe one such case in China.
The Yellow River Bridge carrying Ping-Han railway traffic had been attacked repeatedly but
unsuccessfully by the 311 (US) Air Force, with heavy friendly losses. OSS Operational Team
Jackal severed the bridge on August 9, 1945.
80. As a matter of policy, Great Britain prohibited area bombing attacks in Nazi-occupied
territories. WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 76, at Vol. I, 463; ROBIN NEILLANDS, THE
BOMBER WAR, 288-289 (2001).
81. See, for example, MICHEL, supra note 76, at 289, who notes that in Russia in the summer
of 1942, it was necessary for Germany to employ fifteen divisions in counter-partisan
See also MICHEL, supra note 76, at 215-216, describing the

water

facility in

operations.
82.

FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note

note 65, at 153-154; HAESTRUP, supra note 65, at 434-^135. The

"On D-Day

itself,

65, at 225-227;

latter

STAFFORD, supra

notes at 435, for example, that:

about 950 actions were carried through, out of a planned 1,050, and German

Divisions which relied

upon

railway transport were delayed in their

movements towards

the [Allied]

bridgehead at Normandy for up to two weeks, by which time the bridgehead had been consolidated."
at 373-374; AlREY NEAVE, ESCAPE ROOM (1970); M. R. D. FOOT &
LANGLEY, MI9: ESCAPE AND EVASION 1939-1945 ( 1979).
84. For example, on August 13, 1944, a US Fifteenth Air Force heavy bomber attack on a bridge
across the Drome River in southern France missed the bridge and struck the town of Crest,
killing 280 civilians, wounding 200, and destroying 480 buildings in Crest. OSS Operational
Group ALICE arrived on the scene, and reported:

83.

J.

rTESTRUP, supra note 65,

M.

I.

Upon

arriving they were greeted by a very downhearted and somewhat belligerent
group of people. The damage consisted of destruction of about one-fourth of the
town.
Lt. Barnard and Lt. Meeks talked with the people, visited the hospital and
encouraged the people that the bombing was a mistake and would not occur again.
.

.

.

FUNK, supra note

CHRONOLOGY

73, at 79,

153;

THE ARMY AIR FORCES

85.

424 (Kit C. Carter
LTESTRUP, supra note 65, at 9, 42 1-43 1

86.

Id. at 7.

not the

1941-1945,

at

IN

WORLD WAR

& Robert Mueller eds.,

II,

COMBAT

1973).

At 42-43, the same author attributes emphasis on partisan warfare to several factors,

least

of which were technical advances in aircraft and radios that facilitated partisan

operations.
87.

Supra note 22.

88.

Trial

of Otto

Skorzeny and

Others,

IX

LRTWC (HMSO,

1949),

Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Skorzeny commanded a
during the last-ditch December 1944

at

90-94.

commando

SS-

mission

German Ardennes Offensive to infiltrate US lines wearing US

Army uniforms. Eighteen members of his forty- four man team were captured in US uniform; each
was executed as a spy. Skorzeny was arrested

in 1947.

As he was not captured

in flagrante delicto,

he

could not be charged as a spy. Article 31, Annex to 1907 Hague IV, supra note 20. Nor, however,

was he charged with violation of Article 23(b) of that Annex, that is, "killing treacherously."
The court delivered its acquittal without explanation. Popular speculation has been that the

men did not fight in US uniforms. Skorzeny's defense
was less that he and his men did not fight in US uniforms nor necessarily tu quoque ("you also"),
court accepted Skorzeny's claim that his
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A major contribution
was the testimony of Royal Air Force Wing Commander Forest Yeo-

but rather based upon the international law principle of rebus sic stantibus.
to Skorzeny's acquittal

Thomas, a highly decorated veteran of British Special Operations Executive service, who
acknowledged that British Special Operations Executive engaged in similar conduct. Other
evidence was offered of similar US, Russian and British operations. OTTO SKORZENY, My
COMMANDO OPERATIONS 450-451 (1995) and James J. Weingartner, Otto Skorzeny and the
Laws of War, 55 JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY 207, 217-18 (1991).
89.

Supra note 20.

90.

Special Forces' wear of

enemy uniforms is more common than generally known. For
German special operations Brandenburg Regiment,

example, summarizing the practice of the

one study concluded: "Throughout the period 1941-1943, the usual operational technique was
enemy uniforms." [Emphasis in original.] Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L.
Canby & David L. Thomas, A Systematic Review of "Commando" (Special) Operations 1939—
1980,11-188 (C8cL Associates unpublished report). [On file with author.] Efforts at summarizing
pre-Protocol I law as to the wearing of enemy uniforms are Valentine Jobat III, Wearing of the
Enemy's Uniform, 35 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (July 1941) and R. C.
Hingorani, Prisoners of War 28-30 (1963).
the use of disguise in

Article 39, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol

I,

supra note 23,

states: "It is

prohibited to

make

use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks

or in order to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations." This
In addition to the

list,

infra, there is

1977. See Parks, supra note 43, at 77 n. 259.

The

rather than a codification of customary practice.
ratification

new law has not been tested.

considerable historical evidence to the contrary, including since
list

that follows

Canada took a

shows that

this provision is

reservation to Article 39(2)

new law
upon it's

of the Protocol. The Canadian reservation, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/

677558c021ecf2cl41256739003e6370/172fTec04adc80f2cl256402003fb314?OpenDocument, states:
"Article 39
Emblems of nationality (Enemy uniforms). The Government of Canada does not

—

intend to be

bound by

the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 of Article 39 to

make

use of

military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse parties in order to shield, favor, protect or
impede military operations."
One may speculate on why the Diplomatic Conference supported this provision. Part of the
reason is that State practice was neither acknowledged nor well known. Aside from personal
accounts and the official works of M. R. D. Foot and Charles Cruickshank cited herein, OSS
records were not declassified until 1985, and the official SOE history (MACKENZIE, SECRET
HISTORY OF SOE, supra note 65) was not declassified until 1998. Speaking from this author's
experience, a "wall" between special operations forces and the negotiating process existed that
does not exist within the US government today. While US negotiation guidance was coordinated
within the Department of Defense, in all likelihood it did not reach the closed-door, Cold War
special operations environment that prevailed at that time. Even if it had, it is entirely probable
that the decision was taken not to comment. The author's work with counterparts in other
governments suggests that this wall persists to this day within many governments.
91.

See also supra note 42.

FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note 65, at 98; DOUGLAS DODDSPARKER, SETTING EUROPE ABLAZE 85, 124 (1983). This pessimism was confirmed in a number
of cases. Four uniformed British soldiers captured during a failed attack on the German heavy
water plant at Vermork, Norway, were executed in compliance with this order on November 20,
92.

1942.

Richard Wiggan, Operation Freshman: The Rjukan Heavy Water Raid

1942, at

81-82 (1986). During the night of March 22, 1994, a uniformed US Army special operations
team landed along the Italian coast about 60 miles north of La Spezia. Captured two days later,
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they were executed on the orders of General Anton Dostler who, in turn, was following Hitler's
Fiihrerbefehl (Commando Order) of October 18, 1942, which ordered all SOF to be executed,

even if captured in uniform. Dostler was tried and convicted by a US Military Commission 8-12
October 1945, sentenced to death, and executed. In re Dostler, supra note 20, (cited in n.31).

The background to Hitler's Fiihrerbefehl
25, at 186-187. The Fiihrerbefehl declared:
All enemies

German

on

so-called

troops, even

if

commando

they are to

all

is

contained in FOOT,

SOE

IN FRANCE, supra note

missions in Europe or Africa challenged by

appearances soldiers in uniforms or demolition

armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last
Even if these individuals when found should apparently be prepared to give
man.
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them.
troops, whether
.

.

.

At a minimum, the

Commando Order violated Article 23(d)

(prohibiting denial of quarter),

Hague Convention IV, supra note 23. The Commando Order is
contained in its entirety in United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. ("High Command Case"),
XI TWC (GPO, 1951), at 73-75, 525-527, with additional implementing orders at 76-110. The
Court's judgment that the Fiihrerbefehl was "criminal on its face" is at 527. The Fiihrerbefehl
of the

Annex

also

discussed in

is

to the 1907

Tribunal (1946),

at

1 1

International Military Tribunal (1946), at 26, and 15 International Military

296-306, 403^110, the

trial

of major

German war

criminals.

members of a British SAS team captured in uniform in Italy in
(1960); JOHN STRAWSON,
A HISTORY OF THE S.A.S. REGIMENT 275 (1984). Similarly, German Security Forces (SD) leader
Josef Keiffer was tried and executed for the murder of captured uniformed British Special Air
In Operation Cold Comfort, two

February 1945 were executed.

Service troops.
20, at

ROY FARRAN, OPERATION TOMBOLA 7-8

FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25,

at 305. See also Trial

39-44, and Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others,

of Karl Buck, supra note

V LRTWC, at 45-53 (murder of

captured uniformed SAS pursuant to Fiihrerbefehl); Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus
Falkenhorst, XI

LRTWC (HMSO,

1949), at 18-30,

and VI

WCT (William Hodge, 1949)

Von

(murder

commandoes pursuant to Fiihrerbefehl); and Trial of Werner
Rohde and Eight Others, V LRTWC, at 54-59 (murder of captured female SOE).
The Japanese issued similar orders directing the execution of aviators and/or SOF. In 1944
members of a combined British-Australian SOF team captured in uniform were executed or
died as a result of illegal medical experimentation, pursuant to such an order. As a result of
postwar proceedings, Japanese General Dihihara was hanged, while other participants received
lesser sentences. LYNETTE RAMSAT SILVER, THE HEROES OF RlMAU: UNRAVELLING THE
Mystery of One of World War H's Most Daring Raids 225 (1990). See also The Jaluit Atoll
Case, 1 LRTWC (HMSO, 1947), at 71-80, and Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and
of captured uniformed British

three others,

V LRTWC (HMSO,

1948), at 1-24 (execution/murder of three captured

airmen); Trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama and Seven Others,
1948), at 60-65
93.

Supra note

US

V LRTWC (HMSO,

(murder of captured US aircrew).
15.

For example, a heavily-armed Navy SEAL attired in a wet suit, fins and face mask would be
distinctive from the civilian population except, perhaps, in the annual zany Bay-to-Breakers foot
race in San Francisco.

94.

95.

Examples contained

in this Table are

documented

in the

Chicago Journal of International

Law version of this paper, supra note 1.
96. Where captured SOE personnel were executed without trial, those responsible were
prosecuted following World War II. See, for example, Trial of Wolfgang Zeuss, et al. (The
Natzweiler Trial), V WCT (HMSO, 1949).
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Ex parte Quirin, supra note 22. The eight German saboteurs were civilians. They wore
naval uniforms when they boarded the submarine, and again at the time of their
landings in the United States. After landing, they changed into civilian clothing. The uniforms
were sent back to the U-boat. FISHER, supra note 22, at 23, 26, 35.
98. A detailed and fascinating account is contained in LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN
LAW OF War 41-434 (2d ed. 1999) based upon Professor Green's participation in the post-war
97.

German

trials.

Later in his long

and distinguished

Professor of International

Law

Conflict Spectrum: Essays
2001) (Vol. 75,
99.

US

Naval

Stanislaus Krofan

at the

in

career, Professor

Naval

War

College. See

Honour of Professor

War College

& Another v.

Green was the Charles H. Stockton

International

INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE

Green
Law Studies).
L.

C.

Public Prosecutor, [1967]

1

(Michael N. Schmitt

Malayan L

J

133 Fed Ct Cr

ed.,

App

1966 (Singapore).
100.

Osman bin Haji Mohammed Ali and Another Appellant v. The Public, Privy Council, 3 All.

E.R. 488, 3 W.L.R. 1076, 112
101.

The Medal of Honor

S.J.

802 (1968).

citation of Sergeant

Drew

D. Dix, USA, reads as follows:

Learning that a nurse was trapped in a house near the center of the

Dix organized

a relief force, successfully rescued the nurse,

safety of the Tactical Operations Center. Being

within the

city, Staff

city, Staff

Sergeant

and returned her

informed of other trapped

to the

civilians

Sergeant Dix voluntarily led another force to rescue eight civilian

which was under heavy mortar and small arms fire.
Upon approaching a building,
he was subjected to intense automatic rifle and machine gun fire from an unknown
number of Viet Cong. He personally assaulted the building, killing six Viet Cong, and
rescuing two Filipinos {sic). The following day Staff Sergeant Dix, still on his own
volition, assembled a twenty-man force and under intense enemy fire cleared the Viet
Cong out of the hotel, theater, and other adjacent buildings within the city. During this
portion of the attack, Army Republic of Vietnam soldiers inspired by the heroism and
success of Staff Sergeant Dix, rallied and commenced firing upon the Viet Cong. Staff
Sergeant Dix captured twenty prisoners, including a high-ranking Viet Cong official.
He then attacked enemy troops who had entered the residence of the Deputy Province
Chief and was successful in rescuing the official's wife and children. Staff Sergeant Dix's
personal heroic actions resulted in fourteen Viet Cong killed in action and possibly
twenty-five more, the capture of twenty prisoners, fifteen weapons, and the rescue of
fourteen United States and free world civilians. The heroism of Staff Sergeant Dix was
in the highest tradition and reflects great credit upon the US Army.
employees located
Staff Sergeant

in a building

Dix then returned

to the center of the city.

Citation available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet.htm (under

Drew Dennis

Dix).

was the famous rescue by Lieutenant Thomas R. Norris, USN, of Lieutenant Colonel
Hambleton, USAF, commonly referred to as Bat 21, the designation of the B66 in
which Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton served as navigator. (Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton
actually was Bat 21B.). See DARREL D. WHITCOMB, THE RESCUE OF BAT 21 (1998). The
Vietnamese mentioned in Norris' citation was Nguyen Van Kiet, a South Vietnamese
frogman. For his actions, he became the only Vietnamese in the war to be awarded the US Navy
Cross. T.L. BOSILJEVAC, SEALS: UDT/SEAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM 213 (1990). The 1988
movie Bat-21 starring Danny Glover and Gene Hackman errs in depicting this as solely an Air
Force rescue. Lieutenant Norris' Medal of Honor citation clearly acknowledges his fighting in
civilian clothing, and the US Government's approval of his actions:
102. This

Iceal E.

Lieutenant Norris completed an unprecedented ground rescue of two

downed

pilots

deep within heavily controlled enemy territory in QuangTri Province. Lieutenant Norris,
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on the night of 10 April,

led a five-man patrol through 2,000 meters of heavily controlled

one of the downed pilots at daybreak, and returned to the
Forward Operating Base (FOB). On 1 1 April, Lieutenant Norris led a three-man team on
two unsuccessful rescue attempts for the second pilot. On the afternoon of the 12' a
forward air controller located the pilot and notified Lieutenant Norris. Dressed in
fisherman disguises and using a sampan, Lieutenant Norris and one Vietnamese traveled
through the night and found the injured pilot at dawn. Covering the pilot with bamboo

enemy

territory, located

,

and vegetation, they began the return journey, successfully evading a North Vietnamese
Approaching the FOB, they came under heavy machinegun fire. Lieutenant
Norris called in an air strike which provided suppression fire and a smokescreen, allowing
the rescue party to reach the FOB. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership,
undaunted courage, and selfless dedication in the face of extreme danger, Lieutenant
Norris enhanced the finest traditions of the US Naval Service [Emphasis added.]
patrol.

Citation available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet2.htm (under
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Thomas

R. Norris).

VII
Strategic Targeting

and International Law:

The Ambiguity of Law Meets the Reality
of a Single-Superpower World

Jeffrey K.

Walker

1

Strategic Targeting in Recent Conflicts

My

and the law of war. And

isn't this

an ironic moment in history for such a discussion? For just at the

moment

charge

is

to address strategic targeting

when the evolution of the technology of aerial bombardment allows for the fulfillment of Billy Mitchell's vision, we stand on the verge of jettisoning his underlying
theory as anachronistic and redundant. For 60 years, airmen have bemoaned that if
they but had pinpoint accurate, survivable, and reliable all-weather day/night weapons, the vision of the strategic

be proven correct.

As

is

bombardment gurus would inevitably and inexorably

We now have the technology, but no longer the need.

surely evident in Afghanistan

and

Iraq, strategic

bombardment

just isn't

main event anymore. Kosovo was the seeming fruition of the airman's years of
toil
a campaign limited from the outset to a purely air operation and therefore by
necessity heavily focused on strategic targets. The problem is that air power didn't
win the Kosovo campaign. The bombing showed little effect on Serbian ground
forces and the will of the Serb regime showed little signs of cracking in the face of
around-the-clock bombing in fact, just the opposite. And ultimately, the precipithe

—

—

tating event that caused

Slobodan Milosevic to fold

his tents

was the very public

—
Strategic Targeting

withdrawal of the support

and International Law

—brought about by diplomacy more than by bombs

of his long-time patron, Russia.

So

in

Kosovo, airmen

hit the

apparent high-water mark for strategic bombing

same time many failed to notice that the plug in the bottom of the
doctrinal bathtub had already been pulled. Which brings us to Afghanistan. The
Afghan campaign brought unreconstructed airmen face-to-face with a horrible
theory, but at the

how do you draw Colonel Jack Warden's concentric circles 2 when there's
nothing attackable to draw them around? What do you do when strategic bombing
doctrine meets an enemy that would like nothing more than to be bombed back a
few centuries? To the Taliban, there wasn't much of value we could bomb in Afproblem:

ghanistan, since they placed

little

economic trappings so dear

to

or no value

on

the technological, industrial, or

Western notions of modernity and progress. Al

Qaeda traveled light and could easily disperse and regroup after air attacks. So the
air war in Afghanistan took a decidedly different turn for air planners. What the air
arm of Operation Enduring Freedom became was that much-maligned role assigned them by Heinz Guderian, father of the blitzkrieg. Air forces became what air
doctrine purists most dreaded
"flying artillery" for the very thin, very light, and
very agile special operations ground forces supporting whatever indigenous forces

—

could be allied with
Iraq

seemed

us.

to offer

airmen a reprieve from

ignominy, but

it

didn't quite

Freedom became something of a laboratory for
future non-strategic uses of air power, with five distinct and geographically de-

pan out that way. Operation
the

this

Iraqi

fined air sub-campaigns.
First,

with the quick capitulation of

southern quarter of Iraq,

what was

essentially

air forces

but a few pockets of resistance in the

all

assumed the

role of airborne

SWAT teams for

peacekeeping work. Second, there was the Scud hunt and bor-

der patrol of the Western desert. Like in Afghanistan, this was a special operations

show, with

air

power acting

as

an airborne surgeon

—

precise applications of mea-

sured amounts of force against emerging or fleeting targets with tight control by

ground

forces with eyes

on

was the Kurdish northern
tishness

and the

target or
front.

lightness of

US

from low and slow tactical drones. Third, there

Reduced

to a wait-and-see role

by Turkish

forces in the area, the role of air

skit-

power became

mostly that of airborne cavalry, providing rescue as needed and exploitation of en-

emy

missteps

thrusts

up the

when

possible. Fourth, there

river valleys. This

was

was the Big Show

classic close air

—the dual armored

support and what used to be

called battlefield air interdiction. In this area of operations, air

ably cast in the role of airborne artillery
Finally, there

— and

to very great effect.

were bombs over Baghdad. This was the

role for airpower wistfully

dreamt of

in its idealized
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power was undeni-

classic strategic

hammer

form from Giulio Douhet

to

Walker

Jeffrey K.

Freedom was, in comparison to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a very small sideshow. Why was this? Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was a modern country with a government and population that had
grown accustomed to the infrastructure of a modern economy electrical power,
so there were
effective transportation, good telecommunications, urban living
certainly strategic targets available. However, Iraqi Freedom presented in clear foJack Warden. However, this piece of Iraqi

—

cus the second tectonic shift that

if not

—

exactly sounding the death knell for strate-

bombardment has served notice that airmen better start rethinking strategic
doctrine. The primary reason why the strategic bombing campaign over Baghdad
was not more vigorous was because from the beginning of planning, everyone realized that it would be foolhardy to break any more china than absolutely necessary
since we would be expected to fix most everything we broke. And high on the list of
the plates we wanted to remain unbroken was the good will of the Iraqi populace.
gic

Military Objectives

So where does

campaign

is

all this

and

Collateral Injury in a Non-Strategic

get us in terms of the

law of war?

On the

World

one hand, the

air

fragmenting and over-specializing, with the result that fewer and

fewer targets are

now planned through the target planning cycle and air tasking or-

der (ATO). As a result, the opportunity for systematic review and analysis for collateral

damage

campaign,

less

effects

than

and law of war compliance

is

rapidly fading. In the Iraq air

20% of all targets struck ever appeared on an ATO. This means

that the business of operations lawyers

and more uncertainty. Lawyers

is

need to

will

more complicated with less time
think outside the "JAG signs the legal

getting

—those days

review line on the target folder" box

are mostly gone.

And there is an

enormous amount of work being done right now on strategy tools, collaborative
software, and other air campaign planning tools that offer many opportunities for
innovative new approaches to target review and law of war compliance in air campaigns. The legal community must take advantage of these opportunities to develop future procedures.

On the other hand, the legal equation is being somewhat simplified in one important respect. Since the strategic bombing campaigns of World War
messiest

and most

intractable questions to

essentially the

same

one of the

dog the law of war has been the

infrastructure as the

issue of

modern industrial warfare
modern industrial economy

dual- civilian/military use targets. Unfortunately,

upon

II,

relies

—

rail-

roads, ports, marshalling yards, highways, telecommunications, and, above
electricity

and

oil.

Therefore, striking strategic targets for

all,

maximum impact upon

the enemy's war-making capacity by necessity impacts greatly upon the enemy's civilian population. In addition,

much of this dual-use infrastructure tends to cluster
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in

and around urban areas

—

for completely logical reasons

—and

therefore strik-

ing these targets in densely populated areas heightens the risk of civilian collateral
injury

and damage. More accurate weaponry helps

to reduce collateral injury

from

misdirected bombs, but the blast, heat, and fragmentation from a perfectly placed

bomb cannot be completely contained, so adjoining structures and nearby persons
cannot be completely spared from

collateral effects.

With the

eclipse of the

impor-

downtown" and of the traditional infrastructure-centric strategic
bombing in general, we will be granted some relief from these thorny legal problems. It is a pity that after having finally gotten some serious tools for analyzing dif3
ficult urban and infrastructure targets
I am thinking of Bug Splat, JMEM multitance of "going

—

tiered analysis, 4

weapons

effects

and the ready

—the need

for

availability of sophisticated

them

computer modeling of

declining.

is

Expanding the Notion of Lawful Targets?
However, the frustration borne from the slow realization of how

ineffective or

un-

important strategic bombing was in Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq has caused

some airmen to suggest that the problem lies not with the limitations of strategic
bombing itself, but rather with the artificial restrictions of international law. Why
should the will of the enemy's population not be a lawful target?

Some have

sug-

gested that the parameters of lawful objectives should be expanded to include objectives that if struck
fair,

would discomfort or

distress the civilian population.

everyone stops well short of advocating directly killing

(To be

For example,

civilians.)

why not target symbols of cultural pride like the national soccer stadium? Why not
acknowledge that making life difficult for the civilian population in the enemy capital is a lawful objective in that it will undermine political support for the enemy
leadership and sap their desire to continue the war? Of course, this was one of the
publicly articulated
and more regrettable reasons why the electrical grids in

—

Baghdad

in 1991

campaigns.
that

and

—

in Belgrade in 1999

Some commanders from

one goal of the

initial

now at war

ing out for both the Iraqi military

illegal.

is,

—most obviously evidenced by

and

it

should remain

illegal.

targeting the will of the people

least a collateral

them angry and

will. Killing,

generally

more

First,

it is

arguably

There are several reasons why.

—

explicitly illegal

but

purpose of nearly every bombing campaign

has and probably never

the lights go-

civilians all over the city.

of course, a problem with this expansive approach.

Second,

First,

Desert Storm have stated at various times

wave of bombing over Baghdad was to impress upon the

Iraqi people that they were

There

were attacked early in those bombing

tacitly

—doesn't work. Never

wounding, or displacing

resolved to resist

124

—

it's

accepted as at

civilians just

makes

a tragic-comic aspect

of

Jeffrey K.
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human nature that the more we get hurt the more we are willing to get hurt just to
spite the

one who's doing the hurting. Even carpet bombing and fire bombing Ger-

man and Japanese cities

didn't really break the resolve of the civilian populations.

We saw no evidence of this in Serbia in
Second, even a weak declarative
least default to

not attacking

1999

norm

civilians.

either.

is still

better than nothing in that

we

at

Eliminating or even reversing that default

could easily put us on the infamous slippery slope and become a race to the bot-

tom.

If selecting targets to

make the enemy population uncomfortable is lawful, the

parameters of just what constitutes discomfort will inevitably expand.
to sap the population's will without directly killing

—then why not

hardly allow that
hospitals or

them

If the goal is

—our consciences would

attack irrigation systems or grain elevators or

mosques? Some commentators have even suggested

this

is

exactly

what the United States did in the first Gulf War by hard killing the electrical generation systems in Iraq, resulting in prolonged famine.

We have already engaged in

ill-

advised expansions of the definition of "military object" even under the current
rules

—

television

stations

and the infamous "crony targets"

in Serbia are

would be disastrous were we completely to jettison the presumpcivilians
and the will of the people are immune from direct attack.

good examples.
tion that

and radio

It

—

—

enemy civilian population in any way asresponsibility on the part of the enemy population.

Third, allowing direct targeting of the

sumes some

sort of collective

This completely ignores the nature of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.
itarian

A total-

regime exercising a stern monopoly over the levers of power can stay in

no direct support from the population.
In such States, the opportunities for dissent and resistance are generally very limited. In fact, the very regimes we most want to remove are generally those with the
least direct popular support
the Ba'ath regime in Iraq and the communist regime
place for a very, very long time with little or

—

in

North Korea spring

United

States, the first

half of the

52%

to

mind. (Recall that even in the raucously democratic

Bush "regime"

initially

enjoyed the support of a bit less than

of the population that even bothered to vote.) Deliberately target-

ing the will of the civilian population in these circumstances constitutes nothing

more than collective punishment and random reprisal.
The final and most significant reason why we must avoid loosening the declarative norm against directly targeting the civilian population is that we surely don't
want any further weakening of the admittedly

less- than- effective existing legal

standards protecting civilians from the effects of armed attack.

It is

the sad history

of the documents that compromise the law of war that they were written predominantly by soldiers (or diplomatic surrogates afraid to offend soldiers) to the over-

whelming benefit of soldiers.
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Let us take the

The law of war

and International Law

example of an important law of war concept, proportionality.

and

states "indiscriminate attacks are prohibited"

that an indis-

"may be expected to cause incidental loss of
damage to civilian objects, or a combination

criminate attack includes one which
injury to civilians,

civilian

life,

thereof,

which would be excessive

in relation to the concrete

vantage anticipated." 5 Thus says Additional Protocol

and direct military ad-

on the

I

rule of proportion-

ality in the attack.

The problem of course is that the rule implicitly accepts that it is the attacker
who decides what is and is not excessive injury, damage, or death. And the determination of excessiveness turns on the equally ambiguous term "military advanor as further obfuscated in US practice, military advantage "when viewed
tage"
in the context of the campaign as a whole," 6 whatever on Earth that means. Except
in the most obvious or ludicrous marginal cases, this studied ambiguity yields a
systemic default to rendering any military advantage thrown into the balance by
the attacker as not excessive in relation to resulting civilian injury and death.
The baby elephant in the room that most of us choose to ignore is the inherent

—

and completely irreconcilable
I

vividly recall reading the

subjectivity built into this so-called balancing test.

Kosovo

by Human Rights Watch 7

post-conflict report

while working in the Pentagon. This thorough and well-substantiated report

mated

that 500 civilians

had been

killed

esti-

during the 78-day bombing campaign.

The reaction of my colleagues and me was "not bad." The reaction of Human
Rights Watch was substantially different. In the report prepared for the International Criminal Tribunal for the

legations of

former Yugoslovia prosecutor

in response to al-

NATO war crimes in the Kosovo air war, the rapporteur stated,

The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists
but what it means and how it is to be applied .... For example, bombing a refugee

camp

is

obviously prohibited

if its

only military significance

are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike

should not be prohibited merely because a farmer

is

is

that people in the

camp

on an ammunition dump

plowing a

field in

the area.

Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so
clear cut

....

It is

commander would
to

noncombatants

unlikely that a
assign the
It is

same

human

and an experienced combat
military advantage and to injury

rights lawyer

relative values to

suggested that the determination of relative values must be

that of the "reasonable military

commander." 8

So we are stuck with a rule of paramount importance that

two incomparable concepts, purports

rests

on comparing

to subjectively quantify the basically un-

quantifiable notion of "military advantage,"

and

party in interest with the least personal and most
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defers

all

decision-making to the

amorphous stake

(soldiers) at the

Jeffrey K.

enormous expense of the other party in
personal stake (civilians)
Sadly,

I

.

Walker

interest with the greatest

To quote the immortal Yul Brenner,

and very tangible
puzzlement." 9

"Is a

have come to believe this was a knowing and deliberate process

The agenda worked by the major powers
tablishments

—

all

along.

—

by the interests of their military esduring the negotiation of all the major law of war conventions was
led

way to present a humane face to the world while avoiding any meaningful
restrictions on the use of military force. It is poignantly ironic to note that the most
to find a

historically effective niches in the

ians

—bans on dum-dum

explicitly protect soldiers,

bullets, glass projectiles,

cerning the protection of the

As a

law of war

wounded and

poison

The very ambiguity of the

it

will

remain

civil-

and provisions con-

prisoners of war.

result of this studied creation of irreconcilable

concept of proportionality,

gas,

not

little

ambiguity into the

more than an

critical

aspirational

norm.

rule has the perverse effect of offering significantly less

protection to the innocent victims than to those

who

enjoy a monopoly on the use

of force. Until such time as the law explicitly reapportions the greater risk of injury

and death

—

as a

normative

legal

—

concept and a moral prescription

wield armed force and have voluntarily assumed the risks attendant
civilians will

to those

upon

its

who
use,

continue to receive scant protection from the laws of war.

Why Does It Matter Who Bears the Risk?
Why,

may well be asked, am I distressed by the notion that the law of war dispro-

it

portionately benefits soldiers at the expense of civilians? Quite simply, because one

has willingly assumed the risk of death, injury, or capture and the other has not.
This requires a

little

explanation.

As the great British military historian John Keegan persuasively argues, since the
advent of means and methods of warfare that allow the application of force
tance

—

basically

gunpowder weapons

—the mark of

a great

at a dis-

and valorous military

on the enemy with his strong
right arm. Rather, with distant means of killing, the mark of the courageous officer
has become an indifference to personal safety, a scorn for injury or death. This
reached its most ludicrous extreme in World War I, when young lieutenants fresh
from Oxford or Cambridge went over the top with nothing but an umbrella or riding crop or soccer ball. However, this is a very clear manifestation of the most funofficer has ceased

being the ability to

inflict

injury

damental characteristic of the profession of arms
self-sacrifice

up

to

—

the willingness to engage in

and including death. Military men and

women

often say,

"It's

not about the money." The military profession has traditionally and still does fancy
itself a

unique calling.

It

must not be all about the money, otherwise you could sim-

ply contract out for infantry to the lowest bidder.
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As the United
cal superiority

ways

States continues to

and with

its

self-sacrifice, to

civilian casualties

was

target folders flashed

on screens

not

[did]

have demanded

will

it

mean to

this culture

of

a virtual war, fought in video teleconference rooms, using
...

[it]

demand blood and

never reached deep into the psyche of a peo-

sacrifice." 10

of the American people

little

President's call for "blood
in airports

will

al-

New Yorker article soon after the end of the Kosovo air campaign

in 1999, asserted, "It

.

—what

—almost

the ultimate defining characteristic of the profession of arms? Mi-

chael Ignatieff, in a

ple ..

engage in conflict marked by its vast technologi-

leadership's aversion to friendly casualties

expense of higher

at the

and International Law

and

and an enjoinder

Even the wars of the post-9/1

—indeed, immediately

sacrifice" consisted for

to

1

era

after 9/11 the

most people of shoe removal

spend more money shopping. Hardly the

stuff that

render us the next "Greatest Generation."

Assumption of the Risk
So soldiers have willingly assumed the heightened

members of the

profession of arms. This

is

risk of

not to say that

fuzzy about every civilian. Just as soldiers assume

risk,

I

death or injury as

am all-over warm and

there has long been a tacit

but universal acceptance within the law of war regime that in some circumstances
civilians also

tion against

who would

assume a heightened risk. For example, although the blanket prohibi-

making

civilians the direct object

vessels laden with

is

a

war materiel

factory workers sleep

The

is

not a war crime.

is

lawful

difference

The concept seems
this category

equation

no

explicit

few

is

—although

when

merchant

estate

where the tank

soldiers asleep in their barracks

that the law of

to be that although

civilian

On the other hand, few would be

bombing of the housing
war

willingly present within a lawful military target

ity

applies, there are

war crime. Likewise, the torpedoing of

so bold as to assert that night area

them,

still

argue that the killing of war workers busily assembling tanks inside a

munitions factory

this risk.

of attack

tacitly

acknowledges that

assume the

do bear
civilians

risk of being attacked.

one should not go out of your way to

kill

of civilian quite simply weighs quite lightly in the proportionalattacking an otherwise lawful military target. Again,

statement of this in law

—

it

just

I

can find

seems to be a generally accepted princi-

ple of application.

Voluntary human shields are another category of persons that assume the risk of
death or injury by willfully placing themselves in harms way at a lawful military objective.

ations

Of course, the law is only the law, and as we saw in Kosovo, policy considercan render immune from attack otherwise lawful targets protected by

volunteer civilians.
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Perhaps of more

companying US

moment

for

US

Walker

forces, contractor or civilian

forces in the field logically

The law of war
some protections to

these civilians

if

into the category of assumers of the

Geneva Convention

hints at this in 1949

risk.

fall

they

III

civilians.

tacitly

being contracted
ian

is

this subject,

by extending

enemy

acknowledged

force.

by

this

As more and more functions

heretofore performed by uniformed soldiers are contracted out

be uninformed on

11

into the hands of an

fall

Both defense contractors and the government have
paying significantly higher wages to such

employees ac-

—and

lest

anyone

huge swathes of traditional military functions are

—the very notion of what

constitutes a

combatant versus a

civil-

being thoroughly muddled.

The Issue of Impunity

One

final factor

—and

this

is

a big

one

—

is

From

taught as the positivist legal regime regulating armed conflict.
conferences in

St.

the major powers

what we

rapidly undermining

all

were

the earliest

Petersburg, there was a very rough equivalency of threat amongst

who

created the law of war treaty regime. Be

it

the Great Powers

of the 19th century, Democracies versus Fascists in the inter-war years, or the

US

bloc versus the Soviet bloc of the Cold War, there was always a rough equivalency

damage each could do to the other. This more or less balanced military threat
produced a mutuality of self-interest amongst the major players who most influenced the development of the law of war treaties. If all your potential enemies have
the wherewithal to do to you what you can do to them
be it take prisoners or strategically bomb or sink merchant shipping
then everyone faced a somewhat tarnished Golden Rule: don't do some things unto others or they just might do the
same unto you. And this was until recently the positivistic enforcement mechanism admittedly less than totally effective that underpinned whatever success
the law of war regime may have enjoyed in theory and application.
in the

—

—

—

—

But with the emergence of the United States

we

superpower left standing,

mechanism

are faced with a significant threat to this implicit enforcement

impunity.
tions.
all

as the last

I

Now I

don't intend to use this

—the

mean plain old impunity

word with any of its

ability to act

what the Holy Grail of air campaign planners,

ity to act

sense

without constraint. This

air

supremacy, means

And

with impunity over the entire area of operations.

—although not

a political

one

—the United

negative connota-

States

and

its

is

after

—the

abil-

in a military

usual

allies

find

we can pretty much do whatever we want
risk of an enemy doing much back at us.

themselves in this position. Militarily,

with

little

That

reciprocal

said,

any

positivist notions

—and you

will notice that

marginally effective international criminal tribunals in this mix
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—of

the laws of war
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They have become what the more cynical among us have always
merely an admirable collection of declaratory and aspirational norma-

are basically gone.

suspected

—

tive statements, to

be obeyed or not

We Go from Here?

Where Do
So

I

have painted us into a corner

aspirational than effective,

of the situation dictate.

as the exigencies

—the law

and was never

is

more

intended to protect civilians

much

is

really

inherently ambiguous,

With one enormous military power now ruling the international
roost, the self-interest and reciprocity of threat that served to shore up what compliance there was has evaporated. But the law of war regime as it exists today is all
in the first place.

we've got. Can

we do any better with

it?

I'm not really sure, although I'm willing to give

it

some

serious thought

and

The law of proportionality is hardly unique in its inherent ambiguity a lot of domestic law falls into the same category. If you're a
full-blown critical legal studies disciple, all law is inherently ambiguous because
law is a creature of language and all language is inherently ambiguous. And in international law we get the added confounding factor of equally authentic texts in
hope the readers

will as well.

—

What's a lawyer to do?

several languages.

Step one

may be

to simply

acknowledge that we need to make

clear policy

choices rather than tortured legal justifications as to the allocation of risks from the

use of military force. As lawyers,

"black letter" arguments
this area.

And

in

—

we need

there really

is

modern democracies,

—

what

the political masters, this

the

coherent fashion.

And

is

as well stop carping

things are,

it is

little if
is

behind pseudo-positivist

any truly black

letter

mechanism

already a

political control

for

of the military.

law in

making

Much

as

often perceived as niggling interference from

most

effective

as professional soldiers

you might

the

is

very

there

these policy-driven allocations of risk
soldiers grind their teeth at

to stop hiding

about

way things should

it

way

to allocate risk in

an open and

doing the dirty work of democracy,

and acknowledge

this

is

not only the way

be.
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VIII
Air Power, Accuracy,

and the Law of Targeting:

Why No Brave New World?
Adam Roberts

Jeffrey Walker's paper on

"Strategic Targeting

punchy, and splendidly heretical.
focus a discussion of targeting
edly air power that
that presents

is

I

agree with

1

and International Law"

much of it.

It is

is

clear,

indeed useful to

on one dimension of warfare. Today it

is

undoubt-

the driver of revolutionary changes in the conduct of war,

some of the most

difficult

and challenging problems

implementation or adaptation of existing

legal

and

as regards the

norms. As Mr. Walker notes, for

generations airmen have yearned for accurate, survivable and reliable all-weather

day/night weapons.

Now they have got them. He and

strewn with hazards, and that there
controversial bombing.
cient

and

clever curse:

However,
Specifically,

role of

I

as will

I

in

"May your wishes be

granted."

him about why,

I

disagree with his

despite

contemporary warfare remains
I

is

no brave new world of precise and legally un-

be seen from what follows,

struction. In addition,

agree that this situation

suspect that this situation reminds both of us of that an-

disagree with

bombing

is

I

main conclusions.

improvements

in accuracy, the

costly in civilian lives

and de-

do not share his extreme pessimism about the role of the laws

of war in imposing some limits on bombing. As regards his proposed solution

Air Power, Accuracy, and the

more

I

am all in favor of

does not solve the particular problems he

it

In responding to his paper
First,

—

of the military

effective political control

indicated below

Law of Targeting: Why No Brave New World?

I

will focus

on four main

and discrimination

issues relating to air power.

bombing than

in

but for reasons

identifies.

the significance of the technical developments that have

greater degree of accuracy

it,

made

possible a

in earlier eras. Sec-

ond, the provisions of the laws of war that relate to targeting, and the ways in which
they have shaped and reinforced the tendency toward discrimination in bombing.
Third, certain problems that remain, that help to explain
far

from achieving

culties that

perfect precision

why air bombardment

and discrimination. Fourth, the

is

special diffi-

have arisen regarding the obligations on the defender to distinguish

military activities

from

Finally

civilian objects.

I

will

attempt to draw some

conclusions.
In each of the sections below,

focus

on four wars:

•

The War over Kuwait (1990-1)

•

The War over Kosovo (1999)

•

The War

in Afghanistan (200 1-)

•

The War

in Iraq (2003-) 2

These wars have certain
led coalitions

—though

of the

air,

of them there have been United States-

all,

the US-led forces

combat

forces

from progres-

had more or less complete command

and used air power (including precision-guided munitions)

extensively. In

they were fighting against one essentially third-world State that was

isolated diplomatically
at

similarities. In all

the coalitions have involved

sively fewer countries. 3 In

all,

my discussion of the issues, like Mr. Walker's, will

some

stage a civil

and had been subject

war or regional

to

rebellion

economic sanctions. In

ongoing

well as an international war. In short, these were

all

in the

more or

less

there

was

all,

country concerned, as

thoroughly unequal contests.

The bombing in these wars has been a mixture of strategic (intended to bring
about change on its own) and tactical (in support of ground operations). Mr.
Walker says of strategic bombardment: "We now have the technology but no longer the need." 4 If one interprets this to mean, as

much of his paper suggests, that the

power in recent wars have been very different from any of the classic visions such as those of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, I have no problem
with his statement. However, if he takes this to suggest that air power today is a
actual uses of air

would-be solution
with the

spirit

that there

is

a

in search

of his remarks

danger of using

whatever reason,

it is

of a non-existent problem, then while
I

have difficulty

air

I

sympathize

in accepting the analysis.

He

is

right

power, as a default option in situations where, for

not appropriate. However, for better or for worse, some situ-

ations arise in which the application of air

power
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capable of achieving significant
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—

armed forces, whether on the ground
or at sea. Further, we live in an age in which the implementation of international
norms, including resolutions of the UN Security Council, sometimes depends on a
capacity for strategic coercion, i.e., the use of military and other pressures against a
State to secure its compliance with specific demands: in this process, the threat and
actuality of air power may have some part to play.
As in Mr. Walker's paper itself, the main focus here is on the laws of war (jus in
hello) aspects of these wars. The focus is not on the lawfulness of the resort to force
results

(jus

usually in combination with other

ad helium). This

practice.

if

between jus ad helium and jus

not always so in

in hello. If air

power were believed

erroneously) to be a precision surgical instrument that can be applied at

low risk to the United
cline the

government

would have

States

and with

to use

it

a strong likelihood of success, that could in-

in circumstances in which, in earlier periods,

ation, the resort to force

the circumstances, the

first

three wars under consider-

by the US-led coalitions was widely viewed as justifiable in

most contentious of these three being Kosovo. The Iraq War

was and remains much more problematical. In

and partners

relied

tion of earlier
force in Iraq

mined by

it

hesitated to use force. In actual cases, of course, other considerations

have entered in to decisions to use force. In the

in 2003

is

As regards the use of air power, there is particular cause for concern about

a possible overlap

(even

subject, while in principle entirely separate,

on one principal legal justification

this case the

United States

for the action:

implementa-

UN Security Council resolutions. This justification for the resort to

was based on serious considerations, but

its

application was under-

several difficulties: flawed assessments of Iraqi capabilities, a question-

able denigration of the

ongoing inspection process,

Security Council support,
ever, in principle

and a

failure to

failure to secure explicit

plan for the occupation of Iraq. 5

How-

any problems that may exist under the jus ad helium regarding the

international legal validity of an intervention

do not

affect consideration

of the jus

in hello aspects.

Because

air

power

in general,

part in these four wars,

it

and bombing

in particular, played a significant

does not follow that they are necessarily keys to victory

modern wars. For example, in the 1982 Falklands War the United Kingdom
used air power in a much more restricted and limited way than in these four more
recent wars. A major bombing campaign against Argentina and its armed forces
in

all

would have been hard to sustain, of limited relevance to the situation, and highly
questionable on moral and political grounds. Such considerations will apply to
many future campaigns. The extensive use of air power is particularly questionable in pacification operations, for example in support of a friendly government
or an occupation regime, because it risks antagonizing the very people whose
support or neutrality is needed. In these and other cases, the reasons for avoiding
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the use of air power, or for exercising discrimination in

narrowly

legal in character:

how

it is

used, are not

they also involve considerations of interest,

common

sense and prudence. As Mr. Walker notes, everyone involved in planning the

bombing of Baghdad in 2003 "realized that it would be foolhardy to break any
more china than absolutely necessary." 6 Taking all these reasons into account,
Mr. Walker's skepticism about the use and utility of strategic bombardment,
even

if

presented in broad-brush terms,

is

a healthy antidote to Douhet-like ex-

bombing.

cesses in devotion to

The Impact of Technical Developments

World War there has been a slow evolution of the means of delivery of so-called conventional weapons. The United States has been at the forefront
of this process. At the same time, concern about the indiscriminate use of air
power, including by the United States, has endured. The US bombing of North
Vietnam from 1964 to 1972, and also the use of air power within South Vietnam,
Since the Second

reflected certain

improvements

in

technology but also reinforced this concern.

That was one basis for the development of the law of targeting contained

Geneva Protocol

in

1977

I.

At first glance, the dramatic improvement in the accuracy of air-delivered weapons would appear to have improved the prospects of certain

air

campaigns being

conducted in a manner that is compatible with long-established law-of-war principles, especially the principle

that, at least in

some

of discrimination. 7

instances, air

has even encouraged the hope

war can comply with the more

about targeting contained in Protocol
contributed at least as

It

I.

specific rules

Indeed, engineers could be seen as having

much as international lawyers to improving the possibilities

of discrimination in the use of air power.

The principle that the use of air-delivered weaponry should be discriminate was
frequently repeated in all four wars, particularly by senior US government and military decision-makers. The remarkable improvement in accuracy compared to earlier eras was widely noted in the 1991 Iraq War. Subsequent US bombing
campaigns, right up to the 2003 Iraq War, reflected both quantitative and qualitative developments in the use of accurate air-delivered weapons. The way in which
many citizens of Baghdad went about their business in the midst of a major bombing campaign in March- April 2003 indicates that they seemed to have some understanding of the

US

attempt to apply the principle of discrimination.

among the population of the territory being bombed were significantly lower than many forecasts made before the commencement of military hostilities. For example, in the United Kingdom the
In

all

four wars, civilian casualties
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War Coalition" published an advertisement in March 2003 in which
"We want to stop a war which will result in an estimated 50,000 civil-

"Stop the
it

stated:

and 2 million refugees." 8 In the subsequent Iraq
War at least in its intense phase in March-April 2003 casualties and refugee
movements were, by any count, far below these levels. This is not to say that
they were not worryingly high, and cause for major concern. 9 In summary, I
agree with Mr. Walker that civilian casualties in these wars, and in particular casualties of bombing, have been comparatively low by historical standards; and I
also agree with him that this fact does not change everything. Thus there is a
need to explore why, despite developments in the law and in weaponry, civilian
damage and casualties have continued. These themes are explored in the next
ian deaths, 500,000 injured

—

—

two

sections.

The Law on Targeting
Probably the law's most important contribution in these four wars has been the
part

it

has played in the larger overall process of improving discrimination in

weapons. Since

targeting, especially targeting of airborne

at least

1868 the laws

of war have required that only armed forces and military targets should be attacked. This apparently simple rule

been given

much

Geneva Protocol

is

in fact hugely problematical.

greater specificity in the rules

on

It

has

now

targeting contained in 1977

I.

On this matter, my emphasis differs from Mr. Walker's. He is a skeptic about the
value of the rules

on targeting. There is still,

irreconcilable subjectivity"

be made
Rights

as

10

as

he

says,

an "inherent and completely

built in to the balancing test

when

between military advantage and protection of

Watch

sees certain issues

decisions have to

civilian

one way, while the Pentagon has a

life.

Human

different spin

on them. He even implies that there may have been a deliberate and ongoing collusive process by which we have ended up with a body of combat law that seeks only
ostensibly to balance the two "incomparable concepts" 11 of military advantage and
civilian protection. As he puts it:
have come to believe

was a knowing and deliberate process all along. The
agenda worked by the major powers led by the interests of their military
Sadly,

I

establishments
find a

way

restriction

—during

to present a

this

—

the negotiation of all the major law of war conventions was to

humane

on the use of military

historically effective niches in the

bans on

face to the
force.

It is

law of war

world while avoiding any meaningful

poignantly ironic to note that the most
explicitly protect soldiers,

not

civilians

dum-dum bullets, glass projectiles, poison gas, and provisions concerning the

protection of the

wounded and

prisoners of war. 12
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quite an accusation, but

is

combat

things that

is

it

neglects a basic fact.

It is

in the very nature of

extremely hard to regulate; and therefore that some of the

more effective parts of the laws of war should be those that deal, not with combat as
such, but with the treatment of individuals

are hors de

hands of the adversary. Against this background,

into the
is

who

it is

combat or have

fallen

remarkable that there

any significant body of law at all that regulates combat. The most detailed rules of
those in 1977 Geneva Protocol

this type are

I.

rious disagreements with parts of this treaty,

The fact that the United
which

it

States has se-

has not ratified, does not ne-

gate the importance of these rules.

Mr. Walker's analysis

short of concrete examples.

is

To prove beyond doubt

for this.

He

is

not to be blamed

that the law has a benevolent influence

would be necessary to report

on

tar-

on the process by which the decision was made whether or not to attack particular targets; and, if so, with what
weapon, at what time, and in what way. Most people, even specialists in strategic matters, simply do not have access to such information. Information of this
geting,

it

in detail

kind might confirm the substantial positive contribution of law in the decision-

making

process. In this context, there

is

a particular

need for evidence of plans

or missions that were abandoned or modified because of undue risk to civilians

and

civilian objects.

What are the main rules of law that are applicable to targeting? The rules in 1977
Protocol

I

are contained in

particular in

Within
52.2

is

its

Section

I

its

Part IV, which

is

on

"Civilian Population,"

and

in

on "General Protection Against the Effects of Hostilities."

this section, eleven articles

—48

to 58

—contain

all

the

main

rules. Article

particularly important:

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,

which by their nature, location, purpose
military action and whose total or partial

military objectives are limited to those objects

or use

make an

effective contribution to

destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.

Article 52 has to be read,

sions of Protocol
in attack,

which

isfied in the

use"

I.

and implemented,

in conjunction with other provi-

Among the most important of these is Article 57 on precautions

establishes a strong set of procedures

and

conduct of all military attacks. For example,

facilities

—

a

term not used

in the

gent criteria on the basis of which

have to be canceled or suspended.

conventions

many planned
13
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criteria that

must be

sat-

as regards so-called "dual-

Article 57.2(b) sets out strin-

attacks

on such

facilities

might

Adam Roberts
These rules on targeting in 1977 Protocol
lems for certain
ject

States.

I

are well

known to

present prob-

For example, Article 52, cited above, has been the sub-

of interpretative declarations by a

number of parties to

the Protocol. 14

The

UK's sixteen statements made at the time of ratification of the Protocol include
no less than eight that relate to Articles 50 to 57. All eight articles, and all eight
UK statements, relate in one way or another to targeting. A key theme of these
eight UK statements is that the commander must necessarily act on the basis of
the knowledge that was available at the time, as distinct from information that

might have been available to others, or might have emerged later. In short, the
commander should not be judged by an unrealistic standard. Other NATO

member

States have

made some

similar interpretative statements about Arti-

cles 51 to 57.

What
though
cepts

is

the official

it is

US line on the

rules

on

targeting in 1977 Protocol

not a party to the Protocol, the United States has indicated that

and applies many of its provisions. In one major

stated:

"The US views the following

GP

I

official

list

publication

articles as either legally

tomary international law or acceptable practice though not

The US

I?

Even
it
it

ac-

has

binding as cus-

legally binding." 15

includes the following articles that relate directly to targeting:

•

Article 5 1 except paragraph 6

•

Article 52

•

Article 54

•

Articles

57-60

The fact of US acceptance in principle of these articles does not mean that there
are no problems regarding the US understanding of them. US interpretations,
while basically along similar lines to some of the statements made by NATO members when ratifying Protocol

I,

sometimes go

further.

nitions of "military objectives" use language that

of Article 52.2 as quoted above.
sis)

is

For example,

US defi-

official

significantly broader than that

One US version (with italics added here for empha-

reads:

Military objectives are combatants

purpose, or use,
capability

and those

effectively contribute to the

and whose

objects which,

by their nature,

location,

enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining

total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization

constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker

time of the attack. 16

139

would

under the circumstances

at the

Air Power, Accuracy, and the

In one subsequent

US

Law of Targeting: Why No Brave New World?
Commission
This would ap-

version of this definition, namely Military

Instructions issued in 2003, the

word

has been omitted.

'definite'

17

pear to represent a further departure from the text of Article 52(2).

Some

legal experts in the

US armed

forces have expressed serious concerns

about Article 52. For example, Major Jeanne Meyer, co-editor of the Operational

Law Handbook, stated in 2001

that this article "tries to constrict the use of air

hand" and "ignores the

to the specific tactical military effort at
tion's

war effort

power

reality that a na-

composed of more than just military components." 18 While not

is

suggesting total rejection of the provision, she urged the United States to "resist the
pressure to accept restrictive interpretations of Article 52.2." 19 In general, the

United States
gets that

is

anxious to retain some legal justification for attacks on certain

may not themselves be purely military, but which may,

tar-

for example, con-

tribute to the military effort or constitute key parts of a regime's infrastructure.
All in

about

not surprising that some commentators have indicated concern

all, it is

US

interpretations of what constitutes a military objective.

interpretation as differing significantly

more permissive

definition.

20

from

Article 52,

the

a shift as

see the

as tending

US

towards a

Are such expressions of concern well founded? One

could question the extent to which the current

sometimes claimed,

and

They

compared

US

to earlier

position really represents, as

US

positions;

and

also

is

whether

US positions generally have not been similar in their meaning to some of the in-

terpretative declarations
clear

on

beyond doubt that the

Article 52

made by certain

other States. However,

it is

definition of military targets in Article 52 poses certain

problems for the United States despite

its

general acceptance of this

article.

More-

some differences of national approach on these matters, including
between the United Kingdom and the United States; and these can cause problems
over, there are

during coalition military operations.
Is

the law as

stands satisfactory? Mr. Walker suggests that

it

right that the provisions of 1977 Protocol

and that when

it

comes

I

are not as strong as

on

to actual decisions

it is

not.

He may be

many would wish;

actual targets, they

sometimes leave

considerable scope for interpretation and even for a necessarily subjective balancing process. However, he does not suggest specific changes,

and he goes too

far

when he states that "there really is very little if any truly black letter law in this
area." 21 The real problem may be, not the weakness of the law itself, but the very
broad

official

US

tice, especially

above-quoted

interpretation of it. Although Mr.

the danger

it

Walker

is

critical

of US prac-

poses to civilians, he does not explicitly note the

US statements that, arguably, stretch almost to breaking point that

very scope for interpretation of which he

both for and against the

US emphasis oh

is critical.

There are serious arguments

concentrating attacks on the

gime's sources of power and war-sustaining capability

140
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—and the debate about the
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adequacy or otherwise of the existing law needs to take account of this

critically

important debate.

My main disagreement with Mr. Walker's treatment of the law on targeting relates,

not to the law's content or interpretation, but to

der consideration there
effect

is

its effect.

evidence that, so far as the United States

of all the provisions on targeting contained in Protocol

restricted

list

In the four wars un-

of those provisions accepted by the United

I,

States,

is

concerned, the

and even of the more
has been

much more

than the vague and subjective requirement for proportionality mentioned in Mr.
Walker's paper. This
relevant sources.
identifying

22

is

not the place to elaborate on

At this stage

and attacking

it

this point, or

go into the

many

may be enough simply to assert that the process of
wars has been influenced by

targets in these four

quirements, including those of 1977 Protocol

have to defend their actions by the

I.

The

fact that the

criteria established in the

legal re-

US armed

forces

law of war has had more

on target selection and on policy generally than Mr. Walker allows. However, it
has had less effect in mitigating the horrors of war than might have been hoped.
effect

Some

of the reasons for this are explored in the next section.

Continuing Problems in the Use of Air Power

The increased accuracy of air- delivered weapons, while undoubtedly a momentous development in the history of war, is no cure-all. Even when coupled with
attempts to observe legal restrictions on targeting, it cannot guarantee either success or no deaths of innocents. In the course of these four wars, figures for civilian
deaths have apparently not decreased in proportion to the increase in the use of
precision-targeted weapons.

Why is this so?

Despite the improvements in accuracy,
ternational concern, largely

were reports of

many

all

four bombing campaigns aroused in-

on account of the danger

to non-combatants. There

attacks causing significant civilian casualties

and damage.

Accuracy in hitting the intended target area did not itself necessarily eliminate such
problems. The

US bombing

of the Amiriya bunker in Baghdad on February 13,

1991 caused approximately 300 civilian casualties. In the Kosovo war in 1999, a
railway bridge was

bombed when a passenger train was crossing it, with heavy loss

of life. In Afghanistan, the International Committee of the Red Cross warehouse in

on October 16 and 26, 2001; and there were numerous subsequent incidents in which large numbers of villagers were killed.
The question is: what are the specific reasons why the combination of increased
Kabul was

hit twice,

accuracy of air-delivered weapons and increased acceptance of certain rules

more dramatic change for the better? Mr.
main problem is that the relevant body of law is weak,

ing to targeting have not produced a

Walker suggests

that the

relat-
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especially as regards protection of civilians;

superpower

left

of factors

at

is

standing,

work,

tional

many but

problems can be

that the United States, as the last

in a situation of impunity. 23

is

not

all

between adversaries

hostile relations

and

Why No Brave New World?

However, a broader range

of which are recognized in his paper. In the

in the four wars, at least eleven types of opera-

identified:

No weapon is more accurate than the intelligence on which its use is based, and
this may sometimes be wrong or out of date, resulting in civilian damage and deaths.
2. Many targets are selected at very short notice, for example by ground-based
1

personnel in radio contact with aircraft overhead. This can

mean

that targets are

sometimes attacked without being subjected to cross-checking of information, or
lengthy legal and policy consideration. As Mr. Walker

planned through the target planning cycle and

states,

"fewer targets are

air tasking order."

now

24

Precision-guided weapons are generally better at hitting fixed objects, such as

3.

buildings, than

moving

and

objects that can be concealed, such as people

tanks.

(Howuse of air power

This could lead to a perverse prioritization in favor of targeting buildings.

from the 2003 war suggests

ever, preliminary evidence

effective

even against tanks that had been concealed under tree cover.)
4.

In

in close

get

is

some military targets, whether fixed or mobile, are likely to be
proximity to civilians and civilian objects. Thus, even when a military tar-

all

countries,

accurately

hit,

struction of houses
5.

there

may be

significant "collateral"

and deaths of civilians.

As a response to the increased accuracy of targeting, the "receiving State" may

deliberately co-locate military objects close to civilians

making

it

on

that account. (This

problem

So-called "dual-use targets," such as a

both military and

and long-term
7.

and

civilian objects

civilian uses, are

effects

Weapons, even

on the

if

is

power

discussed further below.)
station

sometimes attacked

producing

—often with

that cluster

bombs

may continue

to

electricity for

serious short -

infrastructure of society.

delivered with great precision,

may themselves be of such a

nature as to cause serious and indiscriminate damage. For example,

8.

—thus

harder to attack them without harming civilians and incurring interna-

tional criticism
6.

damage, including de-

it is

notorious

frequently pose a hazard to civilians, including children

do so long

after a

war

is

—and

over.

Malevolence, callousness, incompetence, and poor or inappropriate training

can also lead to attacks on the wrong places or people.
9.

The

greater accuracy of

weapons

risks creating a

high

level

those individuals and States responsible for target selection.

(whether rightly or wrongly) that what

may

be

a greater sense

of outrage

is

hit

among

is

of anger against

If

it

is

what a targeter intended

perceived

to hit, there

the population of the target State and in
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international opinion generally. There

why a particular target was
10.

The

is

ample scope

for conspiracy theories as to

attacked.

greater accuracy of

bombing makes

possible certain forms of action,

such as targeted killings of individuals, that maybe exposed to a wide range of legal

and other

criticisms.

One example

is

a targeted killing that risks deaths of large

Baghdad restaurant attack intended to kill Saddam
Hussein at the start of the 2003 Iraq War). Another example that could incur criticism, mainly on human rights and jus ad bellum grounds, would be a targeted kill-

numbers of civilians

ing

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

the

of an alleged terrorist) in the territory of a foreign country when there

is

no state of war with, or within, that country. Absence of formal consent of its government would aggravate the problem.
11. In an era marked by frequent threats of "strategic coercion" against certain
States to

change their policies or even their regimes, there

is

sometimes tension be-

tween the perceived need to make an impressive threat (such

as that

of "shock and

awe" against Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 war) and then, if force is actually used, the
need to observe certain limitations on
risk

its

use.

An actual military campaign may be at

of conforming more to the preceding threats than to the legal and other consid-

erations that might point in the direction of using force discriminately.

The problem of "friendly
late particularly to

the

two wars

poor

in Iraq

coalition forces.

It

and

fire"

confirms that the reasons for disasters often re-

intelligence

in the

Afghan war, US bombings led

cases in

to casualties

among

appears that in most instances the target was incorrectly identi-

fied or a weapon incorrectly "locked

laws-of-war issue as such. However,

and can lead

States concerned,

and hasty decision-making. In many

on" to the wrong target. "Friendly fire"
it is

a legal issue

not a

is

under the national law of the

to national legal action

—

as

it

has done in the

United States as a result of an incident involving the death of Canadian soldiers in
Afghanistan. 25 Incidents of US "friendly fire" have also caused considerable con-

cern in the United Kingdom, especially as a result of the 2003 Iraq War. 26 The fre-

quency of such incidents confirms the

commentary, that modern

thesis of this

means of war can

lead to disaster not because the law

chaos, confusion

and sheer malevolence of war have survived

is

weak, but because the fog,
into a

A further problem with the new type of US bombing campaign
ceptions of the balance of risk. In the eyes of third parties,

it

new era.
concerns per-

can easily look as

United States puts a lower value on the lives of Iraqis, Serbs or Afghans
vilian

—than

it

share this view

does on

its

when he

at the

proposition.

It is far

—even

if ci-

own almost- invulnerable aircrews. Mr. Walker seems to

refers to "conflict

technological superiority and

most always

if the

its

marked by

its

[the

United

States'] vast

leadership's aversion to friendly casualties

expense of higher civilian casualties."

27

1

—

al-

am skeptical about this

from proven that there is any straightforward link between the
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safety of US aircrew

that the capacity to

ons

and higher

civilian casualties.

make decisions and to

may

in relative safety

It

might

just as easily

release (or refrain

from

be argued

weap-

releasing)

contribute to the careful and discriminate use of

airpower. However, the hostile perception has

some

plausibility.

Bombing from

high altitude must sometimes increase the risk of a target being inaccurately identified;

and must

ground

also increase the time a

—by which

a

takes to reach

time, for example, a previously

senger train running across
lives

weapon

it.

its

target

on the

empty bridge may have

The perception of invulnerable warriors

a pas-

risking the

of civilians underneath feeds those hostile views of the United States that form

background against which terrorism can

flourish.

Perhaps the most profound problem of all regarding the use of bombing
the United States

and

its allies

have developed a concept of war aimed

the sources of an adversary's power, not
military in character. Mr.

all

Walker appears

of which

may be

strictly

is

that

at targeting

and narrowly

to equate this with "targeting the will of

the people." 28

He is rightly opposed to the idea of a policy aimed at civilians, criticizing it on both legal and practical grounds. However, the US doctrine is not necessarily

one of targeting the

targeting the key sources

may in

will

of the people. Rather,

on

aims principally

and instruments of a regime's power

particular cases be very different. This

existing legal regime

it

is

—something

at

that

the biggest single challenge to the

targeting.

The debate about the bombing of the TV station in Belgrade in 1999 exemplifies
the difficulty of determining what is a legal target. Mr. Walker calls this an example
of "ill-advised expansions of the definition of 'military object' even under the current rules."

However,

it is

nition of military object.

not clear that what

On

is

involved

is

an expansion of the defi-

the basis of the pre- 1977 law, especially the 1954

Hague Cultural Property Convention, Article 8(1) (a), 29 a serious argument can be
made that attacks on a broadcasting station are not necessarily illegal. The question
is

rather whether 1977 Protocol

I

the definition of "military object."
slav revolution of

treated the

drastically
It

changed

may or may not be

September/October 2000 the

same TV station

this situation

relevant that in the

resisters to the

as a high-priority target.

ways, and quite properly, be difficult to persuade

by narrowing

Yugo-

Milosevic regime

One thing is certain:

it

will al-

TV reporters that television sta-

tions are legitimate targets!

The Kosovo War raised many other issues indicating how easily a bombing
campaign can conflict with the targeting provisions of the laws of war. For example, there were debates about what NATO should do when it started to run out of
military targets: should it then abandon the bombing campaign, or move on to
other targets? There is also the closely related analytical question: did attacks on
dual-use targets, and/or a perceived threat of further attacks directed at civilians and
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civilian objects, play a

major part in the Yugoslav decision of June

the terms that were being pressed
to that last question.

tion

is

One can

upon it?

certainly

30

It is difficult

3,

1999 to accept

to provide a definite answer

doubt whether any "single-factor" explana-

adequate. However, while agreeing with Mr. Walker that Russia's abandon-

ment of Serbia was of crucial importance, I cannot agree with his strong assertion
31
that "air power didn't win the Kosovo campaign." At the very least it was one important contributory factor. The more difficult question is whether the potential
threat to specifically civilian objects and people was a part of the equation that contributed to Serbia's defeat.

Defender's Obligation to Distinguish Military Activities from Civilian Objects

There are extensive requirements that apply as

much to defenders as to attackers,

including the requirement not to locate military forces and equipment in civilian
areas or in protected buildings such as hospitals or mosques. 32 In these four wars
it

appears that these legal requirements were deliberately violated by adversaries

in order to induce the US-led coalition to engage in
casualties
its

and destruction.

opponents had faked

On

an attack that caused

several occasions the

civilian

or close to civilian ones (for

damage

United States asserted that

by illegally locating military assets
example putting gun emplacements next
or,

mosques), had willfully created a situation in which
ahead, would be likely to cause civilian

US bombing,

if it

in
to

went

damage and incur international criticism.

Iraq War in particular suggested that this

Some evidence from the 2003

civilian

may have

been happening systematically.
In this reading of events, the laws of war are being cynically misused in order to

make

the attacker's actions appear indiscriminate

duct, if it were

and disproportionate. Such con-

proved to have the intention imputed here, would of course constitute

a tribute of sorts to the practical importance of the principles of proportionality

discrimination. Such conduct

is all

part of what Brigadier General Charles

—or misusing—law

has called "lawfare," or "the strategy of using
traditional

means

to achieve an operational objective."

and

Dunlap

as a substitute for

33

Why is there such a tendency of States subjected to coalition bombing to locate
military assets in or near civilian objects such as schools

and mosques? Part of the

may be that it is a logical if deplorable reaction to the situation created by
effective US dominance of the air. If the United States and its partners can see and
answer

strike
its

anywhere, or

at least

it is

believed that they can

do

so,

it is

adversaries should locate their military assets in a place

would be open

to

condemnation

not surprising that

where any US attack

in the court of world opinion. Similarly, the very
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saries to other illegal
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States exerts

on the

battlefield generally

may induce adver-

forms of response, including international terrorism.
Conclusions

There

no denying some obvious truths about the impact of technological

is

opments. The increased accuracy

in the delivery

devel-

of weapons has had significant

ef-

bombing can bear a reasonable relation to
the law of armed conflict; and may contribute to a reduction in numbers of civilian
casualties in the territory being bombed. However, as this survey has suggested,
none of this means that we are in a brave new world of casualty- free warfare. Indeed, the new accuracy in bombing poses a range of difficult and even threatening
problems, many of which relate to the rules on targeting in the laws of war. Such
fects;

ought to improve

possibilities that

problems contribute to Mr. Walker's pessimistic conclusion that "any
notions
cynical

.

I

.

of the laws of war are basically gone. They have become what the more

among

claratory
cies

.

positivist

us have always suspected

—merely an admirable

collection of de-

and aspirational normative statements, to be obeyed or not as the exigen-

of the situation dictate." 34

cannot agree with

into a corner."

35

this conclusion.

Mr. Walker admits that he has "painted us

Yet his account of the corner

is

not completely convincing.

He is

on the uniqueness of the situation where there is only one Great
Power. However, what he says about the supposed impunity of the United States
and its allies does not reflect accurately the full range of constraints on decisionmakers. True, US decision-makers are protected from the attentions of the Interright to focus

national Criminal Court (though in theory their British counterparts are not);

and

in

some measure they are protected from

military reprisals as there

no ad-

is

versary of remotely equal military power. However,

US

volved in such matters as targeting must always have in

mind

the possibility of a

fly in

the face of the de-

wide range of adverse consequences. Any actions which

decision-makers in-

cent opinions of humankind, or which plainly violate the laws of war,

adverse publicity, internal
erations,

US

legal

may result in

procedures, local opposition in the area of op-

and a loss of support both domestically and internationally that could un-

dermine ongoing US

policies. In the twentieth

unique international role thanks largely to

its

leading coalitions of States. That success

is

number of member

States in the coalitions

century the United States acquired a

success in building, maintaining

now

in jeopardy, as the

and

diminishing

between the 1991 and the 2003 Iraq

wars perhaps indicates.

What,

if

anything, can the United States and

(and admittedly modest) body of law as

it

allies

do

in regard to the existing

applies to the use of air

146

power

in

war? In

Adam Roberts
principle three courses of action are possible. All three have strengths,

and the pru-

dent conduct of policy must involve elements of all of them.
1.

Adhere

strictly to the existing black-letter

law on

targeting, especially the

and Mr. Walker,

outlined in 1977 Geneva Protocol I. This course has serious merits,
despite his conclusion that there
for

it,

2.

is

"very little black letter law," shows his sympathy
civilians. 36

advocating strongly a default rule of not attacking

Recognize some right

law as

to interpret

and adapt

the rules in practice.

The

fact that

many States have made interpretative declarations in respect of some of these rules
suggests the strength of this approach.

It

indicates that the rules can properly be in-

terpreted to take account of changing circumstances

some degree of flexibility

States. In principle

important function
there

is

if

the law

is

and the legitimate

in treaty interpretation can have

an

not to be seen as rigid and irrelevant. However,

a difference between a legitimate interpretation of the rules

ceptable departure

interests of

and an unac-

from them. Any actual departure needs to be managed carefully

by other States. A purely unilateral US departure from the targeting provisions of Protocol I would be problematical. A possible difficulty of this
to be accepted

if it is

course

that different States

is

ways, until very
3.

little

was

left

might want to adapt or weaken the
of the treaty regime.

Revise the law. In general, there

amend

the basic rules

on

rules in different

is

remarkably

little

pressure to change or

targeting, including those in 1977

Geneva Protocol

I.

There has been a dearth of specific proposals for formal agreement on these matters

—whether

to dilute

it

to strengthen the law

by making

it

more

restrictive,

in order to bring regime-supporting activities

or alternatively

and institutions more ex-

The main impetus for new law, so far
as the use of weapons is concerned, is focused on such highly specific tasks as limiting or prohibiting the use of cluster bombs.
Perhaps because he senses the difficulty of all these courses, Mr. Walker concludes with a plea for political control of the military, which he sees as "the most effective way to allocate risk in an open and coherent fashion." 37 1 am all in favor of

plicitly into the

category of legitimate targets.

political control

of the military, but to imagine that

addressed in his paper

is

sheer escapism.

it is

a solution to the

problems

The track record, including recently, sug-

—

on the particular issue that concerns us here effective implementation
of the law of armed conflict political control often leads to confusion and failure.
gests that

—

We have heard eloquent testimony at this conference suggesting that in early 2003
it

to

was

political control that contributed to the

make

failure

of the Pentagon

plans for the occupation phase in Iraq. Similarly, in January 2002

largely at the political level that a

number of confusing

about the status and treatment of detainees
the

remarkable

US and UK governments

are

somewhat
147

at

statements were

it

was

made

Guantanamo. Unfortunately both

distrustful of their

own

bureaucracies

Why No Brave New World?
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and those

in the bureaucracies with specialist skills (including the law)

sometimes

suffer in consequence.

My conclusions are that despite dramatic improvements in accuracy we are not
in

an era

in

which the use of air power offers an escape from the

cruelties

of war; that, albeit alongside a wide range of other considerations, the law as

ters

currently exists does offer a useful practical guide to targeting; that

even the United

States,

can afford to ignore basic

geting; that the interpretation to

for

and disas-

many countries, and

lenge in doctrines based

and,

also

be placed on the law of targeting poses problems

not just the United States; that the law faces a major chal-

on attacking the adversary regime's sources of power;

remain central to the

finally, that

no country, not

legal provisions applicable to tar-

implementation of the laws of war, while certainly a matter for

must

it

activities,

political control,

planning and ethos of the armed forces;

show how complex and paradoxical imple-

recent air campaigns

mentation of the law can be

that

—but not

that

it

has ceased to be an important stan-

dard for guiding the conduct of military operations.
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IX
Targeting and Humanitarian Law:

Current Issues

Michael N. Schmitt

1

the 21st century, the
and science of
the
Inenvironment,
has become extraordinarily complex. So too has compliance
art

targeting, particularly in

aerial

with humanitarian law. Battlefields of centuries past were linear in character,
with opposing forces facing each other across a
tle area).

FEBA

(forward edge of the bat-

This positioning, together with the limited range and mobility of

weapons systems, rendered civilian populations relatively immune to the direct
effects of warfare. Civilians were either distant from the battlefield or fled as
hostilities drew near.
The advent of long-range strike capability led to a revolution in military-legal
2
affairs. Civilian populations and objects were not only placed at greater risk due to
their proximity to lucrative, and now viable, military and infrastructure targets,
but civilians and civilian objects became objectives themselves in various strategic
bombing doctrines. 3 Humanitarian law reacted by affirming their immunity from
direct attack, most notably with the 1977 codification of the distinction principle in
Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions. 4
Today, technological advances in range, precision, and stealth, as well as the transparency resulting from advanced C4ISR technologies, 5 have again transformed the
nature of warfare. Entire countries
cal

now comprise the battlespace. And the technologi-

"haves" can strike the assets of their ill-equipped adversaries with near total

Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues

impunity. For instance, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces lost only one
fixed

wing aircraft

to

enemy fire. 6 Such asymmetry has momentous consequences, not

only for combat operations, but also for the application of humanitarian law.

This article explores several of the
geting during 2

st

l

more

-century armed conflict

pressing legal issues involving tar-

— targeting doctrine, targeting an op-

ponent's leadership, targeting terrorists, the use of

human and

shields, treating military installations as a unitary target,

work

attack.

Each

is

civilian object

and computer

especially relevant given the likely use of "lawfare"

net-

by op-

most recently
demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Humanitarian law has become a permanent fixture on the modern battlefield. Those who ignore this reality do so at their own risk.
ponents of the United States and

its

coalition

partners,

7

Targeting Doctrine, Compellance Campaigns, and Military Objectives

Effects-based operations

(EBO) have replaced

attrition targeting in

In attrition warfare, extensive pre-planned target

lists

US

doctrine.

are developed and targets

are then destroyed serially, while engaging targets of opportunity as located. Re-

duced

to basics, the

enemy

is

defeated by progressively weakening

forces. In contrast, effects-based operations represent "the

military

its

maturation of

.

.

.

technologies merged with the theory of targeting for systematic effect rather than

The confluence of three factors makes EBO possible: adeffects-based planning; and parallel warfare, a new concept

absolute destruction." 8

vanced technologies;
of operations. 9

Technological advances enable effects-based operations by generating

new op-

tions for attack. For example, the use of low-observable (stealth) technologies in

the F- 1 1 7

Nighthawk or B-2
need no

stealth aircraft

for escort duties to

Spirit aircraft permits smaller attack

escorts. 10 This frees systems that

conduct attacks themselves.

mission success by making attacks
etration

by

also heightens the likelihood of

than would be the case with pen-

in precision also facilitate effects-based operations.

Attack Munition
are guidance

(JDAM)

tail kits

satellite

a circle within

tached to

less detectable

would otherwise be tasked

a large package.

Advances

system

It

that use

an

inertial navigation

(GPS) linkage to achieve a

which

Vi

free-fall 1,000

Nearly

all

The

Joint Direct

constitutes the great leap forward in this regard.

of the

bombs will

CEP

(circular error probable

strike)

of approximately 20

and 2,000-pound bombs. 11

attack aircraft can carry the

152

JDAMs

system and global positioning

—

feet

A 500-pound variant

radius of

when

at-

entering

more weapons per
JDAM, and each weapon is

the inventory will improve accuracy and allow aircraft to carry
sortie.

packages because

Michael N. Schmitt

independently targetable. Thus, even single-seat fighters such as the F-16 can
strike multiple targets

during a single

mately $2 1 ,000 per tail kit makes
targets.

Combined, these
can be struck in

gets that

net result

is

it

sortie.

JDAM's bargain price

tag of approxi-

an affordable option against the vast majority of

number of tara very short period with a high degree of accuracy. 12 The
characteristics dramatically increase the

the capability to conduct "shock and awe" campaigns,

that stun opponents into confusion

Advances

now

i.e.,

campaigns

and dismay.

in information technology also enable effects-based operations. In-

formation systems

now make it possible to

"rapidly collect, share, access,

and ma-

nipulate information," while sometimes linking the sensor directly to delivery

system. 13

By doing

so

more quickly and comprehensively than an opponent (and

by using information technology to blind the enemy),
inside his

OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop.

The second element of EBO

is

14

friendly forces can operate

Paralysis eventually results.

effects-based planning. This

method of planning

seeks to achieve specific effects with the least risk, in the shortest time possible,

and

with minimal expenditure of resources by considering both direct and indirect
fects.

Direct effects are "immediate,

directly caused

by the weapon.

first

is

repeated

enemy attacks. 17

factors in indirect effects

the cumulative nature of individual effects. This occurs

of various attacks

—"the delayed and/

is

greater then the

sum

characteristics.

when the

above exemplifies

this

The

overall

first

impact

of the individual attacks themselves; the

attacks operate synergistically. Loss of support for the regime in the

Cascading

damage

of support for a regime that appears inept or impotent in the face of

Both direct and indirect effects have three fundamental
is

the

and third-order consequences of military action." 16 A typical

example

loss

i.e.,

ef-

Classic attrition warfare emphasizes direct effects.

However, effects-based planning also
or displaced second-

order consequences,"

15

example cited

phenomenon.

effects are "indirect effects [that] ripple

through an adversary target

system, often influencing other target systems as well." 18 Typically, they occur

when striking targets at a higher level of conflict. For instance, damaging a national
level

command and control net will influence lower levels of the conflict as the abil-

ity to receive intelligence

and direction from above, and

to coordinate operations

with other units, diminishes. Targeting leadership represents perhaps the pinnacle
of a cascading effects focused mission.
Collateral effects are the

unintended consequences of an

attack. 19

To

the extent

that foreseeable collateral effects affect civilians or civilian objects, the humanitarian

law principle of proportionality requires balancing them against the military advantage that accrues

from attacking the

20

target.

153

Further, although

it

is

sometimes

—
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questioned whether reverberating
calculations,

US

effects

must be assessed during proportionality

doctrine affirmatively requires planners to consider them. 21

Effects-based planners deconstruct target systems to identify that element

thereof the neutralization or destruction of which best achieves the desired
Sensitivity to the typology of effects

to yield that result.

expands the universe of possible attacks

likely

Moreover, targeting only components of the target system gen-

erating the desired effect
ability

effect.

means tasking fewer

sorties,

thereby increasing the avail-

of weapons systems for missions against other targets.

EBO

also creates

damage and incidental injury. In the
words of one Pentagon briefer, "The best way to mitigate collateral damage is only
strike the stuff you need to strike
or affect the stuff you need to affect." 22
As to the objects or individuals against which EBO is most effective, one must
opportunities to avoid causing collateral

—

understand that the
gets

effect

sought determines the precise

cannot be assessed in the abstract. That

strategic rings

ship,

said,

target; categories

of tar-

because Colonel John Warden's

concept continues to resonate in airpower

circles, political leader-

economic systems, supporting infrastructure, population, and military forces

remain

attractive targets to planners.

imply that

civilians or civilian objects

be discussed

later,

23

Focusing on these key target

should be attacked

some commentators

sets

does not

directly, although, as will

are suggesting exactly that. Instead,

creatively identifies targets likely to affect, but not necessarily

harm, these

EBO

strategic

centers of gravity.

In addition to a fresh planning approach,
tions, Parallel

EBO leverages a new concept of opera-

Warfare and Simultaneous Attack. 24 Traditionally, warfare was

serial

and sequential. In an oversimplified example, because planners usually deemed it essential to establish air superiority before

paign against other targets, the

enemy

conducting a concentrated bombing camair

defense system typically dominated air

tasking orders in the early days of a conflict. Within that target

tended to be sequential

—

early

set,

the attack plan

warning radars, then interceptor operations

followed by airfields and surface-to-air missiles.

To

centers,

a measurable degree, this ap-

proach dominated planning during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Serial

and sequential attack evolved into

parallel

and sequential

attack, in

which

elements of a single target system are struck simultaneously, but systems are hit sequentially. For instance,

Operation Allied Force, the 1999

NATO conflict against

—deploy; Phase —
Kosovo; Phase — high value

Yugoslavia, was planned as a phased air campaign: Phase
superiority over Kosovo; Phase 2
military

and security

redeploy.

—

military targets in

3

forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

Once operations began, however,

air superiority attacks

underway,

slaughter of the Kosovar Albanians.

When
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and Phase 4

the seemingly bright lines faded.

political pressure

mounted

air

1

to stop the

With

ongoing

the weight of attack shifted to military

Michael N. Schmitt

targets in

Kosovo

in response to such pressure, calls for attacking regime targets

grew louder in the

belief that Milosevic held the

key to ending the conflict on ac-

ceptable terms.
Inevitably, a

new concept of operations emerged, one that leverages the techno-

logical superiority of

proaches

—

Freedom,

forces

and

concept

calls for

neatly with effects-based planning ap-

fits

and simultaneous

parallel

this

US

attack.

Illustrated

by Operation

Iraqi

simultaneous attack on every element of a target

system, as well as

on all systems, from the initiation of hostilities. The beauty of the

concept

encourages treating the enemy as a single system, thereby taking

is

that

it

advantage of cascading and cumulative

merly treated

which

effects

as separate systems. This frees

in turn increase the intensity

occurring across what were for-

up weapons systems

for other attacks,

and speed of the campaign.

The dilemma with EBO from the humanitarian law point of view is that it coincides with an era in which technological advances and dramatic asymmetries in

make

military capabilities

possible coercive strategies that seek to

compellance strategy) an opponent to engage

in,

compel

(a

or desist from, a particular course

25

The archetypal example was Operation Allied Force, which was designed to compel President Milosevic to return to the bargaining table and end sysof conduct.

tematic mistreatment of the Kosovar Albanian population.
If one is trying to

conquer an enemy absolutely, destroying

attrition warfare, albeit less efficient

given the objective, the military

is

and

effective

its

military through

than EBO, makes some sense;

a logical center of gravity. But

if the

objective

is

compellance, force must be applied surgically, striking at centers of gravity likely to
alter the

opponent's cost-benefit analysis, without imposing costs so great as to

him

render

either intransigent or irrational. 26 Because the objectives underlying

the use of force determine centers of gravity, they

may

shift

from the enemy's

armed forces to non-military targets dear to the civilian population or leadership. 27
Indeed, as Allied Force demonstrated, striking military targets

bolden the

civilian population.

may

actually

em-

28

Since effects-based targeting involves precisely this sort of search for effects tied
to

both military and

political objectives,

it

subtly suggests an expansive view of the

appropriate targets and target sets in a conflict. For instance, dual-use

facilities

be-

come particularly appealing targets because the attacker not only benefits from destruction or neutralization of the target's military value, but also
effects

on the

from cumulative

civilian population.

Component Commander for Operation
how commanders tasked with compellance

Lieutenant General Michael Short, Air
Allied Force,

made

it

clear that this

is

missions think. In a controversial interview, General Short was reported as saying "I
felt

that

on the first night the power should have gone off, and major bridges around
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Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, and the water should be cut off so the

'Why are

next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked

we doing

and asked Milosevic the same question."

this?'

followed, for he

seemed

29

A crescendo

to be suggesting that in a compellance

propriate to attack civilian targets because this

General Short backtracked somewhat

would hasten

at

campaign

it

was ap-

victory.

US Naval War

2001

a

of criticism

College

conference on the Kosovo campaign. After stating that the center of gravity was
"Milosevic and the
he, in turn,

I

men and women around him who depend upon him and who

depends upon," he

stated,

do not say to myself and to my planners that
make the Serb population unhappy with their senior leadership because

do not think that you

this will also

are so naive that

they allowed this to happen. But that
a valid military objective.

The problem

is

I

a spin off

—a peripheral

that Article 57 of Protocol Additional

is

result

—of me

I,

which the United

accepts as reflective of customary international law, provides that
is

targeting

30

"

States

[w]hen a choice

possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military ad-

on which may be

vantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack

pected to cause the least danger to civilian
collateral

damage and

lives

and

to civilian objects."

incidental injury are only lawful

31

ex-

Thus,

when they are unavoidable

consequences of an otherwise proportionate attack selected as the most "humanitarian" option

In

fact,

we

from among equally

militarily

advantageous alternatives.

are seeing these sorts of fissures in the guise of both interpretive dis-

agreement and revisionist claims of the inadequacy of the humanitarian law definition of "military objectives." Article 52 defines military objectives as "objects

by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
action and

whose

III

effective contribution to military

total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the cir-

cumstances ruling

and

which

at the time, offers a definite military

advantage." 32 Protocols

II

of the Conventional Weapons Convention 33 and the Second Protocol to the

Cultural Property Convention, 34 as well as
material (including those of the US),

While even the United

35

many

military

manuals and training

repeat this formula.

States accepts this as the correct articulation of the legal

concept of "military objective," explanations of the standard

differ.

Most

notably,

the United States takes an expansive stance. For instance, the authoritative

US

Navy's The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Warfare includes "war sustaining" activities within the scope of the phrase. 36 Similarly,
vides that " [c] ivilian objects consist of all civilian property

US joint doctrine pro-

and activities other than

those used to support or sustain the adversary's warfighting capability." 37
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This interpretation has generated
the non-governmental organization
stance,

some

negative reaction, particularly within

(NGO) community and

academia. For in-

one respected academic has opined that

economic or psychological
importance may sometimes be more efficient to overcome the enemy, but are never
necessary, because every enemy can be overcome by weakening sufficiently its military

Acts of violence against persons or objects of

forces.

Once

its

military forces are neutralized, even the politically, psychologically or

enemy can no

economically strongest

Such assertions are overly
flict

are willing to

longer

resist.

38

simplistic. First, they

commit the

assume that both

sides of a con-

resources necessary to conquer the enemy. Operation

Allied Force demonstrates that this
is

political,

is

not always the

case. It

may well be that one side

seeking limited objectives and therefore only prepared to employ (or risk) forces

necessary to achieve those specific objectives. In the campaign against the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia,
effectively

NATO explicitly ruled out the use of ground forces, thereby

pre-announcing

its

unwillingness to

commit

all

posal to fully neutralize the Yugoslavian military. Instead,
successively

enough to

impose

force

costs

on Milosevic

the resources at

NATO's

Iraq by the United States

dis-

was to

until his cost-benefit calculations shifted

him into compliance with its demands. 39 Indeed,

attitudes towards the use of force,

strategy

its

given 21 st -century

and despite the conquest of both Afghanistan and

and its partners, most States initiating a conflict are likely to

seek limited objectives not involving conquest, and therefore will be unwilling to risk
the forces that

would be required

to fully "neutralize"

its

opponent.

Any attempt to

convince States to narrowly interpret "military objective" because "every enemy"

can be overcome by sufficiently weakening
fails

its

military forces (albeit probably true),

to take cognizance of the realities of modern conflict.

The explanation offered above also rather optimistically assumes that neutralization of enemy forces is sufficient to achieve one's objectives. However, United
States and coalition forces have suffered more casualties in Iraq since President
Bush declared hostilities at an end than during the preceding period in which they
"neutralized" the Iraqi military as an organized armed force. Clearly, victory requires much more than simply defeating one's opponents on the field of battle.
Humanitarian concerns may actually auger against an overly

restrictive defini-

tion of military objective. Consider, again, Operation Allied Force.

limited

its

yielded, for

Had

NATO

attack to Yugoslavia's military forces, Milosevic might never have

he could have simply sheltered his forces while waiting for

solve to dissolve. In the process, identifying

have become more

difficult as attacks

and destroying military

NATO

forces

re-

would

reduced the number of unambiguous and

157

Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues

The likelihood of collateral damage and

vulnerable targets.

Many

resultantly have increased.

the decision not to

would wait out

mount

a

incidental injury would

analysts feared exactly this

would happen once

ground campaign became public

—

that Milosevic

NATO while his centers of gravity remained intact and the Yugo-

population suffered (and his support grew). Without doubt, limiting the target

slav

enemy

sets to

military forces can paradoxically sometimes be less humanitarian

than embracing a broader interpretation of military objectives.

Although few States
targets, the definition

textually.

The Report

US extension to "war sustaining"

explicitly accept the overt

of military objectives

is

nevertheless generally applied con-

to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

on the

NATO bombing campaign provides, for in-

stance, that

When

the definition

some

actual or potential military use

is

applied to dual-use objects which have

systems, petrochemical complexes, manufacturing plants of

may

differ.

The

some

civilian uses

and

(communications systems, transportation

some

application of the definition to particular objects

types), opinions

may

also differ

depending on the scope and objectives of the conflict. Further, the scope and objectives
the conflict. 40

of the conflict

may change during

That there

a gray area regarding the

is

meaning of military

haps best illustrated in the controversy generated by the
grade's Radio Televisija Srbije

(RTS)

facility.

objectives

was per-

NATO attack on the Bel-

The ensuing

litigation

in the

European Court of Human Rights focused on whether the facility was a civilian ob41

ject.

Although the Court eventually dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds,

ICTY prosecutor found that there was insufficient ba42
sis to indict,
many in the humanitarian law community believe the attack was unand despite the

fact that the

lawful under the circumstances. This despite a prominent military law expert's

inclusion of "broadcast
jectives in his
lier in

a

and television

award-winning book,

proposed

list

43

stations" in

an

illustrative list

of military ob-

something the ICRC had done decades ear-

of military objectives

it

offered in 1956. 44

Application of the concept of military objective clearly expands or contracts

based on the scope and goals of the

conflict. Interestingly,

when one compares the

academic commentary on the subject to application of the principle, the practical
differences narrow. For instance, a premier legal thinker in the field has stated that

the

US approach

United

"goes too

States, the

strikes in

far." But, a

review of air campaigns conducted by the

country that coined the term "war-sustaining," reveals that

which the military nature of the

rare. Instead, criticism

of

US

target

is

questionable are extraordinarily

attacks tends to center

compliance with the requisite duty of care. 45 That
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said,

on

their proportionality or

EBO has the capacity to put
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greater substance into the debate. After

on

cuses

effects

one, in a Clausewitzian manner, fo-

during a conflict intended to coerce and compel an opponent

rather than conquer him, the
Interestingly,

war sustaining verbiage looks very

attractive.

arguably not interpretive disagreement that presents the

is

it

humanitarian law, but rather revisionism on the part of those

greatest threat to

who

all, if

argue that the principle

be adjusted. Most significant in

itself needs to

this re-

US Air
Force judge advocate who serves as senior legal adviser for the Air Force's Air Comand very provocative 2000 Strategic Rebat Command. In a very thoughtful
gard are the fascinating writings of Brigadier General Charles Dunlap, a

—

view

article,

We

—

he argues that

need a new paradigm when using force against

propensities.

with malevolent

We must hold at risk the very way of life that sustains their depredations,

and we must threaten
the air

societies

world

to destroy the

weapon should be unleashed

know it if they persist. This means
entirely new categories of property that

as

against

they

46
current conceptions of LOAC put off-limits.

General Dunlap limits this deviation from current principles of humanitarian

law to conflicts with "societies whose moral compass

is

wildly askew." Moreover,

he does not advocate targeting either noncombatants or objects that are "genu-

noncombatant," although "almost

inely indispensable to the survival of the

erything else

would be

middle and upper
essential

some

a duty to

game." 47 As an example, he suggests "reducing the

classes to a subsistence level

through the destruction of all but

goods" might pressure the very groups best positioned to

sired change.

bears

fair

48

In General Dunlap's view, doing so

is

just because the population

it.

49

To an

extent,

he

is

the Air; suggested that the civilian population

of gravity.

fulfill

a 21 st -century adherent to the views of

Giulio Douhet, the Italian air war theorist who, in his 1921 classic

ters

effect the de-

culpability for supporting the government, or at least failing to

oppose

ev-

Command of

and its morale were important cen-

50

Although not addressing

it

directly, the

Dunlap proposal

takes

EBO

to the ex-

treme. Indeed, General Dunlap suggests that the purpose behind the use of force

is

not punishment, but rather "eviscerating the disposition of the adversary to conduct
objectionable activities." 51 His views resonate with many. For instance, another

thoughtful active duty officer, in a 200 1 Air Force
that

it

ize the

Law Review article,

has suggested

might be more humane to attack civilian property if doing so would demoralpopulation and contribute to conflict termination, than to protect property at

the expense of prolonging hostilities. 52
calling for appears to

be nothing

What General Dunlap and his supporters are

less

than a fundamental rejection of a major
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element of the principle of distinction, a principle that the International Court of
Justice labeled "intransgressible" in

its

Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 55

on

Effects-based operations, focused as they are

effects vice targets, enliven the

debate over the distinction principle's effectiveness in infusing humanitarian ends
into

armed

conflict.

But suggesting

civilian objects

can be legitimate targets of at-

tack risks the spiral of violence against innocents that humanitarian law, such as
that prohibiting certain reprisals, seeks to prevent.

tacking civilian objects

would

belligerents

among

is

appropriate

effectively

their population of

when

there

mean malevolent

Moreover, suggesting that
is

a

moral imbalance between

leaders could deprive innocents

humanitarian law's protection against the

war. Although an "ends justify the means" philosophy
short term,

it

will ultimately

at-

may be

of

ill-effects

appealing in the

prove a very slippery slope.

The appropriate balance lies between the extremes. As General Short correctly
noted above, there is nothing wrong with striking legitimate military objectives
in a manner intended to affect the enemy's will to continue the fight or the civilian population's support for the government. For instance, in order to demonstrate that they controlled the air during the Korean conflict, US forces dropped
54
leaflets pre-announcing strikes on legitimate military targets.
US air forces successfully employed this tactic again during Operation Desert Storm, when warnings of impending B-52 strikes led to mass surrender by Iraqi forces. There is
nothing inherently immoral or illegal about targeting the will of the people or
their leader. That said, humanitarian law does, and should, dictate how that may
be accomplished.

Moreover, one must be careful what one wishes

for.

Opponents of advanced

more to gain from a relaxation of the distinction standard than
those capable of fielding state-of-the-art forces. The disadvantaged side in an
militaries

have

far

asymmetrical fight has every incentive to strike
because

it

cannot hope to prevail on the

victory (or chance offending off defeat)

field

so, a restrictive

benefits the advantaged side

by allowing

bilities. It is

only

cause
naive.

is

just,

The

it

need not

difficulty of objectively

(consider the case of Iraq)

means

its

less restrictive
its

it

makes any sense

standard; so long as

its

civilians or civilian objects. This

that in practice
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by labeling one

in hello principles

determining that

equally to both sides.

chance of

superior military capa-

by General Dunlap), that

fear attacks against

sole

its

striking a center of gravity other

to leverage

advantaged side to adopt a

civilian objects

reading of military objective actually

when mixing ad helium and

belligerent malevolent (as suggested
for the militarily

it

and

of battle. Thus,

lies in

than the military. This being

at civilians

a belligerent

any

is

shift in the

in the

law

is

wrong

will

apply
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Relaxing the principle of distinction would also deprive the advantaged side of
the opportunity to use
the

what General Dunlap has labeled

"lawfare." 55

To

the extent

enemy begins targeting civilians and civilian objects, it can be publicly branded
and international supon an adversary's attempt to compensate for

criminal, thereby potentially undercutting both domestic

impose

port. Thus, lawfare can

costs

military weakness by shifting the center of gravity he

is

What proponents

attacking.

of relaxing humanitarian law norms seem to have missed is that the question, from
a purely practical point of view,
side; rather,

it is

not whether relaxation of a

is

norm benefits your

the relative costs and benefits of doing so vis-a-vis likely oppo-

nents. Therefore, adopting an effects-based operations doctrine should not necessarily lead to

support for any relaxation of the principle of distinction, because

doing so might well enhance the opponent's
with his

ability to achieve

enhanced

effects

own operations.
Targeting Leadership

Always an appealing target

set,

EBO

doctrine and the growing emergence of

compellance as a campaign objective have heightened the desire to

enemy leadership. During Operation Allied Force,
istries

were included as

for instance,

strike directly at

government min-

strategic targets, ostensibly because of the "longer

broader impact on the Serb military machine."

56

Of late,

killing the

term and

enemy leader

himself has become an open objective of military operations; failure to do so

sometimes even deemed operational

failure

—consider the

survival of

Osama bin

Laden. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the media was actually reporting

tempts to

kill

Saddam Hussein in nearly real time.

57

is

at-

Contrast this with the removal

of the US Air Force Chief of Staff in 1990 for suggesting Saddam's death was an aim
of the Operation Desert Storm
Targeting leadership

is

air

campaign. 58

often mislabeled "assassination." In fact, the lineage of

the humanitarian law prohibition

on

assassination

Lieber Code) demonstrates that the term
killing
is

of one's enemy,"

59

for

is

(e.g.,

Article 148 of the 1863

best interpreted as the "treacherous

example by perfidiously feigning protected status. 60 It

not the target's status that determines whether a wartime assassination has been

conducted, but rather the method by which he or she

is

attacked.

Recall that humanitarian law requires distinguishing between combatants (and
illegal

ing

noncombatants) and

civilians in

conducting attacks. With regard to target-

enemy leadership, therefore, the determinative issue is the status of the individ-

ual in question; those
hostilities,

i.e.,

illegal

who

are combatants or wrongfully taking a direct part in

combatants,

may legally be

Article 5 1 of Protocol Additional

I

attacked.

sets forth the relevant principle:

161

Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues

Art. 5

1

.2.

The civilian population

as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not

be the

object of attack ....

Art. 51.3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded

such time as they take a direct part in

by

and

this section, unless

for

hostilities.

Violations are grave breaches under Article 85 of the Protocol, and, therefore,
States party to the Protocol are obligated to search for individuals alleged to

targeted civilians (or ordered

them

to be targeted)

and

either try

them

have

for the of-

them over to another State party willing to do so. An analogous ban
for non-international armed conflict appears in Protocol Additional II, 62 while the
61

fense or turn

Statute of the International Criminal Court contains prohibitions along these lines

both international and non-international armed

for

immunity from

Since "civilians" enjoy

Under Article 50 of Protocol Additional
not

fall

into the categories

enumerated

I,

attack,

militia,

necessary to define the term.

someone who does
Third Geneva Convention

a protected civilian

in Article 4 of the

of 1949 and Article 43 of Protocol Additional
of the armed forces;

it is

conflict. 63

I.

volunteer corps, or

64

is

as civilians are

members

members of an organized

resistance

Excluded

commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, who wear a distinctive sign or
uniform, carry weapons openly, and are subject to a disciplinary system capable of
enforcing the law of armed conflict; and

members of a

levee en masse. Article

44

re-

duces the requirement to carry arms openly and wear distinctive emblems or clothing,

but not in situations

likely to

have

much

bearing on whether a

member

of the

65

enemy leadership can be targeted. Combatant organizations can include paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies when incorporated into the armed forces if
other parties to the conflict have been formally notified of the integration. 66

There

is little

doubt that any member (except chaplains and medical personnel)

of such organizations can be targeted, although not directly applying force themselves.

For instance, a public

spite the fact that

affairs officer in the military

is

a legitimate target de-

he or she does not perform typically military functions. 67 Even

heads of State or government

who

are active

members of the armed

forces

may be

68

them no specially protected status.
Senior leaders who are not members of the armed forces, but lie in the chain of
command, are more difficult to categorize. Their legitimacy as a target must be astargeted; humanitarian law provides

sessed contextually

and

holistically.

For instance, wearing military uniforms, carry-

ing weapons, or using military rank suggest combatant status, but are not dispositive.

The Queen of England wears

a

"trooping of the colours," but

uniform and

is

carries a

ceremonial dagger during the

hardly a combatant by virtue of doing so.
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A

more telling indication is the proposed target's role in the command of the
armed forces. Civilians often fill dejure positions relative to the armed forces. As an
example, by Article II of the US Constitution, the President is the "Commander-inChief." 69 Similarly, the Queen of England is the British Commander-in-Chief pursuant to the unwritten constitution of the United

Kingdom, and each of the

serves as a regimental "Colonel-in-Chief." In fact, British officers swear

legiance to the
It

royals

an oath of al-

Queen, not the State, and it is the Queen who issues their commission.

would be incongruous to suggest that all such individuals are legitimate targets.

Obviously,

if a

no

involves

post is purely ceremonial, or otherwise solely dejure in nature,

incumbent

military decision-making, then the

is

a civilian

i.e., if it

who

enjoys

protected status. State practice would also suggest that decision-making at the strategic level

of war does not render the participant a combatant

such decisions are in essence
national coalition
jure position

political.

would not alone

makes decisions

(legal

or

As an example, attempting

suffice.

However,

if an

illegal),

to build

because

an

inter-

individual occupying a de

he or

affecting the operational or tactical level of war,

she is sufficiently involved in military operations to become legitimately targetable. 70

At times, individuals without a de jure position in the chain of command
exercise influence over military operations. For example, Congress
all

military funding in the United States. This

also

must approve

makes Senators and Congressmen,

on committees dealing with the military, enormously influential
vis-a-vis defense policy. Or consider individuals tied to a dictator who exercise
great influence over particular aspects of a conflict, such as certain members of
Saddam Hussein's family or other highly placed members of his tribe from Tikrit.
particularly those

In such cases, the critical issue
ties as

is

whether they are taking a direct part in

envisaged by Article 51.3 of Protocol Additional

meaning of the term

"direct part," the

" [d] irect participation in hostilities

activity

Commentary

(see text above).

I

hostili-

As

to the

to the Protocol states that

implies a direct causal relationship between the

engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the

activity takes place." 71 If a leader

as target selection,
ably, the

makes combat decisions

such

then he or she would certainly be directly participating. Argu-

same is true for those who

sentially, leaders

at the tactical level

who

decide

act in a like

manner at the operational level.

how and where

Es-

to use military force are directly

participating in hostilities.

As an

aside,

note the Article 51.3 "unless and for such time" qualifier.

have suggested that
the

armed

this allows direct participants

forces to opt in

who

Some

are not formally part of

and out of "direct participant"

status, and, as a result,

susceptibility to attack. This position runs counter to the underlying purposes of

humanitarian law because

it

would encourage

a lack of respect for the principle

of distinction on the part of the victims of those moving back and forth through

163

Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues

A much more

the revolving door.

logical

once an individual has opted into the

and

hostilities,

practical standard provides that

he or she remains a valid military

may occur through extended
non-participation or an affirmative act of withdrawal. 72 Since the individual who

objective until

unambiguously opting

directly participated did not enjoy
place,

it is

out. This

any privilege to engage

in hostilities in the first

reasonable that he or she assumes the risk that the other side

is

unaware

of such withdrawal.
Obviously, gray area situations exist in which the sufficiency of the causal relationship to the conduct of hostilities
rect participation

the International

is

is

unclear. Indeed, the issue of the scope of di-

the subject of an ongoing international project sponsored by

Committee of the Red

Cross. In uncertain cases,

it is

prudent to

interpret the concept narrowly, since striking directly at an opponent's leadership

can be highly destabilizing. This

is

especially so

where the proposed

the chain of command, for the absence of a position in an

target

not in

is

armed force or its civilian

control structure creates a rebuttable presumption that he or she enjoys protected
status as a civilian.

As should be apparent, applying the humanitarian law bearing on leadership
targeting can prove difficult in practice.

the leaders are
risk

members of the armed

condemnation on

killing strategy.

widely

73

legal,

With

forces, decapitation operations inevitably

or even moral, grounds. Consider the Israeli targeted

Although the operations are

condemned

the exception of situations in which

as violations

clearly legal in

many cases, 74 they are

of international law. 75

Non-legal reasons also militate against mounting decapitation

strikes.

They

may strengthen enemy resolve or morale, particularly if the target becomes a martyr in the eyes of the

against one's
tion.

own

enemy

population. Leadership attacks also risk retaliation

leadership or other high value targets like the civilian popula-

When the target has ties to terrorist groups, this possibility is especially acute.

Targeting leadership
stakes

may

which increases the

further be perceived as escalation, an upping of the
level

of violence and complicates conflict termination.

Indeed, an individual aware of being targeted
tional,

may become intransigent, even

thereby rendering his military operations

Of course,

there

is

less predictable.

always the chance that targeted individuals

by less acceptable alternatives. And

if they

limit the ability of the State to recover

had civil

from

may be

from

from normative

conflict,

barriers, targeting

a practical point of view.

164

replaced

responsibilities, their death

may

thereby presenting the victori-

ous occupying forces with greater occupation challenges. The simple
quite aside

irra-

an enemy leader

may be

fact

is

that

insensible
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Targeting Terrorists

In the aftermath of the tragic attacks of September 11, the use of force against terrorists

has been fervently debated, particularly as the preferred response paradigm

shifted

from law enforcement

to military action. Unfortunately, the analysis has

tended to be overcomplicated.

During armed

conflict,

the issue of terrorism
als

whether international or non-international

irrelevant vis-a-vis targeting. All

is

in nature,

combatants and individu-

taking direct part in hostilities are targetable regardless of their motive or the

object or persons they attack.

The quandary surfaces in cases of terrorism occurring outside armed conflict. As a
matter of law, the issue
the codified law

on

is

one of self-defense.

the subject.

It

Article 51 of the

UN Charter sets forth

provides, in relevant part, that "[n]othing in the

present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an

armed attack occurs

against a

Member of the United Nations

tion is whether non-State actors such as terrorists can

" 76

The ques-

commit an "armed attack" that

allows the victim State to respond with military force as

if it

had been attacked by an-

other State.
It is

incontrovertible that since 9/11 the international

community has

ac-

cepted just such an interpretation of the law of self-defense. Virtually no State
voiced any opposition to the

US and

ghanistan that began October

7,

coalition attacks

on al-Qaeda

forces in Af-

2001. Indeed, two pre-October 7 th Security

Council resolutions specifically cited the right to self-defense with reference to
the 9/11 attacks, 77

NATO and other international organizations invoked the col-

lective defense provisions

of their constitutive

treaties,

78

and many States either con-

tributed forces to the effort or provided other forms of support. 79 Following

mencement of

hostilities in

com-

Afghanistan, international support for the coalition

operations remained strong and widespread. 80 Clearly, international law

is

now

interpreted as permitting military operations in self or collective defense against
terrorist acts

committed by non- State

actors.

However, when may those defensive

operations occur?
Self-defense

is

obviously permissible in response to an ongoing attack; that

much is clear from Article
legality becomes murkier.

51

on

its face.

When armed action follows an attack, its

Some have suggested that since the attack is over, the ap-

propriate responses are law enforcement {vis-a-vis the terrorists) or diplomacy and
sanctions (vis-a-vis State support). Negative reaction to past responses to terrorist
attacks,

such as the near universal criticism of Operation El Dorado Canyon that

followed the 1986

bombing of the La

81
demonstrates
Belle discotheque in Berlin,

that States have tended to be uneasy with counter-terrorist actions that
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retaliation or retribution. Yet,

denying the possibility of post-attack military action

would surrender the initiative to non-State terrorist actor's intent on continuing
their campaign of violence against the target State and its citizens.

A much more
responses thereto

conducted by the

and appropriate way

effective
is

to ask

terrorist

actions constituting

it

are

whether an attack was part of a continuing campaign

group against the responding

no more separate and

State. If so, the individual

distinct than tactical

campaign. For instance, al-Qaeda has been attacking

in a military

and military

to analyze terrorism

engagements

US

targets for

over a decade in a regular and very violent campaign. In the face of such campaigns,
defensive actions

may continue until it is reasonable to conclude the terrorist cam-

paign has ended.

By this approach, the defending State may conduct strikes against those who would
carry out subsequent attacks, not in retaliation or retribution
future acts of terrorism, but rather because the terrorist
all

defensive actions, the

has to be necessary,

economic
rorist

i.e.,

and not in anticipation of

campaign is underway. As with

two requirements of self-defense apply.

defensive action

non-forceful measures (such as law enforcement, diplomacy,

sanctions, etc.)

would not suffice to

deter further attacks

campaign. Second, the use of force must be proportional.

82

not refer to the relationship between the force against which one

used in self-defense. Rather, proportional force
fectively

First,

is

that

making up the ter-

Proportionality does
is

defending and that

amount offeree necessary to ef-

defend against the attack, and no more. Assessed on a case-by-case

may either exceed or fall

short of that used

by the

basis,

it

attacker.

Characterizing individual terrorist attacks as a part of a single integrated campaign
clarifies

the legality of responses thereto. For instance,

attacked a car carrying
in 2002, there

and so

Qaed Senyan

al-Harthi, al-Qaeda's senior operative in

was much discussion about targeted

forth. Yet, al-Harthi

when a CIA-controlled Predator

had been

tied to the

killings,

Yemen,

the nature of the conflict,

October 2000 attack on the USS Cole

and was still active in a terrorist group against which law enforcement had proven
fective

and which had vowed

to carry out

more

terrorist strikes against the

CIA conducted the

gence service.

84

United

83

Addi-

operation with the cooperation of the Yemeni

intelli-

States in the aftermath of their highly successful attacks of
tionally, the

inef-

The only debatable

issue

from

September

a self-defense perspective

ll.

was whether

al-Harthi could have been arrested instead of killed. Although ultimately a question of
fact,

it

appears reasonable for

US officials to have concluded that there was a possibility

he would elude capture, thereby necessitating the

lethal attack.

An analogous analysis applies to Israel Defense Force operations targeting specific
To the extent the targets are clearly involved in an ongoing campaign of
terrorism, and in the absence of other reliable means of neutralizing them, they may
be attacked in self-defense when there is a "specific and imminent" threat. 85 Thus, in
Palestinians.
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such

cases, the operations are legal quite aside

armed

conflict

is

underway and,

if so, its

from the separate

issues of whether

an

character under humanitarian law.

A third possibility is mounting counter-terrorist strikes before the initial terrorist

attack has taken place.

portionality, but rather

The seminal legal

issue here

is

neither necessity nor pro-

imminency, for the weight of authority in international law

imminent before acting in self-defense. In the immortal
words of Secretary of State Daniel Webster in correspondence with Lord Ashrequires that an attack be

burton following the 1837 Caroline incident, the need for defensive actions must be
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no

"instant,

tion."

86

moment for delibera-

Webster's verbiage has matured over time into a requirement that the de-

fending party wait until the
Professor

Yoram

last possible

moment before

acting anticipatorily. 87

Dinstein has rejected the term "anticipatory" in favor of "in-

on the basis that Article 5 1 requires an armed attack, not the possibility
thereof. He propounds a standard that requires the attacker to have "committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way." As Professor Dinstein explains, "[t]he crucial question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of
action, thereby crossing the Rubicon." 88 By this approach, no shot need be fired
prior to the defensive action, but the attack operation must have been launched.
terceptive"

Professor Dinstein's analysis

an insightful balancing of the practical need to

blow before the opponent strikes

deliver a defensive
effective defense)

is

(lest it

be too

late to

mount an

with the apparent clarity of the Article 5 1 requirement that an

armed attack have occurred. The one difficulty with his approach is the requirement of irrevocability, a criterion that may be too difficult to judge except ex post
facto. A more workable tack may be to appraise the attacker's commitment to follow through, the nature of the acts already performed, and the extent to which the
defensive action occurs during the last viable

window of opportunity to mount an

effective defense.
If a State initiates defensive action

before being attacked, the evidence of the

pending attack (or follow-on attacks in case of a
militarily

campaign), the need to

defend oneself, and the perpetrator's identity, must be very credible. This

was the unambiguous lesson of the widespread
dan

terrorist

in 1998 following terrorist

Compare

criticism of the

bombings of its embassies

in

US

strikes into

Su-

Dar-es-Salaam and

camps in
Afghanistan. Since the two operations were conducted simultaneously and in response to the same terrorist attacks, the logical explanation for the dramatically
different international reactions was a pervasive belief that in the case of the attacks
into Khartoum, the United States got it wrong by striking a pharmaceutical plant
with no ties to terrorism.
Nairobi.

the

muted

criticism of related strikes against terrorist
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Evidentiary issues again surfaced in the aftermath of US and allied operations in
Iraq in 2003. Failure to locate convincing evidence of any Iraqi

destruction programs or Iraqi
decision to attack.
insufficient

and

Given that

89

As

ties to

al-Qaeda generated significant criticism of the

Sudanese

in the

faulty intelligence

case,

concern that the attack was based on

was pervasive.

terrorists intentionally seek to

mask

their activities, evidence in ter-

rorism cases will seldom be unassailable; therefore, to

and

future attacks

threshold

is

justified to
its

their source

weapons of mass

would be

demand

perfect evidence of

to render victims defenseless.

A

better

one that requires evidence on which counterterrorist operations are

be "clear and compelling." The United States proffered

notification to the Security Council that

it

was acting

tacking al-Qaeda and Taliban assets in Afghanistan.

this

standard in

in self-defense

when

at-

same criterion when briefing the North Atlantic Council on the complicity of the two groups
in the 9/11 attacks. 90 Both the Security Council and North Atlantic Council appear
It

articulated the

to have accepted the standard as sufficiently high, for neither criticized the ensuing

military operations.

A mere preponderance standard would certainly be too low to

justify resort to military force, the

most

significant act in international relations,

whereas a beyond a reasonable doubt standard would clearly be too high in the

shadowy world of terrorism.
Finally, the issue

of

who

can legally conduct counterterrorism operations in-

armed force has drawn some attention. Specifically, must operations be
mounted by combatants or can others, such as members of intelligence agencies or

volving

law enforcement personnel, conduct them?
If the

operations are conducted during an international

terrorists are taking part in the conflict,

then combat operations

only by combatants. Article 43 of Protocol Additional

tomary international

armed

forces

into the

No

law.

91

As noted

armed

earlier,

I

conflict,

and the

may be conducted

codifies this point of cus-

combatants are members of the

and paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies incorporated

armed

forces. 92

such limitation applies in a non-international armed

trary, intelligence

conflict.

On

and law enforcement agencies are regularly involved

ing to maintain law

and order during an

lead agencies in such conflicts, as

internal conflict.

was the

case, for

The

the con-

in attempt-

latter are often the

example, during the distur-

bances in Macedonia in 2001.
In cases of violence

ongoing armed

between a State and transnational

conflict,

terrorists unrelated to

an

humanitarian law, with the exception of general principles

pervading all uses of force (such as discrimination, proportionality, unnecessary suffering),

armed

does not apply. The applicability of the humanitarian law to international

conflict

depends on the participation of at
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least

one

State

on each

side, 93

while
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that applicable to non-international

armed

conflicts requires a situation resembling

With respect to the latter, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions envisions a "Party in revolt against the dejure Government [that] possess an orclassic civil war.

ganized force, an authority responsible for
territory."

94

Protocol Additional

II

its acts,

acting within a determinate

requires a conflict "which takes place in the Terri-

armed forces and dissident armed forces
exercise control over part of its territory." 95 In any case, and as noted above,
[that]
the humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict imposes no limitation on
the participation of other than members of the armed forces.
Therefore, except in an international armed conflict, intelligence or law entory of a high contracting Party between
.

.

its

.

may conduct

forcement agents

counter-terrorist strikes such as occurred in Ye-

men. Thus, President Bush's authorization

to the Central Intelligence

Agency

to

members outside the confines of armed conflict did not violate humanitarian law, 96 nor did the creation of a CIA Special Operations Group

target specific al-Qaeda

of several hundred officers to conduct this type of missions. 97
Finally,

where may operations in other than an armed

conflict

be conducted?

Obviously, they may take place on the territory of the State conducting
in the case of the strike in

The more

difficult

Yemen, on the

question

is

them or,

as

territory of any State that has consented.

when may counterterrorist

operations be

mounted

without the consent of the State of situs.
States enjoy the right of territorial integrity

under international law, a custom-

ary right enshrined within Article 2(4) of the Charter. 98 At the
tional

law recognizes a right of self-defense,

Charter.

When legal rights

appear to

itself enshrined

conflict,

an

effort

same time,

interna-

within Article 5 1 of the

must be made

to best bal-

ance them in the context in which they are to be applied.
In this situation, recall that States have a duty to "use due diligence to prevent
the commission within

its

dominions of criminal

acts against

another nation or

people." 99 This duty plainly includes keeping one's territory free from use for terrorist ends. 100 In light
rial integrity

of this obligation, the only sensible balancing of the territo-

and self-defense

rights

is

one that allows the State exercising

self-

defense to conduct counterterrorist operations in the State where the terrorists
are located if that State
tory.

is

either unwilling or incapable of policing

its

own

terri-

A demand for compliance should precede the action and the State should be

permitted an opportunity to comply with

its

ing used to

101

the

detriment of others.

duty to ensure
If

it

its

territory

is

not be-

does not, any subsequent

nonconsensual counterterrorist operations into the country should be

strictly

limited to the purpose of eradicating the terrorist activity (purpose and proportionality),

and

the

intruding

force
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must

withdraw

immediately

upon
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accomplishment of its mission since the necessity
erations evaporates at that point.

for these specific defensive op-

102

Human Shields and Shielding with

Civilian Objects

The US Defense Intelligence Agency has framed this issue as "the placement of any
category of non-combatant personnel, or of civilian equipment, vehicles, or material at or near a recognized or suspected military or government facility immediately before or during hostilities." 103 It would also include placing military objects
or personnel near protected individuals, objects, or locations. In technical terms,

such activity

falls

into the category of "counter-targeting,"

i.e.,

"preventing or de-

grading detection, characterization, destruction, and post-strike assessment." 104

The

goals of using

human or civilian object shields include complicating an oppo-

nent's military planning, reducing the effectiveness of

and

military forces

facilities

such as

its strikes,

command and control assets,

preserving key

and/or generat-

ing a strategic incident by creating the impression that the attacker

competent,

or,

most

Sadly, there have

significantly in the

been

many

instances of the use of

shields in recent history. All have
Iraq's use of human shields
eral

Assembly

as a

CNN age, lawless.

is

careless, in-

105

human

or civilian object

been uniformly condemned. For instance,

during the

first

Gulf War was labeled by the

UN Gen-

"most grave and blatant violation of Iraq's obligations under

international law." 106

A dozen years later, Human Rights Watch, in Off Target, its

on the conduct of the second Gulf War, condemned Iraqi use of civilians
both to protect Iraqi forces during hostilities and to advance on US and British
forces. 107 Similarly, the use of human shields was widespread during the 1999
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even UN
peacekeepers have been used as human shields, most infamously with the seizure
report

of United Nations Protection Force
Serbs in 1995.

(UNPROFOR)

personnel by the Bosnia

108

As a matter of law, the use of shields presents two

issues:

Can

shields

be targeted

how do they factor into the proportionality calquestions, it is useful to note that US targeting doc-

directly (discrimination) and, if not,

culation? In considering these

trine closely tracks the principles set forth in Protocol Additional

I.

For instance,

Joint Publication 3-60 (discussed above) adopts the proportionality formula con-

tained in Articles 51.5(b) and 57.2 verbatim. 109
Joint Publication requires

With regard

to discrimination, the

US forces to "engage only in military operations the effects

of which distinguish between the civilian population (or individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities)

and combatant
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forces, directing the application

of
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force solely against the latter. Similarly, military force

military objects or objectives,

and not against

may be

civilian objects."

directed only against
110

Without question, using human or civilian object shields violates humanitarian
Fourth Geneva Convention provides that

law. Article 28 of the

protected person

may not be used to

military operations."

more

111

render certain points or areas

The analogous Protocol Additional

I

presence of a

immune from

provision

is

even

explicit.

The presence or movements of the

civilian

population or individual civilians shall not

be used to render certain points or areas

immune from

particular attempts to shield military objectives

impede
of the

military operations.

The

from

military operations, in

attacks or to shield, favour or

Parties to the conflict shall not direct the

movement

population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military

civilian

objectives

The

" [t]he

from

attacks or to shield military operations. 112

International Criminal Court Statute includes these prohibitions as

crimes in Article

8.

war

113

Uncertain, though, are the effects of such misconduct on an opponent's military
operations.
shields

To

address this issue,

and those who volunteer

Article 51 of Protocol Additional

it is

necessary to distinguish between involuntary

to serve in this role. Beginning with the former,
I

explicitly provides that " [a] ny violation

prohibitions [which includes the prohibition
Parties to the conflict

lation

and

civilians.

the prohibition

on

shielding] shall not release the

from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian popu," 114

.

on

of these

.

Therefore, an attacker continues to be

directly attacking civilians

bound both by

and the proportionality

principle.

Taking these requirements together, the attacker must consider the deaths and
juries shields

might

suffer

when determining whether

in-

the military advantage ac-

cruing from attack on the military objective they are shielding outweighs likely
collateral

damage and

Few have suggested
to directly target

incidental injury.
that an attacker should be released

human

shields.

However, there

is

application of the principle of proportionality, for
levolent

opponent might turn the use of human

from the obligation not

far less satisfaction

some

with pure

are concerned that a

ma-

shields into a significant military

advantage. Specifically, by using shields, an opponent could so alter the extent of
likely civilian

rendered

death and injury resulting from a

immune from

manual states

that " [a]

strike, that

the military objective

is

US Air Force law of armed conflict
party to a conflict which places its own citizens in positions
attack.

Thus, the 1976

of danger by failing to carry out the separation of military activities from civilian
activities necessarily accepts,

under international law, the
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of otherwise
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lawful attacks

upon valid

military objectives in their territory."

1

And no less a dis-

15

tinguished scholar and practitioner than A.P.V. Rogers has suggested that

... a tribunal

considering whether a grave breach has been committed

[a

disproportionate

would be able to take into account when considering the rule of proportionality the
extent to which the defenders had flouted their obligation to separate military objectives
from civilian objects and to take precautions to protect the civilian population
The
attack]

proportionality approach taken

would otherwise be

Despite such

tilted in

by the

the prevailing practice appears to be unqualified fidelity to

calls,

the principle of proportionality; this

dressing use by the

is

enemy of human

the position taken in

US

.

.

.

military considerations, international law,
its

own

shield legitimate

should be reviewed by higher authority in

and precedent."

117

that:

by the principle of

When an adversary employs illegal means to

targets, the decision to attack

doctrine. In ad-

3-60 states

shields, Joint Publication

"Joint force responsibilities during such situations are driven

proportionality.

which

tribunals should help to redress the balance

favour of the unscrupulous. 116

The US Air

light

of

Force, in

doctrine, acknowledges the shields dilemma, but likewise retains the pro-

under humanitarian law. Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 points

tection civilians enjoy

out that

state's failure to segregate

[a]

and separate

its

own

military activities

and

to avoid

also

may greatly weaken protection
compromised when civilians take a

direct part in hostilities or are used unlawfully in

an attempt to shield attacks against

placing military objectives in or near a populated area

of

its

civilian population.

military objectives.

Note

Such protection

is

118

that protection

is

"weakened," not canceled; in other words, 14-210 recog-

nizes that such practices have a de facto effect of weakening protection of civilians

and civilian

objects because their proximity to military objectives increases their like-

lihood of being incidentally injured or collaterally

damaged

—but

there

is

no dejure

relaxation of the proportionality standard.

Perhaps the best guidance on the subject
ations

and

the

is

that set forth in the Air Force's Oper-

Law text:

[Sjtandards of conduct should apply equally to the attacker and defender. In other

words, that the responsibility to minimize collateral injury to the civilian population
not directly involved in the war effort remains one shared by the attacker and the
defender; and that the nation that uses

its

civilian

population to shield

forces violates the law of war at the peril of the civilians

same

time, however, targeteers

behind

its

own

whom it hides

military

At the

and judge advocates should consider the necessity of
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hitting the particular target, the expected results versus expected collateral

and ways

to

minimize

civilian casualties, if possible."

damage,

119

An approach which refuses to release one side from its full obligations under humanitarian law

when

the other violates

it is

consistent with the underlying purpose

—protection of those who

of that body of law

While humanitarian law takes account of the

effects.

practicalities

principle of proportionality being perhaps the best example),

designed to ensure a
justify a revision

not intended nor

of the other's obligations under humanitarian law in order to re-

two appear under girded by concerns over the inequity

of the malevolent side achieving de facto immunity for

even the highly controversial law of reprisals

its

it is

of warfare (the

Suggestions that the wrongful behavior of one side

"fair fight."

dress the balance between the

sals

from its

are not engaged in the conflict

is

its

military objectives. Yet,

on the basis that repri-

justified solely

(otherwise unlawful acts) can compel the other side back into compliance with

humanitarian law obligations;

fair for

one

The

side to

issue

it

has never been justified on the basis that

be limited by humanitarian law when the other ignores

becomes more contentious when human

the use of involuntary shields, there has been a

marked

civilians to willingly shield military objectives.

flocking to various locations

UN weapons inspection regimes in 1997;
ing Operation Allied Force in 1999;

it.

shields volunteer.

un-

120

As with

increase in the readiness of

Recent examples include Iraqis

when coalition forces threatened force to
121

it is

enforce the

Serb civilians standing on bridges dur-

and international volunteer shields traveling to

Iraq in anticipation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 122

Although there

is

no

explicit distinction

shields in targeting doctrine,

some

between voluntary and involuntary

States, including the

United

States, assert a dif-

ference. In their view, voluntary shields of military objectives lose their protected
status as civilians. 123

Human Rights Watch,

In a February 2002 Briefing Paper,

[l]ike

workers in munitions

it

inter alia, takes the opposite position.

opined that

factories, civilians acting as

human

voluntary or not, contribute indirectly to the war capability of a

state.

shields,

whether

Their actions do

not pose a direct risk to opposing forces. Because they are not directly engaged in
hostilities against

an adversary, they retain

their civilian

immunity from

attack.

They

may not be targeted, although a military objective protected by human shields remains
open

to attack, subject to the attacking party's obligations

potential

harm

to civilians against the direct

given attack, and to refrain from attack

The more

defensible view

is

under IHL to weigh the

and concrete military advantage of any
harm would appear excessive. 124

if civilian

that adopted

Watch wrongly equates voluntary human

by the United

shields with
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States.
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Rights

munitions workers, which they
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correctly characterize as only indirectly contributing to the
a State.

The contribution of human

shields

is,

by

war-making capabilities of

contrast, very direct

—they

are at-

tempting to deter an actual attack on a valid military objective. In a sense, they are no
less

involved in defending a potential target than air defenses.

As discussed

earlier, civilians

nology of Protocol Additional

I,

may lose

their protected status by, in the termi-

taking "a direct part in hostilities."

When

they

immunity from attack vanishes for such time as that participation continues. 125 The Statute of the International Criminal Court adopts this standard by
making it a war crime to intentionally attack civilians unless they are "taking dido,

rect part in hostilities." 126

There

is

much

Commentary to

uncertainty regarding the meaning of direct participation. The

Protocol Additional

I

states that the

relationship between the activity engaged in

time and place where the activity occurs."
direct participation as "acts

which by

term "implies a direct casual

and the harm done to the enemy at the

127

Elsewhere, the

their nature

Commentary describes

and purpose are intended

to

128

harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces." Seemingly, these comments support the Human Rights Watch position that shields
must pose an immediate risk to the enemy before they can be directly attacked.
cause actual

Such a narrow position does not

fit

well into the architecture of humanitarian

law. Recall the definition of military objective. Military objectives are "objects

which by

their nature, location, purpose, or use

military action

make an

effective contribution to

and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,

the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

129

in

By

immune from attack (or contributing to the
enemy's hesitancy to attack it), voluntary human shields contribute to the survival
acting to render a military objective

of an object that by definition contributes to military action; thus, they themselves
contribute to that action in a very direct way. Indeed, by immunizing the military
objective against attack as a matter of law, in
tively

defend

it

than would traditional defenses such as anti-aircraft

face-to-air missiles,

equipped with

many cases shields would more effec-

state

which have proven highly

ineffective

artillery

or sur-

against air forces

of the art weaponry.

When viewed in the context of humanitarian law generally, the most reasonable
characterization of voluntary shields

is

that they are directly participating in hostil-

ities

and, resultantly, lose their protected civilian status. 130 Consequently, volun-

tary

human shields can be legitimate targets.

Further, because they

no longer enjoy

protected status, death or injury to voluntary shields should not be considered in

any proportionality

analysis. Practically speaking,

though, their military contribu-

tion only emerges at the point that they are shielding the military objective; thus,

they enjoy no military significance distinct from the objective
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there

is

no

military necessity for attacking

shielding. Further, even

nale for attacking
jective.

are not engaged in

when they are shielding a target, there is no military ratio-

them directly instead of, or in addition to,

the actual military ob-

Therefore, the only practical impact of their willingness to serve as shields

that they

An

them when they

is

need not be included in proportionality calculations.

exception to this analysis involves children. For instance, Palestinian mili-

tants have used child shields to protect themselves because they

Defense Forces have been ordered not to use

live

ammunition

know

the Israel

against children. 131

As a matter of law, children should be deemed incapable of forming the intent necessary to "directly participate" in hostilities, particularly in light of humanitarian
law's increasing recognition of their

unique predicament in armed conflict. 132 Even

beyond the legal aspects of the phenomenon,

as a practical

be impossible to determine whether a child present
of his or her

matter

it

would usually

at a prospective target

is

there

own volition.

Finally, there

is

the issue of using civilian objects to shield military objectives.

What is often forgotten in the debates is that civilian objects can become military objectives when their use makes an effective contribution to military action and their
total or partial destruction
133

the circumstances.

or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in

When one side intentionally places military objectives near ci-

vilian objects or places civilian objects close to military objectives in order to shield

them

(a

wrongful act as discussed above), those objects

may take on

a status analo-

gous to "military objective." Their use contributes directly to defense of the target

and if their role

as shields

the attacker. That said,
tary shield, there

tack

is

target, but,

and like voluntary shields, because

no need to

on the intended

on the

could be neutralized, a military advantage would accrue to

target.

attack

them

Of course,

their sole use

directly unless they physically

is

as a mili-

impede

at-

they are vulnerable to damage during attack

having taken on the character of a military objective through use,

such damage should not be included within the proportionality calculation.

Note

that the case of intentionally using civilian objects as shields differs

that of the civilian object unintentionally located near a military objective.
gest otherwise
tionality.

would

create

To

from
sug-

an exception that would swallow the rule of propor-

Obviously, objects near the intended target incur the heaviest collateral

damage. Therefore,

if

mere proximity to

military objective, there

a target transforms a civilian object into a

would be no need

civilian objects to protect.
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would be few
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Area Targets

An emerging

issue in targeting involves attacking military installations

civilian facilities exist. In the past, this issue rarely
cilities

seldom existed

at military bases.

presented

on which

civilian fa-

itself. First,

However, with the demise of conscription,

the average age of military personnel has increased, and a greater percentage

married. Thus, military installations increasingly contain

facilities

is

meeting the

needs of military families. Further, in the era of all-volunteer forces, quality of life
has

become an important factor in recruiting and retaining military personnel. To-

day, for instance, the typical
ters,

youth sports

American

US base offers family housing, schools, child care cen-

stores,

fields,

post offices, pools, and even the inevitable

food restaurant.

fast

Second, weapons systems of the past did not have the range to strike
bases far from the front. Today, by contrast,

Globalization

itself,

some systems have global capabilities.

with increasingly borderless

travel,

conduct special operations thousands of miles from the
21st century

most military

The question

is

at military

has

front.

installations lie "within range" of

whether an entire area or

installation

made

it

possible to

Simply put,

enemy

in the

action.

can be treated as a single

To some extent, this defense was mounted in the trial
Galic, former commander of the Sarajevo Romanija

unitary whole during an attack.

of Major-General Stanislav

Corps, before the ICTY. The case involved allegations that troops under his com-

mand conducted a sniping and shelling campaign against the civilian population
Sarajevo intended to spread terror.

The defense argued

that the presence of

of

some

40,000 Bosnian Muslim troops spread throughout the city rendered the entire area a
target

and the

fact that

only 3,000 civilians died out of an original population of ap-

proximately 300,000 meant the attacks were not disproportionate. After carefully re-

Chamber determined that the attacks on the civilians were

viewing the

facts,

intentional

and sentenced the general

the Trial

to 10 years

imprisonment. 134 While not ruling

out the possibility of treating an entire area or installation as a unitary whole, the

Chamber's meticulous focus on the
its

facts

of individual deaths demonstrates that, in

view, questions of discrimination are resolved

on

a case-by-case basis. 135

This approach comports well with Article 51's characterization of "an attack by

bombardment

.

.

.

which

treats as a single military objective a

separated and distinct military objectives located in a
area containing a similar concentration of civilians
criminate.
a

136

By parallel

logic, the

shopping complex or housing

city,

and

number of clearly

town, village or other

civilian objects" as indis-

presence of a clearly distinct civilian area, such as

area,

on

a military installation precludes treating

the entire installation as targetable.
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Further, Article 57 requires belligerents to

the target

is

military in nature

and to "take

employ reasonable steps to verify that

all

feasible precautions in the choice of

means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." 137
Therefore, whether an attack is discriminate enough depends both on the extent to
which the attacker used information assets to confirm the nature of the target and
selected weapons and tactics designed to avoid causing harm to civilians and civilian objects. Again, these requirements auger against treating military installations
as a single entity for targeting purposes.

At any rate, military planners are
targets

and aimpoints.

now able to more accurately refine the choice of

Intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) system im-

provements have made it far easier to distinguish between military and civilian objects,
whereas advances in precision have made striking the intended target with great surety
practicable. 138 In fact, since installations are fixed,

more
will

most missions

them

against

be preplanned. This allows a highly complex and in-depth planning process that

considers such factors as

maximum effective range of weaponry and their circular er-

ror probable, likely collateral damage,
ternatives.

and aim point,

Perhaps most importantly,

it is

fusing,

and azimuth of attack al-

poor airmanship (or

soldiering) to treat

areas in which discrimination

is

possible as a single target because doing so, in an age of

would be wasteful;

it

violates the principle of economy

precision,

That

on an

said, in

those cases where

it is

impossible to verify that individual

installation are military objectives (e.g., does the

tions or school supplies?), a

of force.
facilities

warehouse contain muni-

presumption that they are military attaches. This

cause the Protocol Additional

I,

Article 52,

is

be-

presumption that a prospective target is

not making an effective contribution to military action, and therefore not
targetable, applies only to objects

a place of worship, a
cility

"normally dedicated to

house or other dwelling, or a school."

139

cated to civilian purposes,

The presence of a

For instance, hangar

its

status,

fa-

appear to be normally dedi-

makes striking it consistent with the principle of distincfacilities

often line runways. In

most

for traditional military purposes such as aircraft maintenance.

the

such as

on an active military installation, combined with the fact that it does not, after

reasonable steps have been taken to ascertain

tion.

civilian purposes,

community gymnasium,

as

is

the case at an actual

tacker should be permitted to strike

the circumstances to determine
to have

its

it

after

nature.

been a mistake, but that mistake

However,

if

used

one

is

military facility, an at-

exhausting reasonable measures under

The

will

177

US

cases, they are

attack may, ex post facto, be

have been reasonable.

shown
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Computer Network Attack

enemy through computer networks is a relatively new method of
warfare that raises a number of complex legal issues. 140 Many derive from the jus ad
Targeting one's

helium and have been addressed elsewhere. 141 With regard to the jws in
specifically the

The

hello,

and

law of targeting, three merit mention. 142

on the requirement of precautions in attack. As noted above,
humanitarian law imposes a duty on the attacker to select methods and means of
first

centers

warfare "with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian

life,

injury to civilians

cant obligation because

and damage

means

it

to civilian objects." 143 This

that even if a target

is

is

a signifi-

a lawful military objective

weapon without causing disproportionate
injury, a different weapon must be employed if it

that can be attacked with a particular
collateral

damage or

incidental

could achieve a comparable military advantage with

ment

subject to a rule of reason that

is

would take

less.

Of course,

the require-

into account such factors as the

inventory of available weapons, particularly in light of the anticipated length of the

and any increased

conflict,

This obligation
to

employ them

risk to those executing the mission.

may increasingly drive armed forces

in lieu of kinetic

possessing

CNA capabilities

weapons. The precision of computer network

at-

tack (in which particular systems can be isolated and attacked), the generally low risk
to the attacker,

and the

fact that attacks

needed later in the conflict,
ditional

all

do not expend "ordnance"

lend themselves to selecting

weaponry. For instance, typical goals in

air

might be

CNA in place of more tra-

campaigns include destroying air

defense networks, blinding intelligence capabilities, and disrupting
control.

that

command and

Doing so might involve hundreds of sorties by aircraft dropping or launch-

damage and incidental inon computers of some sort,

ing explosive munitions with significant risk of collateral
jury.

However,

all

such target systems

now rely heavily

thereby making them vulnerable to computer network attack.

A related humanitarian law requirement is that "[w]hen a choice is available between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to
least

be selected

danger to

shall

maybe expected to cause the
objects." 144 Again, the fact that many pro-

be that the attack on which

civilian lives

and

civilian

some fashion opens up opportunities
to avoid striking targets in ways that might cause harm to civilians and civilian objects. As an example, one might wish to destroy an enemy air force by bombing air
spective targets rely

bases.

However,

in

on computer systems

an age of computer network attack,

destructive to feed the

knowingly

media

in

enemy

travel into aerial

false

it

may

be

less collaterally

enemy aircraft to unconsider the bombing of the

information that causes

ambushes. Alternatively,

station in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force that resulted in the
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Bankovic litigation before the European Court of Human Rights. 145 Using

might have been possible to target that aspect of the
station electricity,

thereby simply taking

it

CNA,

providing the

electrical grid

off the air during offending

program-

ming. In an increasingly networked age, the possibilities of computer network

grow

tack

it

at-

exponentially.

The second

issue

posed by computer network attack

is

that of the targets against

which it may legally be directed. The requirement that parties to a conflict "direct op-

would seem to imply that CNA launched

eration only against military objectives" 146
against civilians or civilian objects

Additional

I,

most of which

customary law, reveals that
tions directed against

characterized

is

it is

"attack"

jectives";

and so

149

A careful reading of Protocol

by even non-Party States
civilians

which

is

as reflective of

forbidden, not opera-

the "civilian population

"civilian objects shall

criminate attacks are forbidden";
150

on

them writ large. Thus,

147

the object of attack";

would be unlawful.

.

.

.

shall

not be the object of attack";

148

not be
"indis-

"attacks shall be limited strictly to military ob-

forth.

In Article 49, the Protocol defines "attacks" as "acts of violence against the adversary,

whether in offense or defense." 151 The Commentary on Article 48 echoes

the centrality of violence

by describing the term "operations"

tions during which violence
is

is

applied."

152

as "military opera-

Utilizing this definition, the prohibition

actually on attacking other than military objectives through the application of vi-

olence, that

is,

force

which

injures, kills,

damages, or destroys.

This interpretation does not imply that
force

absent. Instead, the

is

shorthand for a particular
violence

would cause

—

all

CNA is lawful merely because kinetic

term "attack" can best be understood

set

as prescriptive

of consequences, specifically the type of consequences

injury to

humans and damage to

objects. 153

The prohibition

would also reasonably extend to intentionally creating severe mental anguish, particularly in light of humanitarian law's prohibition
tion.

154

on

terrorizing the civilian popula-

However, conducting computer network attacks that merely inconveniences

the civilian population, harasses them, or causes a decline in their quality of

life is

permissible. This interpretation does not represent a relaxation of humanitarian law
in

any way; indeed, the law already countenances such

results through, for

example,

non-violent psychological operations directed at the civilian population.
Finally, there

work

needs to be greater sensitivity to

attacks. Obviously, military

netic force during

an armed conflict

either civilian defense
capabilities.

described,
ent.

is

personnel

may do

who
so.

can conduct computer net-

possess the privilege to apply ki-

However, many countries

rely

on

employees or contractors for their computer network attack

Any civilian who

launches a

CNA "attack," as that term has just been

directly participating in hostilities

So too are those

who

and thus an unprivileged

who conduct computer network
179

attacks that

belliger-

do not damage
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or injure, but nevertheless affect the enemy's immediate war-fighting capabilities.
Typical examples would include directing a computer network attack against en-

emy command and control

facilities, air

defense networks, and combat

communi-

computer network attack

neutralizes

cations nets. Simply put, to the extent that a

or diminishes the capabilities of a military objective, the individual launching

it is

directly participating in hostilities.

Concluding Thoughts
In A

lowing

Man for All Seasons, Sir Thomas More and William Roper engage in the folnow familiar exchange on

Roper: So

the law.

now you'd give the Devil benefit of law.

More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?

Roper: I'd cut

down

every law in England to do that.

More: Oh? And when the law was down

would you hide?

To some

—and

the Devil turned

Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for

—where

round on you

my own safety's sake. 155

degree, each of the targeting issues addressed in this article illustrate

similar contradictions. Targeting doctrine that seeks particular effects subtly
incentivizes attacking protected persons or objects

ponent or when doing so might operate to lessen
cidental injury. Similarly,

many

leader, even if he or she does not

argue that

it is

when

likely collateral

damage and

in-

acceptable to strike at a wicked

meet the requirements

direct participation. Others suggest that

facing a malevolent op-

for

combatant

status or

humanitarian law should be relaxed in

meeting the new phenomenon of catastrophic transnational terrorism. Similar
concerns underlie suggestions that involuntary shields should be treated
ently

from

civilians or that military installations or other areas

has positioned military and civilian objects in close proximity
unitary whole

when

targeting. Finally,

differ-

where the enemy

may be treated as a

computer network attack opens

entirely

new targeting options, some which enhance the protections of humanitarian law,
others that challenge them.

What
ever,

is

is

remarkable throughout the discussions of these complex

how-

the extent to which humanitarian law resolves them. In the vast majority of

cases, application

which

issues,

it

is

of the law, interpreted with sensitivity to both the context in

to be applied

and

its

underlying purposes, meets the concerns of the

180

.

Michael N. Schmitt

William Ropers who

assert its insufficiency in

meeting the challenges of 21 st -century

The law hardly needs to be "cut down"; on the contrary, it still effectively
shelters non-participants from the effects of hostilities, while adequately meeting
the practical concerns of the warfighters. Most importantly, Sir Thomas More's
words remain prescient, for in these troubling times we must preserve the law
conflict.

.

for

own

our

.

sake.
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Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2

declaratory, see Michael

J.

American University Journal of International Law and Policy 419 (1987). See also
International & Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of
the Air Force, Operations Law Deployment Deskbook, tab 12 (no date), and comments by the
then State Department Legal Advisor Abraham D. Soafer in Agora: Tfte US Decision Not to Ratify
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
International
32.

Law 784

Protocol Additional

I,

(1988).

supra note

4, art. 52.2.

33. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10,1980,
1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE Laws OF War, supra note 4, at 515 (1980);
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices
(Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, as Amended, May 3, 1996, art. 2.6, reprinted in id. at 536; Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Oct. 10, 1980, art.
at 533.

1.3,

reprinted in

34.

Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection of Cultural Property

id.

Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1996,

art. If,

in

38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 769 ( 1999).

Law Handbook 10 (2003); US Navy/
Marine Corps/Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
NWP 1-14M, MCWP 5-2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7 5 8.1.1(1995), reprinted in its annotated
version as volume 73 of the US Naval War College's International Law Studies series.
36. Id. J 8.1.1. This assertion is labeled a "statement of customary international law." The
Handbook cites General Counsel, Department of Defense, Letter of Sept. 22, 1972, reprinted in 67
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL Law 123 (1973 as the basis for this characterization.
Judge Advocate General's School, Operational

35.

See, e.g.,

37.

Joint Pub 3-60, supra note 9, at A-2.
Marco Sassoli, Legitimate Target of

),

38.

International

Attacks

Humanitarian Law Research

Under International Humanitarian Law,

Initiative

Brief

3

(Jan.

2003),

available

at

www.ihlresearch.org/portal/ihli/Sessionl.pdf.

NATO's demands were

set forth in a Statement of the Extraordinary Meeting of the North
on April 12, 1999, and reaffirmed by the Heads of State and Government at
Washington on April 23. They included a cessation of military action, as well as ending violence
and repression of the Kosovar Albanians; withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and
paramilitary forces; an international military presence in Kosovo; safe return of refugees and
displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the
establishment of a political framework agreement on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. Press

39.

Atlantic Council

Release

M-NAC- 1(99)51

(Apr. 12, 1999), availableat w-ww.nato.mt/docWpr/1999/p99-051e.htm;

Press Release S-l(99)62 (Apr. 23, 1999), available afw-w-w.nato.mt/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm
40.

Final Report to the Prosecutor

by the Committee Established

to Review- the

NATO

Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1257, f 37 (2000), available at www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato06 1300.htm
[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].

Bankovic 8c Others v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,

41.

Turkey and the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application no. 52207/99.
71-79. The
42. The attack was addressed in the Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40, at
Prosecutor announced her decision not to proceed to the Security Council on June 2, 2000. UN
Doc. S/PV.4150 (2000).
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A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 37 (1996). A second edition of this excellent
book was published in 2004.
44. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time
of War, Annex (1956). The list, which is not included with the ICRC on-line text
43.

(www.icrc.org/ihl/nsf),

reprinted in paragraph 39 of Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40.

is

The Report to the Prosecutor failed
media facilities generally).

on the attack (and on

to take a firm position

attacks against

The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular media
components are part of the C3 (command, control and communications) network they
are military objectives. If media components are not part of the C3 network then they
may become military objectives depending upon their use. As a bottom line, civilians,
civilian objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The
media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for
the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the media is used to incite
crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the media is the
nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it

may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective. As a general statement,
the particular incidents reviewed by the committee,

NATO was attempting to attack objects
Id.

it

in

the view of the committee that

it is

perceived to be legitimate military objectives.

555.

45.

See supra note 38. Coalition forces dropped over 29,000 guided and unguided munitions during

—By

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Freedom

Numbers, supra note 6. Yet, the
Human Rights Watch report on the operation found only the destruction of media facilities and
electrical power distribution facilities "questionable." Instead, it criticized an "unsound targeting
methodology
compounded by the lack of an effective assessment both prior to the attacks of the
risk to civilians
and following the attacks of their success and utility" as the primary culprits in
civilian
causing
casualties. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian
.

the

.

.

.

.

.

Casualties in Iraq (Dec. 2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal203/ [hereinafter Off

Target]

.

The Human

on the 1999

air

Rights Watch,

campaign

Amnesty

and ICTY Prosecutor's Office reports

International,

in Yugoslavia are consistent, with over 28,000

handful of targets questioned as legitimate military objectives.

combat

sorties

See, respectively,

and only a

Human

Rights

in the NATO Air Campaign (Feb. 2000), available arwww.hrw.org/reports/
Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings?: Violations of the
Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force (June 6, 2000), available flfwww.amnesty.org/

Watch, Civilian Deaths
2000/nato/;

library/index/ENGEUR700 182000; Report to the Prosecutor, supra note

Dunlap,

40.

The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy

Post-Kosovo

46.

Charles

Era,

STRATEGIC REVIEW 14 (Summer 2000). He further suggests that current technology allows
power
discreetly and efficiently against a

J.

Jr.,

the United States to apply "tremendous destructive

wide range of objects that opportunistic, materialistic
47.

Id.

48.

Id.

He

.

.

in the

.

societies like Yugoslavia value." Id.

continues,

[ajdditional

targets

under

this

proposal

could

include

selected

cultural,

—

to include

educational, and historical sites whose existence provides support

psychological sustenance
the use of force

is

—

to the malignant ideology that stimulates the behaviors

intended to support.. Furthermore, resorts, along with other

entertainment, sports, and recreational

facilities

could be slated for destruction.

Of

would be subject

to

course, government offices and buildings of every kind
eradication, even

if

they do not directly support military activities (except those
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whose destruction would seriously impede the delivery of services indispensable for
noncombatant survival). Finally, to the extent it is feasible to do so, the personal
property of the sentinent, adult population ought to be held
not, again, indispensable to

high on the target

list

human

survival. Milosevic's

at risk so

long as

it is

bank accounts would be

under the revised model.

Id.

49.

Id.

This proposal openly acknowledges an intent to

inflict

hardship upon the sentient,

noncombatant) populace who must be held responsible for the
deeds of their military forces. It includes even those who may oppose their
government's policies. Given the tremendous scale of atrocities that are infecting the
world, not to mention the globalization of
technology, ethical norms should
place an affirmative duty on a nation's citizenry to actively frustrate their government's
actions when they become patently inhumane.
adult (albeit putatively

WMD

Id.

50.

DOUHET, supra note

51.

Dunlap, supra note 46,

3.

at

15.

Arguably he contorts the principles of necessity and

proportionality to support this effects-based objective: "The scope and severity of the attacks

must
bear a reasonable relationship to the egregiousness of the conduct sought to be prevented, and the
level of force necessary to purge the enemy society of its perverse beliefs." The classic articulation of
military necessity is drawn from the case of United States v. List "The destruction of property to be
lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war .... There must be some
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces." United States v. List, 11 Trials of the Major War Criminals before the Nuremberg
Tribunals 1253 (1950).
52.

the
53.

M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting
Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 143 (2001).
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 78,
Jeanne

79 (July 8)

.

He partially rejects the principle of distinction by treating civilian objects as a military

and the principle of necessity is transformed by measuring it against need to reeducate
population. Doing so ignores the preambular language of the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration, a foundation of modern humanitarian law: "The only legitimate object which
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy." St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens 474-5, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 54. It also flies in the face of Article 22 of the
1863 Lieber Code, the manual for Union forces during the American Civil War, and also a
foundational document of humanitarian law:
objective

the

enemy

Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise
steadily advanced, especially in

war on

individual belonging to a hostile country

arms. The principle has been

and the

itself,

with

its

men

in
is

honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.

General's Office, Instructions for the

United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100,

OF ARMED CONFLICTS

hostile country

between the private

more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen

to be spared in person, property and

War Department, Adjutant

land, the distinction

3 (Dietrich Schindler

art.

Government of Armies of the

22 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in

& Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004).
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Numerous contemporary instruments contain
Additional

I

objectives." Protocol Additional

doubt that the

supra note

State's ability to

ROBERT

55.

See supra note

56.

Lord Robertson, Kosovo

FUTRELL,

if

4, art. 48.

Of course,

this principle

assumes

a legal

the civilian population opposes the war effort, there

wage war

will

is

be seriously degraded.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

54.

F.

I,

one, because

fiction, albeit a defensible
little

the principle, most notably the Protocol

requirement that Parties "shall direct their operations only against military

IN

KOREA 1950-1953,

at

516 (1983).

7.

One Year On: Achievement and

Challenge 13 (Mar. 21, 2000),

www.nato.int/Kosovo/repo2000/index.htm.
57.

Indeed, the

Hussein.

Mark

Freedom was an attempt

attack sortie of Operation Iraqi

first

Kinkaid, The First Shot,

AIRMAN MAGAZINE,

to

Saddam

kill

July 23, 2003, available at

www.af.mil/news/airman/0703/air.html.
58.

Bruce van Voorst, Ready, Aim, Fired, TIME, Oct.

1,

1990, at 55. Also recall the controversy

surrounding Operation Phoenix, the CIA's program

to

neutralize the Vietcong civilian

Bob Kerry Case, Crimes of
The High Command
Soviet Commissars (political leaders). The

infrastructure (resulting in nearly 20,000 deaths). Michael Ratner, The

War Expert Analysis

(July 2001

Case of 1 948 was based

in part

),

www.crimesofvvar.org/expert/rather.html.

on

Hitler's order to kill

judgment labeled the order "notorious" and the case yielded multiple convictions. United

Von Leeb (High Command

v.

Case),

Tribunals under Control Council
59.

Lieber Code, supra note 53,

1 1

Trials of War Criminals before the

Law No.

art. 148.

10, at

For

1

Nuremberg

States

Military

(1950).

a fuller explanation

of this analysis, see Michael N.

and Domestic Law, 17 YALE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL Law 609 (1992). See also W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order
1233 and Assassination, THE ARMY LAWYER 4 (1989).
60. The British Manual of 1958 is illustrative: "assassination, the killing or wounding of a
and the killing or
selected individual behind the line of battle by enemy agents or partisans
wounding by treachery of individuals belonging to the opposing nation or army, are not lawful
acts of war." War Office, The Law of War on Land, Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law,
art. 115 (1958), reprinted in 10 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).
Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International

.

6

1

62.

supra note

Protocol Additional

I,

Protocol Additional

(II)

to the

.

.

4, art. 85.3(a).

Geneva Conventions of

12

August 1949, and Relating to the

Armed Conflicts, June 8,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4,

125 U.N.T.S.

Protection of Victims of Non-International

1977,

609, reprinted in

at 483 [hereinafter Protocol

Additional
63.

1

II].

Rome Statute ofthe

(1998), arts. 8.2(b)(i)

671 (hereinafter
64.

art. 4.2,

ICC

&

International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
(e)(i) reprinted in

UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9*

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra

note

4, at

Statute].

Protocol Additional

I,

supra note

4, art. 50.1.

The exception applies in "situations in armed conflict where owing to the nature of hostilities
an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such cases, he need only distinguish

65.

himself during each military

engagement and while engaged

the launching of an attack" during such time as he
66.

M., art 43.3.

67.

The Commentary to

medical personnel enjoy
In

lad, in the

a

spcual status
there are

t.isk

has

in

the

armed

deployment preceding

I

makes

it

clear that only religious

fortes:

numerous important categories of soldiers whose
to do with firing weapons. These include auxiliary
the military legal service and others. Whether they

little

services, administrative services,

in "a military

visible to the adversary. Id., art. 44.3.

Article 43 of Protocol Additional

army

foremost or normal

is
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actually engage in firing

weapons

is

not important. They are entitled to do

so,

which

does not apply to either medical or religious personnel ....

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of

8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, f 1677, at 515 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarki & Bruno
Zimmerman eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY].
68. The Rome Statute specifically makes them subject to prosecution, another indication that
humanitarian law carves out no special regime for heads of State. ICC Statute, supra note 63, art.
27. On targeting heads of States, see also Thomas Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites:
Assassination,
Tyrannicide,
and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (1999); Robert F. Turner, It's Not Really "Assassination": Legal and
Moral Implications of Intentionally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 787 (2003); Nathan Canestaro, American Law and
Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1 (2003); Louis Beres,
Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The View from International Law, 13 INDIANA INTERNATIONAL &
Comparative Law Review 847 (2003).
69. US Constitution, art. II, sect. 2, cl. 1 Casper Weinberger has suggested that a head of State or
government who serves as commander of the armed forces is a combatant. As a matter of law, he
overreaches. Casper Weinberger, When Can We Target the Leaders?, STRATEGIC REVIEW 21
.

(Spring 2001). See also Chris A. Anderson, Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of

HAMLINE JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 306 (1992).
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Baghdad, 13
70.

offers the

following definitions for the levels of war:
Strategic Level of War:

The level of war at which a nation,

often as a

member of a group of

nations, determines, national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives

and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.
and multinational military objectives; sequence
initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and
provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
Operational Level of War. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or
Activities at this level establish national

other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing
operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to

and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than
do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide
the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.
achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions,

Tactical Level of

and executed

War: The

level

of war at which battles and engagements are planned

to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Activities at this level focus

on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat
enemy to achieve combat objectives.

elements in relation to each other and to the

Pub 1-02, supra note 26.
71. PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 67, f 1678, at 515. In the context of noninternational armed conflict, the Commentary to Protocol Additional II provides: "Direct

Joint

participation in hostilities implies that there
participation

and

its

is

a sufficient casual relationship

immediate consequences."

Id.
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For a

1 1

full

discussion of the issue of direct participation in hostilities, see Michael X. Schmitt,

"Direct Participation in Hostilities" and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in FESTSCHRIFT

FLECK

505

'Horst

Fischer

et

al.

eds.,

2004),

available

FUR DIETER

www.michaelschrnitt.org/

at

Publications.html. Israel takes the position that Protocol Additional

I,

.Article 51(3),

which

provides that civilians taking part in the hostilities can only be targeted Tor such times as they
take a direct part in hostilities," should be broadly construed such that those

who

participate

remain targetable throughout the entire period of their involvement in the conflict. Yuval Shanv,
Israeli Counter-Terrorism Measures: Are They "Kosher" under International Law, in TERRORISM
D International Law-

Luca Benito
1

3

Challenges and Responses

96, 104

Michael X. Schmitt

& Gian

eds., 2003).

.Although Israel has acknowledged killing over 30 Palestinians pursuant to the policy, non-

governmental organizations estimate that nearly three times that number have been targeted.
Techniques include using snipers, bombs, and
Palestinian controlled territory

involved in attacks against

Israel

strikes

have occurred in

mid- or high-level militants

On the policy of targeted killings, see also Orna
m
Vit Must not Make a Scarecrow of the Law": A Legal Analysis of

the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,

The

against

Israeli targets. Id, at 103.

Ben-Xaftali and Keren R. Michaeli,

1 -

Most of the

airstrikes.

and have been mounted

36 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL

Defense Forces Judge Advocate General has

set

Law JOURNAL

233 2003).

four conditions for conducting such

stri-

1) well- supported

information showing the terrorist will plan or earn' out a terror

attack in the near future; 2) after appeals to the Palestinian Authority calling for the

have been ignored; 3 attempts to arrest the suspect by use of IDF
troops have failed; 4 the assassination is not to be carried out in retribution for events
terrorist's arrest

1

1

of the pasL Instead,

it

can only be done to prevent attacks in the future which are

liable

to toll multiple casualties.

H
7

r

IBE1Z 7r:
See, e.g.,

4

1J02.

Amnesty International,

Israel,

and the Occupied Territories:

State .Assassinations

Other Unlawful Killings Feb. 21, 2001 ), at www.anmesly.org/hbran7index.
|

EXGMDE

UN CHARTER, art. 5
77. S.C. Res. 1368, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., UN Doc. S/ RES/1368
1373, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).

1

and

50052001

1

"

NATO—North Atlantic Treat)-, Apr. 4,

1949,

art. 5,

63

Stat.

(2001

1;

S.C. Res.

2241, 2244, 34 U.X.T.S. 243,

Press Release No. 124, Statement by the
246; Xorth Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO
North Atlantic Council 'Sept. 12, 2001), www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01 -124e.htm.
O.AS
Inter- American Treat).* of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3.1, 62 Stat.
1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S 77 f3; Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1, Twenty-Fourth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty- of Reciprocal Assistance, OEAVSer.F/II.24, RC.24/
RES. 1/01 Sept. 21,2001).
ANZUS Security Treaty- between Australia, Xew Zealand, United States, Sept. 1, 1951, art.
IV, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131 U.X.T.S. 83, 86; 'by Australia;, Prime Minister John Howard,
,

—

(

—

Government Invokes

ANZUS

Treaty-

—

Press

Conference

^Sept.

14,

2001',

available

at

aiistralianrx>htics.com.au/foreign/aiizus/0 1 -09- 1 4anzus- in voked. shtml.

and
South Korea offered logistics support. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke off
diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate fully with the United
States. Twenty-seven nations granted overflight and landing rights and 46 multilateral
79.

Russia, China,

and India agreed

to share intelligence with the United States, while Japan
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declarations of support were obtained.

Overview, Oct.
80.

1,

White House, Fact

Sheet: Operation

Enduring Freedom

2001, www.state.go v/s/ct/rls/fs/200 1/5 194.htm.

In addition to United

Kingdom participation in the initial strikes, Georgia, Oman, Pakistan,

the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan,

Turkey and Uzbekistan provided airspace and

China, Egypt, Russia, and the European Union publicly backed the operations, while

facilities.

even the Organization for the Islamic Conference limited
restrict its

campaign

Czech Republic, Germany,

to Afghanistan. Australia, Canada, the

Japan, the Netherlands,

urging the United States to

itself to

Italy,

New Zealand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom offered ground troops.

Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
43 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 41, 49 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 248 (2002).
81. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Israel, many of the closest US allies
criticized the airstrikes against government and terrorist targets in Libya. The General Assembly
passed a condemnatory resolution following the attack. GA Res. 41/38, UN GAOR, 41st Sess.,
78th plen. mtg. at 34,

UN Doc A/RES/41/38 (1986). See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

33-34 (1999) for a
detailed description of international reaction. See also Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 US
Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GEORGIA
Responses

to

Terrorism, 22

Journal of International and Comparative Law 99
82.

3,

(1994).

Proportionality and necessity have specifically been cited as customary international law by

the International Court of Justice. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.

5 194 (June 27); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran
(Nov.
83.

6,

v.

v.

US), 1986

US), Judgment (Merits) Jf 43

I.C.J.

&

74

2003), www.icj-cij.org.

Profile:

Ali

Qaed Senyan

al-Harthi,

BBC News World

Report, Nov.

5,

2002,

at

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2404443.stm.
84. Anthony Dworkin, The Yemen
news-yemen.html.
85.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Strike,

Israel:

Nov.

14, 2002, at

Targeting Terrorists

www.crimesofwar/onnews/

—Background (Aug.

1,

2001), at

www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go. asp?MFAH0k9d0.
Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1840-1, at 1 129, 1 138. The incident involved the Caroline, a vessel used to supply
Canadian rebels fighting British rule during the Mackenzie Rebellion. British forces crossed into
the United States (after asking the United States, without result, to put an end to rebel activities
on its territory), captured the Caroline, set it ablaze, and sent it over Niagara Falls. Two US
citizens perished. An exchange of diplomatic notes ensued in which Secretary of State Daniel
Webster articulated the standard. Lord Ashburton, his British counterpart, accepted this
formula as the basis of their exchange. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Daniel Webster, US
Secretary of State (July 28, 1842), in 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1841-1842,
86.

available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm.
87.

In addition to acceptance of the standard by the International Court of Justice (see supra

note 82), the Nuremberg Tribunal cited the case approvingly

Germany had

attacked Poland in 1939 and

International

Military

International Law
88.

89.

Tribunal

Norway

(Nuremberg),

when

rejecting the

argument that

in 1940 in (anticipatory) self-defense.

Judgment,

41

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

172, 205 (1947).

YORAM DlNSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 172 (3d ed. 2001).
On January 8, 2004, Secretary of State Powell, referring to "evidence of a connection between

Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida and

... a likelihood that
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stated that he has "not seen

smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection, but I think
and it was prudent to consider them at the time that

the possibility of such connections did exist

we

did." Colin L. Powell, Secretary Powell's Press Conference (Jan. 8, 2004), www.state .gov/

secretary/rm/28008.htm.
90.

Letter

from the Permanent Representative of the United

States of

Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct.

7,

America

2001),

to the

United

UN Doc. S/2001/946,
at NATO

www.un.int./usa/s-200 l-946.htm; Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement

Headquarters (Oct.
91.

2,

2001), www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.

"Members of the armed

forces of a party to a conflict (other than medical personnel

chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that

have the right to participate directly in
92.

hostilities."

Law enforcement incorporation must be

Protocol Additional

I,

is

supra note

notified to the other side for

and

to say, they
4, art. 43.2.

combatant

status to

attach. Id. art. 43.3.
93.

Common

shall

apply to

Geneva conventions provides that "the present Convention
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."
(Emphasis added). Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 31 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 197; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Article 2 to the four

all

cases of declared

Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,

LAWS OF WAR, supra

note

art. 2,

4, at

6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in

222;

Geneva Convention

DOCUMENTS ON THE

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 4, at 244; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 30 1 Article 1 .2 of Protocol Additional I states

War, Aug.

.

that

it

applies to "situation referred to in Article 2

common."

It

then controversially expands

coverage to armed conflicts in which "people are fighting against colonial domination and alien

occupation and against
Additional

I,

racist

supra note

regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." Protocol

4, arts. 1.3

&

1.4.

Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick of the Armed Forces in the Field 49 (J. Pictet ed., 1952).
94.

95.

Protocol Additional

96.

James Risen

TIMES, Dec.
97.

15,

&

II,

supra note 62, art

1.1.

David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for Al Qaeda,

2002, at

NEW YORK

1.

See report of the group's activities in Douglas Waller, The CIA's Secret Army, TIME, Feb.

3,

2003, www.time.com/covers/ 1 101030203/.
98.

UN CHARTER, art.

2(4): "All

Members

shall refrain in their international relations

threat or use offeree against the territorial integrity or political

other

manner inconsistent with

from the
in any

independence of any state, or

the Purposes of the United Nations." This prohibition extends not

only to seizure of territory, but also to non-consensual penetration. Albrecht Randelzhoffer, Article
2, in

I

The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 12, 123 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
1

ed. 2002). See also Declaration

and Cooperation

Among States

in

Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

Every State has a duty to refrain in

its

international relations

from the threat or use of

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any

other

manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or
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use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United

Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international

UN GAOR

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),

,

25th

Sess.,

annex,

issues.

UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (1970), reprinted in

American Journal of International Law 243 (1971) and in Key Resolutions of the
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1946-1996, at 3 (Dietrich Rauschning, Katja Wiesbrock
65

& Martin Lailach eds.,

1997) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].

The

resolution was

adopted by acclamation.

Noted by John Basset Moore in his dissent in the Lotus case.
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 88 (Sept. 7)(Moore, J., dissenting).
99.

100. See,

(Fr. v.

Turk.) 1927

UN Doc. A/49/743

to

UN GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 84th plen.

(1994); Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to

Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210,
plen. mtg.,

Lotus

Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 98; Declaration on Measures

e.g.,

Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60,
mtg.,

S.S.

UN Doc. A/51/631

UN GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th
UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4352d mtg., UN
54th Sess., 4051st mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/

(1996); S.C. Res. 1363,

Doc. S/RES/1363 (2001); S.C. Res. 1267, UN SCOR,
1267(1999).
101. In the case of Afghanistan, the United Nations had demanded that the Taliban put an end to
terrorist activities on territory it controlled both before and after September 11. See, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1267, supra note 100; S.C. Res. 1363, supra note 100; S.C. Res. 1378, UN SCOR, 56th Sess.,

4415th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001); S.C. Res. 1390, UN SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452d mtg., UN
Doc. S/RES/ 1390 (2002). After 9/11, President Bush made the demand explicit. President
George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001). The United States also made back-channel demands
through Pakistan.
102. Perhaps the

Caroline case

most

itself,

significant case of a State crossing into another to deal with attacks

since the correspondence

between Webster and Ashburton

is

is

the

universally

cited as the source of the requirements of self-defense.
103. Defense Intelligence Agency,

Saddam's Use of Human Shields and Deceptive Sanctuaries:
Corps (Feb. 26, 2003), www.defenselink.mil/news/

Special Briefing for the Pentagon Press

Feb2003/g030226-D-9085M.html. On this subject, see also Central Intelligence Agency, Putting
Noncombatants at Risk: Saddam's Use of Human Shields, January 2003, www.cia.gov/cia/
reports/iraq_human_shields/; Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal
and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War by a Democratic State against Terrorism, 16 EMORY
International Law Review 445 (2002).
104. Defense Intelligence Briefing, supra note 103.
105.

For a version of these points, see

106. G.A. Res. 46/134,
107.

id.

UN GAOR, 46th Sess., f 2(c), UN Doc. A/RES/46/134

(1991).

Off Target, supra note 45.

UNPROFOR peacekeepers

and used them as human
United Nations condemned the action,
demanded release, and authorized the creation of a rapid reaction force to handle such
situations. S.C. Res. 998, UN SCOR, 3543d mtg., UN Doc S/RES/998 (1995).
108. In
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1995, Bosnian Serbs seized

NATO

shields against

109. Joint

Pub

airstrikes. In response, the

3-60, supra note 9, app. A.

110. Id.
111.

Geneva Convention Relative

note 93,

to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

art. 28.

112. Protocol Additional

I,

supra note

4, art 51.7.
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113.

ICC

Statute, supra note 63, art 8.2(b)(xxiii): "Utilizing the presence of a civilian or

other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces

immune from

military operations."
1

14.

Protocol Additional
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I,

4, art. 51.8.

—

Department of the Air Force, International Law The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
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desist in

REPRISALS (1971). Protocol Additional
reprisals, a fact that led to

51.6 (civilians

and

I

went

beyond prior humanitarian law

far

in prohibiting

US opposition to the treaty. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 4, arts.

civilian population), 52.1 (civilian objects),

53 (cultural objects and places of

worship), 54.4 (objects indispensable to the survival ofthe civilian population), 55.2 (the natural

environment), and 56.4 (dams, dykes and nuclear
121.

electrical

generating stations).

CNN Interactive, Iraqis Volunteering as Human Shields (Nov.

WORLD/971 1/14/iraq.al.sahhaf.presser. They
December 1998.
Although most came to shield

14, 1997),

afwww.cnn.com/

used force for that purpose during Operation

Desert Fox in
122.

civilian objects, the Iraqi

government urged them

to shield

military objectives.
123.

Department of Defense, Background Briefing on Targeting (Mar.

5,

2003), at

www

.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03052003_t305targ.html.

And then, the other target category that is a challenge for us is where the human shields
that we've talked of before might be used. And you really have two types of human
shields. You have people who volunteer to go and stand on a bridge or a power plant or
a

water works

own free will.

facility,

and you have people

placed hostages,

if

you

will,

shields, but, in fact, they

deal with that,

community
124.

Human

that are placed in those areas not of their

In the case of some ofthe previous use of human shields in Iraq,

to

and

it

on

Saddam

show that these were human
own free will. Two separate problems to

sensitive sites in order to

were not there of their
requires that

we work

very carefully with the intelligence

determine what that situation might be

Rights Watch, International Humanitarian

at a particular location.

Law

Issues in a Potential

War

in Iraq

(Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.hrw.Org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm#l.
125. Protocol Additional

ICC

I,
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4, art. 51(3).

The notion of direct participation also appears in the
humanitarian law pertaining to non-international armed conflict. Common Article 3 to the four
1949 Geneva Conventions specifically applies to "persons taking no active part in hostilities."
Geneva Conventions, supra note 93, art. 3(1). The very limited nature ofthe article's protections
were augmented in 1977 by Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions, which provides
far more extensive protection to civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities." Protocol Additional II, supra note 62, art 13.3. Although Common Article 3 and
Protocol II employ different terminology ("active" and "direct" respectively), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda reasonably opined in the Akayesu judgment that the terms are so
similar they should be treated synonymously. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 Sept. 1998, 5 629.
126.

Statute, supra note 63, art. 8.

192

Michael N. Schmitt
Protocols Commentary,

127.
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129. Protocol Additional
130. This

is

I,

swpra note

arguably consistent with

The protection

4, art. 52.2.

US

doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60 provides,

offered civilians carries a strict obligation

on the

part of civilians not to

armed combat, become combatants, or engage in acts of war.
combat operations, singularly
and
unlawful
combatants
lose
their
become
protected civilian status.
group,

participate directly in

Civilians engaging in fighting or otherwise participating in

or as a
Joint

Pub

3-60, supra note

9, at

A-2.

Without

131. Justus R. Weiner, Co-existence

Cooperation Pursuant

Israeli-Palestinian

Journal of International Law

Conflict:

to

The Implementation of Legal Structures for

the Interim Peace Agreements,
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BROOKLYN

591, 679 n.407 (2000).

on February

12, 2002 of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A.
Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 UN GAOR Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/54/49 (2000).

132. For instance with the entry into force

133. Protocol

I,

supra note

4, art. 52.2.

134. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Judgement, Dec. 5, 2003, Case

No. IT-98-29-T, www.un.org/

icty/galic/trialc/judgement/index.htm.
135.

reus

The Report to the Prosecutor on the NATO bombing campaign usefully addresses the actus
and mens rea of the offense of unlawful attack under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
Attacks which are not directed against military objectives (particularly attacks directed

and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian
damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The mens rea for the offence is

against the civilian population)
casualties or civilian property

unlawful attack

intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. In determining whether or not the

mens

rea requirement has

been met,

it

should be borne in mind that commanders

deciding on an attack have duties:
a) to

do everything practicable to verify that the

objectives,

b) to take

and means of warfare
any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties
property damage, and

all

practicable precautions in the choice of methods

with a view to avoiding
or civilian

objectives to be attacked are military

.

c) to refrain

or, in

from launching attacks which maybe expected to cause disproportionate
property damage.

civilian casualties or civilian

Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40, f 28.
136. Protocol Additional I, supra note 4, art. 51.5(a).
137. Id., art. 57.2.

The Report to

the Prosecutor

on the NATO bombing campaign expanded on

this obligation:

The obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military commander
must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and evaluate
information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct his forces
to use available technical means to properly identify targets during operations. Both the
commander and the aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range of
discretion to determine which available resources shall be used and how they shall be
used. Further, a determination that inadequate efforts have been

made

to distinguish

between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects should not necessarily focus
exclusively on a specific incident. If precautionary measures have worked adequately in
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a very high percentage

of cases then the

number of cases does not

necessarily

fact

mean

they have not worked well in a small

they are generally inadequate.

Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40,5 29.
138. Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal for the

weapons where

Former Yugoslavia addressed the
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Blaskic, Judgment, March 3, 2000, Case No. IT-95-14.
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4, art. 52.3.
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or

promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries." Computer
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destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves." Joint Pub 1-02, supra note 26. The essence of CNA is that, regardless of the context in
which it occurs, a data stream is relied on to execute the attack. Methods include, inter alia, gaining
access to a computer system so as to acquire control over it, transmitting viruses to destroy or alter
data, using logic bombs that sit idle in a system until triggered on the occasion of a particular
conflict to achieve or

occurrence or

at a set time, inserting

worms

upon

that reproduce themselves

entry to a system

thereby overloading the network, and employing sniffers to monitor and/or seize data.
141.
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X
Coalition Operations and the

Law

M. H. MacDougalT

This paper addresses the practical side of the application of the law of armed
conflict

and domestic law requirements during

tions; highlighting areas

where

coalition

combat opera-

different legal structures or divergent national in-

terpretation of the applicable international

framework may have

significant

am going to do this by briefly canvassing three such areas in the context of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Two of these are directly related to the topic of
impact.

I

combatants and

civilians.

The

third

is

a completely distinct topic

—the conduct of

coalition investigatory boards.

Coalition Boards of Inquiry

The

first

that

was convened by the United

area

I

would like

to discuss

is

coalition boards, using the Coalition

States Air Force to investigate the

Board

Tarnak Farms

Range friendly fire incident and the Canadian Board of Inquiry that was ordered by
the Minister of National Defence
cus.

I

do not intend, however,

board. Rather,

to

(MND)

to investigate the

comment on any

same incident

as a fo-

substantive findings of either

my emphasis will be on the procedural issues that arose during the

conduct of the concurrent boards that were investigating the incident and the resolution of those issues.

The facts are undisputed. On the evening of April 17, 2002, soldiers from Alpha
Company, Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were

Coalition Operations

engaged

and

in a night live fire training exercise at

the

Law

Tarnak Farms Range

just

Kandahar, Afghanistan. While the Canadian soldiers were training, two
fighter aircraft
forces.

As the

south of

US

F-16

were returning from an on-call mission to support coalition ground

aircraft

passed south of Kandahar, the

flight leader

observed what he

described as fireworks coming from an area a few miles south of Kandahar. Perceiving this as surface-to-air

the mission crew of a

fire,

the pilot asked for

and received permission from

US Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

to determine the precise coordinates of the surface-to-air

fire.

aircraft

While attempting to

obtain the coordinates, the pilot of the second aircraft, the wingman, requested

permission to

fire

on the location with

his 20-millimeter

cannon. The

AWACS

crew told him to stand by, and later requested that the wingman provide additional
information on the surface-to-air

fire

immediately responded "I've got some
tillery firing at us.

away"
a

as

I

am

fire

him

to hold

fire.

The

pilot

men on a road and it looks like a piece of ar-

rolling in in self defense."

he released one 500-pound

Canadian

while directing

The

pilot

then called "bombs

GBU- 12 laser-guided bomb. The bomb struck

position at Tarnak Farms. Four Canadians were killed, eight were

wounded.
As

a result of this tragic incident,

American with

a

two boards, one

exclusively

Canadian and one

Canadian co-chairman (Coalition Board), were convened

to in-

vestigate the incident.

However, although each Board was investigating the same incident, the primary
purpose for the respective investigations was quite
later, this

difference in purpose

had

significant

different.

As will be highlighted

impact on the procedural processes

applicable to each board.

The primary purpose

for the Coalition

board was convened with the
tions, if such

specific

Board was of a disciplinary nature. This

mandate

to

it is

disciplinary

recommenda-

were warranted. The Canadian Board of Inquiry was convened under

Section 45 of the National Defence Act whereby the

when

make

appropriate for the

MND may convene such a board

MND to be informed on a matter connected with the

Canadian Forces or that affects a member thereof. The primary purpose of the Canadian board was quite different than that of the Coalition Board.

It

was convened

for

administrative/safety purposes

and was designed to meet the Canadian public expec-

tation that this tragic incident

would be

manner. Recommendations
plated

investigated in a balanced

as to potential disciplinary action

were never contem-

and under Canadian jurisprudence, the conduct of the

have, in

fact,

and transparent

investigation could

prejudiced future criminal/disciplinary action.

The conduct of simultaneous
different purposes, poses

unique challenges. The

of information. This issue has two

same

incident, with

that of sharing

and disclosure

investigatory boards into the

facets: first,
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how to ensure both boards had access
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to the necessary information to reach

informed conclusions and recommendations;

and second, what information could be publicly disclosed once the respective boards
had completed

their investigation

and made

recommendations.

their

Because the co-chairman of the Coalition Board was Brigadier General Marc

Dumais, a Canadian, one obvious option for the sharing of the requisite information

would have been to use General Dumais as a conduit of information between the two
boards. This option was not a viable one because of the significant impact such an ar-

rangement could have on the perceived independence and impartiality of each
board.

The second

and the one

option,

that

was

utilized,

was the establishment of a

protocol for the release of information to the boards. This protocol established the
process for requesting documentary evidence and witnesses and set out the parameters

under which the information could be released. In the case of requests by the Ca-

nadian Board of Inquiry for information from

formed part of the legal basis

US

for the determination of what information could be re-

leased publicly. In light of the raison d'etre (a balanced
for the

authorities, these parameters

Canadian Board of Inquiry and the

fact that

and transparent investigation)

had been Canadian

it

soldiers

who had been injured or died, as much public disclosure as possible was of great importance. Equally important, however, was the desire not to release classified infor-

mation, personal information protected from release under privacy legislation or

information the release of which could impact on potential disciplinary proceedings.
Balancing these conflicting priorities takes a great deal of coordination and coopera-

and coordinated public

tion between national authorities to ensure consistent
lease of information.

process

is

One

never assume

tion partner

may be

full

of the most important lessons learned in this whole

knowledge of the

legal

operating under, particularly

and

political constraints a coali-

when

dealing with such an

tion charged issue as the death of coalition soldiers as a result of friendly fire.

Canada and the United

re-

States,

who

emo-

Even for

share such similar legal, political and cultural

foundations, reaching a compromise that addressed both countries concerns took
significant effort

and coordination and,

I

might add, a

lot

of late nights,

last

minute

panics and very senior intervention.

Returning to the

initial

theme of the impact of procedural processes adopted by

the respective boards as a result of their differing primary purposes, I'd like to

touch briefly on the issue of compellability of witnesses. As

I

understand

it,

no wit-

ness could be compelled to testify before the Coalition Board. In contrast, the Ca-

nadian board could compel anyone subject to Canadian law to
testimony could not be used as evidence in a

legal

proceeding

testify,

(civil,

but their

disciplinary or

criminal), save for perjury charges. This striking difference in procedural process
directly linked to the

is

primary purpose for the convening of the board. In the Cana-

dian context, because no evidence given to a Board of Inquiry can be used in future
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legal

on

and

the

Law

proceedings, witnesses can be compelled to testify because

their

tied primarily to safety issues, the balance

nesses to testify in the interests of a

Having now

identified

full

believe that

stance

I

is

cursory

none of these challenges
enhanced the

proceedings

an administrative one,

facts.

manner some of
let

me

the

close this issue

legal

by saying

are insurmountable. In fact, in this in-

believe these differences in process, dictated largely

legal standards, actually

in

tipped in favor of compelling the wit-

exploration of the

very

a

in

is

interoperability issues related to coalition boards
I

does not impact

fundamental right "not to be compelled to be a witness

against oneself." Because the purpose of the investigation

that

it

by different national

credibility of the findings

tions of the respective Boards. In the case of the

and recommenda-

Tarnak Farms tragedy, the

struc-

tured process that evolved for disclosure of information to the respective boards,

ensuring that there was no collusion or collaboration between the boards, led to
the public perception that there
into the matter.
tive process

had been

a balanced

and transparent investigation

A closer relationship between the two boards during the investiga-

may not

have resulted in the same perception.

Transfer of Detainees

The second

area where different legal structures or divergent national interpreta-

tion of the applicable international
is

framework may have an impact on operations

that of the transfer of detainees to another coalition partner. Let

me again paint a

brief background of the issue in the context of Operation Apollo, Canada's contri-

bution to Operation Enduring Freedom. Throughout the campaign against terrorism, the tasks

and

capabilities of Canadian Forces (CF) units, as well as

some other

coalition partners, deployed in the theater of operations did not permit the long-

term detention of persons detained by the CF. Persons detained by the
ther released or evacuated

from the point of capture

screening, long-term treatment

and

to a facility

CF were ei-

where proper

security could be ensured. For Operation En-

during Freedom, the United States assumed the responsibility of establishing and
maintaining the coalition's short- and long-term detention
stan

facilities in

Afghani-

and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Government of Canada has noted

times that Canada, as a coalition partner,
tained by the CF, and

who

are suspected

will, as a

several

general rule, transfer persons de-

members of the Taliban and

al-Qaida, to

the United States.
I

would

like to highlight

some of the legal

issues that

may impact on the decision

of a coalition partner whether or not to transfer detainees to another coalition
partner.

As with so many other

issues related to international law these are not

"black letter law" issues and different coalition partners will likely have different
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interpretations of the applicable law or even

course,

is

one of the

what

is

significant challenges of coalition operations.

Before addressing the specifics of these legal issues,

how fundamental

the applicable law. This, of

let

me provide an example of

these different interpretations can be.

campaign against terrorism, Canada and

its

As part of the

overall

coalition partners are engaged in an

armed conflict and are exercising their inherent right of collective and individual
self-defense against the al-Qaida and the Taliban. But what is the legal regime applicable to these hostilities? Generally,

where

a State

is

entitled to use force in

an

must conduct hostilities in accordance with international law,
particularly the law of armed conflict. However, al-Qaida is a non-State entity (not
qualifying as a "national liberation movement") and prior to September 1 1th most

armed

conflict,

it

States rejected the Taliban as the legitimate

legitimate governments of Afghanistan

ventions of 1949

2
).

government of Afghanistan (previous

had signed and

ratified the

This has led to a debate as to whether the coalition partners are

engaged in an international or non-international armed conflict and,
that

it is

Geneva Conif one

accepts

an international armed conflict, whether the Geneva Conventions and the

1977 Additional Protocol I 3 apply as a matter of conventional law to the
example, on February

7,

conflict.

2002, the United States announced that although

it

For
has

never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan Government, the President

determined that the Taliban members are covered by the Geneva Conventions because Afghanistan

is

may have taken the
1977 Additional Protocol I may not tech-

a party to them. Other coalition partners

view that the Geneva Conventions and the

nically apply to the conflict as a matter of strict conventional or treaty law.

regardless of the legal position adopted

are applying the

What

is

same standards,

by

coalition partners,

all

However,

coalition partners

either as a matter of law or policy.

the legal authority for one coalition partner to transfer detainees to

another coalition partner?

Turning

now to the

specific issue of transfer of detainees

ner to another, one issue that legal advisors

being
tion

made is whether there is legal

(III)

Relative to the

tion's obligations for the

satisfied itself

is

may have to analyze prior to a decision

authority for such a transfer. Geneva Conven-

who are willing and able to abide by the Conven-

handling and treatment of such persons. In particular,

Article 12 states: "Prisoners of war

Power which

coalition part-

Treatment of Prisoners of War provides for the transfer of

prisoners of war to other nations

to a

from one

a party to the

may only be transferred by the Detaining Power
Convention and

after the

Detaining Power has

of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the

Convention." (Emphasis added.) There are no specific provisions for those detained persons

who have taken part in hostilities but are not entitled to prisoner of
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war

status

(i.e.,

and

unlawful combatants) and therein

the

Law

may be

some

the rub for

coali-

tion partners.

In the context of Operation Enduring Freedom, a review of US treatment of detainees at

Kandahar and Guantanamo Bay and statements made by President

Bush, indicate the United States

is

willing

and

able to apply the appropriate inter-

on February 7, 2002, the White House clarified the US position on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to members of
the Taliban and al-Qaida. 4 The White House Spokesman's comments can be sumnational law standards. In particular,

marized

as:

The United

•

States

committed

is

to applying the principles of the

Geneva

Conventions;

The United

•

Convention

III)

States applied the

Geneva Conventions (including

and made

to the Taliban

Article 4 of

a blanket determination that

members

of the Taliban are not prisoners of war;

The United States has decided not to apply the Geneva Conventions to
members of al-Qaida because they do not represent any State that is a party to the
Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, they cannot have prisoner of war status under
the Geneva Conventions;
•

The United States will treat all detainees humanely and
principles of the Geneva Conventions; and
•

consistent with the

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been allowed,
and will continue to have, access to facilities and detained persons.
•

In circumstances such as this,

it

maybe reasonable to argue that a coalition partner

can transfer these unlawful combatants to the United States in accordance with
standards analogous to the provisions of Article 12 of Geneva Convention

III.

Are blanket determinations of PW status permissible under international law?
Even

if

a coalition partner

is

satisfied that the receiving State

is

willing

and able

to

apply the Geneva Conventions and other appropriate international legal standards, the issue of the reasonableness of a blanket determination that

group are not
tially

entitled to prison of war status

may be problematic.

members of a

This was poten-

an issue for coalition partners during the campaign against terrorism.

one hand, you have the position
under international law

if

On the

that such blanket determinations are supportable

based on appropriate evidence. (The United States

decided that members of the Taliban and al-Qaida are not entitled to prisoner of

war

status.

This was based on

its

determination that al-Qaida met none of the re-

quirements for prisoner of war status

—

a responsible
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and

visible insignia, the

open bearing of arms and compliance with the laws and

customs of war. The Taliban

failed to

meet the

last

requirement.)

On the other hand, you have the argument that Article 5 of Geneva Convention
requires a case-by-case evaluation of the status of detained persons

III

war

status

if prisoner

not being conferred, based on the plain reading of Article

is

Article 5

5.

who

addresses the issue of the legal status of a captured or detained person

committed a

belligerent act.

It

notes that a person

ant" under Article 4 will be treated in

all

who

is

classified as a

of

has

"combat-

respects as a prisoner of war. If there

is

any

doubt about whether a detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status, Article 5 delineates the

requirement to conduct a status determination tribunal as follows:

Should any doubt

arise as to

whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and

having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4

[i.e.,

combatants], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present

convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

One could argue that a simple way for a coalition partner to solve this debate is to
conduct its own status determination hearing prior to transfer, but there is no requirement

at

law to do so and

may be

situation

where

What

the impact

is

it

this

approach ignores the

of the operational

impossible to do so in a timely and effective manner.

on the decision

transfer that a detainee

reality

is

likely to

to transfer if

be charged and

penalty and/or judicial proceedings that

may

it is

known

at the

time of

may be subject to the death

not meet minimal

fair trial

guarantees under international or domestic law?
This, of course,

is

the thorny issue of transferring detainees to a State

code authorizes the death penalty or has a judicial system with

whose penal

less

procedural

guarantees than those found under the coalition partner's law. International law,
including the law of armed conflict, contemplates that detainees, including prison-

maybe subject to judicial proceedings and ultimately sentenced to death. 5 International law imposes minimum legal standards
on the conduct of these proceedings. Unlawful combatants may be prosecuted as
ers

of war and unlawful combatants,

criminals for having taken part in hostilities. Prisoners of war could be liable for

prosecution

The

if

they committed violations of the laws of war.

real legal issue for coalition operations,

however,

is

likely to

be

how the do-

mestic law of the respective coalition partners impacts on the transfer of detainees
to

a. coalition

alty.

partner,

who

Unlike the United

standards have

some

could potentially subject the detainee to the death pen-

States,

most other western

nations' domestic

extraterritorial application to aliens.
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and

the

Law

of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees individuals the right not to

be deprived of their

liberty or security of the

life,

the principles of fundamental justice.

person except in accordance with

The Supreme Court of Canada has held

6

extradition to face the death penalty or immigration removal
stantial risk

stances.

of torture

7

would

violate Section 7 in

Arguably the issue of transfer of detainees

operation abroad

is

is

on Canadian

territory,

to such operations has yet to be addressed

European Court of Human Rights ruled
ropean Convention on

is

is

a sub-

but exceptional circumof a military

in the context

quantifiably different than the extradition or immigration re-

moval of a person who

territorial

all

where there

that

Human

but the application of the Charter

by Canadian courts. In a similar vein, the

in

Bankovic8 that while Article

of the Eu-

1

Rights 9 contemplates the ordinary and essentially

notion of jurisdiction, extra-territorial jurisdiction by a contracting

possible in exceptional circumstances depending

on the

state

particular circum-

stances of each case.

Additional Protocol I

The

final issue

I

—Article 51

(3)

would like to touch on today is what Hayes Parks

ing door" for certain civilians provided

by

the "revolv-

calls

Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol

As a trade-off for the protection they enjoy against the dangers

arising

from

I.

mili-

tary operations, civilians should not directly participate in hostilities. According to
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol

matically entails loss of

I,

their direct participation in hostilities auto-

immunity from

attack "for such time as they take a direct

part in hostilities" In principle, the trade-off does not appear to be problematic,
particularly in the context of those

precisely defining

combatant and

armed

conflicts

civilian status.

where there

is

no

difficulty in

But in the context of Operation

Enduring Freedom, the practical application of this temporal limitation could be
problematic, particularly from a targeting perspective.

which a

civilian

who

How can the period during

directly participates in hostilities loses

be defined in practical terms? Does

and become lawful

it

mean

immunity from

attack

that civilians only lose their protected

weapon and they revert to their
protected status once they throw down their weapon or return home from a day in
the trenches? Or do they continue to be lawful targets so long as they perform the
status

targets while they carry a

functions of combatants, such as planning and

duct of operations? There

is

command as well as the actual con-

no international consensus on

not academic questions, the answer to which
only relevant to those nations

who

is

this issue

and these are

of no practical import.

Nor are they

are parties to Additional Protocol

I.

Targeting

decisions will remain subject to legal review as part of the accountability process
that

is

integral to the principle of

command
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There

will

be an

effect

.
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on the whole

coalition as a result of each partner's interpretation

each nation's position on this issue

may

signed to each partner by the coalition

on

this issue as

have a direct impact on the targets

as-

commander.
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PART III
MARITIME OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

XI
Current Legal Issues in Maritime Operations:

Maritime Interception Operations in the
Global War on Terrorism, Exclusion Zones,
Hospital Ships and Maritime Neutrality

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

1

Preliminary Remarks

With

the adoption of the

UN Law of the Sea Convention in 1982

2

there was

a strong belief that with that "constitution of the world's oceans"

all

the

disputed issues relating to coastal State rights on the one hand, and to freedom of
navigation on the other hand, had been settled for good. Since 1982, however,
coastal State legislation has frequently

had

a negative impact

on

the

latter.

The US

Freedom of Navigation Program gives ample proof of excessive maritime claims
ranging from restrictions of the rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage, to the establishment of illegal baselines and maritime security zones,

all

of which have no basis in either the

LOS Convention

or in

3

customary international law. The problem of "creeping jurisdiction" has gradu-

on the protection of the marine environment. Many coastal States have understood that when a deviation from the
established rules and principles of the law of the sea is justified on environmental
ally

been reinforced by national

grounds,

it

enormous difficulties for those States that are prepared to counThe general public will all too easily accept them as reasonable and

creates

ter these claims.

legislation

Current Legal Issues

legitimate.

for countries like the

Still,

European Union,

4

achievements of the

Martime Operations

United States and the

member

States of the

view of their dependence on the freedom of navigation for se-

in

and economic reasons,

curity

in

is

it

of tantamount importance to preserve the

LOS Convention.

At the same time, these very States are confronted with new challenges. There already exists reliable intelligence information that transnational terrorists
get ships

and

ports.

Moreover, transnational terrorism

may

may tar-

well seek to take

advantage of navigational freedoms by transporting weapons, including weapons
of mass destruction, by
tion

it is

sea. In

order to prevent them from reaching their destina-

necessary not only to establish effective control mechanisms in ports 5 but

also to interfere with international shipping
fective control

comply with
tions of the

mechanism

its

on the high

seas if there

in the port of origin, or if the flag State

no such

is

is

ef-

unwilling to

6

obligations under treaties in force or under the respective resolu-

UN Security Council.

7

The dilemma the target States of transnational terrorism find themselves in seems

On the one hand, there is a necessity to interfere with foreign shipping,
restricting the freedom of navigation. On the other hand, these measures may

to be obvious.

thus

be precedents for a modification of the law which would,
to the vital interests of these States

goods by sea and whose security
position to exercise

The

first

interests

it

answer to

dramatic than

it

be contrary

far,

whose economies depend on the

free flow

necessary.

and to what

stands provides a sufficient legal basis for Maritime Intercep-

(MIO) 8

this question

seems to be

in the Global

maritime operations

that,

War on

affirmative, the said

is

Terrorism

dilemma

will

(GWOT). 9

prove to be

less

at first glance.

The second part of this paper will be devoted to

three further current legal issues

although dealing with the law of naval warfare and

neutrality at sea, are not in toto unrelated to the issues dealt with in the
Firstly,

of

presuppose that their navies remain in a

power projection whenever and wherever

tion/Interdiction Operations

in

too

section of this paper will deal with the question of whether

extent the law as

If the

if going

first part.

the establishment of "exclusion/operational zones" during an international

armed conflict will, in any event, interfere with the freedom of navigation of "neutral" and innocent shipping. Secondly, the threat posed by transnational terrorism
will not vanish or even decrease during an international armed conflict. Rather,
transnational terrorists

be

it

consider warships and hospital ships perfect targets,

only for propaganda reasons. 10 Hence, the question arises as to which mea-

sures belligerents
finally, in
flict,

may

may

take in order to effectively protect their units. Thirdly,

view of the persisting

terrorist threat

and

during an international armed con-

the traditional rules and principles of the law of (maritime) neutrality,
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applied in a

strict

manner,

may prove to be a considerable obstacle for non-bellig-

erent States in their contribution to the

War on
Developments following the

GWOT.
Terrorism

terrorist attacks

of September

broader understanding of the right of self-defense.

11

It

11, 2001,

have led to a

not only applies to situa-

armed forces or in some other way attributable to
it, has attacked another State. It also comes into operation if an armed attack is
launched against a State from outside its borders 12 by persons whose acts cannot,
tions where a State, either with

its

or for the time being cannot, be attributed to another State. Moreover, the target
State,

or the potential target State, and

policy but they
tacks as early

may

and

take

all

its allies

do not have to adopt a wait-and-see

measures reasonably necessary to prevent future

at-

as effectively as possible.

MIO in the GWOT
In the maritime context such preventive measures
Surveillance

and control of sea

may comprise,

inter alia:

traffic;

Providing for freedom and safety of navigation;
Protection of endangered vessels;

Disruption of lines of communication;
Visit, search

(boarding) and capture;

Diversion;

Establishment of security zones and of restricted sea areas;
Capture/arrest of cargos and persons.

Self-defense

However,

if maritime

interception/interdiction operations 13 are solely based

upon

the right of self-defense there needs to be a sufficiently clear link to the threat posed

by transnational

terrorism. This will, for example, be the case

able grounds for suspicion that a given vessel
ists

and/or of weapons destined for an area

training

is

if

there are reason-

involved in the carrying of terror-

known

to serve as a hiding place or

ground for terrorist groups. In any event, the generally accepted legal limi-

tations of the right of self-defense
to be observed.

14

Indiscriminate

—immediacy,

necessity, proportionality

—have

MIO exercised in vast sea areas would be dispro-

portionate and, hence, not justified by the right of self-defense.

209

Current Legal Issues

It

may be added in

this

context that

if a

vessel

can be connected to the persisting

by transnational terrorism no further conditions have to be met. Es-

threat posed
pecially,

any form of consent

relevant.

The

—be

it

by the

The

or by the ship's master

flag State

right of self-defense has never

third States or of individuals.
tion,

Martime Operations

in

—

been made dependent upon the

is ir-

will

of

UN Security Council alone would be in a posi-

by taking effective measures, to terminate the exercise of that inherent

right. 15

Law of the Sea
While

MIO could be based upon the rules of the law of naval warfare on prize mea-

sures (measures short of attack) 16

and on targeting 17 this would presuppose the

ex-

armed conflict. While the United States is, at present, a
party to an international armed conflict (Iraq), the exercise of the right of visit and
search and the targeting of vessels could be based on these rules. However, transnaistence of an international

tional terrorism poses

an ongoing threat that

will

tion of the hostilities in Iraq. Hence, the question

the right of self-defense

is

whether there are

and the law of naval warfare

law that could serve as a

Of

not disappear with the termina-

legal basis for

course, the law of the sea, as

—other

—apart from

rules of international

MIO on the high seas.

embodied

in the

LOS Convention and

in

customary international law, recognizes the right of warships and of other State
ships to take measures against a

merchant

same

vessel, including visit

search, 18

if

warship;

•

the vessel

is

flying the

•

the vessel

is

"stateless";

•

there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the vessel

(a) piracy,

flag as the intercepting

and

is

engaged

in

19

(b) slave trade, or

(c)

unauthorized broadcasting.

Accordingly, the boarding of the So San 20 was justified not merely according to
the right of collective self-defense, but also according to Article 110 of the

vention because,

because
tion.

it

at the

time of the interception,

it

could be considered

did not give satisfactory information about

Hence,

all

measures, including

visit

its

origin

LOS Con-

stateless

and

and about its destina-

and search (boarding, including opposed

boarding), undertaken for the purpose of verifying the true character, function, and
destination of the vessel were admissible. 21
tionality of the vessel

The

fact that, after the

proved to be North Korean and that

nocent" shipping of missiles does not justify a different
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it

boarding, the na-

was engaged

legal evaluation.

in the "in-

22
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Against allegations to the contrary
admissible to

some

may be

cases acts of transnational terrorism

would be

it

must be remembered

characterized as piratical, or at

that,

according to the consensus of

on the one hand and piracy
Therefore, according to the law as it stands, the rules on piracy can not

States, there

still is

on the other.

23

be applied to

it

draw an analogy between transnational terrorists and pirates. While in

least similar to piracy,

It

however, doubtful whether

it is,

a clear distinction between terrorism

terrorists, unless their acts qualify as piracy

proper.

may be added that, according to the LOS Convention,

coastal States

may take

action against foreign merchant vessels to enforce their domestic laws. This right to

enforce varies and decreases with the sea area in question. While

would be in
accordance with international law to enforce domestic immigration and security
regulations in the internal waters, in the territorial sea and in the contiguous
zone, 24 especially

if

the vessel affected

is

it

believed to be involved in acts of

transnational terrorism, the law of the sea does not provide for such enforcement

measures in the costal

nm contiguous zone. In the exclusive
entitled to prescribe

beyond the 12-nm territorial sea or the 24economic zone (EEZ) coastal States are only

State's sea areas

and enforce

rules that are designed to regulate the exploration

and exploitation of the natural resources and to protect the marine environment of
that sea area. 25

With regard

to activities of foreign vessels not affecting these

"sovereign rights" nor resulting in severe

to the

marine environment, the

has precedence over the coastal State's rights. Hence, Article

flag State principle

110 of the

damage

LOS Convention provides

a legal basis for

MIO

on the high

seas.

Other Legal Bases for MIO?

There remains one legal aspect that seemingly has not been made use of in the current discussion

on the legality of MIO

reprisals. In this context,

Resolution 1373,

26

it is

in the

GWOT, i.e., countermeasures and/or

of great importance that the

has decided

—

in a legally binding

transnational terrorism States shall, inter

UN Security Council, in

way

(!)

—

that with regard to

alia:

Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from

making any funds,

financial assets or

economic resources or

financial or other related

services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons

attempt to commit or
entities

facilitate

owned or controlled,

entities acting

on

who commit

or participate in the commission of terrorist

directly or indirectly,

or

of

by such persons and of persons and

behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
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Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or

(a)

persons involved in terrorist

acts,

including by suppressing recruitment of members

of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b)

Take the necessary steps

to prevent the

commission of terrorist

acts,

including by

provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c)

Deny safe haven

to those

who

commit

finance, plan, support, or

terrorist acts, or

provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those

who

finance, plan, facilitate or

their respective territories for those
(e)

Ensure that any person

who

commit

terrorist acts

purposes against other States or their

that, in addition to

citizens;

participates in the financing, planning, preparation

or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

and ensure

from using

is

brought to

any other measures against them, such

are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws

justice

terrorist acts

and regulations and that

the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;

Prevent the

(g)

controls

movement of

terrorists or terrorist

and controls on issuance of

identity papers

groups by

effective

and

documents, and

travel

border

through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents.

Hence,

if

tionals or
tive,

a State either assists transnational terrorism or has

merchant vessels are engaged in such assistance,

that State

Of

course,

armed

if

the assistance rendered

amounts

terrorist attack or if the terrorist attack

is

etc.,

under the

in clear violation of its obligations

is

knowledge that

in

but

still

its

na-

remains inac-

UN Charter. 27

to direct participation in

an

some other way attributable

to

the sponsoring State, the target State will be entitled to take self-defense measures.

Whether the armed response qualifies as an "on-the-spot reaction" or a "defensive
armed reprisal" 28 is merely a matter of the modalities of the exercise of the right of
self-defense. In

any event, the target State

will

have the right to respond by the use

of armed force.

But what

amount

the assistance

to assistance in an

inactive State
1373.

if

would

Even more, the

and could,

still

by the sponsoring

armed

On

would be supportive of acts of transnational terrorism
amounting, however, to

act of aggression ("smaller scale use of force"). In such a

situation the target State,

on

remain

would be

Rather

inactivity does not

the one hand, the sponsoring or

therefore, constitute a prohibited use of force, not

inactive.

its

be in violation of its obligations specified in Resolution

inactivity

an armed attack or an

reprisals in

attack?

State or

it

response to the

the other hand,

illegal acts

would not be under an

entitled to take

all

necessary countermeasures or

of the sponsoring State.
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recently been expressly acknowledged

by Judge Simma who

is

from being a

far

supporter of a broad understanding of the law governing the use of force. In his
separate opinion to the Court's

judgment

in the Oil Platforms case 29 Judge

Simma

stated, inter alia:

In

my view, the permissibility of strictly defensive military action taken against attacks

Samuel B. Roberts cannot be
denied. What we see in such instances is an unlawful use of force "short of an armed
attack ('agression armee') within the meaning of Article 51, as indeed "the most grave
of the type involving, for example, the Sea

Isle

City or the

—

form of the use of force." Against such smaller-scale use offeree, defensive action by
is to be regarded as lawful. In other words, I would
force also "short of Article 51
suggest a distinction between (full-scale) self-defence within the meaning of Article 51
against an "armed attack" within the meaning of the same Charter provision on the
one hand and, on the other, the case of hostile action, for instance against individual
ships, below the level of Article 51, justifying proportionate defensive measures on the
part of the victim, equally short of the quality and quantity of action in self-defence

—

expressly reserved in the United Nations Charter. 30

Applied to the

GWOT, the target State of acts of transnational terrorism would

be entitled to take defensive countermeasures "short of Article 51" against the State
that

is,

actively or passively,

assisting or otherwise furthering transnational

and search

terrorism. Accordingly, countermeasures/reprisals involving visit

could be taken against vessels for the mere reason that they are flying that State's
flag

(genuine link). However, in view of the importance of the freedom of

navigation such measures must be necessary and strictly proportionate. That will

only be the case

if

affected are indeed

terrorism,
flag

e.g., if the

there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the vessels

engaged in

activities

—or in assistance of—transnational

of

State in question fails to prevent the

from transporting

terrorists

or

objects

that

merchant vessels

are

designed to

flying

its

further

transnational terrorism.

The Use of "Zones"

When it comes to

in the Context of Anti-Terror/Force Protection

number of misunder"war zones" known from the two World Wars 31

"zones" in a maritime context there are a

standings due to connotations to

or to "exclusion zones"

known from

the Falklands/Malvinas

War

(1982) 32 and

from the Iran-Iraq War ( 1980-1 988). 33 As a method of naval warfare such a zone
whatever its purpose or legality may be
international

armed

—cannot be made use of

in times other

than

conflict.

"Defense bubbles" or rather warning zones established around warships or
naval units are also to be distinguished from "operational," "exclusion" or other
zones. Such warning zones merely serve to protect the naval vessels
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and are generally recognized

illegal activities
34

in

as in

Shipping and aviation are notified of potentially hazardous

conditions and are requested to clearly identify themselves
the warning zone.

determined

The extent of
Rather,

in abstracto.

case, especially

on

known

a

these zones

it

will

threat

is

will

is

single

and on the location of the ships concerned,

may be

reasonable or excessive. 35 As the
threat posed

by terrorist

activities

vary according to the region of operation and to the general

security environment.

zone

are approaching

and the measures taken cannot be

on the USS Cole clearly demonstrates, the

obvious but

if they

depend on the circumstances of each

whether the extent of the warning area
attack

accordance with

If,

however, the extent of the defensive/protective/warning

proportionate to that threat, the inconveniences imposed upon sea and air

traffic will

not amount to a violation of the freedom of navigation. This holds true

for times of peace

to be kept in

and during periods of international armed conflict.

mind

deliberations, such

that, unless the threat

warning zones

is

agreement with the respective coastal

needs

no choice of
be based upon some form of an

overwhelming and

have to

will

Still, it

State, if the

leaves

warships or naval unit are

deployed, or are operating, in the internal waters or territorial sea of that State.
In addition, warning zones are not to be equated with "special warnings" which
are merely a tool for
States

and

presently

implementing the warning zone and

to international shipping

operating

approaching

aircraft

warned that the US

under

a

and

for notifying

US

aviation. For example,

heightened

state

and ships are requested

of readiness.

it

to other

forces are

Accordingly,

to maintain radio contact

and are

forces will exercise appropriate self-defense measures, without,

however, impeding freedom of navigation. 36

The question remains whether zones may

also

be made use of in the

GWOT for

purposes other than force protection. Certainly, in view of the importance of the

freedom of navigation

for international trade

and security, the closure of larger areas

of the high seas to international navigation and aviation would be
present, assertions

by some

reasons beyond the

12-nm

never been recognized.

37

illegal.

Up

to the

States of a right to extend their sea areas for security

territorial sea

have regularly met protests and have, thus,

Older concepts,

blockade," 38 or

like the so-called "pacific

singular precedents, like the "quarantine" of Cuba, 39

would not

justify

such far

reaching infringements of the freedom of navigation either. Although, in theory,
the establishment of an "exclusion zone" could be based

defense there
a

is

but one

realistic

measure would meet the

group of transnational

test

the right of

self-

scenario this author can conceive of in which such

of immediacy, necessity and proportionality:

terrorists gains control

capabilities for intermediate-range missiles

information that they

upon

will attack

from

over a submarine with launching

and there

is

sufficient intelligence

a given sea area.
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accordance with the right of self-defense of the threatened State to close that sea
area to

all

underwater vehicles.

Apart from such a scenario, however, the extensive use of a given sea area in the

GWOT will always be in conformity with international law, when approached from
a different perspective. If the target States of terrorist attacks

lowed to conduct MIO worldwide on the high
operations only to certain limited seas areas

cerned are

is

and

their allies are al-

seas, clearly a decision to restrict

lawful, particularly if the sea areas con-

known to be used for the transport of terrorists and of weapons

to terrorist groups.

The

such

States cooperating in the

destined

framework of Operation Enduring

Freedom have been doing exactly this by restricting MIO to the sea areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula. Up to the present, no State seems to have protested or
otherwise contested the legality of these measures. Accordingly, and subject to the
principles of necessity and proportionality,

guished from any form of

—

an operational area

"zone"—may be

that

and

their allies to

and aviation or, if reasonable grounds for

suspicion of an activity supportive of transnational terrorism

from approaching the

coastline of a State that has

unable to comply with

its

obligations

to be distin-

established in the context of the fight

against transnational terrorism in order to enable the target States
identify and control international shipping

is

under the

exist, to

prevent

them

proved to be either unwilling or

UN Security Council resolutions on

transnational terrorism.

Law of Naval Warfare and Maritime Neutrality
While the San

Remo Manual

in

most of its

parts reflects customary international

law, three aspects of the law of naval warfare addressed therein either

remain

dis-

puted or, in view of new threats and exigencies, seemingly need to be reconsidered:
maritime exclusion/operational zones, technical equipment of hospital

ships,

and

maritime neutrality.

Maritime Exclusion/Operational Zones
There

is

general agreement that the "war zones" established

two World Wars were, and remain,

illegal.

40

by the belligerents of the

No zone, whatever its denomination or

alleged purpose relieves the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation

under the law

of naval warfare to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not constitute
legitimate military objectives. 41 In other words, a zone

amounting

to a "free-fire-

zone" has no basis in the existing law. Considerations of military necessity

from

—do not

a submariner's point of view

Still,

justify a

in view of State practice, the discussion

"zone" has not ceased.

On

the one hand,
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e.g.,

conclusion to the contrary. 42

on the legality of some other kind of

modern weapons

are far

more
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means of naval warfare used during World War II. On the
other hand, modern weapons have brought about over-the-horizon targeting
capabilities. At the same time, naval platforms, in view of their construction and
technical equipment, are rather vulnerable and can suffer severe damage inflicted
by comparatively "primitive" means. Moreover, the number of the world's
merchant vessels has increased considerably. They may be engaged in innocent
discriminating than any

may

trade but they

also be integrated into the

enemy's war-fighting or war-

sustaining effort, thus constituting a threat to the overall effort to bring the
conflict to a successful

naval

armed

armed

end without suffering unreasonable damage. Therefore,

forces are forced to control large sea areas in order to

position to effectively protect their units

and

remain in a

to achieve their military goal.

Before dealing with the legality of such exclusion/operational zones under the

law of naval warfare

warning zones

43

it

needs to be stressed that they must be distinguished from

and from the customary belligerent right to control the immediate

area or vicinity of naval operations.
are entitled to take

presence

all

It is

generally acknowledged that belligerents

measures necessary against neutral vessels and aircraft whose

may otherwise jeopardize

naval operations in that area. 44 While in

cases such measures will consist of a belligerent's control over the

of these vessels and

aircraft,

many

communications

they may, depending on the circumstances, include the

closure of the sea area in which naval operations are conducted. 45

State Practice

After the

condemnation of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Nuremberg Tri-

bunal, the

precedent of an exclusion zone obviously occurred during the

first

Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982.

On April 7, the United Kingdom proclaimed a

"maritime exclusion zone" around the
proclaiming a "maritime zone."

islands.

Argentina followed on April 8 by

On April 23, the British Government proclaimed a

"defensive bubble" 46 limited to the protection of the British forces against Argentine warships

the United
fect

and Argentine military and

civilian aircraft.

However, on April

Kingdom proclaimed a "total exclusion zone" (TEZ)

on April

that

28,

came into

30:

[T]he exclusion zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries

but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which

support of the
will also

illegal

is

operating in

occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine Forces. The zone

apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which

is

operating in support of

Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is
zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will

the Argentine occupation.

found within the

be regarded as operating
regarded as hostile and

in

will

support of the

be

liable to

illegal

occupation and

be attacked by British Forces.
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In view of the wording of the proclamation that clearly indicates the British were

prepared to attack any vessel or aircraft encountered within the TEZ,
astonishing that one

commentator has characterized the TEZ

temporary appropriation of a limited area of the high
mainly based on the

fact that the

seas."

zone had been adequately

been established in a remote sea area without significant sea
not resulted in any casualties to neutral ships or
are without

doubt

proclamation.
British

On

47

aircraft.

48

it is

rather

as a "reasonable

This conclusion

notified, that

traffic,

and

that

is

it

had

it

had

While these arguments

they do not alter the wording of the

reflecting reality,

the other hand, due to other rather obscure statements of the

government

it

may

well be that, in reality, the British forces were not

—

TEZ

allowed to target just any contact within the
authorization from the highest political

level.

at least

not without prior

Therefore, the United

Kingdom was

TEZ vis-a-vis
neutral vessels and aircraft or, what is more likely, the proclamation of the TEZ was
either lucky that

its

naval units were not forced to really enforce the

nothing but a most effective ruse of war because

it

obviously induced the Argentine

forces to avoid the area. If the latter holds true, the British

measure was not

illegal

under the law of naval warfare. At the same time, however, the British TEZ may not
serve as a legal precedent for the

—

alleged

—

legality

of exclusion zones as a

method

of naval warfare.

During the Iran-Iraq

War both

government issued guidelines

for the safety of

Gulf obliging vessels to transit the
line,

belligerents

made

use of zones.

merchant shipping

The Iranian

in the Persian

of Hormuz south and east of a designated

Strait

declaring a "war zone" covering

all

Iranian waters, and prohibiting

all

49

The Iraqi government declared the area
North of 29-30N a prohibited war zone and warned all vessels appearing within the
zone to be liable to attack. The Iraqi government further warned that all tankers,
regardless of nationality, docking at Kharg Island were targets for the Iraqi air
transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports.

force. 50 In

contrast to the practice of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict both

by attacking neutral tankers, did enforce their
evidence that they regarded them as "free-fire

belligerents of the Iran-Iraq conflict,

zones thus providing sufficient

zones." Since the attacks were not directed solely against legitimate military
objectives, 51 the zones of that conflict are generally considered illegal. 52

Military

Manuals and Expert Opinions

In view of the general condemnation of the zones established and enforced during
the two

World Wars and during

the Iran-Iraq War, States that are prepared to

characterize exclusion zones as a legitimate

cautious approach.

The

method of naval warfare

respective parts of their military
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take a rather

all stress

that
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the establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent

•

of the obligation under the law of armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels

and

aircraft

which do not constitute lawful

may not

targets,

unreasonably interfere with neutral commerce, and that

•

the zone

•

the geographical area covered, the duration,

the zone should not exceed what

is

strictly

and the measures taken within

required by military necessity and the

principle of proportionality.

Accordingly, those States agree that the same body of law applies both inside and
outside the zone and, moreover, that the establishment of an exclusion zone

conformity with the law as an exceptional measure only.

is

in

conditions are

If all these

met, exclusion zones are accepted as in conformity with the law of naval warfare

both

San

in the

sinki Principles.

Remo Manual 54 and

the question remains what object

Still,

that end, the

San

Remo Manual

Commander's Handbook on
either contain the geographic
safe distance

the

in the International

and

aircraft]

Association's Hel-

is

and purpose an exclusion zone is to serve. To
ambiguous. 56 According to the

US Navy
zone may

Law of Naval Operations an exclusion
area of the conflict or it may keep neutral shipping
the

from areas of actual or potential hostilities.

German Navy Commander's Handbook

rights"

Law

55

that refers to "comprehensive control

and

to the denial of access to a given sea area "in order to protect [vessels

from the

effects

of armed conflicts." 58 The Helsinki Principles also contain a

reference to particular risks to

designed to contain or

at a

A similar approach underlies

57

restrict

which neutral shipping

the area of naval operations

ruse of naval warfare, an exclusion zone

navigation and aviation or

it

may

may imply

is

60

exposed. 59 Hence,

—

and if not a

if

not

legitimate

either serve the protection of neutral

that a belligerent, in a given area, will

extensively exercise the control rights already conferred

on

it

by the law of naval

warfare and of maritime neutrality. Then, however, the zone will rather resemble a
geographical restriction of belligerent rights of control

would merely
refrain

indicate that in sea areas not covered

from exercising these

rights.

Be that

as

it

—

the establishment of the zone

by the zone the

may,

if

the further conditions set out above are met, there can be

belligerent

serving these purposes,

may

and

if

no doubt about the legality of

exclusion zones.

Hospital Ships:

New Necessities and Threats

At the time of their adoption, the rules on hospital ships
seq.

of the 1949 Second Geneva Convention

(GC

II)

laid

down

in Articles

22

et

were a well-balanced compro-

mise between considerations of humanity and of military necessity and were adapted
to the

weapons technology of

that time.
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development soon gave rise to concerns. At first, the rules on the marking of hospital
ships proved

no longer

sufficient to ensure their effective identification as specially

protected platforms under the law of naval warfare. 61
rules regulating the technical

Then

it

became

clear that the

equipment of hospital ships for communication pur-

poses had become outdated in view of modern forms of communication via

and other means. Today there
clusively employed in
ists

who

arises
flict,

its

will consider

is

a realistic danger that a hospital ship, although ex-

humanitarian role,

it

satellite

an easy and very

may be attacked by transnational terrorTherefore the question

effective target.

whether and to what extent hospital ships, during an international armed con-

may be equipped with secure communications

enabling

them

devices

and with an armament

to effectively defend themselves against illegal attacks.

Secure Communications
Article 34, paragraph 2, of

GC II emphasizes that "hospital ships may not possess or

means of communication." This proviappears to imply a prohibition on possession and use of secure communicaequipment for both sending and receiving encrypted communications,

use a secret code for their wireless or other
sion
tion

However, the English version

is

not the only authoritative text of the Convention.

The equally authentic French and Spanish
crypted
cret

traffic ("les

texts prohibit

only the sending of en-

navires-hopitaux ne pourront posseder ni

utiliser

de code

se-

pour leurs emissions par T.S.F. ou par tout autre moyen de communication").
of the Vienna Convention on the

According to Article 33, paragraph

3,

Treaties, "the terms of the treaty are

presumed

authentic text."

62

Therefore, the conclusion

is

to have the

justified that

same meaning

Law

of

in each

only the possession or

use of secure communications equipment for transmitting, not for receiving, messages in secret code

While some

is

prohibited.

States, like the

United Kingdom during the Falklands/Malvinas

conflict, 63 hesitate to share this interpretation, others, like the

Germany, 65 obviously are prepared

would enable them to

United States 64 and

to provide hospital ships with

equipment that

receive messages in secret code. Indeed, that

would not only

be in accordance with the generally accepted rules on the interpretation of
multilingual treaties,

it

would

also guarantee the effective

genuinely humanitarian function of hospital ships.

allowed to receive encrypted messages, the

performance of the

If hospital ships

enemy would be

were not

in a position to

them and to deduce from that message the location of a
possible naval or military operation. 66 If a "Red Cross Box" is not a feasible
alternative, the hospital ship would be prevented from performing its
humanitarian function because the respective flag State would be forced to, at least,
intercept messages sent to

delay the message in order not to jeopardize the military operation in question. 67 In
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view of the overall importance of the protection of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, an interpretation leading to such a result would be manifestly absurd
or unreasonable. Hence,

it is

paragraph 171: "In order to
hospital

ships

equipment
in

shall

no

surprise that the San

most

fulfill

Remo Manual

effectively their

provides in

humanitarian mission,

should be permitted to use cryptographic equipment. The
not be used in any circumstances to transmit intelligence data nor

any other way

to acquire

any military advantage." 68

This statement implies that hospital ships should be permitted to also use
cryptographic equipment for the sending of messages. Indeed, in the explanations

San

to the

The

Remo Manual, 69

the commentators state:

participants were of the opinion that as the inability to receive encrypted information

jeopardises the ability of hospital ships to operate effectively, the rule ought to concentrate

on

the sending of military intelligence. Therefore, in order to

mission

effectively, hospital ships

fulfil

humanitarian

their

should be permitted to use cryptographic equipment

(modem terminology for a secret code) which in modem technology is an integral part of
most communications systems. This cryptographic equipment may not be used for any
purpose other than the humanitarian tasks of the
intelligence data,

obviously not to transmit

vessel,

nor for any other incompatible purpose.

Seemingly, according to the San

Remo Manual,

would not be

hospital ships

prohibited from sending encrypted messages as long as they are strictly related to
the humanitarian function of the hospital ship and not used for any militarily
useful purposes. In view of the importance of the humanitarian function

view of modern communications technology,
34,

paragraph

2,

it

GC II could be interpreted in that way.

In this context
is

reinforce the prohibition of committing acts harmful to the
1,

GC

II.

in

would indeed make sense if Article

be kept in mind that the prohibition of a "secret code"

paragraph

and

Moreover, according to Article 35

(1)

have on board an "apparatus exclusively intended to

needs to

solely designed to

enemy

GC

it

II,

facilitate

in Article 34,

a hospital

may

navigation or

communication." Today, however, modern means of communication necessitate
the use of

equipment that could be considered

prohibition of Article 34,
e.g., if

GC

II.

The same holds

as violating the "secret code"

true for navigation equipment,

using the military Global Positioning System (GPS).

aircraft in Article 28.2

of the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

The

rules

on medical

take that development into

account. While medical aircraft are prohibited to "be used to collect or transmit
intelligence data" this implies that they are allowed to receive

messages

in a secret

and transmit

code as long as the data are not of a military nature.

Hence, an extensive interpretation would certainly be in accordance with the
object

and purpose of

Article

34,

paragraph
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II.

However, every
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interpretation finds

its

limits in the "ordinary

meaning

to be given to the terms of

the treaty." These terms merely justify an interpretation allowing hospital ships the

use of equipment for the receiving, not for the sending, of encrypted messages.

San

Remo Manual together with the

explanations does not serve as evidence for a

view to the contrary. In the explanations
not
still

reflect the

law

as

it

The

it is

made

clear that

stands. Rather, the majority view

paragraph 171 does

was that "the present law

equipment and that this law has not fallen into desuetude.

prohibits the use of such

[Therefore the majority was] of the opinion that the text needed to reflect this fact and

were encouraging a change in the law." 70

that the participants

Since the sending of encrypted messages by hospital ships cannot be based
the lex lata, States

whose

interests are specially affected

should endeavor to

contribute to a modification of the law. While a codification conference
realistic

option, those States should focus

upon

is

not a

on convincing other States to recognize a

deviating practice as reasonable in order to safeguard the specially protected

humanitarian function of such ships under lexferenda. Numerous statements to
that effect would certainly contribute to a modification of the law as

it

now stands.

Protective Arming of Hospital Ships

The provisions of GC

II

on

hospital ships neither expressly prohibit the

arming of

hospital ships for self-defense purposes nor expressly provide for such protection

or defense. Article 35(1), according to which a hospital ship

is

not deprived of its

armed for the maintenance
of order, for their own defense or that of the sick and wounded," is restricted to an
exclusively personal scope of protection. As such it does not seem to allow any conspecial protection if the "crews of ships or sick-bays are

clusion with regard to the protection or defense of the hospital ship

the said provisions are based

vided for hospital ships
tacked. That

is

on the assumption

true in the past but

under present conditions that assumption
Still,

the manuals of the

US Navy and

it is

is still

of the

Rather,

that the special protection pro-

sufficient to ensure that they will

may have been

itself.

not be captured or

at-

more than doubtful whether

valid. 71

German Navy, 72

as well as the

San

Remo Manual, reflect a strict position with regard to the protective/defensive arming
of hospital ships. While they either expressly or implicitly refer to Article 35(1)
they prohibit

and

rifles.

73

all

arms other than

light, portable,

individual

as pistols

Only the German Manual and the San Remo Manual acknowledge the

right of hospital ships to take defensive
tacks, especially

by

missiles,

measures against erroneous or arbitrary

and they conclude

that they

purely deflective means of defence, such as chaff and

Indeed,

weapons such

GC II,

it is

more than

likely that the respective

at-

"may be equipped with

flares."

enemy

74

belligerent will not be

prepared to any longer respect the special protection of a hospital ship whose crew
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armed with other than small pistols and rifles. And as the provision of the San
Remo Manual referred to above clearly shows it would be nearly impossible to
reach consensus on the criteria that would make possible a distinction between the
offensive or defensive character of such arming. The reference to chaff and flares
is

was the utmost the participants

felt

The United Kingdom, during

able to agree upon.

the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, decided that they were

unable to effectively protect hospital ships and that
the special protection altogether. Hence,

RFA

it

was preferable

abandon

Argus, which was equipped with

was not a hospital ship proper but

light air defense systems,

to

a "primarily casualty

receiving ship" that also served for the transportation of troops. 75

were copied by other States the special protection of

If the British practice

hospital ships

would become

obsolete. This, however,

humanitarian function of such ships and certainly

would be detrimental

politically

to the

inopportune. States

feeling unable to directly contribute to a multinational military operation

would

be deprived of the possibility of indirectly participating by deploying a hospital

The deployment of a hospital ship would not be a merely symbolic act. It
would imply a most valuable contribution for all States and parties involved. On
the one hand, the belligerents would equally profit from making use of the
impartial humanitarian service. On the other hand, the deploying State would be
in a position to prove its credibility and to contribute to confidence building that
would facilitate a future return to normal relations.
ship.

These considerations do not, of course, rule out the basic
admissibility of the defensive

arming of hospital

legal

problem of the

ships, the interest in

which has

re-

cently increased considerably in view of the worldwide terrorist threat. Moreover,
it is

quite probable that in an asymmetric

war environment

at least

one "party to

the conflict" will disrespect the fundamental protection of such vessels under the

law of naval warfare.
It is

doubtful whether the drafters of GC

II

were

at all

aware of this new threat. As

already stated above, they started from the assumption that
international

employed

an

parties to

armed conflict will respect and protect hospital ships as long as they are

in their

normal

role

and

as long as they

do not commit acts harmful to the

enemy. Then, however, an attack against a hospital ship
violation of the law.
belligerent

all

The

drafters of

would consider such

parties to the conflict

or the attacker,

is

would

GC II may have been

illegal

behavior and that,

will in

any event be

under the

if it

belief that

occurred after

all,

in

no
the

find a solution ex post facto. If one party to the conflict,

not a State or other recognized subject of international law, such

as transnational terrorists,

any remedy provided for by the law of naval warfare will

be void. Moreover, the law of naval warfare contains no rule or other provision that

would justify the conclusion

that a belligerent
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obliged to suffer an

illegal

attack or
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other

illegal act

defense that

is

and

remain

to

passive. In other words, the inherent right of self-

not abolished by any known

by the law of naval warfare. Accordingly,

legal
if

order

there exists reasonable grounds for

suspicion that hospital ships will be the target of an
entitled to take
If the

also implicitly recognized

is

illegal attack,

a belligerent

is

necessary measures to effectively prevent or counter that attack.

all

only means available to achieve that aim

is

the

—defensive—arming of

a

hospital ship, then this would not constitute a violation of the law of naval warfare.
This, however,

is

problem that is far from having passed the test

a solution to the

of practice. As already indicated above, the

enemy

belligerent

the arming of a hospital ship a hostile act. Hence, even
ship

is,

if

is

no guarantee

the opposing belligerent. In addition,
settled interpretation

weapons

would imply

of the existing law

76

for strictly personal protection.

that interpretation

precedent." This

measure of protection

for a continuing respect
it

and protection by

a deviation

from

that

is

a rather

and

light

willing to deviate

from

that only provides for small

Any State

consider

the arming of a hospital

in the circumstances ruling at the time, a necessary

or of self-defense there

may well

must be prepared to take the consequences and "to live with the

may

lead either to the total abolishment of the protection of

hospital ships or to the

deployment of hospital ships whose "employment

in

an

innocent role" and, consequently, whose specially protected status, could no
longer be determined with the certainty necessary.

(Maritime) Neutrality

The Law of Neutrality is

laid

down

in

two of the Hague Conventions of October

18, 1907:
•

Convention

V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case

of War on Land [hereinafter
•

Hague V]; 77

Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers

Naval War [hereinafter Hague XIII]

,

—apart from the 1977 Additional Protocol

There is no international treaty
I)

79

—dealing with

in

78

aerial warfare, neutrality in aerial

war or with the

I

(AP

legal status

of

The only authoritative document dealing with these issues is the
Hague Rules on Air Warfare of 1923 80 a private draft whose customary character
neutral airspace.

—

remains an unsettled matter.
In view of the limited time and space available we do not intend to deal here with
the law of neutrality in a comprehensive way.

Still, it is

clear that, if applied to

an

armed conflict, such as the current hostilities in Iraq, that body of law
would imply far-reaching obligations of abstention and of prevention on part of
international

those States that have decided not to take part in the hostilities. 81
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emphasized, however, that allegations of an absolute duty of neutral States to
intern

members of belligerent armed

all

basis in the traditional law of neutrality.

Hague V, such an

forces present

on

their territory

According to Article

11,

have no

paragraph

obligation presupposes that the neutral State "receives

1,

on

of
its

territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies." This does, therefore, not

apply to

members of the

State's territory

due

is

belligerent

armed

whose presence on the neutral

forces

to a status of forces agreement. Additionally, escaped

prisoners of war and prisoners of war "brought by troops taking refuge in the
territory of a neutral

paragraph
allow" the

1

Power"

shall

be

left at liberty. Finally,

according to Article

5,

conjunction with Article 2) of Hague V, a neutral State "must not

(in

movement of belligerent

or supplies" across

its

territory.

obligation to prevent such

"troops or convoys of either munitions of war

This means that the neutral State

movements but

it

under an

is

does not necessarily imply an

obligation to intern the persons engaged in such transports. Hence, the duty of

internment only applies to members of the belligerent armed forces

who

have

already actively taken part in the hostilities and who, thus, have to be prevented

from reentering the war from the
Scope of Applicability of the
It is

a

well-known
of war,

state

is,

While some

—the

authoritative determination

refers to

is

it

it

applies only in the context of a

decision of the non-participating States.

party to an international

aggressor,

assert that

will

its

armed

conflict

is

by the

if

more or

the aggressor. 84 If the Security Council

powers under Chapter VII, without expressly identifying the

remain unclear which State has breached the law and which State

A fortiori, this holds

the Security Council remains inactive.

Still,

from

the

UN Security Council that one

the victim of an act of aggression or of a breach of the peace.

true

upon

83

however, only one situation in which the law of neutrality clearly does

not apply

merely

of the law of neutrality has always been

others maintain that that determination depends

less unrestricted

There

Law of Neutrality

fact that the applicability

a highly disputed issue.
82

territory of the neutral State concerned.

despite the unsettled scope of applicability of the law of neutrality,

situations in

which the Security Council has

and apart

identified the aggressor, State

body of law has not become obsolete. That very State practice also reveals, however, that there is no longer any room
practice since 1945 gives sufficient evidence that that

for an automatic application of that law to every international

armed

sense of common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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Law of Neutrality
post-World War II international armed

Current State of the

The

parties to

States

conflicts, as well as those

not actively taking part in those conflicts have, by their actual behavior,

shown that they were not prepared to accept the automatic and comprehensive applicability
ally

of the law of neutrality, even

amounted

or formally,

armed

conflicts that

if

the situation in question, either materi-

to a "war" proper. 85

were not characterized

On

the other hand, international

as "wars"

—

either

by the

parties to the

—

by non-participating States or by international legal scholars have cerhad an influence on the conduct of States not being parties to those con-

conflict or

tainly
flicts.

86

Therefore, the doctrine of the necessity of a state of war proper, as well as

the doctrine of "status mixtus," lack authoritative substantiation

During international armed

conflicts since 1945, the

but

is

partially

State practice.

conduct of non-participating

States at least indirectly gives evidence of their belief that the
toto replaced

by

law of peace

modified by the law of neutrality.

It is

is

not in

also clear

from

body of law does not depend
upon an individual decision of the non-participating States but upon the mere existence of an international armed conflict. Either those States have refrained from
providing arms and other war material to the belligerents altogether, have denied
providing such supplies officially, or have provided them clandestinely.
Hence, modern State practice gives proof of a functional and differential approach. As far as the relationship between States (that is to be distinguished from the
relations between belligerents and neutral nationals) is concerned, the law of neutrality automatically comes into operation only insofar as the applicability of its rules
is strictly necessary for the achievement of the very object and purpose of that body
of law. Accordingly, during an international armed conflict, non-participating States
are obliged to refrain from any act that may escalate that conflict. Especially, they are
prohibited from assisting one party to the conflict in a way that may lead to a tempo87
ral, territorial or other expansion of the armed hostilities.
The delivery of weapons
and of other war material by States is prohibited. Activities of private persons who attempt such deliveries must be prevented according to domestic laws and regulations
already in effect. The territory, including the territorial sea and archipelagic waters,
and the superjacent national airspace, may not be made available as a base of operations to any party of the conflict. 88 Moreover, non-participating States must take all
that conduct that the legally binding effects of that

measures necessary to prevent one of the belligerents from gaining military advantages

by abusing

their neutral status.

the use of neutral territory
to the conflict,

on

Any permissions

or restrictions with regard to

must be applied and enforced

impartially.

The parties

their part, are obliged to respect the sovereignty of the

participating States, as well as their territorial integrity
tions with other States.

The economic

relations with the
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and

their

economic

nonrela-

opposing belligerent to the
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conflict

may be interfered with only according to, and within the limits of, the law of

maritime neutrality. In other words, the law of neutrality
rights of the belligerent States.

As

on behalf of a non-participating

State

not wish to become directly involved in the armed
applicability

an upper limit to the

concerned, there

far as these essentialia neutralitatis are

facultative stance

sets

89

and

if,

hostilities.

presuppose the existence of a "war" or of

is

as long as,

it

for a

does

Neither does their

a "state

fundamental obligations apply to every international armed

no room

of war." These

conflict. It

has to be

kept in mind, however, that in case of a violation of these fundamental obligations

of the law of neutrality by a non-participating State, the aggrieved belligerent

remains free to assert

its

rights. 90

The functional and differential approach, which leaves aside the admissibility of
belligerent

an

measures under the law of neutrality,

effective prevention

of unlawful

activities

is

based on the consideration that

of non-participating States, as well as

of an escalation of an ongoing international armed conflict, can be achieved only if
these upper legal limits are observed
rights

and duties of neutral

unilateral decision but rather

by all

States concerned.

As regards the further

States, their applicability will

on whether the

not depend upon a

belligerents are willing

and able

to

enforce the law of neutrality that goes beyond the said essentialia neutralitatis. If the
belligerents decide

—

for whatever reason

—not

comprehensive manner, that abstention
contents of that

body of

law.

will

Modern

to enforce the law of neutrality in a

have no impact upon the material

State practice has merely led to the

abolishment of a comprehensive automatism regarding

its

applicability.

Only this

approach enables us to explain why States continue to maintain that the material
contents of the traditional law of neutrality have not been modified.

Concluding Remarks

While there can be no doubt about the "reactive" character of any legal order,

it

has

been one of the purposes of the present paper to show that an early call for a modification of the existing rules in

correct

way of approaching

view of new threats and necessities

way in which

not always the

—allegedly—new problems. Rather, a

the solution of

sober and not too formalistic scrutiny of the law as
identify the

is

a given situation

it

stands will in most cases help

should be addressed.

Of course,

it is

not

always comfortable or convenient to comply with the law. Considerations of military or political necessity

and

justify a deviation

and the need

from the

law.

to rapidly react to
It is,

new threats may

suggest

however, one of the most important

achievements of civilized nations that they adhere to the law and, thus, show their
respect for the rule of law even in situations in
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which

this

complicates things. In the

,
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context of international law
that

it

should, moreover, not be

left

out of consideration

any deviation from the law will be a precedent closely observed by other

which may,

may have

in the near future,

States

adopt a similar conduct. Although the precedent

served a different, and legitimate, purpose,

prevent those other States from referring to

it

may

it

and claiming

prove impossible to

their

conduct to be in

conformity with the modified law.
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during the Tanker War in the 1980s to contend with suicide craft laden with high explosives. See
George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy 57-8 (2000) (Vol. 74, US
Exclusion

LAW REVIEW

Naval

War College International Law Studies). Following the
Stark on May 17, 1987, the fixed distance criterion

on USS

warning zone published in the Notice to Mariners.

may be

Id. at

Iraqi air-to-surface missile attack
(i.e.,

5nm) was

61-2. While a

deleted

from the

5nm zone in those waters

reasonable vis-a-vis a small craft suicide threat, a zone broad enough to deal effectively

with an air-to-surface missile threat would likely have been excessive in that setting, which
36.

why the 5nm

may

was deleted rather than expanded.
International shipping and aviation was informed about this condition by the following

explain

criterion

"special warning":

Middle East and the American homeland, US Forces
heightened state of readiness and taking additional
defensive precautions against terrorist and other potential threats. Consequently, all
aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels approaching US Forces are requested to
maintain radio contact with US Forces on bridge-to-bridge channel 16, international
1.

Due

to recent events in the

worldwide are operating

air distress (121.5
2.

US

at a

MHZ VHF) or MILAIR distress (243.0 MHZ UHF).

Forces will exercise appropriate measures in self-defense

if

warranted by the

circumstances. Aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels approaching
will,

by making prior contact

as described above, help

make

avoid unnecessary initiation of such defensive measures.
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US

Forces

their intentions clear

and

—

—

.
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US

3.

Forces, especially

when operating

confined waters, shall remain mindful of

in

navigational considerations of aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels in their

immediate

vicinity.

Nothing in the special warning is intended to impede or otherwise interfere with the
freedom of navigation or overflight of any vessel or aircraft, or to limit or expand the
inherent self-defense rights of US Forces. This special warning is published solely to

4.

advise of the heightened state of readiness of

contact be maintained as described above
37.

ROACH & SMITH, supra note 3, and F.

See

(

US

Forces and to request that radio

162045Z

NOV 2001

).

C. Leiner, Maritime Security Zones: Prohibited Yet

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 967-992 (1984).
made use of in the 19th and beginning 20th centuries and predominantly

Perpetuated, 24 VIRGINIA
38.

This concept was

served to evade the consequences that would have arisen
39.

If at all,

&

Christol

the

Cuban Quarantine was

of war" had been recognized.

C. R. Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive

Associated Materiel to Cuba, 1962, 57 AMERICAN
40.

if a "state

a legitimate measure of self-defense. See, inter

alia,

C. Q.

Weapons and

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 525-543

(1963).

See the references cited at supra note 3 1

San Remo Manual, supra note 16, f 105; Annotated Supplement, supra note 17, f 7.9;
KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 34, no. 304; The Helsinki Principles on Maritime
Neutrality, f 3.3, in International Law Association (ILA), Report Of The Sixty-Eighth
Conference 497 (1998) [hereinafter Helsinki Principles]; AUSTRALIAN BOOK OF REFERENCE
ABR 5179 Manual of International Law Nov. 3, 1998.
41.

—

42.

Hence

it is

submarines and

contrary to the law of naval warfare to claim: "There are two things out there:
targets." It

needs to be stressed, however, that most of the doubts surrounding

employment of submarines during armed conflict have now been settled. The only merchant
enemy and neutral exempt from attack are those that are innocently employed in
their normal role. If, e.g., a neutral merchant vessel is transporting enemy troops it may be
attacked on sight. There is no duty to first provide for the safety of passengers, crew and the
the

vessels

—

—

vessel's

documents.

43.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

44.

San Remo Manual, supra note

16, 5 108;

KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 33,
41,f

3.3,

which expressly recognizes the

Annotated Supplement, supra
no. 303. See also,

note 17, f 7.8;
Helsinki Principles, supra note

"rights of commanders in the

zone of immediate naval

operations."
45.

to

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

deny access

supra note 17, f

to neutral nations, or to close

7.8:

"A

may not,

belligerent

an international

strait to

to this authority unless another route of similar convenience remains
46.

The language was

however, purport

neutral shipping, pursuant

open

to neutral traffic."

as follows:

Her Majesty's Govt wishes

to

make

clear that

any approach on the part of Argentine

warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could

amount
will

to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the

encounter appropriate responses.

engaging

in surveillance

All

Argentine

Apr. 26, 1982,

at 5.

47.

Fenrick, supra note 3

48.

See also references cited supra note 32.

1

,

South Atlantic

including

civil aircraft

of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are

to be dealt with accordingly.

THE TIMES (London),

aircraft,

at 92.
.
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49.

Notice to Mariners Nos. 17/59 of September, 22, 1980; 18/59 of October

November 4,1980; 22/59 of January 21,
50.

See the documentation in

WARFARE
51.

83 (Andrea de Guttry

Note, however, that

if

1,

and 23/59 of January 21, 1981.
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE

1980; 20/59 of

1981;

& Natalino Ronzitti eds.,

LAW OF NAVAL

1993).

a "contribution to the war-sustaining effort"

is

considered sufficient

to render an object a legitimate military objective, the illegality of the attacks on tankers during
the Iran-Iraq War may not be that clear after all. Both belligerents were able to continue the war

them to purchase weapons abroad.
52. See R. Danziger, The Persian Gulf Tanker War, 111 UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS 160-167 (May 1985); B. A. Boczek, Law of Warfare at Sea and Neutrality: Lessons
from the Gulf War, 20 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INERNATIONAL LAW 239-264 (1989). See also
for eight years because the revenues of oil sales enabled

references cited at supra note 33.
:

OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS

—

DI (AF) AAP 1003 and
Australian Book Of Reference, supra note 41; United States: The Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMPDTPUB
P5800.1) 5 7.9 [hereinafter COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK], in ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 17; Germany: KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 34, no. 304.
54. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 16, ff 105-108.
53.

Australia:

55.

Helsinki Principles, supra note 41, 5 3.3:
Subject to Principle 5.2.9 and without prejudice to the rights of commanders in the zone

of immediate naval operations, the establishment by a belligerent of special zones does

not confer upon that belligerent rights in relation to neutral shipping which

it

would not
upon a

otherwise possess. In particular, the establishment of a special zone cannot confer
belligerent the right to attack neutral shipping merely

on account of its presence

in the

zone. However, a belligerent may, as an exceptional measure, declare zones where neutral

shipping would be particularly exposed to risks caused by the
location

hostilities.

and duration must be made public and may not go beyond what

is

The

extent,

required by

Due regard shall
Where such a zone

military necessity, regard being paid to the principle of proportionality.
also

be given to the

significantly

rights

impedes

normal navigation

free

routes,

of all States to legitimate uses of the

and

safe access to the ports

measures to

facilitate safe

seas.

of a neutral State and the use of

passage shall be taken.

Paragraph 106 merely refers to an "exceptional measure" without specifying which
measures a belligerent may take within the zone.
56.

58.

Commander's Handbook, supra note 17, 57.9.
KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 34, no.

59.

Helsinki Principles, supra note 41, 5

60.

Note

57.

that the British

TEZ

304.

3.3.

during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict was misunderstood as

It maybe that it originally was meant to serve that purpose.
armed conflict the General Belgrano was sunk outside the TEZ.
This clearly shows that a belligerent making use of the exclusion zone device ought to be as clear

being such a geographical restriction.

However,

in the course of the

as possible as regards his intentions.
61. Accordingly, the States parties to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, agreed on Annex I "Regulations concerning Identification." That
Annex was revised and now also allows for underwater identification. See Philippe Eberlin,
Underwater Acoustic Identification of Hospital Ships, 229 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 202-215 (July/ August 1982). However, these modern means designed to facilitate the
identification of hospital ships are far from being effective.

231

Current Legal Issues in Martime Operations

62.

Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna,

May 22,

1969,

1

155 U.N.T.S. 331. For an equal

Law of Naval Warfare at the
Turn of Two Centuries, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 75 (2000);
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1262-63 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
63. The British did not want to send messages in the clear because they did not want the
Argentine forces to get advance information about the possible movements of their forces.
consideration of the other authentic texts, see

Instead, they created so-called

J.

Ashley Roach, The

"Red Cross Boxes" where the hospital ships were deployed and

to receive wounded soldiers.
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 5

where they waited
64.

of transmitting message
65.

traffic

by hospital ships

prohibited under current law" (emphasis added).

is

KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 34,

of encrypted messages should also be permitted

performance of humanitarian
66.

As

"Use or possession of cryptographic means

8.2.3:

no. 357: "Devices designed for the reception

when

they are employed solely for the effective

tasks."

O'Connell noted that dilemma. See D. P. O'Connell,
Contemporary Naval Operations, 64 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF

early as 1970 the late Professor D. P.

Law and
International Law 19, 59

International

(1970).

During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict the "Red Cross Box" created considerable problems
because the hospital ships were not informed prior to the arrival of the wounded and were thus
not well prepared to treat them efficiently. See S. S. Junod, La protection des victims du conflit
arme des ties Falkland Malvinas (1982), in DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET ACTION
67.

—

HUMANITAIRE 26 (2d ed.
68. SAN REMO MANUAL,
69.

Id.1 171.4.

70.

Id.

1985).

supra note 16, 5 171.

5 171.5. Therefore, the participants could not agree

merely on the formulation "should be allowed
71.

For an early analysis of this problem, see

on the formulation "may" but

to."

Oreck, Hospital Ships: The Right of Limited
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 62-66 (Nov. 1988).
S. L.

1 14 UNITED STATES NAVAL
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 53, f 8.2.3: "Hospital ships may not be armed
although crew members may carry light individual weapons for the maintenance of order, for
their own defense and that of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked." Accord KOMMANDANTENHANDBUCH, supra note 33, no. 357.
73. See also THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY, II GENEVA FOR
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SlCK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF

Self-Defense,
72.

ARMED FORCES AT SEA 194 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960).
74. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 16, 5 170; KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH,
no. 357.
75.

D.

Foxwell

&

R.

The

Jolly,

RFA

Argus

—A

Gas-Tight,

International Defense Review 116-117 (1991); A. Bouvier,
International Defense Review 246(1992).
76.

supra note 34,

Floating Field Hospital,

2

Fighting Hospital Ships, 3

See references, supra note 72.

Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
77.

OF
78.

WAR 87 (Adam
Convention

Hague, Oct.
79.

Roberts

(XIII)

18, 1907,

3,

Articles

3d

ed. 2000).

Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers

36

Note, however, that

paragraph

& Richard Guelff eds.,

Stat.

AP

2415, reprinted in
I

id.

in

Naval War, The

at 128.

regulates aerial warfare only in part. According to Article 49,

48-67 apply

to air warfare only
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if it

"may

affect the civilian population,
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individual civilians or civilian objects on land" or if air attacks are launched against "objectives
on land." Neutral air space is dealt with in the context of medical aircraft alone in Article 31.
80. Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

supra note 77, at 141.

For an overview of the rights and duties of neutral States under the traditional rules of the
see, inter alia, ERIK CASTREN, The PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY

81.

law of neutrality,
421 (1954);
1963); C.
82.

J.

L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 627 (6th

Then, however, the question

arises

of

how

(Vol. II) 673 (7th ed.
ed. 1968).

to define "war" or a "state of war." For those

claiming a "state of war" to be a necessary precondition for the applicability of the law of neutrality,
see L.

KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

141 (1956); D. Schindler, State of War, Belligerency,

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3-20
83.

In that context,

international

armed

some of those authors

conflict

Armed Conflict,

(A. Cassese ed., 1979);

in

THE NEW HUMANITARIAN

CASTREN, supra note

refer to a status mixtus,

81, at 34, 423.
i.e.,

a situation of

not amounting to "war" proper. See G. Schwarzenberger, Jus Pads

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 460-479 (1943); C. Greenwood, The
Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
Quarterly 298, 300 (1987); P. Guggenheim, Traitede Droit International Public (Vol.
II) 510 (1954); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 313 (1959); Phillip C.
Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between Peace and War?, 48
American Journal of International Law 98-103 (1954).
84. Helsinki Principles, supra note 41, Principle 1.2: ... In particular, no State may rely upon the
Principles stated herein in order to evade obligations laid upon it in pursuance of a binding
" SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note
decision of the Security Council
16, 5 7: "Notwithstanding
ac Belli!, 37

any rule in

this

document or elsewhere on the law of neutrality, where the

Security Council,

its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has
one or more of the parties to an international armed conflict as responsible for

acting in accordance with
identified

resorting to force in violation of international law, neutral States
assistance other than humanitarian assistance to that State;
State

and

which has been the victim of a breach of the peace or an

:

(b)

(a) are

bound not

may lend

to lend

assistance to

act of aggression

by that

any

State."

Law of Neutrality Since
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead Essays In
HONOUR Of FRITS KALSHOVEN 367-86 (A. J. M. Delissen & G. J. Tanja eds., 1991); Greenwood,
85.

Schindler, supra note 82, at 14; D. Schindler, Transformations in the

—

1945, in

—

supra note 83, at 297-300.
86.

See references cited at supra note 85.

87.

The

validity of this obligation

is

confirmed by the statements of the United Kingdom: 57

BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 638 (1987); United
Bulletin 61 (1988)

—during

(UNSCR 540 of October 31,
The United

the Iraq-Iran War;
1983;

and by the

States:

88

US Department of State

resolutions of the

UN Security Council

UNSCR582 of October 8, 1986;andUNSCR598of July 20,
Cambodia was,

1987).

by the violations of the
law of neutrality by that State. See the statement by the legal advisor of the Department of State, J.
R. Stevenson of May 28, 1970, 62 US Department of State Bulletin 765 (May 1970). See also R. A.
Falk, The Cambodian Operation and International Law, in THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vol. 3) 35-57 (R. A. Falk ed., 1972).
89. For a similar approach, see Greenwood, supra note 83, at 299.
90. See P. M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality,
17 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 249, 276 (1976).
88.

States attack against
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inter alia, justified

XII
The Legal Efficacy
of Freedom of Navigation Assertions

Dale Stephens

The

1982

tial

tion

is

Law of the

LOS Convention)

Sea Convention 2 (1982

institutionalization of process.

It is

its

utilizing the sea

is

fully influenced

LOS Convenby an evolved

thus typical of the co-operative pragmatism of

current approaches to international law. 3

and

content

a quintessen-

is

product of the modernist period. The emphasis of the 1982

decidedly communitarian and

exploiting

1

and

its

The

interaction of sovereign interests in

resources are "managed" within

frame-

its

work, and potential conflicts concerning such rights are intended to be resolved

through emphatic

utilization

of dispute settlement mechanisms which

regard" to the sovereign participants.
ification process

4

will

pay "due

The 1982 LOS Convention continues the cod-

of its antecedents, especially the 1958 Conventions, 5 though

it

sets a

"progressive" course with the inclusion of new concepts hitherto not recognized un-

der the law including, in particular, the archipelagic concept as a juridical entity.

Given the

holistic character

of the 1982

LOS

Convention,

not surprising, that security issues are not directly tackled.
issues, the potential for a clash

trinal

substance of sovereignty,

most

significant

ironic,

although

When it comes to such

of sovereignty, or at least conceptions of the docis likely. It is

cerning the efficacy of freedom

pronounced. The United

it is

within this context that questions con-

of navigation rights are, naturally,

6
States, a notable absentee

from the Convention,

most
is

the

proponent of exercising navigational freedom through use of its

The Legal Efficacy of Freedom of Navigation Assertions

naval and air forces. This has been driven from a measured agenda to ensure that
is

7

instrumental in creating advantageous customary norms. Additionally, the

Freedom of Navigation Program

is

as a whole. In this latter respect espe-

the concerns of the United States are shared by a

powers who have either commenced

upon US

or have otherwise relied
It is

own

their

number of other maritime

navigational assertion programs 8

practice. 9

a critical time for preserving international navigational freedom.

creasing ratification of and accession to the 1982

and

strategic realities.

ing to established rules by

The "game"

many coastal

The

in-

LOS Convention means that nav-

igational regimes are being established that will have a
political

US

designed to influence interpretations of ambig-

uous provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention
cially,

it

permanent impact upon

not necessarily being played accord-

is

States.

There are discordant voices

position to maritime State strategies and the stakes for

in

op-

remain impossibly high,

all

thus the need for precise and resolute action. Naval and air forces remain at the
forefront of this critical
effective

campaign and are the principal instruments

and peaceful resolution of these

for ensuring

threats.

The Freedom of Navigation Program which was first authorized by the United
States Government in the late 1970s has been criticized in both legal and normative
terms. 10 Arguments have been rendered which criticize the legal efficacy of the
program and question the apparent provocative nature of such assertions as unnecessary exercises of hegemonic power projection. Moreover, such criticism contends that the preservation of navigational freedom can be more effectively
achieved through other,

less invasive,

means. 11 Indeed these arguments suggest

may offend

that the exercise of the operational assertions

ternational law concerning "abuse of rights."
are misplaced

and

that the

12

general principles of in-

contended that such arguments

It is

freedom of navigation assertions undertaken by the

United States and others do provide the most

effective

means of preserving the bal-

ance of interests reflected in the legal architecture of the 1982

The current cacophony of claims made by some
navigational freedom

is

strident in

both frequency and depth. In

cally,

means of addressing

Convention.

coastal States collectively to limit

world of strategic norm creation and suppression,
assertions are an essential

LOS

it is

this

dynamic

contended that navigational

these suspect claims.

More

criti-

such assertions are undertaken in concert with the jurisprudence of the Inter-

national Court of Justice that has repeatedly endorsed the principle of navigational

freedom and recognized the legitimacy of asserting such
for the
tial

rights.

This paper argues

continued maintenance of the Freedom of Navigation Program as an essen-

means of preserving the

demonstrate the

integrity of the 1982

risks involved in failing to

seeks to

be vigilant to contrary strategies de-

signed to limit the freedoms so desperately won.
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Law of the Sea Legal Regime
The 1982 LOS Convention
States

have

permanent

a very well subscribed treaty. As of this writing, 145

acceded to the Convention, 13 which

ratified or
five

is

members of the

list

includes four of the

Security Council. Following the resolution of issues

associated with Part XI of the Convention dealing with deep seabed mining, 14 Presi-

dent Clinton submitted the 1982

ment

LOS

Convention, together with the 1994 Agree-

Relating to the Implementation of Part XI, to the United States Senate

October

1994 for

7,

consent, respectively, to their accession and ratification. 15

its

Notwithstanding its broad acceptability, the 1982
subscribed and thus

sally

on

is

not, in

its

LOS Convention is not yet univeron

terms, binding

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

all.

Moreover, the Third

(UNCLOS III) 16 debates that led to

LOS Convention were conducted under the aegis of a consensus negotiation practice that ensured that the convention was, in many respects, a
the drafting of the 1982

"package deal" of concessions which resulted in a
ities

in the text. 17 Unlike the previous 1958

lation, 18

1982

the

reservations

19

LOS Convention

the 1982

LOS Convention

which

is

does not permit the making of general

compromised language

identified over 60 terms, a

Significantly, the issue
led,

Conventions dealing with maritime regu-

and was intended to be a discrete enunciation of maritime

thus further ensuring a

mentary has

number of constructive ambigu-

in the text. Indeed, a recent

dozen of which are

that are either

cifically

critical,

com-

included within

ambiguously used or not

fully defined. 20

of the use of force in the maritime environment

is

barely tack-

not altogether surprising given the cold war environment prevailing

the time of negotiation. Accordingly, military subjects
text of the

regulation,

do not loom

at

large within the

Instrument and assessment of State actions must be undertaken more spe-

under general principles of international law. 21

The Issue of Sovereignty
Article 2 of the 1982

LOS Convention

confirms that coastal States exercise sover-

eignty over their territorial sea "subject to [the] Convention
ternational

law."

22

That

article

provides

a

reliable

and other

rules of in-

touchstone

for

the

conceptualization of nuanced "sovereignty" applicable in the territorial sea. Fol-

lowing the conclusion of the negotiating process

it

was evident

that coastal State

would be

"subject" both to

sovereignty over newly expanded territorial sea limits

the positively stated terms of the Convention, especially the rights of innocent passage,

and

other,

more

general rules of international law. International legal dis-

course does not admit to a unified theory of sovereignty. 23 Since the treaties of

Westphalia in 1648, both courts and publicists have wrestled with the significance
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Wheaton 24

of the concept. The writings of Henry
the determination of the
in the Lotus case,

25

in the nineteenth century,

Permanent Court of Justice of the

and

early twentieth century

have recognized an absolute quality to the concept of sover-

upon which infringements could not be presumed. 26 Alternatively, the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court of the early nineteenth century 27 and writers
in the current period 28 equate "sovereignty" more with a collection or "bundle" of

eignty,

rights to

Within

which there are concomitant

this

rights enjoyed

by other "sovereign"

States. 29

paradigm, the enduring challenge of international law is the reconcilia-

Modern theoretical conceptions seek to demystify the character
of sovereignty in order to address questions of international community structure
comprehensively. Hence, the theorist Hans Kelsen tackled the nature of sovereignty by positing that it was a conception premised upon an authority of order
tion of such rights.

and nothing more. 30 However,
the international

as a manifestation of order

community

equally possessing the mechanics of an order

through an expression of collective

upon

its

he was able to perceive

and thus was able

will

to conclude that based

coercive predicate, international law exists as an equally binding legal or-

der by which State sovereignty

is

necessarily limited.

31

The monolithic and "mystical" nature of sovereignty expressed in the vocabulary of defense of measures to restrict and hamper navigational freedom, especially
of warships, can be seen as representative of a particular schism of absolutist

atti-

tudes towards the legal nature of sovereignty. This essentialism seems to brook no

heresy on the character of such claims. Notwithstanding this approach,

it is

evident

that the sovereignty expressed to exist in the territorial sea of a coastal State

accordance with Article 2 of the 1982
eignty. International

law

is

LOS Convention,

is,

in

a disaggregated sover-

now replete with authoritative expressions on the frac-

tured nature of this sovereignty. 32

It

was

this realization within the

Corfu Channel

prompted Judge Alvarez to acknowledge the social interdependence between States and to conclude that sovereignty carried with it both rights and obli-

case that

gations, stating in his individual opinion that
as

"we can no longer regard sovereignty

an absolute and individual right of every State as used to be done under the old

law founded on the individualist regime." 33 The relationship between the coastal
State

and the navigating

gations. Accordingly,

or the 1982

State

it is

is

thus a relationship of intersecting rights and obli-

not possible to conclude that under either customary law

LOS Convention,

there

accorded the sovereign status of the

is

necessarily a "weighted" significance to be

territorial sea

of a coastal State based upon ap-

34
a fortiori
peals to mystical conceptions of what underpins the nature of sovereignty,

with respect to international

straits

and archipelagic
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The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention

UNCLOS III was ambitious in its goals. Addressing age old doctrinal antagonisms
concerning theories of mare clausum and mare liberum naturally meant that there

would be deep divisions between coastal State preferences, which sought to expand
maritime jurisdiction, and those of the maritime States who sought to emphasize

more liberal navigational regimes. 35 The 1982 LOS Convention itself is a statement
par excellance in affirming a general theme of "balance" throughout its provisions.
The Convention pits one principle against another in repeated provisions throughout its text. Thus coastal States were able to win consensus for a greatly expanded
territorial sea limit

(from three to twelve nautical miles) in exchange for rights of

concisely defined innocent or transit passage. Similarly, the archipelagic concept

was recognized

in

exchange for rights of archipelagic sea lane passage,

rights of high seas navigation

economic zone (EEZ).

as

were

and freedoms within the newly established exclusive

It is this

thematic goal of "balance" that especially under-

pins the nature of the freedom of navigation programs.

Excessive Claims

As a

result of the

ambiguity in the language contained within the 1982

and in conjunction with independent

vention,

strategies designed to

LOS Con-

shape the de-

velopment of the law, there have been a multitude of claims made by coastal

States

concerning their sovereign or jurisdictional rights within maritime areas, the legal
basis of which

is

suspect. Thus, the broad language of the

drawing of baselines

36

has led a

number of States

approach to designating such co-ordinates. In
draws

it

baselines in a

manner that extend up

Convention regarding the

to adopt an excessively generous

this regard, for

to

example, Vietnam

50nm 37 around islands within the

South China Sea and cannot, under any reasonable interpretation, be regarded

as

"generally following the direction of the coastline" as provided for in Article 7 of

the 1982
larly, a

LOS Convention 38 and

supporting customary international law. 39 Simi-

United Nations publication from 1994 40 identified a number of States that

acted inconsistently with the terms of the 1982

included

Myanmar which adopted

one 222 nautical miles long),
rea

which had drawn

coast.

42

41

LOS

Convention. Such countries

excessively long straight baselines (including

as well as the

Democratic People's Republic of Ko-

straight baselines that did not follow the direction of the

Moreover, the report noted a number of States that purported to require

prior notification or authorization pending the exercise of innocent passage
vessels, especially warships.

India, Iran

and Maldives. 43

Such countries included,
Critically, the report
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inter alia, Bangladesh,

by

China,

noted that such restrictions on
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navigational freedom were inconsistent with the right of innocent passage for
vessels as
States

guaranteed under the 1982

such as North Korea

45

LOS Convention.

assert that special "security zones"

tively to restrict navigational

freedom on self-conceived terms

Countries such as Brazil, India, Malaysia and Pakistan

may be imposed in

them independently and

adjoining maritime areas which purportedly enable

all

all

44

selec-

relating to "security."

seek to restrict naval activities

within their EEZ's in terms not readily recognized under the 1982

LOS Convention. 46

The catalogue of "excessive maritime claims" is quite large. The following non-exhaustive

list

provides a representative outiine of the types of claims made:

and very broad claims

bay

47

•

Excessive

•

Territorial sea limits

•

Imposition of a multitude of environmental or safety conditions on

for historic

beyond the 12nm range, 48

"innocent passage" which effectively denies the

Denied

•

status,

right, 49

and

transit passage rights within international straits. 50

Perhaps the most striking challenge to navigational freedom comes from the
cent adoption of legislation by the Indonesian

purported to

passage through

restrict all

archipelagic sea lanes. Passage

permitted,

on the

sion only. 52
exercisable

been

its

in

December 2002 51

that

archipelago to three north/south

from east-west through the Indonesian archipelago

face of the legislation, to

is

be with Indonesian Government permis-

The legislation also provided that archipelagic sea lanes passage was only
within a limited number of north-south archipelagic sea lanes that had

partially designated

Such

Government

re-

legislation

is

with the International Maritime Organization. 53

inconsistent with a general right to engage in innocent passage

through archipelagic waters as outlined in the 1982

LOS

Convention. 54 Moreover,

with respect to both innocent passage and the partial designation of archipelagic sea
lanes, the legislation

is

contrary to the terms of the 1998 Resolution of the Maritime

Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization

(IMO) which said, re-

spectively, that "[ejxcept for internal waters within archipelagic waters, ships

of all

through archipelagic waters and the

terri-

States enjoy the right of innocent passage
torial sea"
fect,
all

55

and "[w]here

a partial archipelagic sea lanes proposal has

the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage

normal passage routes used

into ef-

may continue to be exercised through

as routes for international navigation or overflight in

UNCLOS." 56 The

Explanatory

to the Indonesian Regulations declared that designation of routes

under which

other parts of archipelagic waters in accordance with

Note

come

innocent passage could be exercised was a right reserved to the Indonesian Govern-

ment notwithstanding

the provisions of the 1982
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Convention. 57
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Freedom of Navigation Program

The US Freedom of Navigation Program was
bipartisan political support since that time.

the debates at

58

established in 1979

and has enjoyed

Developed against the background of

UNCLOS III, the program was conceived as a means to shape the de-

velopment of the law in a manner consistent with ensuring the maintenance of
navigational freedoms so desperately won through the negotiations. 59 American

economic and

tion of maritime

freedom

in relation to ensuring

maximiza-

60

with other maritime State

and

ad idem

strategic policy goals are

and such coalescence of interests are naturally similar
goals. Such freedom critically underpins 61 existing US

coalition military strategy of deterrence, forward defense

and

alliance solidar-

62

The Freedom of Navigation Program is a composite policy of both diplomatic
exchange and physical operational assertion. 63 Moreover, the program is to be seen
ity.

as

an important element in an overall process of US supported bilateral and multi-

lateral military efforts to foster

consistency in recognition of maritime freedoms.

Such efforts are contextualized in the transparency of the international military exercise

64

programs which are conducted in all regions of the world.

itime legal

The agreed mar-

framework and associated rules of engagement issued for the conduct of

such exercises seek to reinforce the strategic balance of interests reflected in both
the 1982

LOS Convention and equivalent customary law.

65

The thematic focus of the Freedom of Navigation Program

is

US

to consolidate

and, collaterally, coalition rights of global maritime mobility, particularly in relation to

contentious "choke points" within strategic waterways

(e.g., Strait

of Malacca,

Strait

of

Hormuz, etc.). The program is mandated by Presidential Directive to be "non-provoc"even-handed" and

ative,"

"politically neutral" in its application. 66 In this regard,

"non-provocative" does not necessarily equate with "non-confrontational" as the very
essence of the

program is to contest excessive

claims. 67

As will be subsequently argued,

such actions do not in themselves constitute a violation of United Nations Charter
prohibitions under Article 2(4) 68 nor other

domestic jurisdiction of a

State.

norms proscribing intervention within the

69

The Freedom of Navigation Program

is

a critical part of an overall strategic focus

of US policy with respect to maritime freedom. While not a party to the 1982

LOS

Convention, President Reagan declared in 1983 that the United States would act
consistently with the provisions of the
overflight rights,
tional law.

not

.

.

.

70

Convention with respect

to navigation

and

acknowledging that they were representative of customary interna-

Significantly, President

Reagan counseled that the "United

States will

acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the rights and

freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other
lated high seas uses.'

71

Critically,

US

policy perceives
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Program
vention.

as

LOS Con-

an instrumental aspect of preserving the integrity of the 1982

Thus the actions of US naval

forces are rationalized as representing not only

but also those of the international community generally. 72 As

US

strategic interests

the

commentator Richard Grunawalt has opined,

"[t]o that end, the

Freedom of

Navigation Program encourages nations to modify their domestic laws and regulations so as to bring

them

into conformity with the Convention." 73

Australian Freedom of Navigation Program

Navy (RAN) adopted an informal policy of
under the 1982 LOS Convention. The focus of

In the mid-1990s, the Royal Australian
asserting lawful navigational rights
this policy was specifically

the

US program,

within the South Pacific/Southeast Asian region. Akin to

the Australian approach

is

an amalgam of navigational assertion

coupled with coordinated diplomatic exchange.
Australia's geographic proximity

demands

that

it

have

free regional

maritime

A key feature of that mobility is assured access through the Indo-

mobility capacity.

nesian Archipelago so as to access important regional ports within Southeast Asia as
well as

North

While access through the Indonesian Archipelago

Asia.

critical aspect,

it is

is

necessarily a

not the sole focus of the Australian program. In April 2001, an

Australian naval task force of three ships transited the Taiwan Strait in order to travel
efficiently

between

Hong Kong and South

so-called Chinese "security zone"

Chinese naval

which led to

lies

within the

a non-violent confrontation with

units. 74 Australian diplomatic responses to

upon conventional
ter

Korea. The Taiwan Strait

rights contained within the 1982

Chinese protests relied

LOS Convention and

the mat-

was not permitted by either side to escalate beyond an oral diplomatic exchange.
Legal Critique of Freedom of Navigation Program

The approach taken by the United States in undertaking freedom of navigation assertions seeks to achieve two principal legal goals. Firstly, as a non-party to the 1982

LOS Convention,
law develops in a
rity goals

bound to ensure that customary international
manner consistent with its own strategic interests. The stated secuthe United States

is

of the United States in ensuring free access through maritime "choke

points" and

unencumbered

goals of almost

all

maritime

exercise of navigational
States.

To

freedom do accord with the

that end, such navigational assertions seek to

create a "practice" necessary to shape the evolution of

customary norms recogniz-

able in accordance with Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of
justice. 75

Such practice

is

accompanied by statements concerning US convictions
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to the state of opinio juris concerning the establishment of a permissive regime of

through contested

transit

The

actions taken

areas.

76

by those

coastal States that maintain excessive

claims or that otherwise seek to impose restrictions

on

free navigation

maritime

do not ap-

pear to have been taken in concert. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared that

freedom of navigation,

form of

in the

a right of innocent passage

through territorial seas and more generally through other foreign maritime zones,
is

a right possessed

under customary law. 77 The Court has opined that the right

guaranteed to include

"all

the freedom necessary for maritime navigation"

78

is

which

The 1982 LOS Convention, in the opinion of the Court, "does no more than codify customary international law on this
point." 79 Having regard to the ICJ's pronouncements therefore, it seems an en-

was not to be hindered by the

tirely

coastal State.

vacuous process for such countries to be seeking to

which should

crystallize into a rule

set a

contrary "practice"

of customary international law. Contemporary

theory posits that in the face of a generally established rule of customary interna-

been declared by the ICJ in

tional law (as has

this instance), there

is

a need for a

"great quantity of practice to overturn existing rules of customary international

law."

80

With a strong presumption

against the change in law81 there

be demonstrated an extremely widespread and uniform

82

would need to

practice in opposition to

the existing rule for there to be any opportunity for even beginning an assessment
as to the

emergence of a contrary rule. The brief survey of the multifarious claims

by some

coastal States indicates that there

radic

is

no such uniformity, but rather

and somewhat disjointed array of challenges.

UNCLOS

of the

ter stages

It is

a spo-

notable that during the

lat-

debates there was an unsuccessful attempt by

III

approximately 29 States to impose a requirement for prior notification and/or authorization for innocent passage into the Convention. 83

uniform in
there

continued insistence on

their

this

Had

such countries been

requirement in subsequent years,

may well have been afforded a basis to assert that such a proposition had crys-

tallized into a rule

of customary law (assuming, of course, evidence of opinio juris

and acquiescence by other
persist

States)

but this has not been the

case.

While some

with claims for either prior notification or authorization, there

is

States

no wide-

spread uniformity in practice on either element or indeed any particular claim or
principle of law that

dom

act to

contained within the 1982

Alternatively an
specificity

undermine the guarantees of navigational

LOS Convention

etc.),

argument might be advanced that rather than relying on the

opposing "rule"

opposing States

84

free-

relating to warships.

of claims regarding the restriction on navigation

permission

it

would

maybe

to collectively bring

it

might be contended that the rule

(i.e.

security zones, prior

able to frame a broader enunciation of the

within a single normative framework. Thus
is
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constrained by a

would

all

number of factors" and

the multifarious actions by coastal States

be consistent with such a broadly stated

rule.

Such an approach would,

however, be disingenuous. The reasoning employed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case insisted that a level of exacting uniformity

termining the existence of a
with an existing

rule.

85

navigational freedom
to have discretion to

new

rule, especially

one

that

was required before de-

seemed

In the current scenario, coastal States

do so

to be in conflict

which seek to

in widely inconsistent ways. Thus,

some

States

restrict

purport

deny innocent passage where others simply seek to be provided

with information beforehand of an impending passage so as to "ensure" that such
passage

is

innocent while not denying outright the "right" of innocent passage. In his

analysis of customary law formation, Michael

Akehurst has noted "practice which

is

marked by major inconsistencies at all relevant times is self defeating and cannot give
rise to

a customary rule." 86

On any level of analysis therefore, the development of a

general customary rule contrary to the existing customary status

freedom of navigation

is

quo concerning

fraught with considerable difficulty.

Persistent Objectors

If there is little likelihood that there will

restricting navigational

develop a contrary general customary rule

freedom, what then

is

the efficacy of the

US Freedom

of

Navigation Program? Given that navigational freedom exercised in accordance
with the terms of the 1982

LOS Convention is not yet a norm of peremptory status

("jus cogens") the existing international legal structure

does permit individual

States the right to opt out of the application of prevailing general international cus-

tomary

law.

While

strictly defined,

the so-called "persistent objector" theory per-

mits a particular State the opportunity to resist the application of customary
international law but only in relation to that State.
a protest to a developing rule during

and must be

vigilant in maintaining

its

its

To

qualify, a State

formulative stages

(i.e.,

must express

protest ah initio)

opposition to a developing

In view of the "persistent objector" principle, the utility of the

rule. 87

US Freedom

of

Navigation Program can best be understood as testing the resolve of those States

who may seek to develop opposition to the application of customary international
law to them. It is notable that the 2000 International Law Association (ILA) Committee Report on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law relies
upon the
the

most

actual physical actions of States in the maritime
effective

demonstration of State intent. Hence, the ILA uses the example

of a State purporting to
illustration

environment to provide

restrict navigational rights

through

its

territorial sea as

an

of the general need to discern the nature of the express or implied claim

and response

as to the applicability

of a
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international law.

Thus the
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A expressly claims the right to exclude for-

authors of the report note that "if State
eign warships

from passing through

its territorial sea,

through without seeking the permission of A
omission can, in

this infringement, this

existence of a right of passage after

.

[and] ...

.

State

B sends

a warship

A fails to protest against

turn, constitute a tacit admission of the

its

all."

.

and

88

do indeed speak louder than "words." Some
of sources doctrine have traditionally been insistent on pointing to

in this context that "actions"

It is

interpreters

"deeds" over "words" as the

critical "practice"

of a State for determining the

le-

new rule of customary international law. In support of this proposition, the publicist Anthony D'Amato notes that "acts are visible, real and
significant; it crystallizes policy and demonstrates which of the many possible
gitimacy of a

rules of

law the acting State has decided to manifest." 89 Such arguments have

been diluted by other commentators

who have opined that more

are available to gauge State practice.

90

State practice.

This latter view

is

and

made by States,
entities are

may

also

be constitutive of

surely the correct one, indeed

served that the ICJ in the Nicaragua case
State practice

sufficient opinio juris

means

Akehurst, for example concludes that

statements, in either abstract or concrete contexts,
91

general

itself

has been ob-

it

appeared to conclude that both

can be gauged from public statements

or even international organizations in circumstances where such

purporting to declare the state of the law. 92

While diplomatic statements may be acceptable for discerning the formulation of
norms, the principal
ated. It

is

as

much

difficulty

is little

value in

States could be

its

of the

norm cre-

and in the absence of a clearly directed public statement

evidentiary effect. 93 Blanket verbal protests

by maritime

met with equally blanket ripostes from coastal States contending their

enduring resistance. In
difficult to assess the

the

specificity

a matter of probative value than anything else in discerning the

quality and content of a rule,

there

remains in identifying the

this flurry

of statements and counter- statements

it

may be

cogency of any new rule or exception to a rule. As recognized by

ILA Committee, the matter only becomes

truly tested

when

a transit

is

under-

taken through contested waters and reactions gauged. Such a practical demonstration

necessary to determine the coherency of claims, especially in circumstances

is

where a well subscribed multilateral instrument has established a
deed, as the

ILA Committee report

exceptional sense

rule in conflict. In-

notes, the persistent objector rule

by allowing "the convoy of the

law's progressive

is

development
94

an

useful in
.

.

move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel." Such an approach can be supported upon a utilitarian basis in the maritime context, especially
given the sophisticated level of the balance struck in the 1982 LOS Convention be[to].

.

.

tween coastal and maritime State

rights

and
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It is

in this context that the "relative normativity" theory 95 of interpretation of

international legal "sources" finds useful application.

The development of both

"hard" and "soft" arguments within customary normative discourse concerning
coastal State/maritime State interaction does require attention to the
less" calculus so resisted

State action

by traditional approaches. Accordingly,

and counter-action

in a very public

"more or

specific physical

and concrete manner plays

much more compelling role in the establishment of international legal norms.
essence, navigational assertions

do carry with them greater normative

a

In

signifi-

cance with respect to this issue than only diplomatic exchange of notes.

The 1982 Convention and Legal Framework of Navigational Rights
As outlined in the introduction of this paper, the 1982 LOS Convention is a well-subscribed treaty. Given the widespread nature of its support,

it

may be wondered why

the rights concerning freedom of navigation that are contained within the
tion are sought to be denied

by some

coastal States.

varied. Plainly, in the face of "constructively

The answer

Conven-

to this question

ambiguous" provisions,

is

a coastal State

may seek an interpretation that is advantageous to that State. Hence, arguments may
be proffered in the case of innocent passage, for example, that read much into the
terms of Article 19(1) that "Passage
peace,
stract

innocent so long as

it is

not prejudicial to the

good order or security of the coastal State." Such terminology is on

enough

soning

is

is,

96

to permit a

its

face ab-

wide array of challenges, especially to warships. Such

rea-

however, quite disingenuous. Article 3 1 of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties 97 prescribes that "A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context

and

in light of

its

and innocent passage,

good order or

object
it is

and purpose." 98 With respect

evident that the abstract propositions concerning "peace,

informed by the detailed terms of Article

security" are necessarily

19(2) of the 1982

to the issue of warships

LOS Convention which provides a very specific contextual outline

of those

activities that a

nocent."

99

warship must observe to

As with the remainder of the

come within

the definition of "in-

treaty, this prescriptive catalogue

was the

necessary "price" for expanded territorial sea jurisdiction and obviously provides a
reliable basis for legal interpretation.

knowledged at the time of the

As the Indian commentator Shekhar Ghosh

ac-

UNCLOS III debates, " [t] he scope of coastal discretion

has been undeniably reduced to an unavoidable
In essence, the rights of navigational

minimum" 100 under this provision.

freedom were "won"

in the context of ensuring

a necessary balance with coastal State interests.

Beyond
open

a textual interpretation of the terms of the 1982

LOS Convention,

to a coastal State to observe the positively stated obligations while
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still

it is

relying
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upon "gaps"

Convention to advance a restrictive agenda. In this

in the terms of the

context so called rights to insist

upon

prior notification before undertaking inno-

cent passage might be asserted consistently with primary obligations under the

Convention. Thus, under

been infringed by

this

insisting

paradigm, the "right" of innocent passage has not

upon

prior notification, rather

it is

merely a procedural "condition precedent" necessary to give

contended to be

effect to that right.

Such an approach would, however, deny, in practical terms, a substantive
In asserting such a claim, a coastal State
the Vienna Convention

102

may seek to

rely

upon Article

right. 101

31(3)(b) of

that provides that interpretation of a treaty's terms

may

be determined by "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the

agreement of the parties regarding

"prior notification"

ment an

interpretation."

Compliance with

demands might therefore constitute a "practice" which will ce-

interpretation of the 1982

navigational freedom
tions

its

by

LOS Convention

that necessarily

undermines

indirectly denying a unilateral right of passage.

Such

ac-

would be akin to the process of customary norm formulation, though they do

not require the demonstration of opinio juris, merely acquiescence with respect to
"subsequent practice." This

article's reliance

upon

"practice" anticipates a level of

demands of a coastal State in limiting freedom
maritime zones if met with indifference by other States

State interaction. Accordingly, the

of navigation through

its

parties could conceivably

permit the establishment of a specific interpretation to

the Convention. While diplomatic protest
a development, the

normally

bilateral

obviously a means of challenging such

is

and confidential nature of such action

means that there is a lack of visibility by all States party to the process. The assertion
of navigational rights in a contentious zone remains a publicly visible event, which
tangibly constitutes a "subsequent practice" that other States parties

may overtly,

or tacitly support, thus shaping an interpretation consistent with the underlying

balance of preserving navigational freedom.

Criticism of the

In his analysis of
the

manner

in

US

US Freedom of Navigation Program

navigational assertions, William Aceves 103 takes issue with

which the United

States undertakes these assertions. His criticism

stems from a reading of the constituent elements of customary norm generation and

he argues that the program

is

overly provocative

and inconsistent with more general

disputes peacefully. 104

He

requirements of international law to

settle

quirements of Article 279 of the 1982

LOS Convention that in turn refers to Article

2(3) of the United Nations Charter,
are to be settled in a peaceful

which mandates that

all

international disputes

manner. Additionally, he contends that

tions undertaken in the context of a

cites the re-

US

naval ac-

freedom of navigation assertion have the
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potential to offend general principles of international law, particularly the "abuse

of rights" doctrine 105 by adopting an unnecessarily militarily confrontational ap-

proach to the resolution of points of law.

The

critique

by Aceves that navigational assertions are unduly confrontational,

and thus potentially violative of Article 279 of the 1982 LOS Convention,
Articles 2(3)

and

(4) the

UN Charter,

sue of navigational assertions
the Corfu Channel case

to resist

curious.

107

as a mission designed to affirm a right

Admittedly, the Court subsequently

squadron

which had

condemned

a later

through the channel to sweep for mines, however the reasoning em-

ployed by the Court was not predicated upon the

upon

centrated

British transit of a naval

order to assert a right of innocent passage that Albania

was justified

been unjustly denied.
British transit

As Aceves himself notes, 106 the isand innocent passage was considered by the ICJ in
is

which determined that a

in full battle readiness in

had sought

as well as

the

fact

number of ships and the manner

of the
in

transit,

which the

but rather, contransit

had been

undertaken. Indeed, the Court expressly noted that the British government

itself

admitted that the transit was not innocent and thus the Court found that the transit

was an impermissible intervention. 108

The broader implications of the decision have been
troversy in subsequent years. While

decision

broad enough to permit

is

subject to significant con-

may be fairly argued whether the ratio of the

it

a general exception to the prohibition

on the

use of force, there does seem to be a consensus as to the significance of the ability to
affirm rights operationally in the maritime context. Thus, the eminent publicist

Ian Brownlie,

who

rejected

any general implication of the decision, did

strained to acknowledge the import of the decision as to

its facts,

feel

con-

namely the

right

to use force to assert a right unjustly denied in the maritime context.

even on

109

As such,

narrowest construction, the case stands as a specific precedent in sup-

its

port of the legality of the

Feedom of Navigation Program,

where "innocent passage"

is

at least in

circumstances

sought to be unlawfully denied.

The issue received indirect consideration some 40 years following the delivery of the
judgment
case.

1

10

in the Corfu

The

Channel

case, in the

1986 decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua

decision of the Court in the Nicaragua case reviewed contemporary juris-

prudence concerning the prohibition against intervention under international law that
has significance for assessing the confrontational nature of navigational assertions.

The majority opinion of the Court

in the

Nicaragua decision confirmed that the

principle of "non-intervention" did relate to the question of the use of force. Significantly, the

Court determined that the central criterion for determining whether

prohibition had been violated turned
ercion."

1
'

'

upon

this

a determination of the existence of "co-

The Court's assessment of this concept was somewhat

holistic in seeking

an objective assessment of whether the internal choices made by a State had been
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influenced as a result of "coercion" by another State. 112 Such a formulation

deed have an impact upon

a navigational assertion

and thus come within the terms

of objections raised by Aceves in circumstances where
transiting State to "coerce" or intimidate a State to

would not

the intention of the

it is

adopt behavior that

Such an interpretation does not

arise,

it

otherwise

however, in the con-

of a "normal" freedom of navigation assertion. The purpose of such an assertion

text
is

freely adopt.

may in-

not to intervene in the manner contemplated by the Court where

armed bands or financing

soring

internal disruption.

113

The

This

is

LOS

Convention,

not to suggest that the maritime State should not be cognizant of inter-

nal political machinations at the time of a

programmed transit,

as

such an assertion

may have a destabilizing significance in the context of specific internal fractures.
contended though that such circumstances are not

typical.

does have internal concerns regarding security issues,

LOS Convention)
through

The

is

an "external" settlement of rights concerning maritime

quite the opposite, relating to
areas.

spoke of spon-

interplay of maritime

coastal States, particularly those that have ratified the 1982

and

it

it

Moreover, where a State

may

temporarily and legitimately suspend

its territorial

sea

on

a non-discriminatory basis.

It is

(if

a party to the 1982

all

innocent passage

114

criticisms raised as to the inherently threatening behavior of a navigational

was particularly reinforced

assertion are imprecise. This

in the Nicaragua case

where the majority opinion determined not only that innocent passage was

a well

established right of customary international law, but so were other navigational

freedoms extending beyond the

territorial sea. Indeed, the

Court in that instance

determined that the conduct of US naval exercises just beyond the
limits of Nicaragua

was

not, in

itself,

territorial sea

a violation of the prohibition of the threat to

use force which Nicaragua had expressly contended, but rather was consistent with
the exercise of maritime freedoms. 115

Abuse of Rights

A further

criticism of the

Freedom of Navigation Program

relates to the

con-

frontational nature of such assertions as potentially constituting an "abuse of
right" contrary to
ally

both Article 300 of the 1982

LOS Convention 116 and more gener-

under "general principles" of international law, of a type recognized under Ar-

ticle

117
38(1 )(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

The general principle of "abuse of rights" may reasonably be regarded as having
118
The
a settled place within the doctrine of sources comprising international law.
principle essentially seeks to restrict a State from exercising its rights in a manner
which

significantly

exercised for an

impedes the enjoyment by other

end

different

from

that

which the
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States of their

right

own rights or is

was created

in a

manner
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that causes injury to another State.

ing of international legal society

The doctrine

if the

is

an

essential

notion of sovereignty

is

one

to the function-

not to be regarded as

being absolute. In his separate opinion in the Corfu Channel case, Judge Alvarez

was able

to give judicial expression to his theory of disaggregated sovereignty that

he had been advocating for some twenty years. Hence,
cepted as a "bundle" of rights and duties, then a

among

States

was

essential.

if

method

sovereignty

is

to be ac-

for their reconciliation

Premised upon a foundation of "social

justice,"

Judge

Alvarez advanced a theory of limitation on the "absolute nature" of the exercise of

untrammeled sovereignty and considered

that such an approach

was mandated by

the authority of the United Nations Charter. 119

In the context of navigational freedom,

it is

unclear

how the doctrine of "abuse

of rights" might apply in a manner to impinge the assertion of navigational rights
prescribed by the 1982

LOS Convention and

reflected in

customary international

As has been outlined above, the jurisprudence of the ICJ has provided a framework for testing whether such transits could violate more general principles of inlaw.

ternational law concerning the prohibition

on the

basis of coercion. This element

is

on intervention which

is

determined

singularly lacking in the context of the

simple exercise of innocent passage or transit passage provided the criteria for such

methods of passage

are observed. Ironically, during the drafting of the predecessor

Article 38 of the Statute of the

Permanent Court of International

Justice in 1920,

it

has been noted that the Italian commissioner to the negotiations expressly considered that the doctrine of "abuse of rights" had

its

place in the context of ensuring

that coastal States actually recognized the principle of freedom of the seas. 120

been observed that the doctrine of "abuse of rights"
reasonableness in the exercise of rights.

121

is

It

has

based upon conceptions of

In that regard,

it

seems to be a remark-

able invocation of the doctrine to assert the legality of actions designed to extend

the breadth of maritime zones

beyond what the 1982 LOS Convention prescribes

or to otherwise impose unilateral conditions on the exercise of navigational rights
contrary to the terms of the Convention. While positivist theory does not ascribe a

formal hierarchy

among

sources of international law, 122 principles of good faith

(pacta sunt servanda) in accepting the balance of rights

LOS Convention

and duties under the 1982

surely dictate that the exercise of navigational rights in accor-

dance with the tenor of the Convention must be accepted and cannot of themselves
be a violation of the principle of "abuse of rights."

Conclusion

It is

possibly an irresistible

tective

human

impulse that compels States to be extremely pro-

about the sanctity of their maritime

areas.
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Most assuredly what

is

"one man's

.

Dale Stephens

distant water

is

another man's maritime backyard" 123 and

has created what one

this

author has termed "psycho-legal boundaries" 124 in popular perception. Such a senti-

ment does not accord with modern legal analysis of the nature of the "sovereignty"
exercisable in offshore areas, which is of a disaggregated kind and which is necessarily
by equally compelling rights of navigational freedom. This historical docstruggle between freedom of the seas and protection of sovereign interests has

limited
trinal

found its most recent incantation within the terms of the 1982

LOS Convention and

supporting, indeed largely identical, customary international law.

The 1982 LOS Convention does
maritime interests throughout

its

reflect the necessary

composition.

It

balance of coastal and

provides for an extended sover-

eign range for coastal States through their adjacent maritime areas, yet preserves

by maritime

the necessary freedoms sought

States to traverse these areas, thus

achieving the economic and security priorities that were necessary for such States.

The entry into force of the 1982 LOS Convention does provide a level of certainty
for the realization of goals, yet notwithstanding high hopes 125 on the normative potential of the Convention, it was never going to be the last word on the reconciliation of interests. 126

As

a result of both the ambiguity within the terms of the

Convention and the determination of some

States to press claims that are plainly

upon the integrity of lawful
rights of free navigation to demonstrate an equal resolve. The operational aspect of
the Freedom of Navigation Program has its place, indeed as has been argued in this
contrary to

paper,

its

terms,

its critical

it is

necessary for those relying

place in the

dynamic of international

legal rule determination.

The Program draws considerable support from ICJ jurisprudence and has been
successful in ensuring conformity to legal standards. 127
tional law is

It is

ironic that interna-

sometimes derided as being too ephemeral for realist approaches to

in-

Freedom of
discourse and

ternational relations theory, yet the operational assertion aspect of the

Navigation Program
ultimately

is

reflects the

a testament to the

very vibrancy of international legal

power of the

law.
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XIII
Military Activities in the

Exclusive

Economic Zone:

Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict

Hyun-Soo Kim

1

Coastal States have jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial islands, installations

the

Law of the

States enjoy

and structures under the 1982 United Nations Convention on

Sea (hereinafter the

LOS

Convention). 2

On the other hand, foreign

freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and freedom to lay sub-

marine cables and pipelines in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal
States. 3

The contemporary

issue in the

have the right to conduct military

LOS Convention

activities,

is

whether foreign States

including naval task force maneuver-

ing, flight operations, military exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering,

weapons
It is

and

testing or firing, in coastal States' EEZs.

argued that the foreign

olating the

States' military and missile exercises

may result in vi-

LOS Convention in two fundamental respects: first, it will interfere with

reasonable use of the high seas by others; and, second,

it

will violate the prohibition

against use of the high seas for non-peaceful purposes. 4 Thus, foreign States' military activities in the

EEZs of coastal States would be inconsistent with the principles

and norms governing

States' military actions at sea

tions or customary law.

5

under international conven-

Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone

As

a result, the legal question concerning military activities

become much more complicated
EEZ. This

is

at sea has

since the establishment of the legal regime of the

so mainly because Article 58 of the

economic zone,

In the exclusive

1.

conducted

all

States,

LOS Convention

provides that:

whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy,

subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article

87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those

and submarine

associated with the operation of ships, aircraft

and pipelines, and

cables

compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. (Emphasis added)

2. Articles

88 to

1 1

economic zone

5

and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive

in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.

During the negotiation of the LOS Convention, agreement on the above
cized

wording was perceived

pretation

it

also

high

by the maritime powers because

EEZ

it lists

dom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Accordingly, other States'
EEZ

are the

same

as those in the high seas.

"and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related
that other States

an

the major freedoms of the

which include freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and

a coastal State's

as

with the operation of ships." The cross-reference to Article 87

important to the maritime nations because

seas,

in their inter-

implied the legality of naval maneuvers in a coastal State's

activity "associated
is

as vital

itali-

may enjoy other,

free-

freedoms in

Moreover, the phrase

to these

freedoms" implies

unspecified freedoms in a coastal State's

EEZ in

addition to the ones listed in Article 58.1.

Furthermore, Article 58.2 makes a general cross-reference to Articles 88-115

and other pertinent

rules of international

they are not incompatible with Part

However, some coastal
that

it

State's

such

V

(the

EEZ

articles)

States interpreted Article 58

of the

much more narrowly, arguing

does not authorize other States to carry out military

EEZ, and that the consent of the coastal State

activities.

is

activities in a coastal

required before conducting

6

The question of whether
tivities in a coastal State's

text of the

EEZ in so far as
LOS Convention.

law as applying to the

a foreign

EEZ was

LOS Convention and

powers argued for

a

country has the right to conduct military ac-

a controversial issue in the negotiations of the

continues to be in State practice. 7 The maritime

broad range of military

activities

consonant with traditional

high seas freedoms. Consequently, they believe the right to naval maneuvers in the

EEZ of a coastal
is,

State

is

implied in the freedom of navigation and overflight. 8 That

they interpret the phrase "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to

these freedoms" contained in Article 58.1 as including military activities such as
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task force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, naval surveys, intelli-

gence gathering, and weapons testing and

During the negotiations, some

States

9

firing.

expressed strong opposition to military

EEZ because such activities can result in threats to coastal States.
However, nowhere in the LOS Convention does it clearly state whether a third
State may or may not conduct military activities in the EEZ of a coastal State. 11 Abactivities

10

in the

sent clarity in the text of the Convention, resolution of this issue

and

cated

controversial. Despite the apparent ambiguity,

understanding of the text of the

be conducted.

LOS Convention would

it

EEZ,

it is

putes

very compli-

seems that the general

permit such

activities to

12

Nevertheless, due to the ambiguity found in Article 59,

compulsory

is

and the absence of any

concerning military

judicial settlement of disputes

activities in the

very difficult to render an authoritative legal interpretation whenever dis-

arise.

The question of whether naval maneuvers and

exercises within a

EEZ are permissible under international law will remain. No authoritative legal rulings will be made unless actual international disputes arise, and the
coastal State's

parties contest the issue before the International

tional Tribunal for the

Law of the

The question concerning the

Court of Justice or the Interna-

Sea.

legality

of laying military- related submarine ca-

EEZ is also subject to different interpretations of, and application to, the relevant provisions of the LOS
Convention. The coastal State should have the exclusive right in its EEZ to con-

bles, pipelines,

struct,

and

and/or devices by a State in another State's

to authorize

and regulate the construction, operation and use of artifi-

cial islands, installations

and structures

for

economic purposes, and

installations

and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the right of the coastal State
in the

EEZ. Accordingly, other States should obtain consent before laying military-

related

submarine

cables, pipelines,

and/or devices in the

Therefore, the subsequent practices of States will
for determining the proper interpretation of the

Some

States

EEZ

become

LOS

of the coastal State.

particularly important

Convention's provisions.

argued that "the right of the coastal State to build and to authorize

the construction, operation

and on the continental

and the use of installations and

shelf

is

structures in the

EEZ

limited only to the categories of such installations

and structures as listed in Article 60 of the LOS Convention." Accordingly, they argue that it is not necessary to obtain consent from a coastal State

if another

State in-

tends to lay military- related submarine cables, pipelines, and/or devices in the
or

on the continental shelf of the coastal State.

Article 58.3 "other" States,

are required to "have

should be remembered that under

when exercising their rights in the EEZ of a coastal State,

due regard to the

with the provisions of the

It

EEZ

rights

.

.

.

of the coastal State" in accordance

LOS Convention. If the military activities conducted by a
259
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foreign country in a coastal State's

EEZ interfere with the lawful resource rights and

interests of that coastal State, the latter's rights

and

interests

would

prevail.

no matter how international disputes concerning the issue of namaneuvers and other military activities conducted in the EEZ of a coastal State

In the future,
val

might be generated, or

how

the disputes are settled, the possibility of this kind of

dispute arising could be avoided entirely or at least reduced. This
State

conducting military activities in the coastal

State's

is

possible

vation and

and

and

resources; the establishment

structures;

marine

and use of artifi-

scientific research; the protection

and preservation of the marine environment in its EEZ; and other States'
interests in the coastal State's

and freedom

to lay

if the

interests in relation to exploration, exploitation, conser-

management of natural

cial islands, installations

the

EEZ shows "reasonable re-

gard" for the interests of that coastal State and other States. 13 In other words,
coastal State's rights

if

EEZ, such

as

submarine cables and

rights

and

freedoms of navigation and overflight

pipelines, 14 are not affected

by the

mili-

tary activities of another State, these kinds of military activities are permissible un-

LOS Convention.
Article 58 of the LOS Convention should be applied in order to answer the ques-

der the

tion of whether foreign States have the right,

under international law, to conduct

military- related activities in the coastal State's

EEZ. The answer

nature and purposes of the

activities.

and is thus considered to be "associated with the operation of the ships"
it

"due regard" indeed has been given to the coastal

foreign States

do have the

right to

testing or firing, in the coastal State's
cises are to

As a matter of law,

States' rights

conduct military

activities,

EEZ. Of course,

if

in

can hardly be main-

tained that the foreign States' activities violate international law.

and

interests, the

including weapons

any live-fire military exer-

be conducted, the establishment of a warning or exclusion zone to pro-

tect others using the affected
fire

States' intel-

EEZ involve no use of weapons and ex-

exercising freedom of navigation in the coastal State's EEZ,

if

depend on the

Because the operation of foreign

ligence gathering ships in the coastal States'
plosives,

will

ocean area

military exercises creates dangers.

is

required because engaging in any

In addition, military intelligence-gathering
to the construction, operation

live-

15

is

and the use of

different,

because

it is

installations in the

not related

EEZ and

also

would not normally be published or disseminated. Intelligence-gathering activities
can also take
shelf, the

rine

many forms, and

activities that involve "drilling into the continental

use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the

environment" 16 would certainly implicate concerns of the coastal State

should require

its

maand

consent.

In light of the foregoing analysis, foreign States are allowed, under international
law, to conduct military activities in the EEZ, provided that the coastal State's
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resource rights and interests are not affected

by the

purpose for conducting the

activities is

or use of force. However,

would be considered

it

activities,

and provided that the

not to intimidate the coastal States by threat
a violation of international

affected other States'

and

interests of the coastal States

freedoms of navigation and overflight in the coastal

or had an adverse impact

if

EEZ without

foreign States were to fire missiles into a water area in the coastal State's
giving due regard to the resource rights

law

and/or

State's

if it

EEZ,

on other States' national interests concerning maintenance

of peace and stability in the coastal States' region. In these circumstances, the legality
of the foreign State's military
relevant provisions of the

should be examined in accordance with the

activities

LOS

Convention, in particular Articles 58 and 301, and

other international legal instruments, such as the Charter of the United Nations.

In conclusion, even

EEZ

have navigational and overflight rights in the

if all States

of a coastal State under the

LOS Convention,

these rights should be balanced

against the resource interests of the coastal State. If there
coastal State's

economic

utilization of its

is

interference in the

EEZ, limitations on the above mentioned

freedom of navigation and overflight should be accepted. Conflicts between coastal

and maritime

States regarding military activities in the

EEZ

''should be resolved

on

the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances, taking into account
the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international

community

as a

whole." 17
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XIV
The Unique and Protected Status of Hospital

Law of Armed Conflict

Ships under the

D.

L.

Grimord

and G. W. Riggs

Hospital

1

ships have long enjoyed a unique position under the law of

armed conflict. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea (GWS-Sea) 2 codifies the protection afforded hospital ships that are serving in an area of hostilities during international armed conflict. In light of the
deployment of USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), the protected status of hospital ships and the maintenance of that status
remain important topics. The import is even more pronounced in light of the
sweeping changes in technology since the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
modern-day terrorist threat from non-State actors who do not adhere to the
law of armed conflict.
Background

GWS-Sea

may

no circumstances be attacked or captured, but shall at all times be respected and protected.
This provision extends to hospital ships the immunity conferred on the wounded,

Article 22 of

sick

provides that military hospital ships

and shipwrecked. 3 Article

3 1 of GWS-Sea provides the

in

means by which

parties

The Unique and Protected Status of Hospital Ships
by the provisions of GWS-

to a conflict can verify that hospital ships are abiding
Sea, specifically that they are not
ties

and harmful

to the

enemy.

It

committing

acts outside their

humanitarian du-

includes the right for parties to the convention to

control and search the vessels, direct their

movement

or even detain

them

for a

may place a commissioner on board to ensure comparties may also arrange for the placement on board of

limited period of time. Parties
pliance. Additionally, the

who

neutral observers

shall verify "the strict observation

of the provisions con-

4

tained in the present Convention." Article 34 of GWS-Sea provides that the protection to

which hospital ships are

commit, outside
hospital ships
erations.

6

their

must

entitled shall not cease unless they are used to

humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. 5 In short,

refrain

from

all

interference, direct or indirect, in military op-

In addition, the second paragraph of Article 34 provides that hospital

may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other means of communication. Article 35 of GWS-Sea enumerates conditions that shall not be con-

ships

sidered as depriving hospital ships of the protections afforded. Specifically, the

arming of crews

for the

maintenance of order or

board of apparatus exclusively intended to

and the storage of arms taken from the

facilitate

sick

prive a hospital ship of its protected status.

navigation or communication,

and wounded

Two

on

self-defense, the presence

are not actions that de-

points that must be reassessed in

light

of modern conditions are the use of secure communications aboard hospital

ships

and the arming of hospital ships beyond the traditional "small arms" paradigm.
Secure Communications

Article 34 of GWS-Sea has

communications equipment on hospital ships during international armed conflict.
Changing technology and the practical necessity to communicate in a manner consistent

been viewed

as prohibiting the use of secure

with present-day technology requires that the prohibition against hospital

ships using secure

communication equipment be reevaluated. While the

intent of

the prohibition (the right of belligerents to be assured that hospital ships

commit

"acts

harmful to the enemy") must be maintained, the

communications and navigation technology should
ation. In today's highly technological
ellite

realities

do not

of modern

also be taken into consider-

environment where most computer and

sat-

communications are routinely encrypted, hospital ships should be able

utilize these state-of-the-art

communications

assets in order to operate safely

to

and

7

accomplish their humanitarian mission. In today's highly technological operating

environment, the ship's capacity to operate safely and
sion during

armed

conflict

fulfill its

would be degraded without

communications.
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access to encrypted

D.

Since 1949, discussions

L.

Grimord

among

W. Riggs

international legal authorities have recognized

the need to reevaluate the use of secure
late,

& G.

communications equipment that may vio-

or appear to violate, the "secret code" prohibition of Article 34.

As

early as the close of the Diplomatic

concern

among

communicate

Conference of Geneva of 1949, there was

the Conference participants that the ability of hospital ships to

efficiently

needed further study.

with warships and military aircraft was in jeopardy and

8

More recently, paragraph 171 of the 1994 San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 9 recommends a different rule than ArtiParagraph 171 provides: "In order to

cle 34.

mission,

tarian

hospital

ships

equipment. The equipment
telligence data

shall

fulfill

most

effectively their

should be permitted to

use

humani-

cryptographic

not be used in any circumstances to transmit in-

nor in any other way to acquire any military advantage."

The Explanation to the San Remo Manual 10 details the reasons for this new rule,
that being, the general wording of Article 34 has caused difficulties. The British,
during the Falklands War, found that transmitting to or from their hospital ships
in the clear risked giving away the positions or planned movements of combat
forces. The participants in the San Remo process evidently thought that, since Article

34 jeopardizes the ability of hospital ships to operate

to concentrate
their

on the sending of military

humanitarian mission

secure communication equipment that in

most communications systems.

and

intelligence

effectively, hospital ships

effectively, the rule

that in order to

ought
fulfill

should be permitted to use

modern technology is an integral part of

11

Given the interpretation of Article 34 of GWS-Sea, the use of encrypted communications

equipment on board hospital ships is problematic.

It is clear

that as technology

has changed, the terms of paragraphs 2 of GWS-Sea Article 34 have been rendered obsolete.

Nonetheless, States parties to the

One possible approach to

effecting a

GWS-Sea arguably remain bound by its terms.

change in the law is the premise that an accepted

change in practice by parties can be utilized to further interpret and modify a
This concept

is

reflected in Article 3 1 of the

treaty.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

which states, "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties" can be used to interpret the

The prohibition
gone

era.

against the use of secret codes

meaning of that

by hospital

ships

treaty.

was born

12

in a by-

In the past, use of encrypted communications was not needed for safe navi-

gation or for affecting the humanitarian mission of hospital ships, rather, only for military operational reasons such as receiving or transmitting intelligence. Paragraph 171

of the San

Remo Manual,

widespread recognition

as well as varied other international sources, 13 illustrate the

that, in

concert with the necessities of modern technology, the

use of encrypted communication equipment
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on

hospital ships in furtherance of their
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humanitarian mission and

safe navigation

cation

equipment necessary

tion

now

is

in

common

should be permitted. Encrypted communi-

and

for safe operation

use at sea.

The

long-range communica-

efficient

necessity for this

now commonplace

use of

encrypted communications equipment should apply equally to hospital ships, as long
as they

commit no

act

harmful to the enemy. The modification of existing treaty obli-

gations between parties envisioned

by

Article 3

1

of the Vienna Convention could be

applied to the practice of using encrypted communications by hospital ships.

Accordingly, use of encrypted communications should be permissible

purpose

is

to facilitate the navigation

furtherance of

its

14

or communication

humanitarian mission and

is

15

when

its

of the hospital ship in

not employed in a manner that

is

harmful to the enemy. Under such circumstances, the presence and use of such

equipment

violates neither the spirit

nor the intent of GWS-Sea.

Defensive Arming of Hospital Ships

The arming of a hospital ship for self-defense against terrorists and other non-State
actors must also be reconsidered. The Geneva Conventions by their own terms
only apply during "declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." Terrorists and their organizations (the threat against which hospital ships are now defending themselves) are
not States party to the Geneva Conventions and their tactics (attacking "soft" targets normally protected under the law of armed conflict (LOAC)) fall outside the
traditional definition of international

the

Geneva Conventions apply

armed

conflict.

to self-defense

take against terrorist acts, an analysis of this issue

Although

it is

doubtful that

measures that hospital ships
is

required based

on

position reflected in Department of Defense(DoD) Directive 5100.77

may

US policy
(DoD Law of

the

War Program) that US forces will apply the LOAC to all military operations.
GWS-Sea does not directly address weapons systems for hospital ships. As noted
above, Article 34 provides that the "protection to which hospital ships and sick-

bays are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their hu-

manitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy." Article 35 provides that the fact the
crews of ships or sick-bays are armed for the maintenance of order, for their

own

defense or that of the sick and wounded, shall not be considered as depriving hospital ships

While

or sick-bays of vessels of their protected status.

it is

may be armed for their own defense,
permissible weapons. The accepted norm for

clear that crews of hospital ships

GWS-Sea does

not specify what are

arming medical personnel ashore has been "small arms" such

and

that

norm was

was thought that

as pistols

and

rifles,

equally applied to the crews of hospital ships. Traditionally,

light, portable,

individual
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weapons such

as pistols

and

rifles

it

were

D.
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was needed for personal defense on hospital ships. 16 Crew-served weapons,
such as machine guns, were presumed to go beyond the need for use in self-defense, given that belligerents were bound to not attack hospital ships under the
all

that

provisions of GWS-Sea.

However, current-day
gets,"

suicide-style terrorist tactics against so-called "soft-tar-

exemplified by the attacks

embassies in Africa, and on the

on

USS

the

Cole,

fenses against individuals or groups not
this

new threat environment, where

World Trade

Center, the Pentagon,

US

demonstrate the need for enhanced de-

complying with the law of armed conflict. In

large-scale, deadly,

and indiscriminate

attacks

on civilians and civilian objects have become part of terrorists' modus operandi,
mounted machine guns have become by necessity standard elements of defensive
force protection systems for naval vessels. Such weapons have offensive capability

when installed on
mounted on board a
offensive capability

helicopters

and small

large, relatively

is

boats, but in the context of being

slow and not- easily- maneuverable ship, any

and the weapon

greatly diminished (if not lost altogether)

To that end, hospital ships should be able to
employ machine guns and similar armament solely for self-defense against terrorists and other persons who do not recognize or follow the law of armed conflict.

becomes purely defensive

This interpretation

is

in nature.

consistent with the long-standing

self-defense permissible

US Army interpretation of

under Article 22 of Geneva Convention

I

17

(pertaining to

wounded and sick forces on land) as "personal defense and for the protection of
the wounded and sick under their charge against marauders and other persons violating the

law of war." 18 Such weapons would not be used in an offensive capacity

nor against lawful belligerents complying with the law of armed conflict and
are exercising their rights

under GWS-Sea.

threat to targets traditionally protected

hospital ship) that

it is

only as a result of the emergent

under the law of armed

conflict (such as a

necessary to enhance the defensive measures available to

these protected platforms. Although the
ply, the

It is

who

Geneva Conventions would not likely ap-

use of machine guns in self-defense against non-State actors

is

consistent

with Articles 34 and 35 of GWS-Sea, as well as the underlying principles governing
the protected status of hospital ships under the law of armed conflict.
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7.

A
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3, at 191.

secondary, but important additional consideration,

is

the current standards relating to the

privacy of medical records pursuant to the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).

The Standards

for Privacy of Individually Identifiable

Health Information ("Privacy Rule") establishes, for the

first

time, a set of national standards for

The US Department of Health and Human Services
implement the requirement of HIPAA. The Privacy Rule standards

the protection of certain health information.
issued the Privacy Rule to

address the use and disclosure of individuals' health information

information" by organizations subject to the Privacy Rule

—

standards for individuals' privacy rights to understand and control
is

—

called "protected health

called "covered entities," as well as

how their health information

used.

8.

See Resolution 6 of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, reprinted in

Armed Conflicts,

supra note

4, at

The LAWS OF

691.

Sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and completed in June
1994 by a group of legal scholars and naval practitioners, the Manual serves as a contemporary
restatement of international law applicable to armed conflict at sea and comprehensively

9.

addresses the subject for the

Manual

first

time since the 1913 Oxford Manual. In most respects, the

correctly states the law and, with the exception of some portions,

is

consistent with

US

The San Remo Manual is reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 4, at 1 153. The
1913 Oxford Manual is reprinted in id. at 1123.
10. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea

practice.

236-37 (Louise Doswald-Beck
11.

It is

ed., 1995).

Remo Manual recommendation is consistent with the
communications equipment by medical aircraft and vehicles.
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

important to note that the San

rules regarding the use of secure

See Protocol Additional to

Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, art.
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 422.

Protection of Victims of International
28,

1

125 U.N.T.S.

3,

reprinted in

Unlike hospital ships, other medical transports are not restricted from using encryption

equipment. They

are,

however, bound by the same requirement that they commit no acts

and vehicles to possess and use
communications, or
Hospital ships have the same or similar navigation, communication, and

harmful to the enemy. International law permits medical
encrypted communications equipment "solely to
identification."

identification requirements as medical transport aircraft.
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aircraft

facilitate navigation,

D.

L.

Grimord

& G.

W. Riggs

May 22, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
13. In The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, the German equivalent
to the US Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War
12.

Convention on the Law of Treaties,Vienna,

College International

Remo

Law Studies), Professor Heintschel von Heinegg recommends that the San

be adopted. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) senior legal advisor
Louise Doswald-Beck notes that the San Remo Manual's recommended change in Article 34
derives from the British experience during the Falklands conflict. See Louise Doswald-Beck, San
rule

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583, 593
(1995). Phillip Eberlin, Merchant Navy and Maritime Security Officer, ICRC, in his modern
Commentary to the 1923 Hague Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, argues that rules
should be clarified to allow the use of modern communications equipment by hospital ships.

Remo Manual on

14.

International Law, 309

Military Global Positioning System (GPS)

is

encrypted.

Video teleconferencing of real time medical procedures and other patient information would
have to be encrypted in order to utilize the necessary satellite communications.
necessity
by
15.

16.

5

See COMMENTARY, supra note

3, at 1 94.

See also ANNOTATED

SUPPLEMENT, supra note

1 3,

at

8.2.3.

17.

Convention

(I)

for the Amelioration of the

Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,

LAWS OF WAR,
18.

US Army

supra note

2, at

Wounded and Sick in Armed
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE

Condition of the

197.

Field Manual 27-10 J 223b (1956).
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PART IV
THE FUTURE OF LAW IN WAR:
DIFFERENT APPLICATION
OR DIFFERENT RULES?

XV
Legal and Tactical

Dilemmas Inherent

in Fighting Terror:

Experience of the Israeli Army

and Bethlehem

in Jenin

(April-May 2002)

Alan Baker

l

Introduction

One
is

of the major challenges presently facing the international community
the extent to which the laws of

armed

conflict, as

understood today,

maybe applied to conflict scenarios of today's world realities, and specifically in a
situation in which the international community finds itself in a concerted global
campaign against
lated,

terror. 2 In other

words,

is

the law of armed conflict, as articu-

understood and applied in what we have grown up to understand to be

to-

day's world, capable of guiding States in the fight against today's terror?

When
flict

faced with legal issues arising in a "standard situation" of

—whether

tions—the

in regard to

legal

ground operations,

parameters are usually relatively

air

or naval targeting opera-

clear.

and customs of war and international humanitarian law
gral

components of international law

—

set

armed con-

This

is

because the laws

—which constitute

inte-

out the norms and standards by which

—
Legal and Tactical Dilemmas Inherent in Fighting Terror

States are obligated to act

and armed

dard situation" assumes that the clearly-defined armed forces
usually belonging to States
field,

and engage

in

The term "stanof the two sides

forces required to operate.

— confront one another on

a defined or clear battle-

such actions as are necessary to conduct the armed conflict.

The term "armed conflict," as understood up to now, thus serves as a code-word
or form of algebra, indicative of a series of norms, rules, articles, principles, rights,
prohibitions and requirements, obligating the forces, and the governments sending them, in guiding the military conduct of the war. The assumption is, in most
on both sides will indeed conduct themselves in accorcases, that armed forces
dance with such rules and norms. More important, the assumption is also that each
relies on the fact that the other will indeed observe the requisite norms and rules.
That is, perhaps, the underlying assumption of any logical and viable armed con-

—

flict

—

situation in today's international legal system.

This

system

is

a

somewhat

—both

civil

idealistic

and international

the system are able to live

—

simplistic description of any

in

normal

legal

which the individual components within

and conduct themselves within the orderly parameters of

on the assumption

the system,

and even

that the other

components of the system

will

com-

port themselves in the same way. Departure from such parameters and behavior in
violation of such a normative system

undermines and threatens the very existence

of the system and raises the question as to the need to review the system, adjust the

norms or adapt them

to

meet the new

realities

or developments.

Thus, as long as the conduct of armed conflict includes the accepted components and follows the accepted normative guidelines

—whether from the point of

view of the parties to the conflict or as to the modes of behavior and the theater of

war

—then

the "standard situation" prevails.

To conduct

a

war

in Iraq against the

Iraqi

army, or in Afghanistan against organized armed forces fighting for the

gime

in Afghanistan, or

even a collective

military forces in Yugoslavia,

"standard situation," even
arise to deal

armed

if,

and
set

fall

within the parameters of the

during the course of such

conflict, the necessity

might

with exceptional occurrences, including terror, violations of the law of

conflict,

war crimes, crimes against humanity and other

known and acknowledged

their

NATO action against organized Serbian

would generally

Today's international community
rently

re-

armed

forces are

is

irregular events.

faced with a dichotomy, because what

to be "the law of armed conflict,"

by which

supposed to function, developed over the

out in clear terms in the

late 1800's

and

early 1900's,

3

amended

years,

is

cur-

States

and was

in the post-Sec-

ond World War years (1949), 4 and again in the 1974-7 timeframe 5 in the background of the Vietnam War, and has since not really been touched (apart from
specific instruments to reflect the

need for protection of cultural property

6

in

time of

war, as well as instruments reflecting technological developments in conventional 7
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and non-conventional warfare. 8 ) However,

it is

armed conflict as it exits today, incorporating as
law,

is

really capable

it

questionable whether the law of
does, international humanitarian

of providing legal as well as operative answers to the practical is-

sues arising out of today's struggle, directed not necessarily against a defined
identifiable

armed

force of a State, but rather against terror as a concept

and

and

a phe-

nomenon. This may not necessarily be confined to the territory of a particular State,
and certainly, by its very definition, is not necessarily directed against military forces
of a State in the reality of today.

"Global

War on

Terror"

While the concept of "war" or even "global war" maybe

clear,

while the phenome-

non of "terror" is rapidly and ever-increasingly becoming understood to more and
more countries, and while the challenge placed before the international community may be patently evident, the concept of a "global war on terror" in international legal terms nevertheless raises innumerable questions. Can such a war legally
take place? Is the existing law of armed conflict, based as it is on well-defined criteria,

capable of identifying, categorizing and recognizing the needs and components

of such a war, especially
necessarily States,

when

considering that the parties to the conflict are not

and the geographical boundaries of the war

are not necessarily

within the confines of one State? Similarly, as the tactics and the weapons needed to
deal with terror are not necessarily the

enemy in

same

as those

used

a standard war, are the law of armed conflict

vis-a-vis a

conventional

and international humani-

tarian law equipped to deal with this?

To

fight against Iraqi or

Lebanese army,

is

Afghani armed

theoretically

forces, or in Israel's case, a Syrian or

and legally relatively simple, and can indeed be ad-

dressed in terms of the existing rules and sanctions of warfare. But as has

become

Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Fedayeen
Saddam, and other such nebulous and vague terrorist opponents, may be quite a
evident, to fight against al Qaeda,

different kettle offish for a
•

rules

number of very significant

reasons:

They openly and demonstratively shun and violate the accepted norms and
of armed conflict. Their very modus operandi and inherent functioning

philosophy are

built,

and

organized, western armies

rely as a tactical assumption,

—

as well as the society that they

on the
defend

fact that the

—

will

indeed

norms and rules. Thus, they utilize civilian locations, homes, churches,
mosques, medical facilities and ambulances, and schools as shields for placement
and concealing of weapons, bases, headquarters, laboratories and training camps,
assuming that an organized army of a State obligated by the law of armed conflict
and international humanitarian law, will not risk causing collateral civilian damage
abide by the
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and

to civilians

and

objects,

civilian facilities

by responding and targeting such blatantly civilian

not wish to be accused of using disproportionate military force

will

against groups of apparently unorganized civilians.
•

They

demoralize and terrorize the

civil

governments and

their tactical

•

society. This

is

to

population and to pressure organized

In so doing, they knowingly violate,

conflict

and concerted means

target civilians as a distinct, deliberate

modus

operandi.

and operate outside the law of armed

and thereby place themselves outside the bounds of any accepted norms

entitling

them

to protection or

combatant

status

and

privileges. This in itself

undermines and abuses the basic assumption of an organized
pursuant to

legal

norms and

obligations

—both

in

its civil

society, functioning

system as well part

legal

of its international conventional and customary obligations.
•

Such modus operandi undermines and abuses the humanitarian sense of

responsibility

and obligation

military training

instilled into the

psyche of soldiers, whether in

and academies, or whether stemming from the

basic sense of

decency and morality emanating from home, childhood, family values, education,

Sunday school, church, synagogue and upbringing.
•

This

phenomenon produces the impossible and paradoxical predicament in

which, on the one hand, organized armed forces or police forces of the State are
obliged to function within the limitations of the law and the accepted norms,

while on the other hand, the terrorists openly, deliberately and proudly violate

such law and norms. This

is

perhaps the essence of terror.

Israel Defense Force (IDF)

Case Studies

—Jenin and Bethlehem

Following are two pertinent case studies and other examples from

Israel's

own ex-

periences of the blatant abuse by Palestinian terrorists of the laws and accepted

norms of armed

lemma

conflict,

and the sometimes

tragic

that this creates in the psyche of the field

commanders,

the political leadership that holds responsibility. This
judiciary that

armed

is

often called

upon

moral and humanitarian

is

di-

soldiers, as well as

no less of a dilemma for the

to judge the actions of the

government or the

forces during real time conflict.

These studies are also indicative of a certain element of hypocrisy and dual standards within parts of the international community, which to a certain extent

would, for reasons of political

interest,

appear to prefer to

to judgment rather than seek to unify efforts

The

situations covered are:
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the side

and rush

and engage in the fight against terror.
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The IDF operation, between April 3-10, 2002

•

fortified terrorist infrastructure in

overcome an armed and
the Jenin refugee camp and to prevent its
to

conversion into a training and exit base for suicide terrorism.

The 37-day occupation and

•

holiest sites to Christianity

April 2

and

May 8,

violation

by Palestinian

—the Church of the Nativity

terrorists

of one of the

in Bethlehem,

between

2002.

Other pertinent examples.

•

Scenario

The refugee camp in Jenin occupied a corner of the south-eastern outskirts of the
town. The refugee institutions (schools, clinics and related facilities) were under
the administration

and

responsibility of the United Nations Refugee

and Works

Agency (UNRWA), within the general context of the United Nations' responsibility for

In

handling refugees. 9

fact, this

camp

(together with others in the

West Bank and

the Gaza Strip)

had, for a considerable period of time prior to the hostilities in the area, been over-

run and controlled by the

had established a
ries,

series

Hamas and

Islamic Jihad terror organizations, which

of terror training centers, explosive-producing laborato-

suicide-belt sewing workshops, metal-working facilities

duce, cut

and sharpen metal shavings,

to pro-

and

related

ball bearings, screws, bolts

objects comprising part of the "suicide kits,"
clear

and foundries

and

related equipment. This despite

United Nations requirements prohibiting use of refugee camps under

ministration for military purposes, including a

call

its

ad-

by the United Nations Secre-

camps should be free of any military
presence or military equipment, including weapons and munitions
the neutrality and the humanitarian nature of the camps must be meticulously kept," 10 and
despite a series of very clear obligations undertaken by the Palestinian Authority,
and witnessed by the international community, to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and arrest and prosecute those involved in all forms of terror. 11
The schools and kindergarten facilities ostensibly under the administration of
tary-General establishing that "[rjefugee

.

the United Nations

—were used

.

.

—

to train terrorists, replete with posters covering the

classrooms and nurseries depicting the shaheeds ("martyrs") suicide bombers, as
folk heroes,

and

as role-models for the children. Children's playing cards depicted

the faces of these "folk-heroes." 12

The presence and control by the various terror organizations was no secret and
was not done in a covert manner. 13 Jenin was proudly dubbed in the Palestinian
propaganda apparatus as "capital of the shaheeds," having produced over 20 successful suicide

bombings within

Israel.
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During the course of the armed

activities prior to the entry

of IDF into the

camp, the terror organizations had evacuated the majority of the refugees, sending

them

into the

town of

Jenin,

and proceeded

camp, disperse small mines connected

to booby-trap buildings within the

to piping along the

narrow

streets,

and

booby-trap doorknobs, toys, household utensils and other objects.

The Legal Situation
In strict legal terms, in the context of the law of armed conflict, the Jenin refugee

camp had been turned

into a military objective/location,

which openly and

clearly

served and rendered an effective contribution to the Palestinian unique form of

The camp served as

military action.

base for acts of terror

a purveyor

—predominantly

suicide

and chief supply depot and training

bombings both during the days im-

unknown

mediately preceding the military action, as well as having supplied an

number of

potential future suicide bombers, the neutralization of

clearly required in order to gain military, psychological

and

which was

tactical advantage.

14

Despite the obvious factors pointing to this case as being a classical "military objective"

by all criteria of international humanitarian law, and despite the lack of any

doubt that might place
of Additional Protocol

indeed to treat
gee

it

it
I,

within the "grey area" set out in paragraph 3 of Article 52

15

the legal

and moral dilemma facing the IDF was whether

as such, or whether, in light of its overall

denomination

as a refu-

camp and the protected status to which such camps are entitled, nevertheless to

grant

it

immunity

as a civilian object.

The Action
camp, consideration was given

In reaching the decision to enter the

most of the

civilian

tification

of the

camp and virtually all

population had been sent out of the

maining persons were presumed to be

camp

as ascertained

terrorists

•

who

re-

(about 200). The extent of the for-

through intelligence and

subsequently became evident from a series of statements
terrorists

to the fact that

aerial

photographs,

made by the

Palestinian

fought in the camp:

"The fighting

forces,

from

all

the factions in the camp, have been equipped

with explosive belts and grenades." 16

"Our fighters are blowing themselves up
explosive devices on the roads." 17
•

•

"We had more

in front

of the soldiers and planting

than 50 houses booby-trapped around the camp.

We chose

empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel
." "We cut off lengths of
because we knew the soldiers would search for them.
main water pipes and packed them with explosives and nails. Then we placed
old and

.
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—

them about four meters apart throughout the houses in cupboards, under sinks,
" "They were lured there. We all stopped shooting and the women
and in sofas
went out to tell the soldiers that we had run out of bullets and were leaving. The

women

alerted the fighters as the soldiers reached the

booby-trapped area." 18

However, due to the cramped nature of the building, the narrow and winding
streets

and the possibility that some refugees remained, or were nevertheless being

held as hostages or

human

not to use

tank or aerial targeting, with their concomitant potential of in-

artillery,

shields within the

camp, a

tactical decision

was made

damage to civilian life and property, but rather to send
ground forces into the camp and to move from house to house with a view to limiting offensive action strictly to armed terrorists and to military objectives.
During the action, IDF forces suffered heavy casualties as a result of the boobytrapped buildings and suicide bombers who exploded themselves within and close
to buildings that collapsed on to the soldiers. 23 soldiers were killed (10 in one
discriminate or collateral

house). This required introduction of heavier equipment to enable acquisition of
control by widening the narrow routes for heavier military equipment.

of the action, a total of 59 terrorists had been killed in the entire

By the end
action
most of

—

whom were discovered together with their weapons.
International Reaction
In the immediate aftermath of the action, Israel and

its

forces

were widely accused

of carrying out a "massacre" and of killing hundreds of innocent

civilians.

Senior

came out with televised statements describing the situation in such terms as "horrific" and "morally repugnant." 19 The United Nations
Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and
others determined that Israel had committed war crimes. 20
United Nations

officials

Pursuant to consultations between the
tration, Israel agreed to the

Israeli leadership

and the US Adminis-

sending of a team composed of US military experts, un-

der United Nations auspices, to ascertain the situation on the ground and to view
the terrorist infrastructure prevalent in the

dered the

camp

a military target.

camp and the terrorist activity that ren-

The Secretary- General of United Nations, through

the United Nations Security Council, converted this into a fully-fledged international fact-finding

commission 21 with the substantive components of an interna-

tional tribunal (headed

by the ex-President of Finland who had previously served

as

an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, ex-President of the International

Committee of the Red Cross,
and a US

ex- United Nations

retired general, with legal, political

and technical

extended mandate to interview witnesses and
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High Commissioner

for Refugees

staff and advisers)

officers, to attribute

with an

blame, place

and

Legal

responsibility,
ritory, rather

Tactical
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and to extend the commission to cover other areas of the West Bank ter-

than the

initial

The Government of

intention to analyze the Jenin situation.

objected to the extended format of the Fact Finding

Israel

Commission. The team was subsequently disbanded by the Secretary-General, especially after

it

became

publicly

and internationally evident

and

perpetrated; that those killed were terrorists;
object to

all

and purposes. The

intents

camp and

camp had become a military

terrorists

of the civilian infrastructure in

affirming the fact that only 59 Palestinians had been killed, specifically

rejecting the claim

and other

no massacre had been

Secretary- General subsequently issued a report

acknowledging the misuse by the Palestinian
the

that the

that

by Palestinian leaders and echoed by several senior United Nations

international personalities that

IDF Operation

in

Bethlehem

300-500 had been massacred. 22

— the Church of the Nativity

(2

April-8

May 2002)

Scenario

The Church of the Nativity
(Catholics,

one of the major holy

Greek Orthodox, Armenians and others).

tivity scene, as

described in the

nual pilgrimage by
to

is

all

sites for all

It is

the site at which the na-

New Testament, took place.

the various Christian sects

conduct the Christmas Eve midnight mass.

altars serving the various Christian sects.

It

of Christianity

It is

the

site

and general public

to

of the an-

Bethlehem

contains a complex of chapels and

23

The Abuse

On April

2,

2002,

some 220 armed

Palestinian terrorists belonging to the

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Hamas,

and the Al

Aksa Martyrs group, entered the main church areas with weapons and ammunition, barricaded themselves inside the

Church, used the roofs and balconies as

shooting positions, held priests, monks, religious
well as ordinary citizens

and abused holy

artifacts (chalices,

baptismal fonts,

neighborhood church or mosque (which

altars, carpets, tapestries).

24

situation of the use of a municipal or

local holy site for shielding hostile action, or the

conflict).

the church, as

who happened to be there, as hostages and human shields,

The Moral, Military and Legal Dilemma
Clearly this was not merely a simple combat

armed

officials serving in

occupation by enemy forces of a

in itself is

no

less a violation

of the laws of

This situation centered within one of the world's major holy

sites

revered by over one billion Christians throughout the world, from as far afield as
Italy,

Spain, Greece, Russia,

Germany, Scandinavia, Central and South America,

the Philippines, South Korea, Ireland,

and

Africa.
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and holiness of the

stern warnings to Israel to ensure the integrity

site.

25

Whether

any admonishment was passed on to the Palestinian authorities for encouraging

unknown.
The moral and tactical dilemma faced by the IDF and the Israeli government
was clear. Both Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Culand supporting the

terrorist

tural Property in the

tional Protocol

objects

I

overrunning of the

Event of an

to the

Armed

site, is

Conflict, 26 as well as Article 53 of Addi-

Geneva Conventions, 27 regarding the protection of cultural

and places of worship, prohibit

acts of hostility against the historic

monu-

ments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples,
effort

and prohibit the use of such

objects in support of the military

and as objects of reprisals. While indeed the immunity of the site, as a place of

worship, had been clearly prejudiced and abused, and technically and legally the

circumstances (including the intense publicity worldwide and concomitant psychological warfare) were such that there existed an imperative element of military

who had occupied the

necessity as a criterion for active intervention against those

Church, in order to bring the stand-off to an end, could
all

countries, nevertheless afford to bring

by responding to

this

Israeli

itself the ire

the lewish State, of

of all of Christendom

provocation and undertaking any military action that might

prejudice the status of or

Action by the

upon

Israel,

damage the Church?

Army

Apart from responding to sniper fire emanating from the terrorists using the Church
as cover

(sometimes leading to

casualties),

and pressuring the

terrorists

through the

withholding of supplies, the matter was handled by negotiation between officers

comprising a special negotiating unit, and a group of priests held hostage within the

—

Church who negotiated

principally

by

cell

phone

—on behalf of

Ultimately, after twenty five days, an agreement

from such foreign

the terrorists.

was negotiated, with

government and the Vatican, whereby the

actors as the Italian

majority of those occupying the Church were able to leave for their
cinity of Bethlehem, while

men were
them

assistance

homes in the vi-

twenty six were transferred to Gaza and thirteen wanted

deported to a number of European countries that undertook to host

in restrictive conditions.

Additional Examples of Abuse

While the case studies analyzed above

clearly exemplify

on

a large scale the

operandi of terror organizations in utilizing and abusing accepted

civil

modus

and human-

norms and institutions, other less grandiose, but no less serious examples of
such abuses abound on a daily basis, all of which involve some manner of element
itarian
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shielding

and

and perfidy
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in violation of,

and abuse by, the terrorists of central compo-

nents of international humanitarian law
ian

ambulances

for carrying

arms and

norms and instruments. The use of civilunder recognized humanitarian

terrorists

emblems; the use of mosques, churches and schools
explosives; travel

by wanted

location of offices
vehicles to

terrorists in vehicles

and headquarters

in

in Fighting Terror

as storage space for

weapons and

accompanied by children and

family;

dense residential areas; and the use of innocent

approach and attack roadblocks are

illustrative

examples.

The techniques developed for rendering the weapons of terrorism more lethal
cynically and blatantly utilize normal civilian objects in order to enhance the extent
of the damage caused by a suicide bomber. For instance, sharpened metal shavings,
rusty screws and ball bearings are added to the "concoction" of explosive materials
and placed into the suicide belts in order to increase the damage to internal organs
and to increase infection, germ impregnation and other such inventive and horrific
means all clearly in violation of basic humanitarian principles.

—

Legal

The irony of the situation

is

Dilemma

that despite the fact that the accepted rationale of such

terms as "combatant," "legitimate target," "defended locality" and
shield," as well as the situation of "military necessity,"

context of a war on terror, the international
anachronistic conceptions of

armed

judge those fighting terror by such

have become blurred in the

community is still geared to somewhat

conflict

criteria

"human

between

States,

and standards. Hence,

and presumes

to

some cases,

re-

in

action in international fora to actions by Israel and the United States (as well as
others) takes a

more

critical

view of the actions taken against the

overlooking the terrorist acts that have themselves given

dilemma is compounded by a
fora in which automatic majority

rise to

terrorists,

while

the need for re-

sponse. This

situation in the various international

political

resolutions are adopted

condemning

those that fight terror while unwittingly (or deliberately) giving encouragement to
those supporting and perpetrating the terror, instilling

them with

the confidence

that their actions are indeed achieving their intended political ends.

Conclusion

Clearly, the international

modern-day

terror

community must come

and the need

to deal with

it

both militarily and

requires addressing the motivation driving terror
tional

and

social

to terms with the existence of

—

legally.

To do

so

especially the religious, educa-

element inherent in the vast rate of incitement feeding terror from

the youngest of ages. This might require

some reevaluation of human
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rights concepts
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in the context of dealing with terrorist infrastructures. It also requires addressing the

and organizations that

capability of terrorists to act, including dealing with those States

finance, support, encourage,

and

green light to continue with their

glorify terror,

and thereby grant the

terrorists the

activities.

Here the international community in its most developed and organized form
United Nations and
tional

the

its

related organs, as well as the

humanitarian law bodies

way in which they address

—

major human

political, social, as well as legal

rights

—

the

and interna-

—must

re-evaluate

the problem. Rather than systematically criticize those

that fight terror through allowing a parliamentary majority to dictate resolutions that
are viewed as encouraging terrorism, this

community must

problem and not allow itself to be abused and

tackle that aspect of the

utilized for furthering terror.

Both from the case studies and situations examined in this

article,

it is

clear that

community is presently experiencing a period of acute change
and evolution in what has up to now been accepted morality and behavior in
armed conflict and warfare. The enemy is different in nature, definition, geography, modus operandi, and in terms of morality and responsibility.
the international

—

In order to be capable of dealing with international terror, and overcoming
the civilized world
to the exigencies
Tragically,
error.

the

is

going to have to adapt legal concepts and modes of behavior

is

and challenges

—

so far

Sometimes

trial

that

—

it

it,

this

is

works and

that

modern-day terrorism

poses.

being achieved by a system of default and
lives are spared.

Sometimes

it

trial

and

does not. Practically,

and error is taking on the character of a new mode of international practice

obliging the international

community

to adjust itself accordingly

and

to

consider reviewing the old rules with a view to their possible rejuvenation in light

of today's terrorism. The question remains
ble

and prepared

Time

—and

to take

up the

—

terror

will

if the

international

community is capa-

challenge.

tell.
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XVI
International Humanitarian Law:

Should

It

Be Reaffirmed,

Clarified or Developed?

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer

1

Introduction

The aim

of this paper

is

to give

an overview of some concrete problems of ap-

plication of international humanitarian law (IHL)

possible future remedies. This will be

perspective of the International

The ICRC

is

mandated by

and then

done from the practice

to look towards

oriented, operational

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

States, in particular

through the 1949 Geneva Con-

ventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, as well as the Statutes of the Interna-

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, to act as promoter and "guardian"
of IHL. This role has many facets. It ranges from the promotion of IHL treaties, the
monitoring of respect of IHL by the parties to armed conflicts, the dissemination of

tional

IHL, to preparing developments of IHL. 2
For the ICRC, an institution present in almost

main challenge
conflicts.

that,

on

is

^vithout

Extensive research into recent

While the main problem

that the law

is

the "hot spots" of the world, the

any doubt the proper application of IHL

armed

conflicts has led the

the whole, the existing rules are adequate

conflicts.

all

perfect. Like

is

enough

in today's

ICRC

armed

to conclude

to deal with today's

armed

therefore not a lack of rules, this does not

any law, IHL

is

the result of careful

and

difficult

mises, in this case between considerations of humanity, military necessity

mean

compro-

and the need

International Humanitarian

to protect the security of the State.

the adequacy of

must be

It

IHL does not mean

that

it

Law

stressed that the

would

ICRC's conclusion on

any way ignore the many

in

chal-

lenges with regards to the application of the law, including those relating to the fight
against terrorism, nor the need for

IHL

to evolve together with the realities of war.

Especially following the attacks of
raised about

whether IHL was

still

September

1

1,

2001, questions have been

adequate to respond to today's challenges. The

debate has taken various forms. At the beginning of 2003, the Swiss Government

and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research organized an informal expert meeting on contemporary challenges of IHL for a group

of States and independent experts, as well as the United Nations and the ICRC.

The experts

identified a

number of

topics deserving further examination

and

same time they also strongly reaffirmed the validity of
current humanitarian law and the necessity to apply it. 3 A second meeting was
clarification.

But

at the

held in June 2004. 4

The ICRC

for

its

later in this paper,

The

first

number of initiatives

that will be

mentioned

with a view to reaffirm, clarify or develop IHL.

part of this paper will highlight

some of the current

challenges.

It

will

some important general obligations under IHL will be reand second, some special challenges linked to the "war on terror" will be

address two aspects:
called,

part has taken a

first,

briefly discussed.

Challenges

The more

IHL can be subdivided very roughly according
obligations in peacetime, obligations during armed conthe armed conflict. Even if these different phases will of-

general challenges facing

to the following timeline:
flict

Of A General Nature

and obligations

after

ten overlap, these distinctions provide a useful analytical framework.

Before addressing

some concrete

importance for States to widely

obligations, a

ratify

IHL

word should be

treaties.

said about the

Indeed, broad ratification of

IHL treaties confirms the validity of the rule and, therefore, contributes to improving compliance. A look at the list of the State parties to the main IHL treaties shows
that there

obtain

—

is still

ideally

a great effort to

—

be undertaken to promote these treaties in order to

universal adherence. 5

Obligations in Peacetime

Many States have still not fully incorporated IHL treaties into their domestic law. It
is

not sufficient to ratify a treaty;

national level.

makes

it

it

must also be implemented,

i.e.,

integrated, at the

One particularly important area is the adoption of domestic law that

possible to prosecute grave breaches
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based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. There

is

also a

need to adequately

and red crescent emblems.

protect, inter alia, the red cross

The ICRC's Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, created pursuant to a proposal by the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent in 1995, promotes national implementation and gives technical advice to
States through its legal advisers based in Geneva and in several field delegations.
Practice in the last few years has shown that "National Committees on IHL" are
a very successful tool for the promotion of IHL generally, and for national implementation measures in particular. There are at present more than 70 such interministerial committees.

In order to assist States, the

on

its

tional

6

website. In addition,

it

committees on IHL.

Its

mittees and between

ICRC has put many examples of national legislation
has recently set up an electronic forum open to na-

aim

them and

is

to facilitate contacts

the ICRC. This

between national com-

forum

will also allow these

committees to engage in an interactive debate.

Another important obligation even in peacetime
ing of IHL, especially to the
years, States

armed

forces. It

is

the dissemination and teach-

should be acknowledged that in recent

have undertaken increasing efforts in

this respect.

also

obvious that much more needs to be done.

and

rules of IHL are fully incorporated into military courses

It is

At the same time,

it is

indeed crucial that the principles

and

training.

Obligations during Armed Conflict
If we

look at the different phases

and

after the conflict

that

is

the

is

over

most important

trate their efforts,

—

—

it is

clearly respect

challenge.

It is

on

this

phase that States should concen-

whether or not they are involved in an armed

In this regard, special attention should be
spect,

armed conflict
of IHL during armed conflicts

obligations in peacetime, during

drawn to the obligation not only to re-

but also to "ensure respect" for IHL, as stated in Article

1949 Geneva Conventions and Article
reference should be

made to

1

dressed in

more

Article 89 of Additional Protocol
is

vague and

This notion definitely needs to be

detail in the

1

common

of 1977 Additional Protocol

However, the notion of "ensuring respect"
difficult to grasp.

conflict.

its

clarified.

I.

I.

7

to the

A further

8

substantive content

This issue will be ad-

second part of this paper.

How to apply the law in internal armed conflicts is likely to remain a major challenge in the future, especially in situations where the conflict

is

exacerbated by

reli-

gious and ethnic components. Furthermore, particular challenges for respect of

IHL are situations where

mand

are disrupted,

where law

State structures have disintegrated,

where there

in general has ceased to

is

a general

breakdown of law and order and

be a relevant reference.
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where chains of com-
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In the recent past, a

"asymmetric warfare,"

ogy weapons

in the

new

i.e.,

Law

challenge has emerged, a challenge referred to as

where due

situations

hands of one of the

to the availability of high technol-

parties to

an armed

conflict, there

is

a clear

imbalance between the belligerents. This situation tends to force the adversary that
is

overwhelmed by the other party to the conflict to use means and methods of war-

fare that are prohibited
fully

examined, but

power

will

Finally,

it is

under IHL. The implications of this challenge must
likely that in future military operations, this

still

imbalance of

tend to increase.
it

has to be recognized that

all

too often, violations of IHL are not due to

a lack of knowledge of IHL, but rather to lack of political will to apply that law.
difficult challenge
ties to

be

armed

ahead of us

be

will

The

how to generate political will among the par-

conflicts.

Obligations after the

Armed Conflict

The prosecution of those suspected to have committed grave breaches of IHL is eshave only rarely applied the principle of univer-

sential. It is regrettable that States
sal jurisdiction,

1949.

9

although

it

was established through the Geneva Conventions

in

In the last ten years, important developments have taken place at the inter-

national level, with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia

and Rwanda, of the mixed tribunals

for Sierra

Leone and Cambodia,

as well as of

the International Criminal Court.

As already indicated, the prosecution of war crimes

at the national level is linked

to the existence of appropriate domestic legislation.
States

must be
ties.

10

have additional obligations once the
released

and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active

Likewise, civilian internees

States shall

hostilities are over: prisoners

endeavor to

must be

of war

hostili-

released after the close of hostilities

and

facilitate their repatriation. 11

A Special Challenge:

The "War on Terror"

The use of force by groups operating transnationally is certainly another key challenge. What legal qualification must be given to terrorist acts committed by transnational groups on the one hand
and to counter-terrorist activities on the other
hand? Regrettably, this debate has led to some confusion and uncertainty about
IHL. This body of law has been criticized for not being adequate to deal with the
"war on terror." It has to be acknowledged that violent activities by transnational

—

groups
It

11,

raise

many difficult

challenges

— including
— including

in the legal field.

has been asserted that terrorist attacks

2001

—

as well as counter-terrorist activities
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conflict" in the legal sense,

an armed conflict that started years ago and that

continue until the end of terrorist

activities.

erable consequences in practice, especially

group

theoretically strike the transnational

having to obtain any kind of approval,

e.g.,

will

Such a conclusion would have considif it is

at

used to

justify that States

could

any time and everywhere

—without

on whose

territories

from those

States

the military interventions take place.

This debate has

shown

that there

and jws ad helium. This confusion
tional humanitarian law) has to

is

is all

too often confusion between jus in

extremely regrettable,

hello

asjt/s in hello (interna-

be separated from the question of the jus ad helium

The latter is not regulated by IHL, but by the United Nations Chara typical
ter. It therefore becomes problematic if the notion of armed conflict
IHL notion is employed to justify the use of force. This justification, as well as
(use of force).

—

—

brushing aside the traditional law enforcement paradigm,

is

a risky undertaking

that could adversely affect international relations.

The ICRC has done considerable legal research into the question of whether the
"war against terror" should be considered in toto as an armed conflict in the sense
of IHL. For the time being, and based on its long practice of IHL throughout the
world, it feels uncomfortable with the notion that the different attacks and reactions thereto are part of a worldwide armed conflict. The "war on terror" does not
fit well into the existing categories of armed conflict.
First, in the ICRC's view, terrorist and counter-terrorist activities cannot be
viewed as an international armed conflict. Such a conflict can occur only between
12
Second, could the "war on terror" be a non-international armed conflict? 13
States.
This would raise a number of questions when and where does the conflict take
place? Who are the parties to the conflict? What is the beginning and what is the
end of such conflict? In the view of the ICRC, no satisfactory answers have so far
been given to these and other questions.
One fundamental requirement of IHL should be recalled here: during an armed
conflict, all the parties to the conflict have the same rights and obligations. To qualify the "war on terror" as an armed conflict would give legitimacy to the transnational groups as a party to the armed conflict, with rights and obligations, an effect
that is probably not intended by States. So far in the debate on the "war on terror,"
those advocating that it represents an armed conflict have indeed given the impression that this balance no longer exists.
The "war on terror" can very well take the form of an armed conflict in the traditional IHL sense. The military operations that started in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001 were clearly an international armed conflict, and generally understood to be
causally related to terrorism. Likewise, no one questioned the qualification of the more
recent military campaign in Iraq as an international armed conflict, although its

—
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relationship to terrorism

armed

time, the

conflicts

Law

and counter-terrorism has been
both

in

controversial. In the

mean-

Afghanistan and Iraq became non-international in

character after the establishment of national authorities.

Terrorism

is

complex

a

must be faced with

issue that

a variety of tools, depending

on the results to be achieved. Experience has shown that armed conflict

—and IHL

are usually not the best tool to fight terrorism, since force as such will often not lead
to the

ternational cooperation between States,
cial

Among the more effective tools are in-

most adequate solution to the problem.
e.g.,

sharing of intelligence, police and judi-

cooperation, domestic law enforcement, financial investigations and freezing of

assets

belonging to terrorist groups, and improved control of arms trade and of the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally,
is

unlikely to disappear

if its

it

has to be said that terrorism

root causes are not properly addressed.

Terrorist acts are foremost crimes that a series of international conventions

have criminalized. The further development of international law in

this field

could

be an important contribution to the fight against terrorism.
This question of legal qualification has, of course, implications on the legal

sta-

tus of those captured during the fight against terrorism. This issue will be dealt with

only very briefly here.
First,

there

is

presumption of prisoners of war

a

(POW)

status for

captured on the battlefield in an international armed conflict.

about that

status,

competent tribunals

should come into action.

from the

start all

15

To make

all

is

a

POW or not. Therefore,

combatants captured by coalition

doubt

Third Geneva Convention

and

to disqualify

POW status raises serious concerns.

must take place

it

combatants

If there is a

a blanket determination

captured combatants from

Rather, a case-by-case examination

person

as foreseen in the

14

if

there

is

a

doubt whether a

would be logical to have given POW status to
forces in the war in Afghanistan, 16 unless de-

cided otherwise by competent tribunals.

Such tribunals may have had good reason to recognize
of the Taliban armed forces, but the situation

may be

POW status for members

different for

members of al

Qaeda, even though one would have to take into account the factual situation

Qaeda and the Taliban? Could acts of
members of al Qaeda be attributed to the Taliban armed forces? 17
The extent of legal protection to which "unlawful combatants" are entitled has

what was the exact relationship between

become an important
tection

—

a

person

is

issue.

al

For the ICRC, IHL provides a comprehensive pro-

protected either by the Third Geneva Convention or by the

Fourth Geneva Convention.

And

in addition to

law and domestic law also provide protection to
gal

vacuum.
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those detained. There

is

rights

no

le-
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If an

"unlawful combatant"

—or

better, "unprivileged belligerent"

ered by the Fourth Geneva Convention
there exist additional safeguards,

(e.g.,

which are

is

not cov-

because of his or her nationality 18 ),

common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-

ventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol

customary law, including by the United

—

I,

19

which

is

regarded as reflecting

States.

on terror" is the question of how long "unlawful combatants" may be detained. As already indicated above, both the Third
and the Fourth Geneva Conventions contain specific rules about release and repatriation. To detain persons that are protected under IHL not just until the end
of hostilities with Afghanistan or with other countries, but until the end of the
"war on terror" (that could easily be many years ahead of us) would certainly

One

further challenge of the "war

raise serious difficulties.

more general question of how to qualify the "war on terror," it is suggested that IHL applies to terrorism and counter- terrorism when the
level of force used amounts to an armed conflict. This approach limits the scope of
IHL to those situations it has been intended to regulate. Acts of terrorism and the
responses thereto must therefore be qualified on a case-by-case basis.
IHL is well equipped vis-a-vis terrorist activities committed in the context of an
armed conflict. It prohibits all acts commonly considered as "terrorist." As an ex-

To come back to

the

ample, both Additional Protocols of 1977 prohibit "acts or threats of violence the

primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population." 20 IHL
also prohibits attacks against the civilian population,

nate.

21

It

lation

be they direct or indiscrimi-

protects goods that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian

(like

food,

agricultural

areas,

irrigation works), cultural objects

livestock,

drinking water installations,

and places of worship, works and

containing dangerous forces, as well as the natural environment.
hostages
the

is

prohibited.

23

popu-

22

installations

The taking of

Furthermore, persons that find themselves in the hands of

enemy enjoy special protection. 24

If

an attack

batant"

—

carried out

is

by a

—who thus becomes an "unlawful com-

civilian

that person loses his/her protected status as a civilian during the time of

the "direct participation" in the hostilities

and becomes a legitimate military target.

Also, civilians having participated directly in the hostilities can be punished for

having done

so.

IHL

have asserted. In

These are

is

fact,

by no means an

quite the opposite

done on the different facets
it is

is

some commentators

the case.

no doubt that more work has to be
of the "war on terror." The dialogue must continue. In

difficult questions,

the meantime,

obstacle to justice, as

and there

is

extremely important that persons suspected of having commit-

ted terrorist acts are not denied individual basic rights and due process of law.
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Any development

of IHL

at

Law

present or in the future should build on existing

standards and should not undermine a solid body of law that has taken

more than a

century to develop.

Having
the "war

said this,

on

would seem

that the solution to the legal questions

terror" has to be looked for not so

ad helium,

jus

it

as

it

force.

To change

of the

UN Charter.

much within

appears that the fundamental problem

is

around

IHL, but rather in the

about the recourse to

the rules in that field would, however, necessitate an

amendment

The Future of International Humanitarian Law

The second

part of this paper deals with challenges in three very specific ways:

which parts of IHL need

to be either reaffirmed, clarified or developed? This

is

not

supposed to be an exhaustive enumeration, but rather, a suggestion of examples
that could provide a useful basis for discussion.

The Need for Reaffirmation of IHL
Generally speaking, existing IHL needs to be vigorously reaffirmed. As already indicated, IHL is not perfect, but its rules represent a careful balance between miliand considerations of humanity.

tary imperatives

of utmost importance to

It is

reaffirm in particular the obligations referred to earlier. However, reaffirmation
also urgent in

some more

specific fields that will

In the ICRC's opinion,

it is

for

be enumerated below.

example important to strongly reaffirm the

armed

prohibition of use of poisons or infectious disease in
cern

is

based on the

sciences
fit

and

fact that

conflict.

This con-

important and rapid advances are taking place in

in particular in the field of biotechnology.

humanity in

is

life

These advances will bene-

several ways, like the production of new vaccines, of new cures for

diseases or for increasing food production.

But

same advances could be used

ing risk that the

at the

same time, there

is

a

grow-

for hostile purposes, to poison or

deliberately spread disease. These concerns have increased following the attacks

of September

1 1

,

200 1 and also by the

failure of States to strengthen the

1972 Bio-

Weapons Convention through the adoption of a compliance monitoring
mechanism. The implication of the misuse of biotechnology could be devastating

logical

for

humanity.
In response to

in

its

grave concerns about the capacity of misuse of new advances

biotechnology and the lack of effective controls

ICRC launched an Appeal

called "Biotechnology,

at

an international

level,

the

Weapons and Humanity." The

launch took place in Montreux, Switzerland on September 23, 2002, coinciding
with an informal meeting of government and independent experts. 25 The Appeal
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addressed to the political and military authorities, to the scientific and medical

communities, and to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.

The Appeal focuses on the

risks, rules

and

responsibilities in relation to ad-

vances in biotechnology being used for poisoning or deliberate spread of disease.

It

by giving concrete examples, calls for the reaffirmation, implementation and reinforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological
describes the risks

Weapons Convention, and

calls

medical communities as well as

on governments, the military, the scientific and
the pharmaceutical and biotechnological indus-

ensure that advances in biotechnology are not diverted for use as weapons

tries to

or for other hostile purposes.
In addition, the Appeal calls for a high-level political declaration, to be adopted
at a ministerial level. In

January 2004 the

ICRC hosted a meeting with States about

beginning a process to explore how the international community could adopt such
a declaration. At the

groups,
tries,

same time the ICRC has

medical researchers, academic

i.e.,

defense scientists,

Another

started to reach out to the key target

scientists, scientists

view of the

ICRC needs to be reaffirmed is the protec-

tion of cultural property in situations of armed conflict.

its

in indus-

etc.

issue that in the

become party to

working

It is

important that States

the relevant instruments, in particular the 1954 Convention

and

1999 Protocol, which further develops the Convention. Recent conflicts have

shown

that the protection of cultural property

is

crucial in the sense that

through

attacking cultural property, the attacker destroys the very heart of a civilization.

Concerning the need to reaffirm the validity of IHL, the 28th International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Conference that took place in Geneva from December 2-6,

2003 was an important opportunity. The International Conference

rum to

discuss humanitarian issues.

It

is

a unique fo-

meets every four years. The participants are

Geneva Conventions, the National Red Cross or Red CresInternational Federation and the ICRC. 26 This mixture be-

the States party to the

cent Societies, their

tween

States

and non-State

entities

is

certainly

one of the noteworthy features of

the International Conference.

The

International Conference adopts resolutions that are as such not legally

binding.

They

are nevertheless important

documents

that are often cited.

A good

example are the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Move-

ment

that describe the tasks of the

components of the Movement. They were

adopted by consensus and have therefore become a very authoritative statement.

IHL is always high on the agenda of the International Conference.
The overall theme of the last International Conference was "Protecting Human
Dignity." It was attended by more than 1,700 delegates from 153 States and 176
National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, by the International Federation and
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the ICRC. There were also 64 observers. Never before had their participation been
so important.

The Conference opened with a welcoming ceremony, followed by plenary meetings and meetings in commissions. In parallel, the Drafting Committee met. At the
end of every day, workshops took place that were not part of the official program,
but that allowed informal discussions. The participants also had the possibility to
make individual or collective pledges. More than 360 such pledges were made, thus
reinforcing the impact of the International Conference.

The 27th

International Conference in 1999

had adopted a Plan of Action

for the

Years 2000 to 2003. This time, the Conference adopted two important documents:
a Declaration highlighting the

manitarian Action.

continued relevance of IHL and an Agenda for Hu-

27

The Declaration with the title "Protecting Human Dignity" is a short text of two
and a half pages. It reaffirms forcefully what "protecting human dignity" actually
means. This makes this document so important. The Declaration contains a clear
reaffirmation of States' obligation to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian
law. It calls upon the parties to an armed conflict to make all efforts to reduce incidental, and prevent deliberate injury, death and suffering of civilian populations.
The need to protect women and children is highlighted.
The Declaration recalls that IHL is applicable to all situations of armed conflict
and foreign occupation. It vigorously condemns all acts or threats of violence
aimed

at

spreading terror

among

the civilian population. Furthermore,

it

stresses

must be treated with humanity and that all persons alleged to
have committed crimes must be granted due process of law and fair trial. The Dec-

that

all

detainees

must be respected and procircumstances. Their independence from political and military actors

laration also firmly states that humanitarian workers

tected in

all

must be reaffirmed.
Finally, the Declaration

commits the

participants to reduce the risks

and

effects

of disasters on vulnerable populations, as well as to reduce their vulnerability to
disease

due

to stigma

and discrimination,

particularly that faced

by people

living

with and affected by HIV/AIDS.

Whereas the Declaration
itarian

Action

is

is

held in a rather general way, the Agenda for

very focused and deals with concrete issues.

It

Human-

comprises an intro-

duction, 4 General Objectives, 15 Final Goals and 64 Proposed Actions. In this
paper, only highlights of some aspects of IHL will be provided.

The first two General Objectives deal with humanitarian law:

the

first is

about miss-

ing persons, whereas the second deals with weapons.

The title of the first General Objective is "Respect and restore the dignity of persons as a result of armed conflicts or other situations of armed violence and of their
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families." This objective

is

based on the observations and recommendations of an

international conference that the

The Agenda

for

ICRC had organized in Geneva in February 2003.

Humanitarian Action covers a broad range of activities linked to

missing persons, starting with the prevention of persons becoming missing. The

Agenda then

recalls that Article

right of families to

know the

fate

32 of Additional Protocol
of their

of 1977 refers to the

I

relatives.

management of
management of human re-

In addition, the following topics are covered by the Agenda: the

information and process

files

on missing persons; the

mains and information about the dead; the support of families of missing persons;

and an encouragement of organized armed groups to resolve the problem of missing persons, assist their families and prevent persons from becoming missing.

The
ians in

title
all

of the second General Objective

is

"Strengthen the protection of civil-

from the indiscriminate use and

situations

effects

of weapons and the

protection of combatants from unnecessary suffering and prohibited weapons

through controls on weapons development, proliferation and use." The following
issues are dealt with in this General Objective:

End

•

the

the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. States, in partnership with

components of the Movement,

rehabilitation, social

mine
also

will

provide assistance for the care,

and economic reintegration of war wounded, including

victims, as well as for

mine -awareness and clearance programs.

States will

pursue the ultimate goal of the eventual global elimination of antipersonnel

mines. They are encouraged to consider adhering to the Ottawa Convention.
States party to the

Conference that

Convention should develop in time

will take place in Nairobi, national

for the First

programs

Review

for clearance,

mine awareness and victim assistance consistent with the
Convention's deadlines. The Agenda also reaffirms the ICRC's lead role in the
implementation of the Movement Strategy on Landmines. National societies, in
partnership with the ICRC and States, will maintain mine action among their
priorities and develop their capacity in this regard.
stockpile destruction,

•

Minimize

indiscriminate

from weapons that may he extremely injurious or have
The Agenda warmly welcomes the adoption of a new

suffering
effects.

Protocol on "Explosive Remnants of

War"

to the 1980

Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons, and encourages States to consider
as possible. States are

its

ratification as

soon

encouraged to adhere to the 1980 Convention and to the

extension of the Convention's scope of application to non-international
conflict that occurred in 2001. States are also

armed

encouraged to consider measures to

ordnance becoming explosive remnants of war and

minimize the

risk of explosive

to reduce the

human costs of mines other than anti-personnel mines.
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States

will

rigorously apply the

on

rules

Law

distinction,

proportionality and

precautions in attack, in order to minimize civilian deaths and injuries resulting

from certain munitions, including sub-munitions.
•

Reduce the human suffering resulting from the uncontrolled

misuse of weapons. States should take concrete steps to

arms and ammunition. In

and
strengthen controls on

particular, States should urgently

availability

enhance

efforts to

prevent the uncontrolled availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

They should make respect for humanitarian law one of the fundamental criteria
on which arms transfer decisions are assessed. States, with the support of the ICRC
and national societies, should ensure that armed, police and security forces receive
systematic training in international humanitarian law and human rights law, in
particular concerning the responsible use of weapons.
•

Protect

humanity from poisoning and

party to the 1972 Biological

Weapons Convention

their efforts to reduce the threat

work with

the

ICRC to

efforts within the

the deliberate spread of disease. States

are encouraged to continue

posed by biological weapons. They are invited to

develop a ministerial-level declaration that would support

framework of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, on

preventing the hostile use of biological agents as called for in the
Biotechnology,

Weapons and Humanity.

becoming party

to

the

States are

1925 Gas Protocol, the

ICRC Appeal on

encouraged to consider

Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. They are
to

monitor closely advances

in the field of the

life

Weapons
called upon

1972 Biological

sciences, taking practical action

to effectively control biological agents that could be put to hostile use,

and

to

improve international cooperation.
•

Ensure the

legality

of new weapons under international law. States are urged to

establish review procedures to determine the legality of new

weapons, means and

methods of warfare in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977.
Reviews should involve a multidisciplinary approach, including military,

legal,

environmental and health-related considerations. States are encouraged to review
with particular scrutiny

all

new weapons, means and methods of

warfare that

cause health effects with which medical personnel are unfamiliar.

The

titles

of the third and fourth General Objectives are "Minimize the impact

of disasters through implementation of disaster risk reduction measures and im-

proving preparedness and response mechanisms" and "Reduce the increased vulnerability to diseases arising

from stigma and discrimination and from the lack of

access to comprehensive prevention, care

This Agenda for Humanitarian Action
that

and treatment."
is

the continuation of the Plan of Action

was adopted by the 27th International Conference
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The ICRC submitted

to the 28th International Conference a report "Interna-

Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts"
containing its analysis of some major challenges in the field of international hutional

manitarian law. 28 This report provides the ICRC's analysis on the following topics:

IHL

applicable in international

tional

armed

conflicts,

compliance with IHL.

IHL and

Many

armed

conflicts,

IHL

applicable in non-interna-

the fight against terrorism,

of the

comments made

and how

to

improve

in this paper also appear in

that report.

The Need for Clarification of IHL
There are a number of domains where

there exist rules of great significance, but

that are formulated only in a very general way. This can

make

it

difficult to

apply

may be cases where the law should be further developed in response
situations. However, this may often not be the most appropriate reaction

the rule. There
to such
(risk

of difficult and lengthy negotiations, uncertainty about the outcome, possi-

bility that the result

undermines

existing standards, etc.).

To try to clarify a provision can be more promising, but also
particular concerning the concrete
clarification

amples

will

could also lead

form

raises questions, in

a clarification should take. In

at a later stage to a

some

cases,

normative development. Some ex-

be given here, where attempts for clarification are being made.

The basic concepts underlying the rules concerning the conduct of hostilities
are phrased in a rather general way and tend
in particular the rules on targeting
to be therefore difficult to apply. The ICRC does not see a need to change the rules,
which have kept their relevance since they were incorporated into the 1977 Addi-

—

tional Protocols.

However, to

clarify the provisions

about the definition of a "mili-

tary objective," the principle of "proportionality"

taken in an attack would render these rules

would

assist

more

and the "precautions"

operational. 29 Such clarification

the belligerents in their concrete implementation.

be very useful

if a

to be

It

would therefore

consensus on the interpretation of these notions could be found.

Particular attention could be given to "high-tech" warfare, as well as asymmetric

The ICRC plans to conduct consultations
to work on these concepts.

warfare.
useful

Another example

is

in order to clarify if it

would be

the notion of "direct participation in hostilities" 30 that was

The Hague, during a meeting jointly organized by the ICRC and the Asser Institute with the participation of renowned
IHL experts. This seminar showed the need for clarification of this important concept—especially having in mind the debate about "unlawful combatants." In 2004
and 2005 the ICRC organized two other expert meetings in The Hague and in

discussed at the beginning of June 2003 in
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tilities."

A

Law

view to find a shared understanding of "direct participation in hos-

a

further meeting

is

planned

in

Geneva

In addition, at the beginning of 2004, the

later in 2006.

Harvard Program on Humanitarian

on "Air and Missile
Warfare." Its aim is to clarify and to restate the applicable law and to draft a manual
similar to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, which was adopted in June 1994. A series of expert meetings were subPolicy and Conflict Research launched an important initiative

sequently held in Lucerne, Heidelberg, Oslo, and Brussels between 2004 and 2006.

The ICRC

is

also

tion. In 2003,

it

organized

promoting and

clarifying

five regional expert

mechanisms of IHL implementameetings on

pliance with IHL, with the active participation of

how to improve com-

government

representatives,

academics, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other organizations.

These meetings took place in Cairo, Pretoria, Kuala Lumpur, Mexico City

and Bruges between April and September 2003. 31

ICRC wanted to make common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions more operational. What does "ensure respect" mean concretely? What
can be expected from States? The regional expert meetings have generated many
ideas about how to improve compliance with IHL. During these meetings compliIn particular, the

ance by organized armed groups was also high on the agenda.

IHL mechanisms suffer from a lack of use. The International Fact-Finding Commission was
considered to have a very promising potential. 32 The participants were, however,
divided on the question of whether new mechanisms should be created, although
some interesting proposals were made (e.g., periodic reporting, individual complaints mechanism, IHL Commission). Participants in all the regional seminars
commended the ICRC for its work, including its multi-faceted role as promoter
and "guardian" of IHL. It was even proposed that the role of the ICRC should be
strengthened, more particularly in non-international armed conflicts.
The

participants in the regional meetings regretted that existing

Concerning

common

Article

1,

the participants in these regional meetings

acknowledged that there was an obligation not to encourage a party to a

first

conflict to

IHL nor to assist in such violations. It was also recognized that States not involved in an armed conflict had a positive obligation to take action
unilaterally or
collectively
against parties to an armed conflict that were committing violations.

violate

—

—

This would not entail an obligation to obtain specific
to take

all

results,

but rather an obligation

appropriate measures with a view to ending violations. Concrete examples

of possible measures were discussed, such as diplomatic pressure, public denunciation,

renouncing exports of weapons that are or could be used to commit violations

of IHL, sanctions, and coercive measures, including lawful reprisals or acts of
retorsion. 33

The ICRC has continued

to

work on compliance mechanisms, with an
300
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emphasis on improving respect for IHL in non-international armed
should also be noted that
lines

conflicts. It

end of 2005, the European Union adopted "Guide-

at the

on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law," thus translat-

ing the obligation contained in

common Article

1

into practice.

—

ICRC organized in September 2003 together with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law that year's San Remo Round Table on
the theme: "International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay
Furthermore, the

—

in Situations of Violence." This event has helped to clarify
plies in a given situation, in particular

IHL and human

particularly relevant with regards to terrorist

which

legal

regime ap-

rights law. This question

and counter-terrorist

activities.

is

34

December 2003, the ICRC convened an expert meeting to discuss issues
linked to multinational forces. When does IHL apply to them? Is it the law of international armed conflict or internal armed conflicts? Does the law of occupation apIn

De jure or de facto 7
More generally, the ICRC plans to look into some aspects of the question of oc-

ply to them?

.

cupation, having in mind, in particular, the recent

and

Iraq. Besides situations

armed

conflicts in Afghanistan

of occupation in the traditional sense, there

may be

a

need to develop a more functional approach in order to ensure the comprehensive

The existing rules on occupation are based on effective control of a territory and on the premise that the occupying power will administer the
territory. However, practice has shown that there can be situations where a belligerent exercises control only to a limited extent or where persons are captured in
protection of persons.

territory that

not occupied in the traditional sense.

is

Future work on clarification of IHL will benefit from the

ICRC study on cus-

tomary IHL. The ICRC was asked to conduct this study by the 26th International Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference in 1995. Work was carried out
by the ICRC's Legal Division and almost 50 national research teams, supervised
by a Steering Group. In addition, government and academic experts of great
reputation have contributed to the study. The study, which has revealed the
great

amount of

practice in the area of IHL, will be useful inter alia for the

teaching of IHL, the drafting of military manuals, as well as for international

and domestic courts.
The study published in March 2005 will be particularly useful for non-international armed conflicts. Maybe the most important result of the study is the

—

—

fact that

many

hostilities also

rules of the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

relating to the

conduct of

apply to internal armed conflicts on a customary law basis. Further-

more

States not party to certain

rules.

The ICRC intends

IHL

treaties will

be bound by their customary

to update the study as needed. It
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through the clarification and extension of the applicability of IHL
timately improve the protection of war victims in the

Another

issue

where some

clarification

needed

is

rules, will ul-

field.

ICRC's view is related

in the

chemical weapons. Both the 1925 Gas Protocol and the 1993 Chemical

to

Weapons

Convention prohibit the use of toxic chemicals, including incapacitating agents.
However, the Chemical Weapons Convention permits the use of chemical agents
for law enforcement. This could lead to the proliferation of incapacitating agents

enforcement and could eventually undermine the existing prohibition of

for law

the use of such agents in warfare.

therefore important that States clarify the

It is

meaning of the Convention's law enforcement exemption.

The important role of national and international tribunals
and clarification of IHL should also be mentioned here.

The Need for Development of IHL
Finally, should IHL be further developed? Should
Geneva Conventions or

IHL

treaties

Geneva Conventions could
tain results at the

complete revision of the

their Additional Protocols take place, or should rules be

developed only in certain domains? For
overhaul of the basic

a

in the interpretation

easily

is

its

neither

ICRC believes that a complete
necessary nor realistic. To open up the

part, the

mean opening a Pandora's box, with very uncer-

end of the day. There would even be

standards could be undermined. In any event,

it

a real risk that the existing

would seem that the current

inter-

national climate does not allow major normative developments.

However, the ICRC

is

of the opinion that there

tain specific areas of IHL. In that respect,

ments
the

in the last ten years or so.

of adopted

list

treaties,

it is

The record

is

space for developments in cer-

some developimpressive when one looks at

useful to review briefly
is

quite

which are testimony of a very dynamic development:

Weapons Convention
1995 Prohibition of Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW))
1993 Chemical

1996

Amendment to

Protocol

II

to the

4 to the 1980 Convention

CCW

1997 Ottawa Convention prohibiting antipersonnel mines
1998

Rome

Statute

on the International Criminal Court

1999 Protocol on the protection of cultural property

2000 Optional Protocol strengthening the protection of children
2001 Extension of scope of the

2003

New

in

armed conflict

CCW to non-international armed conflicts

protocol to the 1980 Convention on "Explosive Remnants of

(Protocol

5).

2005 Protocol on the adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem.
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One very good example of successful work in the field of development of IHL is
the question of "explosive remnants of war,"

which are a serious consequence of

modern armed conflict. Explosive remnants of war are the unexploded and abandoned ordnance that remain after the end of active hostilities. In September 2000,
the

ICRC launched an

weapons

at

reduce the

initiative to

an expert meeting held

in

human

suffering caused

Nyon, Switzerland.

35

by these

Following discussions

2001 Review Conference, States party to the Certain Conventional Weapons

at the

Convention agreed to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to negotiate a

new instrument on explosive remnants of war.
The negotiations came to a fruitful conclusion when

—

—
—

on No"Protocol on Explosive Remnants
the State parties

vember 28, 2003 adopted by consensus a
of War." 36 This protocol Protocol 5 to the CCW is an important development of IHL. It is the first multilateral agreement to address the generic problems
of unexploded or abandoned ordnance. While the existing treaties have focused
on specific weapons, Protocol 5 applies to all explosive ordnance not covered by

—

earlier instruments.

The new Protocol
•

requires each party to an

armed

conflict to:

Clear the explosive remnants of war in territory

it

controls after the

end of

active hostilities.
•

Provide technical, material and financial assistance to

of unexploded or abandoned ordnance in areas
its

it

facilitate

the removal

does not control resulting from

operations. This assistance can be provided directly to the party in control of

the

territory

or

through

a

party

third

nongovernmental organizations or other
•

such

as

the

United

institutions.

Record information on the explosive ordnance employed by

forces

and

Nations,

its

armed

to share that information with organizations engaged in the clearance

of explosive remnants of war or conducting programs to warn civilians of the

dangers of these devices.
•

Provide warnings to civilians of the dangers in specific areas.

•

The protocol

also creates future meetings of State parties in

which

States

with explosive remnants of war predating the entry into force of the protocol can
seek and receive assistance to help

The

them address

obligations to provide technical

the problem.

and material

assistance to facilitate the

clearance of explosive remnants of war in territory a party does not control and to

record and share information on the explosive ordnance used during an armed
conflict are of particular importance.

make an important

Implemented correctly, these obligations can

contribution to the rapid removal of explosive remnants of
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war, the establishment of risk education programs and the provision of warnings

The adoption of these rules reflects recognition by the international
community that the parties to an armed conflict cannot ignore the post-conflict effects of the weapons they use and that they must take measures before, during and
after a conflict to reduce the impact on the civilian population.
The new protocol has, of course, several limitations. Qualifications like
to civilians.

"where
sus.

feasible"

were necessary

if

an agreement was to be concluded by consen-

These qualifications are in part compensated by the protocol's vast scope of

application.

In addition to concluding the

new protocol, State parties agreed that the Group of

Governmental Experts would continue
without tangible

Concerning

cluster

work on

anti-vehicle

bombs and

other sub-munitions areas of

ICRC

work included

weapons from becoming explosive remnants of

war, as well as proposals to strengthen the regulations

such as the

cluster

results.

technical features to prevent these

flict,

mines and

Work on these issues was indeed conducted in the following

sub-munitions in 2004.
years, so far

its

on

their use in

armed con-

proposal for a prohibition on the use of sub-munitions

against any military objective located in a civilian area.

Such a

rule

would

strengthen the restrictions on targeting contained in 1977 Additional Protocol

I.
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The Group of Governmental Experts met regularly in Geneva during 2004,
2005, and 2006. The Review Conference of the CCW will take place at the end of
2006 and will be an important point in time to assess the whole CCW process and
lay the ground for future work.
One area that would certainly need further analysis with a view to possible development are the rules that apply in non-international armed conflicts. Those
rules are quite rudimentary, at least in treaty form.

has the time

come

to have a fresh look at the feasibility of a normative develop-

ment? Such a development would
the law of international
possible in 1977,

To put it in a provocative way:

would

some momentum

at last

narrow down the differences between

and of non-international armed
it

What was imon customary IHL

conflict.

be possible today? Can the study

ICRC for its part has not planned any
initiative going into that direction. However, if the general mood were favorable
to a normative development, the ICRC would be pleased to carry the idea forward, together with governmental and other experts. In the past, the ICRC has
give

to such

actively contributed to the

and submitting

an idea? The

development of IHL by organizing expert meetings

draft proposals.

The extension of the scope of application of the CCW to non-international
armed conflicts in 2001 was relatively easy. A few years before that, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also contributed to narrowing the
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difference in treatment

between international and internal armed

examples seem to indicate that today's atmosphere
that prevailed during the diplomatic conference

is

conflicts.

quite different

from 1974

These

from the one

to 1977 that adopted

the 1977 Additional Protocols.

One particular issue that the ICRC has been discussing during its regional expert
meetings

IHL.

38

is

whether organized armed groups could be given incentives to respect

Could this aspect be included in the discussion of a possible new instrument?

Speaking about non-international armed
should be briefly mentioned.
conflicts,

it

If a

would be important

conflicts, the issue

of missing persons

new instrument was to be developed on

internal

to include rules related to missing persons

rather rules that could help prevent persons

from becoming missing.

39

—or

Indeed,

many of the existing rules apply formally only in international armed conflicts.
Finally, how not to mention the adoption, in December 2005, of a new Third
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions creating a new distinctive emblem,
the "Red Crystal?" This emblem will be at the disposal of those States and national
societies that

have

difficulties

with the present red cross or red crescent emblems.

The adoption of the additional emblem was the culmination of a long process
that started more than ten years ago. In 2000 a draft protocol was elaborated, but
due to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, its adoption had to be
postponed. The 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
in December 2003 adopted an important resolution on this question, following the
commitment of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to
achieve, with the support of States, a comprehensive and lasting solution to the
question of the emblem. The resolution also requested the Standing Commission
to continue to give high priority to securing, as

soon

as circumstances permit, a

comprehensive and lasting solution. The Standing Commission

Group

to continue

work on

the

emblem

set

up

a

Working

issue.

Early in 2005 Switzerland, as depository of the Geneva Conventions and of their

Additional Protocols, initiated new consultations. Since they turned out to be positive,

13,

Switzerland convened an informal meeting in Geneva on September 12 and

2005 and later on sent out invitations for a Diplomatic Conference, which took

Geneva from December

The Diplomatic Conference adopted
the text of the Third Additional Protocol that had been drafted in 2000.
The adoption of the additional emblem was facilitated by the conclusion, on
November 28, 2005, of a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the
Magen David Adorn in Israel and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. This Memorandum was signed "in en effort to facilitate the adoption of a Third Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to pave the way for the membership
of both societies in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement."
place in

5 to 8, 2005.
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On

the

same

day, the

two

societies also

Law

concluded an operational agreement.

This second agreement aims at enhancing their cooperation
their

humanitarian mandate.

also signed

It

when

carrying out

should be noted that these two agreements were

by the Swiss Minister of Foreign

ternational Federation of Red Cross

Affairs, as well as

and Red Crescent

by the ICRC, the

Societies,

In-

and the Standing

Commission.
It

made clear that the additional emblem does not in any way replace
emblems. Most importantly it does not have any religious, political,

should be

the existing

ethnic, cultural, or other connotations.

shown during

visibility tests

lates that all distinctive

It is

also recognizable at a distance, as

was

conducted by Switzerland. The new Protocol stipu-

emblems

shall

enjoy the same legal status.

The new emblem does so far not have an official name, but the name "Red Crystal" has been proposed and has received considerable support. This name should
be made official in the course of this year. There is no doubt that the additional emblem will promote unity and universality within the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement.
Conclusion

IHL on the whole adequately responds to the challenges of protection genby today's armed conflicts. It represents a careful balance between military

Existing

erated

imperatives and the protection of human dignity.

It is

therefore important to vig-

orously reaffirm the existing principles and rules of IHL, in peacetime, during

armed

conflict

However,

and

it is

after the

at the

armed

domains where

is

over.

same time necessary to work on the

concepts and provisions in order to
specific

conflict

it is

clarification of certain

make them workable in practice. There are also

desirable that the law be developed, as has already oc-

curred in several respects in the past few years.

When developing the law, great care

should be taken not to weaken existing standards of protection.

The "war on terror" represents a particularly difficult challenge. Terrorism is a
complex issue where IHL can only play a limited role. Other tools like domestic law
enforcement and cooperation between States are usually much better suited to
reach the desired results.

It

must be determined which law applies

in a given situa-

IHL applies when the fight against terrorism amounts to an armed conflict.
IHL itself clearly prohibits acts of terrorism when committed during an armed
conflict. Those committing violations of IHL must be punished. "Unlawful com-

tion.

batants" enjoy the protection of IHL, even though they can be punished for the

mere participation

in the hostilities. Persons in the
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hands of the adversary must be

.
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treated humanely,
sally

which includes due process of law, and benefit from the univer-

recognized judicial guarantees.

must be made between jus ad helium and jus

Finally, a clear distinction

To develop the former

—through an amendment of the UN Charter—could

sent an important contribution to the fight against terrorism. This

avoid invoking

in hello.

IHL to justify the

repre-

would help

use of force.
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XVII
Enforcing the

John

The

F.

Law

Murphy

1

focus of this panel, as well as that of most panels in this conference,

the jus in

bello,

the law regulating the

way armed

force

is

haps worth noting parenthetically, however, that participants

Oaks and San Francisco conferences determined

applied.

at the

that, unlike the

is

It is

on

per-

Dumbarton

Covenant of the

League of Nations, the United Nations Charter should outlaw war. 2 As the major
hostilities

phase of the conflict in Iraq dramatically demonstrates, we are a long

way from

achieving the goal of the founders of the United Nations. Indeed,

highly unlikely that we shall ever reach the goal of outlawing
theless, as recent events also

good will

to

During

demonstrate, there

recommit themselves

this

is

it is

armed conflict. None-

an overriding need for people of

to the pursuit of this goal.

conference most of the discussion and debate has revolved around

armed conflicts of the 1990s and the early 2000s: the Gulf War,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But it is important to remember that international
armed conflict is not the primary kind of armed conflict today, but rather it is internal or civil wars. In the main, these wars are being fought with no concern for the
jus in bello and are largely ignored by the great powers. This is especially the case in
four international

Africa.

A major reason for the failure

political will.

wars

But

—Common

it

to deal effectively with these wars

appears clear as well that the jus in

Article 3 of the

is

lack of

bello applicable to internal

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol

inadequate; yet efforts to improve this law are strongly resisted.

II

—

is

Enforcing the

Law

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer suggests in his paper that the jus in hello

have

not the major problem but the failure to implement

is

seems

but as the debates

clear,

at this

in

it

we

good

currently

faith.

This

conference have clearly shown, there are

the least major differences as to interpretation of the existing rules, even

leading experts of Western developed States,

much

less

on

among the

worldwide

a

at

basis.

would be resolved by international negotiations to revise
However, as Dr. Lavoyer also notes in his paper, the risk of this

Ideally these ambiguities

the existing law.

might open Pandora's box and

route

is

more

satisfactory jus in hello. This

that

it

is

also a

result in a

much

less rather

than a

problem with the jws ad helium, the law

of resort to the use of force, and efforts to revise the

UN Charter. There are now 191

member States of the United Nations, and more and more of them, especially those
from the so-called "third-world," are demanding

Under

to be heard. 3

a rule of law paradigm, 4 courts

biguities in the

law of armed conflict

trators of war crimes. 5

would play a major role in resolving amand in prosecuting and punishing the perpe-

Courts have usually not played such a

role,

but

this

may be

changing. As Ambassador Alan Baker reported in his presentation, Israel's applica-

and enforcement of the law of armed

tion

court. In his presentation, Colonel Charles

rope, there

armed

is

conflict

supervised by

Garraway noted

an overlap between international

conflict.

is

human

its

supreme

that, especially in

Eu-

law and the law of

rights

This overlap was dramatically demonstrated by the claim brought

Human

before the European Court of

Rights by several Yugoslav nationals that

various North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries had violated the European

Convention on
tion)

Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Conven-

by their 1999 intervention

merits of the challenge because

in
it

Kosovo. The European Court never reached the

decided that the applicants did not

the jurisdiction of the respondent States for purposes of Article

Convention, which provides: "The High Contracting Parties

1

come within

of the European

shall secure to ev-

eryone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section
this

Convention." 6 Nonetheless, the stage had been

lenges to the use of armed force based

1

of

set for possible future chal-

on international human

rights law.

As sug-

would seem to be considerable
law and the law of armed conflict

gested by Colonel Garraway, at the least, there

need to ensure that international

human

rights

are compatible.

At

this writing there are in existence three international criminal tribunals: the

International Criminal Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Interna-

Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal
Although both the ICTY and the ICTR have had their share of criti-

tional Criminal Tribunal for

Court (ICC).
cism,

it is

generally agreed that the

significant role in interpreting

two

tribunals, especially the

and applying the law of armed
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ICTY, have played
conflict.

a

Moreover,

John

F.

Murphy

while the International Criminal Court has not yet started any proceedings,

do

well

likewise, especially with respect to the jus in hello of internal wars.

ing to media reports, the ICC's

Congo and other

first

cases are likely to arise

from

it

may

Accord-

situations in the

conflicts in Africa.

Also, as Professor Adam Roberts suggested during this conference, the

stimulate national law enforcement authorities

and courts

to

do

ICC may

a better job of en-

The failure to prosecute such crimes as genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity at the national level has often been cited as
forcing the law of armed conflict.

a primary reason for establishing the International Criminal Court.

Belgium has recently learned how difficult it can be for a national legal system to
prosecute these crimes. Belgium had legislation 7 so wide-ranging in scope that
resulted in Belgian courts being flooded with cases based

and the Belgian government being involved

One

on

it

universal jurisdiction

in heated international controversies.

of these controversies, over a Belgian arrest warrant issued for the foreign

minister of the Congo, resulted in a ruling by the International Court of Justice that

Belgium had violated international law because the foreign minister enjoyed im-

munity from judicial process. 8 As a result of this ruling, Belgium had to drop prosecutions of officials such as Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,
object of a criminal complaint for
cres at the Sabra

war crimes

and Shatila refugee camps

filed

who had been the

by survivors of the 1982 massa-

in Beirut,

Lebanon. In the Sharon

case,

however, Belgium's highest court ruled that Sharon could be tried for war crimes
after

he leaves

office

Army chief of staff,

and

that his co-defendant,

Amos

Yaron, the former
9

Israeli

US war in
who claimed

could be tried before Belgian courts. Later, as the

Iraq was getting under way, representatives of seven Iraqi families

they had lost loved ones in the 1991 Gulf War, filed a criminal complaint naming

former

US

President George H. W. Bush, as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell

(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991), Vice-President Dick Cheney (Secretary of Defense in 1991) and Norman Schwarzkopf, the general in charge of US
forces during Operation Desert Storm. 10 This apparently was the last straw,

sulted in such strong protest
islation to allow cases to

from the United

States that

Belgium.

its

leg-

be brought only if the victim or suspect is a Belgian citizen

or long-term resident at the time of the alleged crime.
tees diplomatic

Belgium modified

and re-

The revised law also guaran-

immunity for world leaders and other government officials visiting

11

Recently, an important alternative to prosecution before an international criminal tribunal or a national court has

begun

to emerge, the so-called "hybrid court."

In Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, the United Nations has established hybrid courts, consisting of international and national elements, to prosecute atrocities

committed

in these regions. Also,

on May
313

13, 2003, after

long and tortuous

Enforcing the Law

negotiations, the

UN General Assembly approved

an agreement with the govern-

ment of Cambodia to establish a hybrid court to prosecute some of the perpetrators of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during the mid-to-late 1970s. 12
Although these hybrid courts have taken a variety of forms, perhaps the archetype
the hybrid court for Sierra Leone. 13

Under the court's statute, there is a three judge
trial chamber and a five judge appellate chamber. The government of Sierra Leone
appoints one judge to the trial chamber and the UN secretary-general appoints two.
The appellate chamber has two judges picked by the government of Sierra Leone and
is

three selected by the secretary-general. Further, after consultation with the govern-

ment of Sierra Leone, the secretary-general appoints the prosecutor and registrar.
The court has jurisdiction over serious violations of the law of armed conflict as well
as certain crimes

erra Leone.

and

its

committed since November

The judges of the court

as well as

registrar (a British national)

30,
its

1996 under the national law of Si-

prosecutor (an American national)

have been selected, and accused persons have

been brought before the court. The court has also indicted Charles Taylor,
the president of Liberia but

The arrangements

now enjoying asylum

for the hybrid court for

at the

time

in Nigeria.

Cambodia

contrast sharply with

those for Sierra Leone and reflect five years of difficult negotiations between the

United Nations and the Cambodian government. Under the agreement approved

by the General Assembly in May 2003, Extraordinary Chambers will be established
in

Cambodian

courts under

Cambodian law but

will

have subject matter jurisdic-

tion over several offenses defined under international law as well as certain offenses

proscribed by
ary 6,

1

Cambodian law when committed between April

16,

1975 and Janu-

979. In the two-tier system of the Extraordinary Chambers, a majority of the

Cambodian while the remaining judges are to be appointed by the
Cambodian government based upon nominations by the Secretary-General. The
vote of at least one UN-nominated judge is required for a judgment of guilt. 14 It re-

judges must be

mains to be seen whether these arrangements

will

be both effective and

just.

The hybrid courts in Kosovo and East Timor present still another model of adjudication. Under a UN Security Council resolution adopted at the conclusion of
the 1999 conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Yugosla15
via,
Kosovo has been governed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and this arrangement will continue until Kosovo's final status is determined. As the interim authority,

UNMIK has established local courts that prose-

cute both ordinary offenses and certain violations of the law of

armed

conflict.

Foreign lawyers have been appointed as prosecutors, and a majority of the judges
are foreign nationals.

Shortly after the people of East
sia in

Timor voted

for

independence from Indone-

August 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration
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in East

1

John

F.

Murphy

Timor (UNTAET) began its administration of East Timor, which lasted until
the territory became an independent State on May 20, 2002. 16 During this time

UNTAET established a hybrid court system in East Timor. An UNTAET regulation adopted in

March 2000

created special panels of the District Court of Dili

Timor) and granted them exclusive jurisdiction over three
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as
international crimes
well as crimes of torture, murder, and crimes of sexual violence when commit(the capital of East

—

—

ted between January

1,

1999 and October 25, 1999. In 2001 ten defendants were

convicted of crimes against humanity.
After
East

its

independence, the United Nations established a Mission of Support in

Timor (UNMISET)

previously,

to assist the

new nation

for

two

years.

As

UNTAET had

UNMISET administered the Serious Crimes Unit of the East Timorese

judicial system.

In the aftermath of the US-led forces' attack on Iraq, there has been substantial

debate about

how to bring to justice, to the extent possible, the
high ranking

as well as other

government has expressed

its

officials,

of the

Saddam Hussein

regime.

The US

preference for prosecutions in reconstituted Iraqi

courts, operating with foreign assistance. 17

ing

55 most-wanted,

Many commentators, including lead-

human rights organizations, have called for the establishment of either an in-

ternational or hybrid court established under

UN

auspices, arguing that, after

decades of subservience to Ba'ath Party rule, Iraqi courts are not capable of dis-

pensing impartial justice. 18 Other commentators, including this writer, have supported the
impartial
sible

US

position

on the ground, among

others, that the creation of an

and professionally competent judiciary in Iraq

and that,

is

not a mission impos-

any event, the ultimate decision on the kind of tribunal or tribu-

in

nals to try the leaders of the

Hussein regime should be made by the new

government of Iraq. 19 As of this writing no

final decision

has been

made on

this

The US government has indicated that it plans to prosecute Iraqis in US
military tribunals for war crimes committed against US forces during the 2003
Iraq war, and perhaps also for war crimes against Americans committed during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
A primary issue arising out of the "war on terrorism" is the appropriate legal reissue.

gime to apply to

efforts to control terrorism after the horrific events

11, 2001. Prior to

as a criminal

1 1

international terrorism

law matter. Under

were prosecuted
the situation

September

is

as

common

much

this

of September

had been treated primarily

regime the perpetrators of

terrorist

crimes

criminals in the civilian courts. After September

less clear, as

the debate over the proposed use of military

commissions for prosecuting Taliban and Al Qaeda members detained

Guantanamo

Bay,

1

Cuba demonstrates. The
315

at

case against Zacarias Moussaoui, a

Enforcing the

member

confessed

of

al

Law

Qaeda and the only person

so far charged in a

with conspiring in the terrorist attacks of September 11,

is

US

court

especially salient. Be-

bers of

US government refused to allow Moussaoui to interview captured memal Qaeda who might provide useful information for his defense on the

ground

that

cause the

would endanger national

it

security, a federal district court judge has

him and that
any way to the Sep-

ruled that the government cannot seek the death penalty against

prosecutors would be barred at

tember

ulation at this writing that,

Moussaoui

to

Guantanamo

to link

him

if it loses

in

this ruling, there

the appeal, the government

military commission, possibly at the

a

Bay.

from trying

Although the government has appealed

attacks.

1 1

trial

US

may

is

spec-

transfer

military base in

20

Should such a transfer occur,

it

would

likely

be met with a firestorm of protest,

"given the obvious implication that civilian courts
rights they provide to criminal defendants

—

are

—because of the procedural

no longer capable of dealing with

defendants accused of terrorism." 21
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Protection of Cultural Property:

The Legal Aspects

Jan Hladfk

Dr.

1

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer's paper, Should International Humanitarian

Law

be Reaffirmed, Clarified or Developed?, 2 provides an excellent overview of

international humanitarian law

and touches briefly on the need

for the protection

of cultural property during armed conflict.

The

principal law of

war

treaty provisions protecting cultural property are

found in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention) 3
1954;

and

its

;

its

First Protocol, 4 also

Second Protocol of 1999. The following substantive areas of the

Hague Convention and the Second Protocol are, in my view, those
primary impact on the conduct of military operations:
•

that have the

Safeguarding of cultural property (Article 3 of the Hague Convention and

Article 5 of the
•

adopted in

5

Second Protocol);

Respect for cultural property (Article 4 of the Hague Convention and

Articles 6, 7

and

8 of the

Second Protocol);

and 25 of the Hague Convention);

•

Military measures (Articles 7

•

Protection of cultural property in occupied territory (Article 5 of the

Convention and Article 9 of the Second Protocol);

Hague

Protection of Cultural Property: The Legal Aspects

•

Special protection

under the Hague Convention and enhanced protection

under the Second Protocol

Chapter

(essentially

II

of the Hague Convention and

Chapter 3 of the Second Protocol); and
•

Hague Convention and Chapter 4 of

Sanctions (Article 28 of the

the

Second Protocol).
Safeguarding of Cultural Property

Under

Article 3, States party to the

Hague Convention

are to undertake the safe-

guarding of cultural property through the taking of appropriate measures in peacetime against the foreseeable

effect

of armed conflict. Such measures only address

property situated in the territory of the State concerned. The Convention does not
define the nature or scope of the measures;

it

leaves those questions to the discre-

tion of the State in question. This omission

is

remedied by Article 5 of the Second

Protocol, which provides for the following preparatory peacetime measures: the

preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency measures for protection
against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal of movable cultural property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of

and the designation of competent authorities responsible
cultural property.

such property,

for the safeguarding of

should be stressed that the safeguarding measures

It

may prove

helpful not only in case of armed conflict but also in the event of natural disaster or
as a highly effective

weapon

against theft.

Respect for Cultural Property
Article 4 of the

consists in

Convention provides

for respect for cultural property.

two mutually corresponding obligations of State

from the use of cultural property and
ances for

its

its

parties:

protection, situated both within their

in the event

( 1 )

to refrain

immediate surroundings or of the appli-

own territories as well as within

the territory of other State parties, for purposes likely to expose

damage

Such respect

it

to destruction or

of armed conflict; and (2) to refrain from any act of hostility

directed against such property. 6

The next paragraph of Article 4 introduces
rule

a very important exception to this

— the waiver of these obligations when required by military

waiver

is

which

referred to in Article 4.2,

tural property as defined in Article

1

1

1.2 for cultural

applicable to generally protected cul-

of the Convention.

where required by "imperative military
dressed in Article

is

necessity. 7 This

necessity."

It

permits a waiver only

Withdrawal of immunity

property under special protection

320

is

ad-

(a subject to

Jan Hladik

which I will return). Such withdrawal is permitted only in "exceptional cases of unavoidable military necessity."
Article 4.2 of the

and

its

Convention permits the State

parties to use cultural property

immediate surroundings or of the appliances

ated within their

in use for

its

protection, situ-

own territory as well as within the territory of other States parties,

for military purposes

and to conduct hostilities against such property "where mili-

tary necessity imperatively requires such a waiver."

The concept of "unavoidable

military necessity" in Article 11.2 has stricter conditions for

its

application to cul-

immunity may be with-

tural property

under

drawn "only

for such time as that necessity continues." Article 11.2 further

special protection. In particular, the

provides that "Such necessity can be established only by the officer
force the equivalent of a division in size or larger." Finally,

permit, an advance warning

is

commanding a

whenever circumstances

to be provided to the opposing party a reasonable

time in advance of the withdrawal of immunity.
Regrettably, the lack of a universally accepted definition of military necessity
leaves

room for a loose interpretation of these provisions or even their abuse. Three

interesting definitions illustrate this issue.

Government of Armies of the United
Lieber.

Known

as the Lieber

The

first is

from the Instructions

States in the Field, prepared

Code, they were promulgated

as

for the

by Francis

General Orders No.

100 by President Lincoln on April 24, 1863. They provide, in part, as follows:
Article 14. Military necessity, as

understood by modern

civilized nations, consists in

the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the

war, and which are lawful according to the

modern law and

Article 15. Military necessity admits of

direct destruction of

all

usages of war.

life

or limb of armed

enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the
armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every
enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it
allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life
from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords
necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not
involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements
entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who
take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be
moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

Article 16. Military necessity does not

admit of cruelty - that

suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge,
in fight,

nor of torture to extort confessions.

It

any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a

321

is,

the infliction of

nor of maiming or wounding except

does not admit of the use of poison in
district. It

admits of deception, but

2
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disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of
hostility

which makes the return

The second

definition

to peace unnecessary difficult." 8

comes from Morris Greenspan who defined

apply that amount and kind of force which

cessity as "the right to

compel the submission of the enemy with the

and money." 9

life

'[a]

Law Dictionary

Finally, Black's

principle of warfare that permits

end, as long as the force used
Black's provides a

is

least possible

background reference

necessary to

expenditure of time,

states that military necessity

enough coercive

not more than

is

military ne-

is

force to achieve a desired

by the

called for

to the 1907

is

situation." 10

Hague Convention on Laws

and Customs of War.
It is

guity

important to point out that military commanders were aware of this ambi-

and

stated:

connection General Eisenhower's order of December 24, 1943

in this

"Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. This

cepted principle. The phrase 'military necessity'

is

sometimes used where

is
it

an ac-

would

be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience.
I

do not want

it

11
For this reason, the
to cloak slackness or indifference."

Protocol amplifies the provisions regarding military necessity as
cultural property

it

Second

relates to

both

under general protection and that under enhanced protection.

What are the main substantive issues contained in the new definition of military
necessity in the Second Protocol? In my opinion, Article 6 includes two new elements:

first,

necessity

a waiver of the respect obligation

when

ner in which

cultural property has

it is

on the

basis of imperative military

now been transformed,

because of the man-

being used, into a military objective (Article 6(a) (i)); and second,

tightening the circumstances under which the obligation not to use cultural property for purposes likely to expose

waived. The

first

it

to destruction or

damage

(Article 6(b))

provision concerns the attacker, while the second applies to the

defender. In addition, Article 6(a)(i), which

Additional Protocol

I

is

based on Article 52.

12

of the 1977

on the Protection of Victims of International Armed

Conflicts to the four 1949

Geneva Conventions, thus makes

a

nexus between the

Second Protocol and the definition of military objective under Protocol
13,

may be

I.

Article

which de facto develops the definition of "unavoidable military necessity" un-

der Article

1

1.2

of the Convention, brings in two

must be ordered

tack

at the highest operational level

obligation to provide advance warning.
tively

tary

new elements:

It is

of

the decision to at-

command and

necessary to point out that to effec-

implement these abstract definitions they must be further

manuals and

rules of engagement

To conclude on

and must be interpreted

the issue of military necessity,

Carnahan, an acknowledged expert

in the

law of armed

322

the

let

me

clarified in mili-

in

good

faith.

quote Burrus M.

conflict:

Jan Hladik
Today, military necessity
ignored

if international

is

widely regarded as something that must be overcome or

humanitarian law

is

and

to develop,

its

original role as a limit

forgotten. As a result, the principle has not been applied in
where it could serve as a significant legal restraint until more specific
or customs are established. 13

on military action has been

new

situations

treaty rules

Article 4.3 of the

put a stop to

Convention introduces the obligations to prohibit, prevent and
misappropriation

theft, pillage,

of,

and

acts

of vandalism against cul-

from requisitioning

tural property. State parties are also required to refrain

cultural

property located in the territory of another party (Article 4.3) and from making cultural property the object of reprisals (Article 4.4).
historic

monuments, works of art or

spiritual heritage

and

places of worship constituting the cultural or

of peoples is reiterated in Article 53(c) of Additional Protocol I. The

waiver of military necessity
Articles 7

The prohibition of reprisals against

8 of the

not applicable to those obligations.

is

Second Protocol provide

for precautions in attack

precautions against the effects of hostilities, respectively. Article 7 imposes a

and

num-

ber of obligations on a military commander, such as verifying that objectives to be

means and methods of attack that
damage, abstaining from attacks that cause excessive

attacked are not cultural property, selecting

avoid or minimize incidental
incidental damage,

and cancelling or suspending

attacks if the objective

is

cultural

property or the attack may cause excessive incidental damage to cultural property.

The

first

two obligations require the military commander

feasible, in

other words what

is

to

do everything that

in his/her power, to fulfill those requirements.

is

As to

the Article 8 precautions against the effects of hostilities, State parties must, to the

maximum

extent feasible,

remove movable

from the

cultural property

military objectives or provide for adequate in situ protection,

vicinity of

and avoid locating

drawn to the
word "feasible." The implementation of this obligation will depend on a number of
military objectives near cultural property. Attention should be again

factors such as the density of the population, the location of armament industries

or economic potential of the State concerned. Finally,
ticles

7

and

it

8 mirror Article 57 (Precautions in attack)

against the effects of attack) of Additional Protocol

I,

should be stressed that Ar-

and Article 58 (Precautions

thus ensuring cohesion in the

implementation of both the Second Protocol and the Additional Protocol.
Military Measures

Military measures are mainly

These, to a certain extent,

embodied

in Articles 7

complement each

and 25 of the Convention.

other. Article 7 provides for

cipal categories of State party obligations: (1) introduction in

323

two prin-

peacetime into their

)
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Conand cul-

military regulations or instructions of provisions ensuring observance of the

vention and fostering in their military personnel respect for the culture
tural property of all peoples;

and

services or specialist personnel

(2) the establishment, again in

whose purpose

peacetime, of

to secure respect for cultural

is

who

property and to cooperate with the civilian authorities

are responsible for

its

safeguarding. In addition, Article 30.3(a) of the Second Protocol expressly obligates States to incorporate guidelines

and instructions on the protection of cultural

property into their military regulations.

To
the

facilitate

UNESCO

the dissemination of the Second Protocol within the
14

Secretariat has prepared a series of inserts

armed

forces,

for training military per-

sonnel on the Protocol's obligations. The main insert contains a detailed discussion

of the Protocol's provisions. Other inserts provide a
tions for those providing training to officers
listed

members of armed

inserts to

its

forces. It

is

up

and

list

of possible instructor ques-

soldiers' rules for the training

to each State's

military traditions, military doctrine

armed

of en-

forces to adapt the

and training methods.

Protection of Cultural Property in Occupied Territory

The 1954 Convention

requires the occupying State to take the "most necessary

sures" to preserve cultural property
in the

occupied territory

are unable to
ticle

do so

if

damaged by

military operations that

is

mea-

situated

the competent national authorities of the occupied State

(Article 5.2). This Article's obligations are

complemented by Ar-

9 of the Second Protocol requiring the occupying Party to prohibit and prevent:

( 1

any

(2)

any archaeological excavation, except when

illicit

export or other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property;
strictly

or preserve cultural property; and (3) any alteration

property which

is

required to safeguard, record

to,

or change of use

intended to conceal or destroy cultural, historical or

dence. Furthermore,

no archaeological excavation

of cultural property in occupied territory

of, alteration to,

of, cultural

scientific evi-

or change of use

may be carried out without close coopera-

tion with the competent national authorities of the occupied territory, unless cir-

cumstances do not permit such cooperation.
Finally,

ment

it

should be stressed that the 1954 Protocol, a complementary instru-

to the original

from occupied

territory. If export

such property that
territory

Hague Convention,

is

from which

does occur,

located within
it

was

prohibits the export of cultural property

illicitly

its

it

requires each State party to return

territory to the

exported. This

is

competent authorities of the

to occur

when

hostilities

have

ended. The 1954 Protocol also expressly forbids the appropriation of cultural
property as war reparations. This provision

324

is

of fundamental importance because
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.,

of its clear recognition that the unique nature of cultural objects makes them inappropriate subjects of war reparations.

Special Protection under the

Hague Convention

and Enhanced Protection under the Second Protocol
It

should be noted that in addition to general protection 15 under Chapter

the

Hague Convention,

(a) refuges

intended to shelter movable

cultural property in the event of armed conflict; (b) centers containing

ments; and

(c)

of

may be

Article 8.1 provides that special protection

granted to three categories of property:

I

monu-

other immovable cultural property of very great importance.

Unlike the general protection which

is

attributed to

property, the granting of special protection

is

all

categories of cultural

not automatic. The Convention

two conditions: (1) the
cultural property in question must be situated at an adequate distance from a de
facto military objective; and (2) such property must not be used for military
subjects the granting of such protection essentially to

purposes.

What
tion

and

is
is,

"an adequate distance?" The phrase

is

not defined by the Conven-

therefore, left to the discretion of each State party to the

tion. Its definition will obviously

depend on

a

Conven-

number of factors, such

as the

presence of military units or armament industry or requirements of national

The only exception to the requirement of the adequate distance is
found in Article 8.5. Under that provision, if the cultural property is situated in
self-defense.

the proximity of an important military objective, the special protection
nevertheless granted

if

the State concerned undertakes not to use this military

objective in the event of

upon

maybe

armed

conflict. Finally, special protection

request by the State where the cultural property concerned

Cultural property under special protection

is

is

is

granted

situated.

listed in the "International

Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection," a registry maintained

by the Director-General of UNESCO. At present, cultural property in three
States (Germany, the Holy See, and the Netherlands) is entered in the Register.
The total property protected is four refuges for movable cultural property and
the whole of the Vatican City State. Two States (Austria and the Netherlands)
submitted registration requests but later withdrew them. Since only three
States have placed five sites under special protection and the last entry in the
Register took place in 1978, clearly the concept of special protection has never
fully

developed

its

potential.

Why have the vast majority of States abstained from placing their cultural sites
under special protection? There

may

be several reasons. In particular, the
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impossibility of complying with the condition of adequate distance

from

a large in-

dustrial center or military objective for densely-populated countries; technical difficulties in

submitting nominations; or the fear of designating cultural property for

special protection because of possible terrorist attacks; or, in fact, providing

eventual adversary with a ready

made

an

"hit-list."

Because the special protection provisions of the Hague Convention had
gain widespread usage, the Second Protocol in Chapter 3 establishes a

failed to

new concept

of "enhanced protection" that combines aspects of special protection from the

Hague Convention and

the criteria for listing of cultural property in the

Heritage List under the 1972
the

UNESCO

World Cultural and Natural

World

Convention concerning the Protection of

Heritage. 16

Under

the

new concept

of enhanced

protection, three conditions are to be met: the cultural property in question

be of the greatest importance for humanity;

it

must

must be protected by adequate do-

mestic legal and administrative measures that recognize

its

exceptional cultural

and historic value; and it may not be used for military purposes or to shield military
sites.

A

declaration to this latter

end must be provided. Enhanced protection

is

granted by entering the property in the List of Cultural Property under Enhanced
Protection provided for by Article 27.1(b).

The granting of enhanced protection is accorded by a twelve-member intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict. As in the case of special protection, objections to the granting of
enhanced protection are permitted but they must be based only on the failure to
meet one or more of the three criteria described above. This prevents States who
are party to the Second Protocol from making objections based purely on political

animosity or mutual non-recognition, thus avoiding cases such as that of

Cambodia, which

in

1972 requested the entry of several

cause of the objections filed by four States

ment of Cambodia

at that time, the

who

sites in

the Register. Be-

did not recognize the Govern-

entry was not made. Finally, unlike the

granting of special protection which requires no objection from any other state
party to the
ity

Hague Convention, enhanced protection may be granted by a major-

of four-fifths of the above Committee. 17

Sanctions

Article 28 of the 1954

Convention imposes an obligation on

punish those persons (regardless of their nationality)

States to prosecute

and

who commit breaches or or-

der the commission of breaches of the Convention. The deficiency of this provision
is its

general character

sanctioned nor does

—

it

Article 28 does not contain a

sets forth the

list

of crimes or offenses to be

procedural aspects of sanctions.
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.

This deficiency

is

addressed in Chapter 4 of the Second Protocol. Article 15 es-

tablishes a category of serious violations (which can be of either the 1954

Second Protocol

tion or the

itself).

Five offenses

fall

within this category:

•

Making

•

Using cultural property under enhanced protection or

cultural property

Conven-

under enhanced protection the object of attack;
its

immediate

surroundings in support of military action;
Extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under

•

the

Hague Convention and
Making

•

the Second Protocol;

cultural property protected

under the Hague Convention and the

Second Protocol the object of attack; and,
Theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against,

•

cultural property protected

under the Convention.

Article 16.1 establishes universal jurisdiction with regard to the first three types

of offenses.

—

Chapter IV also addresses other aspects of criminal responsibility
tional issues, extradition,

mutual

legal assistance,

and the adoption of legislative,

administrative, or disciplinary measures to address other violations of the
tion or Protocol. Again, each State party to the
articles

To

within

its

facilitate

jurisdic-

Conven-

Second Protocol must adopt those

national penal legislation, either civilian or military or both.

the domestic implementation of the provisions of Chapter IV, the

UNESCO Secretariat commissioned and widely distributed a consultant's study on
composed of three parts: the first part introduces the relevant provisions of Chapter 4 and compares them with other international humanitarian law penal provisions by referring to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
1977 Additional Protocol I, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International CrimiThis study

this issue.

is

nal Court; the second provides twelve case studies related to six countries with a

common

law tradition (Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, the United Kingdom,

and the United

States)

and

six countries

with a

civil

law tradition (Argentina,

France, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and Switzerland); the third
part contains a

summary of recommendations. 18
Conclusion

It is

important that there be close cooperation between UNESCO and national mil-

itary forces in
is

implementing and enforcing the body of cultural protection law that

set forth in the

cause

it is

1954 Hague Convention and

those forces that must ensure

its
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and Second Protocol be-

application during the execution of
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combat operations. Unless military forces are properly trained and informed of the
location of cultural property in the adversary's territory and unless rules of engage-

ment address the protection of cultural property, then

cultural property will not be

accorded the necessary protection.
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XIX
The Law of Armed Conflict
and the War on Terrorism

David E. Graham

1

paper, allow me
commenting on Mr. Lavoyer's presentation, well
Inbegin
with
concluding remarks and then move from there
speak
2

as his

as

to

his

observations regarding whether there

is

a

need to

revise,

would note
conflict" (LOAC),

ism."

I

again, as

I

that,

as

it is

contrary to Mr. Lavoyer,

opposed

to "international

to his

amend, or supplement the

existing law of armed conflict in light of the events of September

ensuing declaration by the United States that

to

1 1

,

2001

— and the

now engaged in a "war on terrorI ^will

use the term "law of armed

humanitarian law" (IHL). Once

have stated on a number of previous occasions, both

at

conferences here

Newport and elsewhere, I have yet to hear a definitive explanation as to the need
for
or the body of law encompassed by this latter term. If it is but a kinder, gentler synonym for the law of armed conflict, it is duplicative in nature
and unnecin

—

essary.

human

—

If,

on the other hand,

rights law,

manders

I

reject

it

it

—

purports to embrace some undefined aspects of

as unclear, confusing,

and fraught with

peril for

com-

in the field.

In the draft of his paper, Mr. Lavoyer notes that, "The best guarantee for respect
[of the law of armed conflict]
in

is

to keep the

complete agreement. Aspirational

nature and bear

little

tems. Moreover, they

law realistic." With

LOAC

reality to the practice

harm

this statement,

I

am

standards are inherently subjective in

of warfare and

the credibility of the

LOAC

modern weapon

as a

sys-

whole. As has been

The Law of Armed Conflict and the War on Terrorism

previously stated in

many fora,

this

is

a principal reason

why the United

States has

number of the provisions of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 3 and why it has chosen not to become a party to this Protocol.
rejected a

—

Mr. Lavoyer notes

that,

"[T]he main challenge today

proper application of IHL in today's armed
cent

armed

ICRC

without any doubt the

conflicts. Extensive research into re-

on the whole, the existing
armed conflicts." 4 Once again,

to conclude that,

adequate enough to deal with today's

rules are
I

conflicts has led the

is

agree completely with this statement.

I

do not number myself among those who

now criticize the law of armed conflict "for not being adequate to deal with the 'war
terror.'" 5

on

More on

this particular point, later.

Now, lest you feel that I am being overly kind to Mr. Lavoyer, let me turn to a
number of areas of disagreement. In his paper, he makes reference to a study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the customary LOAC. (He refers to it as "customary IHL.") In doing so, he states that,

—

—

The study published in 2005 will be particularly useful for non-international
armed conflicts. Maybe the most important result of the study is the fact that many
rules of the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

relating to the

conduct of hostilities also apply

armed conflicts on a customary law basis. Furthermore,
IHL treaties will be bound by their customary rules. 6

to internal

certain

This, of course,

national

is

a significant overstatement of the effect of this study.

community,

However,

I

States not party to

think that

of the study's process

at large,

to

gage in this endeavor, not

has not been privy to the results of the ICRC's work.

somewhat controversial nature
include even the supposed mandate of the ICRC to en-

all

States will find themselves in full

conclusions which are drawn therein.

always useful to

It is

agreement with the

remember

sence of customary international law in general, and the customary
ticular,

the

is

State practice,

inter-

safe to say that, given the

it is

—

The

and

—

for better or

worse

—

that the es-

LOAC in par-

the principal practitioner of

LOAC is the United States.

Mr. Lavoyer

refers to the

ICRC

as the

"promoter and 'guardian' of IHL." 7 Well

enough. However, in his draft paper he then goes on to declare
assessment of the needs of the victims of armed conflicts,
clarifications or

of the
sion.

and formulating the

— not

latter.

that of the

Such an arrangement would

community

in

is

the

this assertion,

domain of

far

exceed the

its

I

dis-

the international

demands
ICRC's charter and mis-

ICRC. The former does not respond

While the ICRC can play

tional

LOAC

"Based on

well placed to prepare

developments of humanitarian law." With

agree. Clarifying

community

it is

that,

to the

a vital role in facilitating the efforts of the interna-

addressing

LOAC

matters,
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cannot unilaterally dictate the

—
David E. Graham

agenda.

A prime example of the ICRC's attempt to aspire to the latter is the state-

ment

Mr. Lavoyer's draft paper

in

has to continue in specific

"[development of humanitarian law
domains. The restriction or prohibition of weapons is a

good example." I would submit,
tems

lies

that, the

to you, that such decisions regarding

with the community of States

—not the ICRC.

—

me now turn my attention to the primary point of discussion Did 9/11 and
US Administration's subsequent pronouncement of a "war on terrorism"

Let

the

manifest the need for a fundamental revision of the
rent

body of law

conflict"?

It

is

Mr. Lavoyer

says,

"No"

—

I

has been asserted that terrorist attacks

sense,

an armed

especially if

group

at

it is

agree that

used

States

if the

—

He

notes that

including the attacks of September

were part of a global "armed
ago and that

will

to justify that States

on whose

war on

could theoretically

—without having

to obtain

were considered

2001

conflict" in the legal

in practice,

strike the transnational

any kind of approval,

territories the military interventions take place.

terror

1 1,

continue until the end of

Such a conclusion would have considerable consequences

any time and everywhere

from those

agree.

conflict that started years

terrorist activities.

LOAC in the belief that the cur-

simply incapable of effectively dealing with this "new form of

as well as counter-terrorist activities

I

weapon sys-

as a "global

armed

e.g.,

8

conflict" there

would be considerable consequences. But those consequences are not reached, because, for good reasons, it's not a "global armed conflict."
From a legal perspective, the "global war on terrorism" is simply hyperbolic fiction

—

a

good political sound bite, but nothing more.

Is this

"declaration of war"

by

the Executive branch, vice Congress, truly intended to advise the international

community
forces across

that the President, acting unilaterally, will

now

deploy

US armed

any international boundary or boundaries, with or without the con-

sent of the State or States concerned, to engage in
terrorist organization

tion? Pause for a

—

combatant

regardless of the cause purported

activity against

any

by such an organiza-

moment to consider not only the LOAC concerns that such a pro-

nouncement would invoke, but the broad range of jus ad bellum issues, as well.
Indeed, the US congressional and United Nations Security Council resolutions authorizing the use offeree against the Taliban government of Afghanistan pointedly
tied such a use offeree against only those who engaged in the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon and those who assisted these individuals in their efforts. In no way can these resolutions be cited as authority for the current Administration to unilaterally declare that it is engaged in a "global armed
conflict" against "terrorism," which itself is an undefined phenomenon.
For this reason, we must continue to draw a sharp distinction between acts of
"terrorism" to which numerous international conventions are applicable, and

—
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what can legitimately be perceived

an unlawful "armed attack" against the

as

United States committed by "unlawful combatants" or "unprivileged belligerents,"
i.e., al

fined

Qaeda personnel, aided and abetted by the Taliban government. Well deinternational conventions and State domestic laws apply to terrorist acts,

while the
to

LOAC applies to the use of force undertaken in

an armed attack. The United States must choose: Does

self-defense in response

it

view al Qaeda members

whom the law relevant to terrorism applies, or does it view these

as "terrorists" to

individuals as "unlawful combatants" engaged in an unlawful belligerency (armed
attack) against the
ble?

It

United States and

cannot have

it

its

When

both ways.

viewed

requires

no

Qaeda

al

significant revision;

it

the

if

LOAC

is

applica-

one must come

to

the United States does view

its

in this context,

the conclusion, arrived at by Mr. Lavoyer, that,

ongoing use of force against

whom

citizens to

LOAC

an armed attack, the

as a response to

need only be applied.

While the current Administration might

assert the validity of

its

use of military

—

—

Qaeda personnel and those who support them wherever they
might be found, even this claim must realistically be tempered by the rights of sovforce against al

ereign States under existing international law.
States realistically apply the

LOAC

How,

to a global

for example, does the

war against

Qaeda members

al

United

When

Qaeda?

the

Yemen, did it comply with
the applicable LOAC? With international law in general? Did the United States gain
United States targeted suspected

al

Yemeni government prior to

the consent of the

ders? Absent the consent of any State in

which

its

al

in

use of force within the

latter's

Qaeda personnel might be

bor-

discov-

ered, does the relevant Security Council resolution sanction the use of armed force

by the United
tions? If not,

States within

such a State? Does

what provisions of the

all

LOAC apply to such opera-

of the

LOAC do apply? These are but a few of the ques-

tions associated with this subject that merit serious consideration

The

last issue

I

shall address

among

status of those individuals captured
ticular,

by coalition forces

Guantanamo

—

which the LOAC,

to

by the current US Administration. Given

in

its

entirety, applied

captured personnel have been afforded
fact,

Bay.

clearly constituted

to

is

the legal

in Afghanistan, and, in parI

agree with his assess-

military action taken against the Taliban

Qaeda operatives within Afghanistan

resolution.

those discussed by Mr. Lavoyer

those currently being detained at

ment that the coalition

—and

government and al

an international conflict

a fact belatedly

and reluctantly agreed

why none of the
prisoner of war (POW) status
why all, in
this fact,

he questions

—

have been declared to be "unlawful combatants." Again, he asserts that

not a matter that gives
existing

LOAC

Convention 9

—

the

rise to a necessity for revising

long

— need only be

find myself in

established
applied.

agreement with

or amending the

provisions

Once again

I

the

LOAC;

Third

is

the

Geneva

agree with Mr. Lavoyer.

his contention that while
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of

this

I

he might understand

even

how

David E. Graham
the relevant provisions of Article 4 of the Third Convention could be interpreted in

POW status could be denied to all al Qaeda personnel, how can the

such a way that

same be said to be true of members of the Taliban army as a whole? The question of
the status of Taliban fighters deserves far

parently given

it

careful consideration than that ap-

by the responsible US decision makers. While

for the decision not to accord

gued that sound

more

a case can be

made

POW status to the Taliban captives, some have arconsiderations should have dictated a dif-

legal, as well as policy,

ferent course of action.

Where I do

US

decision

disagree with Mr. Lavoyer, however,

"To make

a blanket determination

captured combatants from

contends that "If there
in the

is

act

and

with his contention that, the

status,

and having

enumerated

he does not

arise as to

fallen into the

cite

start all

He

specifically

competent tribunals

as foreseen

Third Geneva Convention should come into action."

"Should any doubt

from the

to disqualify

POW status raises serious concerns."

doubt about that

refers to Article 5 tribunals,
part:

is

11

10

While

this

statement

the text of this article, which reads, in

whether persons, having committed a belligerent

hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories

in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present

Con-

vention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal."

Mr. Lavoyer clearly implies that the United States had a LOAC obligation under
Article 5 to

employ tribunals to determine the

captives. Yet this

is

clearly not the case.

veals that this provision

sons

status of both al

An examination of Pictet's Commentary re-

was intended to apply only to

who accompany the Armed

Qaeda and Taliban

Forces and

who

Even more telling is the clear language of Article

deserters,

and

to those per-

have

lost their identity cards. 12

5, itself:

"Should any doubt arise as

to whether persons. ..belong to any of the categories

enumerated

."

in Article 4.

(Emphasis added.) While one might argue with the Administration's

.

.

legal ratio-

Qaeda and Taliban captives were to be viewed as
"unlawful combatants," one cannot posit the argument that there existed any degree of doubt on the part of the Administration as to the status of the individuals in
question. I would submit to Mr. Lavoyer
and to others who have raised this isthat the "doubt" referred to in Article 5 must arise in the "mind" of the "Capsue
turing Party," not that of third States, the ICRC, or the collective psyche of the
international community. When the President of the United States makes a determination as to the status of personnel captured by US armed forces on the battlefield, there would appear to be no doubt on the part of the Capturing Party as to the
nale for determining that

all al

—

—

status of the individuals concerned, and, in the absence of
clearly exists
It is

no

LOAC obligation to conduct Article 5

important,

I

think, that in the final analysis

Lavoyer's essential premise:

tribunals.

we

are in agreement

The events of 9/11 do not
335

such "doubt," there

call

on Mr.

for revising or
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supplementing the LOAC. What
ture of the "conflict" in

called for

is

which the United

is

a candid recognition of the true na-

States

is

engaged

—and

a

good

faith ad-

herence to both the law of armed conflict and the other controlling principles
of international law.
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1

9/11 has now passed into folklore. As everybody, in another generation, can recall

where they were when they heard of the assassination of President Ken-

nedy, so for

the

this,

first

information of the terrible events that unfolded that bright

September day are indelibly engraved on the memory.
ations

and

just as

with horror,

I

at the

can

recall

news from

standing in
Dallas, so

I

my school
recall the

I

am a member of both gener-

dormitory in England, frozen

cold shiver

down my spine

as

I

stood on the second tee of the famous Berkshire Golf Club, hearing on a radio, going
full

volume on a

local building site, the chilling

account of what was happening in

New York. By the time I returned to the Club House, the news from Washington and
Pennsylvania was also

in.

The world would never be

the

same

again.

The purpose of this article is to look at the effect of 9/1 1 on the field of international
and operational

law, in particular

Europe. For most of the

dom

in particular),

world peace.

It

last

on

interoperability

century, the United States

between the United

and Europe

have worked together in the military

has been like a marriage.

We

field,

(the

States

and

United King-

to the great benefit of

have been comfortable together and

work together, recognizing each others foibles. Difficulties have been overcome with good will and a willingness to appreciate one another's point of view. How-

learned to

ever,

I

will

and more

be suggesting in

this analysis that there

talking across each other.

I,

like

seems

now to be less understanding

a good marriage guidance counselor, will

and
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seek to go behind the rhetoric and try to look at what
this malaise. In

medical terms,

I

will try to

look

symptoms. That may involve analyzing some
I

spent most of my career in the

and what we now

call

at the

I

see as the underlying causes of

root of the illness rather than the

difficult,

and indeed

sensitive, areas.

UK Army working in the field of international,

operational, law.

To me,

the former

the academic side

is

and

the latter, in relation to the law of armed conflict, the practical application. Both go

hand

in glove.

One

of the advantages of being a military lawyer

The battlefield

theories. Delays

is

can cost

often the lodestone.
vital tool in

the

tools that can

carded.

a very practical place.
lives.

is

I

the sounding board of

no room

for ivory towers or fine

have learned that the law of armed conflict

tool box.

be found in that box,

Law that

is

it

However,

must prove

just as with the

its

impracticable will be disregarded

and those of us involved

one can mix

Decisions have to be instant. The law of good faith

Over the years,

commander's

There

that

on

the academic and the practical, checking out the theory
fact.

is

usefulness

a

myriad of other
not to be dis-

if it is

on the battlefield. That

in the negotiation of international treaties

is

is

is

a fact

and the develop-

ment of international law forget that at our peril. The law of armed conflict is in some
ways a Faustian pact between the interests of humanity and military reality. If the
balance tilts too far in either direction the result is a breakdown in the whole system.

Much

of my professional

life

has also been spent working with

US

forces.

From

my early days as a young officer at the US Army JAG School at Charlottesville, Virginia,

through a tour

at

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

in Belgium, to

Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I have worked alongside my US colleagues in friendship

and harmony.

when we have

We

have shared ideas and, on the surprisingly few occasions

we have worked together to find practical solutions to the
practical problems that we have encountered. As a result, I have rarely found any sedisagreed,

rious interoperability problems

on the ground between

UK and US forces.

But things are beginning to change. Since 9/11, there seems to have been an increasing disconnect between the United States
its

and Europe. That appeared to reach

climax in the unseemly rows over the questions raised by Operation Iraqi Free-

dom. 2 The divide between the United States and what Secretary Rumsfeld described as "Old Europe" 3 opened into a chasm. The distrust, and in some cases,
open dislike, that has developed will take a long time to overcome. The old "entente cordiale" appears to have broken down and even within the "special relationship," there seem to be strains appearing. The United States and the United

Kingdom appear

at

tempting to form

a bridge

times to be moving along diverging tracks.

between the United

self like a rider trying to sit astride

horses have

moved

States

two horses

further apart than has been
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Tony Blair,

in at-

and Europe has found him-

at the

same

good

for the health of the rider.

time. At times those
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This divergence of political views has reached into other areas as well. Within the

law of armed

have appeared that are beginning to impact on

conflict, stresses

and hence operational

interoperability

ingly as looking

upon European

"coalitions of the willing." This

and there

is

an

its

European

allies,

seen increas-

is

asset in opera-

growing emphasis on

began in Kosovo where the United

impression of feeling constrained by

where

States

forces as a liability rather than

tional terms. Traditional alliances are overlooked
4

The United

efficiency.

States gave the

continued in Afghanistan

of assistance from European States (other than the United Kingdom)

offers

appeared to be declined, and culminated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Whilst that

purported to be a coalition,

was one run very much on

it

been involved on the ground in Operation
alition Provisional

Authority and

I

Iraqi

US

terms.

I

have myself

Freedom working as part of the Co-

have to admit that, in terms of interoperability,

has been the hardest of all the operations in which

I

it

have participated.

Why is that? Where does this divergence spring from? I want to look at three areas
where problems have arisen and examine them in
problems?

What

is

the nature of the

How have they arisen and can they be overcome? Finally, I will try to look

to the future.

doomed to wither on the vine amidst muand increasing US isolationism? Or can these issues be resolved

Are the traditional

tual recriminations

in such a

detail.

alliances

way that the United States, acknowledged as the world's only remaining su-

perpower, will lead a willing, rather than recalcitrant, world in the pursuit of peace?
I

will start

by jumping in the deep end of the pool. Probably the most public dis-

agreement between the Atlantic

allies

has been over the question of "unlawful

combatants." The issue of Guantanamo and
sore. Yet, in

stance but in

my view,
its

It

need not be

early days,

As much as anything,
lem.

it

it is

I

so. It

its

inmates has become a running

has turned into a disagreement of sub-

would suggest that it was more

a matter of linguistics.

the term "unlawful combatant" that has caused the prob-

has confused the matter of combatant status and has led to

facto lawyering that always, in

some

ex post

my experience, leads to trouble.

In order to understand the problem,

it is

necessary to go back into the history of

By tradition, States had a monopoly on violence. Only States
could conduct wars and it was therefore for States to decide who could take part in
them. With the limited range of weaponry up until the last century, it was not difficombatant

cult to

status.

have a clear division between those who were authorised by the State to take

part in warfare

and those who were not so

themselves in the hostilities, they were
for the acts that they carried out.

munity which enabled them

entitled. If these latter

chose to involve

common criminals and could be prosecuted

Those who had

official

to carry out acts that

authorization had an im-

would otherwise be unlawful

without sanction. This immunity led to the development of "combatant status" to
represent those entitled to take part in hostilities. Those
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important to note that

this distinction

is

somewhat confused by Article

Hague Convention IV of 1907 5 ).

3 of the Regulations attached to
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this concept, that

combatant

entitlement of a State to authorize persons to take part in
limited to international

non-international
malia,

all

sides

—

armed

where one

side

—or

in

armed

of necessity,
in

some situations such as So-

in recent years with attempts to bring together the

and non-international armed

conflict.

conflict.

However,

this loose use

law relating to

There has been an increasing

tendency to use the term "combatant" in relation to participants
tional

is,

There can be no "combatant immunity"

conflict.

conflict

hostilities,

lack that essential authority. This previously accepted tenet has

come under stress
international

armed

status arises out of the

of language

is,

in

in non-interna-

my view, dangerous

word is used in a separate sense from international armed conflict. Participants
in non-international armed conflicts remain subject to domestic law and dissident
forces have no immunity from that, even in respect of acts which would be legitimate
under international law, such as attacks on military personnel or military objectives.
There have, indeed, been some non-international armed conflicts where the level of
as the

intensity has
fighters,

been such that a form of belligerent

been accorded to rebel

status has

but these are the exception rather than the rule and such concessions have

usually been

more

for pragmatic than for legal reasons.

The word "combatant" has

always indicated a particular status and attempts to extend

use should be resisted.

its

Guantanamo situasimilar loose use of language occurs and this can have an effect on some funda-

In the arguments that have arisen out of Afghanistan and the
tion,

mental tenets of international law as defined over the years. In the

first

instance, the

"war on terror"

raises the

By custom,

has been limited to conflicts between States. Under treaty law,

defined in

this

whole question of what

Common Article

2 of the

war or of any other armed

conflict

Contracting Parties, even

if

The

is

an international armed

Geneva Conventions

6

as "all cases

conflict.
it is

of declared

which may arise between two or more of the High

the state of war

is

not recognized by one of them."

inclusion of the words "High Contracting Parties"

provision also involves States. Non-State entities

fall

makes

outside

its

it

plain that this

terms.

Thus

pirates,

however well organised and however international their activities, cannot, by attacking State forces, create a state of international

combatant

selves

—not

piracy

status.

They remain

the law relating to

armed

pirates

armed

conflict so as to gain for

and subject

them-

to the law relating to

conflict. Similarly, criminal organizations

such as the Mafia and drug cartels, despite having tentacles that reach across international boundaries
fall

and often using

levels

of force that would in other circumstances

within the definition of "armed conflict," cannot benefit by bringing themselves

out of the ambit of criminal law into the law of armed conflict. "Terrorists" are in a
similar position,

though

in their case, the situation
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complicated further by two
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additional factors, the lack of an agreed definition of the term
State

that

sponsored terrorism. However, in

this latter case,

it is

and the existence of

not the acts of terrorism

may create an international armed conflict but the involvement of the State be-

hind those

acts.

In cases where terrorists have

no

State sponsor, their acts

remain

amount to international armed conflict.
The campaign in Afghanistan muddied the waters. It is beyond dispute that
there was indeed an international armed conflict between the Coalition and Afghanistan. That meant that combatant status was an issue for those people involved
in that conflict. But just because there was a specific armed conflict taking place
does not mean that the status of "international armed conflict" extended to all activities in the "war against terror." Even within the United States, some alleged
"terrorists" were arrested and dealt with by the ordinary criminal justice system. It
criminal but cannot, in themselves,

follows that the
is

first

decision in relation to any attempt to obtain combatant status

to identify the international

armed

conflict to

which the claim

relates.

However, the mere identification of an international armed conflict is not
cient. It is
satisfies

then necessary to examine the individual concerned to see

field is necessarily a

the battle-

combatant.

Most examinations into the definition of combatant begin with Article
Hague Regulations of 1907. 7 This reads:
The

laws, rights,

volunteer corps

person

if that

Not everybody to be found on

the definition of "combatant."

suffi-

and duties of war apply not only

fulfilling

to armies, but also to militia

of the

and

the following conditions:

1.

To be commanded by a person

2.

To have

3.

To

4.

To conduct

a fixed distinctive

carry arms openly;

1

responsible for his subordinates;

emblem

recognizable at a distance;

and

their operations in accordance with the laws

and customs of war.

In countries where militia or volunteer groups constitute the

army or form

part of it,

they are included under the denomination "army."

The Hague Regulations were accepted

Nuremberg and
Article
tury,

lie

their

customary international law

terms have been relatively unchallenged. However, within

the seeds of a controversy that has surfaced in the

one hundred years

later. It will

apply to militia and volunteer corps
it."

as reflecting

Does this mean that the "army"

first

at

this

part of the 21st cen-

be noted that the four conditions only appear to

who do

itself is

not "constitute the army or form part of

exempt from these conditions? The answer
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might seem. At the time, in 1907, the difficulties

tween combatants and non-combatants were not so

most part

linear

of uniform.

It

ditions because

in distinguishing be-

severe. Battlefields

and armies, almost by definition, wore distinguishing

was therefore not necessary to require armies
it

was assumed

that they would. This view

The
spite

definition contained in the

huge changes

It

comply with such con-

is

supported by case law

militias or volunteer corps
(2)

it

mem-

until 1977, de-

was reinforced by the Third Geneva
status.

This granted prisoner

forces of a Party to the conflict as well as

forming part of such armed

of organized resistance movements, belonging

own

territory,

even

to

a Party

if this territory

is

members of

forces.

Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,

or outside their

clear that

alia, to:

Members of the armed

(1)

by way

from compliance. 8

Convention of 1949 which dealt with prisoner of war
of war status, inter

features

Hague Regulations would stand

in the nature of warfare.

were for the

to

both within the United States and the United Kingdom which made
bers of armed forces could not excuse themselves

Waters

to the conflict

including those

and operating in

occupied, provided that such

militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements,

fulfil

the

following conditions:

commanded by a person

(a) that

of being

(b) that

of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable

(c) that

of carrying arms openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in

or war.

which I have highlighted,

same assumption

tias

at a distance;

accordance with the laws and customs

y

Apart from the wording

the

responsible for his subordinates;

is

specifically referring to
this

is

organized resistance movements

taken directly from the Hague Regulations. However,

made in the distinction between armed forces and "other mili-

and members of other volunteer corps" which do not form part of the armed

forces.

Anybody who had suggested in 1949 that armed forces were exempt from com-

pliance with the four conditions

would have been looked

at

with considerable puzzle-

ment. Did the conditions not provide a definition of what armed forces were?

This
lished

is

made

plain

by the Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, pub-

by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which

states in re-

lation to Article 4:

Hague Convention, considered that
it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of the armed forces should have for
the purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so that members of its

The

drafters of the 1949

Convention,

like

those of the
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armed

forces can

distinguishable

be immediately recognized

such and to see to

as

from members of the enemy armed

forces or

from

that they are easily

it

civilians.

10

Geneva Conventions, 11 an attempt was
made to bring together the separate strands of "Hague" and "Geneva" law. Articles 43 to 47 deal with "Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status." Some of these
provisions are controversial and undoubtedly do not represent customary law.
In 1977, in Additional Protocol

I

to the

However, others are uncontroversial and, whilst perhaps a restatement of law,
flect

an international consensus. Amongst those provisions

Article 43

is

12

re-

which,

in part, reads:

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces,
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an
authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to
1.

an internal disciplinary system which,
rules of international
2.

inter alia, shall enforce

law applicable in armed

compliance with the

conflict.

Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel

and chaplains

.

.

.

)

are combatants, that

is

to say, they have the right to participate

directly in hostilities.

While

this

may seem to be a withdrawal from the Hague standards, Article 44(2) 13

makes it clear that:

"... all

combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of inter-

national law applicable in
rule that: "...

armed

conflict.

."
.

.

Article 44(3) 14 lays

down

a general

combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the

civilian

population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. ..." Article 44(7) 15 states that: "This Article

is

not intended to

change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the

uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party
to the conflict."

These provisions provide a general format little removed from that

contained in the Hague Regulations. As the
visions of Article 4 of the Third
Articles

ICRC Commentary puts it: "The pro-

Convention are

fully preserved." 16

44 to 47 of Additional Protocol I also deal with a number of unusual sit-

uations, including that of spies
particularly in Article 44(3)

and mercenaries.

which

It is

here that controversy

deals with exceptional circumstances

duty to distinguish can be relaxed. These provisions lay
of non-compliance, the combatant

may forfeit his

arises,

where the

down that, in certain cases

right to prisoner-of war status,

while in others he forfeits his right even to combatant status.

Additional Protocol

I is

also significant because, for the first time,

define the term "civilian." Essentially, a civilian

other than those

who have

lost their

is

combatant
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anyone who
status

under

is

it

attempts to

not a combatant,

Articles 44 to 47. 17

and
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The

principle

is

However, just
with

by

it,

be

also

as

clear.

is

no gap;

"and for such time

is

I

being used almost interchangeably

the

same way,

loses the right to

come

a combatant.

rights

and

How

who

a civilian

is

either a

a civilian.

and the immunity that goes

status,

rules, so the protection given to civilians

can

hardly a model of clarity with different terms

at times,

one thing does appear

combatant

status does not

to stand out.

become

A

a civilian. In

loses his right to protection as a civilian does not be-

Each remains within their respective designation but

loses the

privileges attached to that designation.

does

Guantanamo?

this affect the situation in

term "unlawful combatant"

is

forces of Afghanistan.

It

would appear

that the

being used in a generic sense to cover a multitude of

who might be

different categories of people. First there are those

armed

combatant or

Waters

as they take a direct part in hostilities."

While the drafting of Protocol
combatant who

a person

combatant

comply with the

failure to

lost if

There

possible to lose

it is
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Such people may well

"combatant" within the law of armed

described as the

within the definition of

fall

Some may have committed

conflict.

breaches of the law of armed conflict. That will not necessarily deprive them of the
right to

combatant

oner-of-war

status.

status or to
18

combatant immunity, and consequently

to pris-

However, that immunity only extends to legitimate

warfare and so they will be liable to

trial

and punishment

for unlawful acts.

acts of

These

people can perhaps be described as "combatants acting unlawfully."

Others

may

also

fall

within the definition of "combatant" but by their actions

have forfeited the right to that status or to combatant immunity. 19 These people
can be tried not only for war crimes but, since they have forfeited their combatant

immunity, for acts that would otherwise be legitimate
of person for

even then,

it

whom

the

title

"unlawful combatant"

is

of war.

this category

It is

perhaps the closest

fit

but

does not really adequately describe their position.

There are also those

who do not begin to fit within the definition of combatant

but who choose to take part in the
as

acts

hostilities.

These people can never be described

"combatant" and therefore begin with the status of

their acts, they have forfeited the rights

and

"civilian."

However, by

privileges that go with the status of

"civilian."

20

part.

misleading to describe such people as "unlawful combatants" as they

They do not become "combatants" but can be tried for the part that
they have taken in the hostilities since they have no entitlement to take such a
It is

never were combatants, whether lawful or unlawful.

even

if it

seems somewhat dated to the modern

My

ear,

is

preferred description,
that used

by Richard

Baxter, "unprivileged belligerents."
It

will

be noticed that

I

have avoided such terms as "Taliban" or

"al

Qaeda."

I

do

not find such terms helpful in this analysis. The law of armed conflict deals with
factual situations rather than

titles.

Thus, there
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be Taliban members who could

—
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not be described as "combatants" under any circumstances and, possibly, some Al

Qaeda who

could. That does not

ing line at the

first

assessment. Their subsequent conduct as combatants

them from being

oner-of-war
I

to say that such personnel necessarily are

be treated as combatants but only that they fall on that side of the divid-

entitled to

disqualify

mean

entitled to

be treated

as

may well

combatants, or to hold pris-

status.

said at the start that this issue

began as a matter of linguistics but is now turning

into an issue of substance. If the use of the term "unlawful combatant"
nally loose language,

it

has

now begun to

ments being advanced that there

is

take

on

a

was

origi-

meaning of its own with argu-

indeed such a category of person. This

is

summed up by the words of Professor Dinstein: "One cannot fight the enemy and
remain a

civilian." 21

The core of the argument here is that a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities

not only loses his

civilian protection,

but also his status as a

civilian.

Indeed, he

becomes a combatant. However, because he does not come within the definition of
a combatant as laid

down

in the

law of armed

and privileges of a combatant but becomes,
to

conflict,

in effect,

he gains none of the rights

an "outlaw."

It is this

category

whom the term "unlawful combatant" is most appropriately applied.
can find no basis in law for

As

will

be apparent,

think

it is

necessary. Dinstein states:

sons

who

are either

personnel) or

I

"Under the

members of the armed

irrespective

new

this

ius in hello,

category

take

an

I

combatants are per-

forces (except medical

of such membership —

—nor do

and

religious

active part in hostilities in

22

[My emphasis]. Cited as authority for this statement is the Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, published by the ICRC, and
an international armed

entitied "Fight

it

conflict."

Right." 23

The same

authority

Mitchell Report where a similar proposition
I

regret to say that

I

Israeli

response

fall

ICRC, of all people,

cited in the Israeli response to the

put forward. 24

have been unable to find anything in that ICRC Manual which

would support this proposition.
25

is

is

Certainly, the paragraphs of the

Manual cited in the

some way short of that and it would indeed be surprising if the
were to put forward such a view which would seem to widen

considerably the definition of "combatant," whether lawful or unlawful.

Paragraph 601 of the Manual
a.

states:

Only combatants may:
(

1

(2)

take a direct part in hostilities,

and

be attacked.

Combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to the
medical and religious personnel.

b.
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Paragraph 601 goes on to describe
does

it

1

106c merely

in hostilities,

hostilities."

become combatants.

protected unless and for

states: "Civilians are

such time as they take a direct part in
sistency, this again

prohibited to civilians but nowhere

by taking a direct part

state that civilians,

Similarly paragraph

activities

A Bridge over Troubled Waters

Despite the grammatical incon-

does not in any way imply that civilians become combatants,

merely that they lose their protection.

"A civilian may convert himself into a combatant
In
26
combatant may retire and become a civilian." The analogies

Dinstein goes on to say:

same vein, a
drawn here are incomplete. Indeed,

the

a civilian can convert himself into a combatant

by bringing himself within the definition of "combatant" by, for example, joining the

armed

forces.

The combatant, by

has ceased to

retiring,

come

within that definition

and therefore has become a civilian. The combatant does not, however, become a civilian

if

he goes off to occupy himself in

civilian pursuits.

university course at a civilian institution remains a

from the

indistinguishable

Dinstein further

states:

by retiring and becoming

civilian students

A

soldier

undergoing a

combatant even though he

surrounding him.

"Combatants can withdraw from the hostilities not only
civilians,

but also by becoming hors de combat." 27

But even hors de combat, the combatant retains

his

combatant

his status

There
ing door

is

and become

what

by looking again

at the interpretation

That provision reads: "Civilians
unless

is

sometimes described

—the farmer by day and the

problem which needs addressing. However,
better

and for such time

agree.

He merely
He does not

a civilian.

a justifiable concern about

syndrome"

1

status.

gains extra protection in return for not taking part in the hostilities.

change

may be

shall

I

fighter

as the "revolv-

by night. This

would suggest that

it

is

indeed a

can be resolved

of Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol

I.

28

enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,

as they take a direct part in hostilities"

[My emphasis.]

It is

here that the difficulty is to be found that leads to the "revolving door syndrome" and

maybe necessary to take a wider view of the period during which protection is lost.
It is clearly impracticable to argue that the civilian who takes part in a hostile act reit

gains his

immunity as soon as that act is completed. However, the temporal duration

of the loss of protection needs to be limited in some way. International law does not
allow for a permanent loss of protection so that, years after the

mains vulnerable, even

if

he has taken no part in the

On the other hand, the term
and limited
definition,

to international

and

to

widen the

hostilities since.

The current attempts to extend the
definition of "war" or "armed conflict," amount to a
to come up with clear boundaries and gives far too
armed

It is

much freedom

to interpretation.

the forces of law

the person re-

"combatant" has always been narrowly defined

slippery slope.

difficult

act,

conflict.

While the events of 9/1

1

pose a

real challenge to

and order all over the world, the solution arrived at by the creation
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of this

new category of "unlawful combatant," although understandable,

is,

in

my

unsound and, in less scrupulous hands, could be manipulated in such a way
as to remove to a large extent the protections built into the law for both combatants
and civilians.
The second area that I wish to look at is the question of war crimes and, in particular, methods of trial. I want to move between the Scylla of international jurisdiction
as exemplified by international tribunals, and in particular the International Crimiview,

nal Court,

and the Charybdis of universal

jurisdiction, particularly

when used

bring charges against individuals in States with no links to the crime

itself,

the vic-

own

tims or the alleged participants. These are both interesting subjects in their
right but
als to

I

on the controversy caused by the US proposdeal with alleged war crimes. 29 1 will limit my-

will concentrate primarily

hold military commissions to

self further to the

nature of the commissions themselves, rather than the separate

issue of their jurisdiction
I

which

is

primarily a question of US domestic law.

believe that the United States has

the reaction by their European

allies

been somewhat surprised by the strength of

against the concept of military commissions. 30

While some of this antipathy is undoubtedly caused by specific
arising
31

to

detail

such as issues

from the death penalty and the apparent limitations on the rights of the de-

more fundamental objection which is rather a cultural divide
than a legal one. Again, only by appreciating this, can the two sides reach any form
of modus vivendi.
There is no doubt that there is a duty upon States to deal with violations of the
laws of armed conflict. The ideal method of so dealing is by national jurisdiction
but that may not always be possible. The Afghan courts, for example, are not yet in
fense,

a

fit

there

is

state to deal

people to be so

a

with such cases even

tried.

if the

United States were prepared to release

Furthermore, not all States have given themselves jurisdiction

to deal with the full array of international crimes arising out of armed conflict

quasi conflict situations. There

is,

therefore,

no reason why the Coalition should

not be entitled to take action themselves. Indeed,
cases will be brought but rather the

Military tribunals have a long

majority of war crimes

trials

forum

and

it is

not so

much

the fact that

that has caused the disquiet.

and distinguished record. After World War II, the

were dealt with by way of national military tribunals. 32

They had the advantage that they could sit anywhere in the world and not be limited by territorial considerations. In the Geneva Conventions, the use of military
courts to try certain categories of offense was not only approved but mandated.

Prisoners of war are
the

armed

made

"subject to the laws, regulations

and orders

in force in

forces of the Detaining Power." Article 84 of the Third Convention, in

particular, provides that:
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only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the

expressly permit the

courts to try a

civil

member of the armed

forces

of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been

committed by the prisoner of war. 33

Similarly, in relation to

occupied

territories, Article

66 of the Fourth Convention

provides that, in respect of breaches of penal provisions of occupation law:

Occupying Power may hand over the accused to

its

".

.

.

the

properly constituted, non-politi-

occupied country." 34

cal military courts,

on condition

In the light of this,

why is there this visceral reaction by many Europeans to the use

by the United

is

States of military

that the said courts

areas,

though there

is

a link

historical terms, since the

— and the United Kingdom—we remain proud of our

as a bastion

of our national freedom, this

history of South

between them. One

end of World

bad reputation. While

military justice in general has earned a

The

in the

commissions?

The answer lies in two separate
historical and the other legal. In

States

sit

not so in

is

in the

military

and

War II,
United

see

them

many other parts of the world.

America and the independent African

States has

been

full

of

communist
States, was seen as a symbol of repression rather than a flag carrier for freedom. The
jurisdiction of military courts was extended so that they became part of the State
system of control over the civilian population. "Security courts," often manned by
military dictatorships

and even

in Europe, the military, in the old

military personnel, enabled these dictatorships to survive. "Military justice" be-

came

a contradiction in terms.

Linked to

this

the rise of human rights, particularly in Europe.

is

The European

Court of Human Rights, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, has become
probably the most influential

human rights body in the world. 35 Its judgements are

binding on members of the Council of Europe and the Court has adopted a pro-

human

gressive attitude to

Human
as

rights in general.

It

sees the

European Convention on

document which may need to be reinterpreted
circumstances change. One of the key rights embodied in the Convention is the
Rights

right to a fair

(ECHR)

as a living

and impartial

trial.

36

In recent years, particularly since the

Eastern European judges
ingly to rule

on matters

as a result of cases
justice

on

fall

to the bench, the

of the Berlin Wall and the influx of

Court has been called upon increas-

relating to the military.

brought

Many of these rulings are called for

in relation to military justice.

The suspicions of military

which have inevitably arisen out of the misuse of such systems by dictator-

Whereas

in

was accepted

as

ships of different types have been apparent in rulings by the Court.

1949,
fair

when

and

the

Geneva Conventions were

impartial,

now it

is

drafted, military justice

not necessarily so accepted and increasing restrictions
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have been imposed upon

its

use.

For example, over the

last

ten years both the

sum-

mary justice system and the court martial system used by the UK armed forces have
had to be utterly overhauled as a result of rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights. 37

The assumption

that military officers will conduct their duties "without

partiality,

favour or affection" has been replaced almost by an assumption the

other way.

Any trace

that justice

In

some

is

of possible bias or

command influence has to be removed so

not only seen to be done but manifestly seen to be done.

countries, such as Belgium, there have

the military justice system altogether and in
military personnel already are dealt with

edly

away from

over

civilians. It follows that

even in

dom,

military justice

and

been moves towards abolishing

many

by civil

other continental countries,

tribunals.

in particular to

The trend

is

undoubt-

any exercise of military justice

what was acceptable in occupied Germany in 1945, or
1949, is not acknowledged as necessarily acceptable now. The United King-

for example, has legislation in the

form of

a Royal

Warrant dating from

1945, 38 permitting the establishment of military courts to try war crimes. However,

the legislation
years

is

now effectively obsolete

as

it

has not been updated for over

and any attempt to do so would probably fail

therefore has been

left

It arises

The Royal Warrant

to wither

The question of how
addressed.

on the vine.
with war crimes

politically.

fifty

to deal

is

a very real

one and needs to be

again in relation to Iraq, though in that case,

cases will be tried before Iraqi courts.

The

it is

likely that

correct disposal of such cases

is

most

a matter

some degree of consensus is reached on a way forward. If war crimes trials, whether carried out by domestic civil courts or by military tribunals, are not seen as fair and impartial by
of international concern and

it is

therefore important that

international standards, then they will cause another running sore in that "martyrs" will

be created and allegations of "victors' justice"

will again circulate.

US or UK military, I am convinced that my national system of
military justice is as fair as it could be, and in many cases fairer than the civil system
Like

most

in the

which some would like to replace
is

it

by.

However, that

is

in itself insufficient.

There

an inbuilt suspicion of military justice brought about by years of misuse by some.

Failure to appreciate that suspicion
to increase the divide

it

between the United States and Europe.

appreciation

may lead to

becomes too

great.

The

—and the reasons behind —

third area with

will

simply work

On the other hand, an

dialogue which can only serve to bridge the gap before

which

I

wish to deal

is

linked to

this. It is

of human rights law in general on operations. For decades,

it

the growing impact

human rights law and the

law of armed conflict developed separately, partly because the United Nations was

armed conflict, seeing an inherent inconsistency in its role to abolish war as a means of dispute resolution. However, gradually a
reluctant to involve itself in the law of
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more pragmatic approach was adopted and the updating of the law carried out in the
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions grew out of initiatives started
in the

rights

human

community. 39 Indeed, there are

rights

clear resonances of

law in some of the drafting, particularly in Additional Protocol

II.

human

40

However, there has never been an attempt to define the relationship between
the

two

legal systems,

applicability,

other.

it

and

as

human

rights

law has increased both

in

scope and in

was inevitable that the two would eventually run up against each

By tradition, human

rights

law has been seen as applicable in peacetime and

the law of armed conflict in time of war, but in law that has never been so.

Most hu-

man rights treaties do indeed have provisions allowing some form of derogation in
time of war, but such derogation

usually limited and closely defined. For

of the European Convention on

ple, Article 15
1.

is

In time of war or other public emergency threatening the

Contracting Party

Convention

to the

may

No

Rights provides:
life
its

of the nation any High
obligations under this

extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
its

other obligations under international law.

derogation from Article 2 [Right to

from lawful

from

take measures derogating

such measures are not inconsistent with
2.

Human

exam-

Life], except in respect

of deaths resulting

from Articles 3 [Prohibition of Torture], 4(paragraph 1)
and 7 [No Punishment without Law] shall be made under

acts of war, or

[Prohibition of slavery]
this provision.
3.

Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this

right of derogation shall

keep the

Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which

has taken and the reasons therefore.

It

shall also

it

inform the Secretary General of the

Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of
the Convention are again being fully executed.
It

follows

from

this that the

Convention

is

4
'

[My emphasis.]

indeed applicable in time of war subject to

any derogation. Such derogations cannot include certain

articles

and furthermore, the

European Court of Human Rights has taken to itself the right to decide on whether any
particular derogation

Despite

this,

it

is

indeed

"strictly

required by the exigencies of the situation." 42

has only been in recent years that the Court has begun to

involved in operational matters. There have been a
ish military

with the shootings of IRA terrorists in Gibraltar.
cases arising

number of cases involving Brit-

operations in Northern Ireland, including the

from the Kurdish insurgency

43

become

McCann

case dealing

There have also been a

in Eastern

series

of

Turkey44 and some from the

occupation of Northern Cyprus. 45 For the most part, in such cases the Court was
looking
tion.

at

domestic law issues and comparing them with the terms of the Conven-

For example,

in the

McCann

case, the British

Government did not seek to put

forward an absolute right to shoot the three terrorists but sought to justify the
ings

by the

fact that the soldiers believed that the terrorists
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explode a remote-controlled device. Indeed, the actions of the soldiers in that case

were

specifically

upheld by the Court though the United Kingdom was held

liable

(by a majority of one) on other grounds. The Court has not yet had to examine in

any depth the interplay between the Convention and the law of armed

However,

this

can only be a matter of time.

In the Bankovic case, 46 the Court was asked to rule
the TV station in Belgrade carried out by

An

action was brought

The

on the legality of the

attack

on

NATO forces during the Kosovo campaign.

by some of the survivors of that

dead against all the European NATO
life.

conflict.

attack

and

relatives

of the

States alleging a breach of Article 2, the right to

was dismissed on the technical grounds that the applicants were not

case

"within the jurisdiction" of any of the States concerned. However, had the case pro-

ceeded to arguments on the merits, some interesting points would have arisen. The
first

and most important would have involved the

applicability of the Convention.

The United Kingdom, for example, had not sought to derogate from the Convention
in relation to the Kosovo campaign. Would that have meant that they could not have
taken advantage of the exemption for "lawful acts of war" under Article 15? If not,

what would be the position
conflict, failed to

if

the action, even

if

legitimate

under the law of armed

meet the exacting standards of Article 2 of the Convention?

on
the relationship between the two legal systems. Will it defer to the law of armed
conflict or will it seek to impose some form of human rights supremacy? The International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case 47 referred to the law of armed
conflict as a "lex specialis" and it would seem the most sensible solution for the
Sooner or

later,

such issues are going to

arise

and the Court will have

Court to defer to that law where there appears to be a
the line taken
case.

48

by the Inter-American Commission on

However, in the

cate that

it

later

conflict.

to rule

This appeared to be

Human Rights in the Abella

Las Palmeras case, 49 the Commission seemed to indi-

could not take into account the law of armed conflict as

its

constitution

make decisions based on the human rights treaties under which it
was established. Such a line would appear to put the human rights community on a
collision course with the law of armed conflict.
only entitled it to

However, assuming that common sense prevails and that the
is

lex specialis

argument

upheld, there remains the question of the detailed interrelationship between the two

systems. For example, Article 5 of the Third

Should any doubt
having

Geneva Convention provides

that:

whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
hands of the enemy, belong to one of the categories enumerated

arise as to

fallen into the

in Article 4 [entitlement to prisoner-of-war status], such persons shall enjoy the

protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been

determined by a competent tribunal" 50 [My emphasis.]
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to define further

what

a

"competent tribunal"

is

or what procedures should be adopted by that tribunal. In the absence of any derogation,

is

law and

the nature of the tribunal and

if

so to

much on

home and

a

second thought, they are

effects

rights

now beginning to appear

of the European Convention on military operations both

abroad.

This will inevitably affect interoperability between

United States
its

human

the radar. European governments increasingly have to take into ac-

count the possible
at

procedures governed by

what extent? These are untested questions and while ten years ago,

no one would have given them
very

its

is

own human

US and European forces. The

obviously not a party to the European Convention and while

has

would rightly not consider itself bound by indown by the European Court of Human Rights. However, such

rights obligations,

terpretations laid

it

it

NATO has for many years operated with States being bound by
different legal obligations. Most NATO States are parties to Additional Protocol
issues are not

new.

I;

the United States
result

and Turkey are

not. In the past, this has caused

few problems

as a

of close consultation leading to agreed procedures. Each side recognized the

obligations of the other

and agreed

work round them.

to

A similar problem arises, would suggest, with the European Convention on
Human Rights. It does impose certain restrictions on European partners. FurtherI

more, because of the uncertainty as to
likely to

be cautious in areas where

it

its

scope

at the

present time, Europeans are

could be held to be applicable.

And so what does the future hold? The United States has a number of options. It
could simply say, in relation to coalition operations, "We are the most powerful
and we don't have

to bother with this."

That would be understandable but would

The number of operations on which even the
United Kingdom would be able to assist and support would be greatly reduced and
it would leave the United States with no choice but unilateral action, with its
friends and allies on the sidelines. Such a choice would be unfortunate.
The alternative is to sit down and try to work through these issues. I do not conlead to an inevitable isolationism.

sider that

any are insurmountable. What

is

required

is

a willingness to understand

each others position and to be sensitive to that position. At the same time,
essary for the

human

rights

and law of armed

conflict

communities

it is

nec-

to enter into

become
contradictory, then I would suggest that nobody wins and the world will be a more
dangerous place. If the lawyers cannot agree, then the commanders will call a
plague on both houses and both systems will be discredited. On the battlefield, discredited law amounts to no law at all.
return to my theme of marriage guidance. Do I consider that the old alliances
are subject to irretrievable breakdown? Not at all. However, what is needed is
dialogue to ensure that the two systems remain complimentary. If they

I
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communication between the

greater

parties

and

a willingness to talk with each

other rather than at each other. Furthermore, each side needs to respect the others
position and seek to

accommodate

it.

But then has any marriage guidance counselor ever said anything different?
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Editor's Note: In order to

most accurately portray the events of the colloquium, the bio-

graphical data in this appendix reflects the position in which the authors were serving
at the time of the colloquium, as reflected in the colloquium brochures

and materials.
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